By
Caitlin Forrest with Harleen Gambhir
The ANSF is
unprepared to counter the Taliban militants’ summer campaign. Northern warlords
will take advantage of Taliban militants’ gains to establish themselves as
security providers and gain leverage against the fragile National Unity
Government.
Readiness
gaps challenge the assumptions behind the U.S.’s current plan to draw down from
9,800 to 5,500 troops by the end of January 2017. General John W. Nicholson
took command of U.S. and NATO Forces in Afghanistan from General John Campbell
on March 2. On April 4, GEN Nicholson stated the U.S. is behind schedule to
train a self-sufficient Afghan security force. The ANSF will be particularly
pressed as the Taliban intensify their operations under the banner of their
summer campaign, “Operation Omari,” which they announced on April 12. Taliban
militants seek to degrade the ANSF, discourage foreign presence, and
demonstrate the weakness of the unity government during Operation Omari. They
will achieve these objectives through increased insider attacks, assassination
campaigns, and attacks against Western and diplomatic targets in Kabul City and
beyond. Taliban militants also seek to gain control of additional territory,
for which they have already set conditions over the winter.
The
National Unity Government ordered the ANSF on April 6 to adopt a more offensive
strategy by consolidating forces in strategic areas instead of defending static
check posts, a shift supported by NATO forces. Preliminary applications of this
strategy allowed Taliban militants to solidify control in the areas abandoned
by the ANSF, specifically in Musa Qal’ah and Now Zad Districts in Helmand and
Shahid-e Hassas District in Uruzgan in late February and early March. This consolidation
will likely mitigate actual and potential manpower losses. It will not counter
the Taliban militants’ summer offensive, as militants currently threaten
Helmand’s provincial capital Lashkar Gah despite the ANSF’s attempts to
reinforce the city in late February.
Taliban
militants are also consolidating power under leading Taliban commander Mullah
Akhtar Mansour. He has reconciled with the late Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s
brother and son, who originally challenged Akhtar Mansour’s claim to power. Haqqani
Network leader and Mansour’s deputy emir Sirajuddin Haqqani allegedly brokered
this mediation, indicating the Haqqani Network’s stake in a unified Taliban
front. This reconciliation follows Pakistan’s rumored arrest of leading
dissident Taliban commander Mullah Rasul Akhund on March 22. The mediation and
possible arrest suggest that Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) aim
to present a united Taliban militant force this summer.
Northern warlords and political opposition groups are
increasing pressure on the fragile National Unity Government in the face of
these security challenges, hindering the administration’s ability to respond to
insurgent offensives. Northern
warlords are taking advantage of this pressure to extract concessions. General
Atta Noor and General Abdul Rashid Dostum preemptively activated their
competing personal militias in Balkh, Faryab, and Jowzjan Provinces in late
February and early March in order to counter the Taliban militants’ summer
campaign. Atta and Dostum seek to establish themselves as leading security
providers, challenging national institutions and one another. Political
opposition groups like the Afghanistan Protection and Stability Council (APSC)
and the newly formed National Solidarity parliamentary bloc continue to
criticize the National Unity Government for its inability to provide security
or enact electoral reforms, pressuring the Ghani-Abdullah administration. President
Ashraf Ghani has responded to this criticism by dismissing several significant government
officials in late March in a struggle over cabinet composition and electoral
reform with CEO and rival Abdullah Abdullah. Atta is Abdullah Abdullah’s
primary backer, and his saber rattling is aimed at President Ghani. Dostum, the
sitting First Vice President, recently reconciled with Ashraf Ghani and
returned to participating actively in government. He has mobilized to counter
Atta, as well as the Taliban.
1. Militants attacked heavily fortified areas in Kabul
City, launching four explosive attacks against security and diplomatic
targets from March 25 to 29. ISIS
Wilayat Khorasan militants also indicated intent to attack Kabul City by
claiming two unconfirmed attacks in southern Kabul on April 6. These attacks will likely increase following
the announcement of the Taliban militants’ summer offensive “Operation Omari”
on April 12.
2. Clearing operations continued to displace ISIS
Wilayat Khorasan militants from Nangarhar Province into other eastern
provinces. ISIS’s militants reportedly moved to Sar Kani District, Kunar
Province following ANSF clearing operations in Nangarhar Province in late
March. ISIS militants also conducted their first attack in Ghazni Province
north of Ghazni City on March 11 and reportedly continued recruiting in
Ghazni and Zabul Provinces, including Gelan, Jaghuri, and Khak-e Afghan
Districts in early April. Some ISIS militants remain in southern Nangarhar
despite a significant increase in U.S. airstrikes and ANSF clearing operations,
with some allegedly pledging allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour
on April 11.
3. ANSF retook Reg-e Khan Neshin District Center
in Helmand Province with support from US airstrikes on March 28 after Taliban militants
briefly captured it on March 15, demonstrating the effectiveness of ANSF
operations combined with U.S. airstrikes. Taliban militants control seven
districts in Helmand Province, however, and are contesting areas surrounding
the provincial capital Lashkar Gah. ISW has updated this version of its
Afghanistan map to reflect Taliban militants’ longstanding control of Baghran
District Center in Helmand, which is now among ISW’s researched districts. The
map now also reflects Taliban militants’ effective control of Kajaki District
Center, as the ANSF is reportedly unable to maneuver beyond a fixed position at
the nearby Kajaki dam.
4. Rival Taliban militant factions participated in
large-scale clashes in Shindand District, Herat Province. Shindand
District is a launching pad for militant operations in western Afghanistan. The
district is currently a stronghold for leading dissident Taliban commander
Mullah Rasul Akhund’s faction.
5. Rival Northern Warlords First Vice President General Abdul Rashid
Dostum and Balkh Provincial Governor Mohammad Atta Noor conducted competing
operations against Taliban militants in Faryab, Jowzjan and Balkh
Provinces in late February and early March. Competition between the rival warlords intensified when Dostum
and Atta’s supporters staged protests and counter-protests in Mazar-e Sharif
and Maimanah Cities on March 22 and 23. Competition between these northern
warlords reflects competition between President Ghani, linked with Ghani, and
CEO Abdullah Abdullah, whom Atta backs, and challenges the legitimacy of the
National Unity Government by strengthening militias conducting operations
outside of government control.
6. Taliban militants recaptured Dand-e Ghori area, Pul-e
Khumri District, Baghlan Province, returning to the area on
March 24 after the ANSF conducted multiple clearing operations. Dand-e Ghori
lies on the main road connecting northern Baghlan and Balkh provincial capitals
Pul-e Khumri and Mazar-e Sharif and was originally captured by Taliban
militants in last year’s spring offensive. Control of this area enables
militants to attack Pul-e Khumri City and disrupt travel to Mazar-e
Sharif. Taliban militants may have seized the area as a means of
demonstrating Pashtun strength in response to protests and militia operations
by Uzbek Dostum and Tajik Atta. The capture of Dand-e Ghori immediately
followed protests in Mazar-e Sharif and Maimanah on March 22 and 23. Militants
also attacked Dowlatabad City in late March in Faryab after Dostum’s operations
in the province.
