UA-69458566-1

Friday, August 28, 2020

Iraq Situation Report: August 19-25, 2020

By Calvin Pugh, Brian Carter, and Katherine Lawlor

Key Takeaway: Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi led an Iraqi delegation to Washington, DC, for a productive second stage of the US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue. Delegates representing Iraq and the United States agreed to a number of economic and energy deals and to the continued drawdown of US forces. They did not set a concrete timeline for the complete withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, a key demand of the Iranian regime and its Iraqi proxies. Iran’s proxy militia network in Iraq accelerated its campaigns of targeted assassinations of activists and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on US-affiliated Iraqi contractors during Kadhimi’s Washington visit. Iran’s proxies likely intend to demonstrate Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s domestic weakness and inability to control Iraqi security or protect Iraq’s allies, undermining his domestic authority and global credibility.

Aug. 19: Iraq and the United States Release Joint Statement ahead of Strategic Dialogue Meetings in Washington, DC. The governments of Iraq and the United States released a joint statement outlining US-Iraq cooperation and negotiations in the economic, energy, health, political, security, and cultural sectors. The statement came after a meeting of the Higher Coordinating Committee chaired by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein. The Iraqi delegation to the US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue, led by Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, traveled to Washington, DC for bilateral meetings the same day. The United States reiterated its support for Iraqi economic reform and pledged to facilitate foreign investment and aid packages. The United States reaffirmed its commitment to support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and announced its intent to hold later technical discussions on the management and timing of transitioning to a "new phase” of the ISIS campaign focused on “training, supporting, and equipping” the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The United States also discussed how to help Iraq hold early parliamentary elections, enhance its relationships with its Arab neighbors, and assist with energy and environmental concerns. 

Aug. 19: Iraqi Strategic Dialogue Delegation Discusses Economics, Humanitarian Aid, and Energy Development with US Partners. Prime Minister Kadhimi and his delegation discussed economics, humanitarian aid, and energy development with representatives from the US Chamber of Commerce, the US Department of Energy, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the delegation’s visit to Washington, DC. The US Department of Energy announced that Honeywell International Inc, Baker Hughes Co, General Electric Co (GE), Stellar Energy, and Chevron each signed commercial agreements with Iraq worth approximately 8 billion USD. The US Department of State also announced that an additional 204 million USD will be allocated to support Iraq and Iraqi refugees in the region. Kadhimi stressed to the US Chamber of Commerce that Iraq is aiming to “remove all obstacles” and “facilitate” private foreign investments in Iraq, likely referring to the entrenched corruption and patronage networks that hinder foreign investment in Iraq. 

Aug. 19:  Explosion Hits PMF Warehouse in Southern Baghdad. Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Twitter account reported that an explosion hit one of its equipment warehouses near southern Baghdad. The PMF media account added that the explosion did not result in any casualties and stated it would immediately launch an investigation into the nature and cause of the explosion. Two other PMF weapons depots exploded on July 27 and July 28. Iranian proxy militias alleged that “external” airstrikes caused the July explosions, alluding to the United States or Israel.

Aug. 19: Prime Minister Kadhimi Rebukes Basra’s Security Leadership from Washington, Appoints New Officials amid Assassination Campaign. Prime Minister Kadhimi dismissed the Basra Operations Commander Maj. Gen. Akram Saddam Mudannaf, who is likely connected to the Iranian proxy Badr Organization. His dismissal comes following an assassination campaign targeting civil activists in Basra Province. Kadhimi replaced Mudannaf with Maj. Gen. Nasser al-Ghanim, a former special operations officer. Kadhimi stated that former Basra Police Chief and Iranian proxy Rashid Falih and other Basra “security directors” were complicit in the spate of recent assassinations. Kadhimi flew directly from Washington to Basra after the Strategic Dialogue, vowing that the “killers would be in the hands of justice soon.”

Aug. 19: Iraqi Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs Meet with US Counterparts in Washington. US Secretary of State Pompeo met separately with Iraqi Prime Minister Kadhimi and Foreign Minister Hussein. Pompeo reportedly vowed to continue US support to fight ISIS and outlined other aspects of cooperation. US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper separately discussed mutual security interests with Iraqi Defense Minister Jumaa Inad Saadoon at the Pentagon, where each reaffirmed their commitment to “build the Iraqi Security Forces, such that they are able to prevent [ISIS] from ever re-emerging and threatening Iraq.”

Aug. 19 - 20: Likely Iranian Proxies Target Protesters and Activists in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province. Unidentified militants detonated an explosive device at the home of pro-demonstrator civil activist Mohsen al-Zaid in the Sumer neighborhood of Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province. Zaid was not injured in the blast. Unidentified militants also targeted a protester site in Nasiriyah by detonating improvised explosive devices fixed to a motorcycle. Iraq’s Security Media Cell (SMC), an official Iraqi military body, reported that a motorcycle-borne improvised explosive device (MBIED) “slightly” injured two civilian protesters. Demonstrators blamed Iranian proxy militias for the violence, citing similar recent events in Basra Province.

Aug. 19 - 20: Likely Iranian Proxies Continue Assassination Campaign in Basra Province. Unidentified gunmen assassinated women’s rights activist Riham Yaqoub in central Basra City. Hours later, militants shot and killed Basrawi activist Falah al-Hasnawi and his fiancĂ©. Protesters blamed Iranian proxies for the ongoing violence in Basra while multiple anonymous security sources told al-Araby al-Jadeed that the perpetrators were a part of “a militia linked to Iran.” Likely Iranian proxies have killed at least four people, including three Basrawi activists, and attempted four other assassinations between August 14 and 20 in a campaign to intimidate Basrawi activists. An advisor to Basra Governor Assad al-Eidani blamed Gulf states and “other foreign countries” for the recent spate of assassinations.

Aug. 19 - 20: Iraqi Minister of Interior Issues Security Directives in Basra Province. Minister of Interior Othman al-Ghanimi arrived in Basra to address the ongoing attacks targeting activists and protesters. Ghanimi arrived with a delegation consisting of the head of the National Security Service Abdul Ghani al-Assadi, National Security Advisor Qassim al-Araji, and additional unspecified “intelligence and defense agents.” Ghanimi and his delegation held a “top secret” meeting with Basra Governor Assad al-Eidani, the Basra Operations Commander, Police Chief Maj. Gen. Abbas Naji, and leadership from other unspecified security agencies. Ghanimi ordered the establishment of a coordinated intelligence effort to identify perpetrators of violence. Ghanimi also issued several orders including banning tinted car windows and ordering all unlicensed vehicles to be stopped and inspected.

Aug. 20: Likely Iranian Proxies Attempt to Assassinate Three Protest Activists in Babil Province. Likely Iranian proxy militants attempted to assassinate three protest activists, Muhammad Jaber, Adnan al-Kamar, and Muhammad al-Mansoori, in the al-Qasim district of Babil Province, south of Hilla. The gunmen followed the activists from Hilla to their homes and fired several shots into their vehicle without causing any reported injuries. The activists fled to a nearby police station. Iraqi outlet NasNews reported that the targeted activists were “pioneers” in the Qasim district protest movement. 

Aug. 20: President Trump Hosts Prime Minister Kadhimi for Oval Office Meeting, Addresses Troop Withdrawal. US President Donald Trump met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi in the Oval Office in Washington, DC, during the second stage of the US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue. The two leaders and their delegations reportedly discussed security cooperation to ensure the continued defeat of ISIS and the strengthening of economic, political, and humanitarian cooperation. Trump reaffirmed US support for Kadhimi and the government of Iraq while Kadhimi announced that “Iraq is open for American business and investment.” US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a press conference before the meeting that the United States will leave Iraq “as soon as we complete the mission. The President has made very clear he wants to get our forces down to the lowest level as quickly as we possibly can. That’s the mission he’s given us, and we’re working with Iraqis to achieve that.” Kadhimi also traveled to Capitol Hill to meet with Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, and assorted members of Congress to discuss bilateral ties and Iraqi sovereignty, according to a readout from Kadhimi’s office.

Aug. 20: Likely Iranian Proxy Assassination Campaign Extends into Baghdad. Unidentified militants shot and killed an unnamed member of Iraq’s High Electoral Commission in Baghdad. The assassination follows similar targeted violence against activists and protesters in the southern provinces of Basra and Dhi Qar. Early elections managed by the Commission are scheduled to be held in June 2021 but remain the subject of heated parliamentary debate.

Aug. 20: Ministry of Water Resources Says Iran Cut Off Water Supplies Upstream of Iraq. The Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources stated that Iranian irrigation projects are diminishing available Iraqi water resources. The ministry said that Iran has diverted the Sirwan and Lower Zab rivers, which originate in Iran and flow downstream to Iraq, for damming and irrigation projects. The ministry says that Iraq “recorded a significant decrease in the quantities of water coming from Iranian lands,” resulting in water shortages for residents of Kirkuk, Diyala, and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The ministry added that “these actions are in clear violation of [international] laws” and said it plans to follow up with Iranian officials to resolve the matter. Iraq is situated downstream of substantial damming projects in Turkey and Iran; disruption to this flow poses an existential threat to Iraq’s security, sovereignty, and relationships with its neighbors.

Aug. 21: Likely Iranian Proxies Target Iraqi-operated Convoy Supporting US-led Coalition with IED, Kill Driver near South Baghdad. The SMC reported that an IED detonated on an Iraqi-operated convoy contracted by the US-led anti-ISIS Coalition near Awareej, south Baghdad. The attack reportedly killed a civilian driver and set fire to a vehicle. Likely Iranian proxies have targeted Iraqi-contractors supporting US and Coalition forces with IEDs in at least 10 attacks in August to dissuade Iraqis from working with the United States and the US-led Coalition. 

Aug. 21: Islamic Resistance in Iraq Warns of Sharp Escalation in Attacks on American Interests in Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, a loose descriptor for primarily Iran-linked, anti-US militants in Iraq, released a statement responding to Prime Minister Kadhimi’s failure to establish a timeline for a full US troop withdrawal during his Washington, DC visit. The statement emphasized that Kadhimi’s visit did not result in the complete removal of US forces, the primary demand of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. The group warned “we […] will no longer wait for the strategic dialogue, but instead we will start to target all American interests in Iraq, and create an earthquake under their troops in Iraq, even if they move far away from our cities.” Groups associated with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq accelerated their campaign of IED attacks targeting Coalition-linked contractors in the days leading up to the Dialogue and may increase the tempo or scale of their rocket and IED attacks on US personnel and facilities in coming weeks.

Aug. 22: Likely Iranian Proxies Target Iraqi-operated Convoy Supporting the US with IED Attack near West Baghdad. Unidentified militants targeted an Iraqi-operated convoy contracted by the US-led international coalition with an IED near al-Ghazaliya in western Baghdad, according to a security source speaking to al-Quds al-Arabi. The source said that the attack resulted in damage to one of the vehicles but no casualties.

Aug. 22: Anti-government Demonstrators Use Bulldozers to Demolish Headquarters of Several Shi’a Political Parties in Nasiriyah. Anti-government demonstrators used bulldozers to demolish the headquarters of several political parties in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province. Iraq analyst Harry Istepanian said that protesters demolished the headquarters of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa party, US-designated terrorist organization and Iranian proxy militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, key Iranian proxy Hadi al-Ameri's Iran-backed Badr Organization, prominent Shi’a cleric Ammar al-Hakim's Wisdom Trend, and the Iraqi Communist Party. The chairman of the Iraq Advisory Council, Farhad al-Aaldin, added that protesters struck out against Kata’ib Hezbollah headquarters in Nasiriyah.

Aug. 23: Ostensibly New Shi’a Militia Group Declares its Existence with IED Attack on Iraqi Convoy Contracting with the US-led Coalition near Camp Taji. An IED detonated on an Iraqi-operated convoy contracted by the US-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS near Camp Taji military base, approximately 24 km north of Baghdad, hours after the Coalition formally transferred control of Taji to the ISF. Iraq’s SMC confirmed that the attack caused some vehicle damage but no casualties. An eleventh ostensibly new Shi’a shadow militia group calling itself Alwaiya ad-Dam, or “the Guardians of Blood,” revealed its existence in a statement posted on an extremist Telegram channel and took credit for the attack. The group stated that it will continue to “seek revenge” on the “brutal American occupation” for the January 3 drone strike that killed Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani.

Aug. 23: Coalition Forces Leave Camp Taji Military Base, Transferring Control and Equipment to Iraqi Security Forces. The US-led Coalition formally transferred its portion of Camp Taji to the control of the ISF and credited the transfer to “[ISF] success in the ongoing campaign to defeat Daesh [ISIS] remnants in Iraq.” The Coalition announcement said that the ISF will continue to use the site “to lead and conduct training as part of the mission.” Coalition forces also transferred equipment and property worth 347 million USD to the ISF, including airfield and runway renovations, aircraft hangers, infantry training areas, vehicles, and ammunition.

Click here to download the PDF.

Warning: Lukashenko Appears to Resist Kremlin Pressure to Request Russian Intervention in Belarus

 August 28, 2020, 4:00 pm EDT

By Mason Clark

President Alexander Lukashenko asserted he was in control of the situation in Belarus and does not require Russian help on August 28. Lukashenko gave a defiant speech downplaying the need for Russian assistance during a visit to the city of Orsha in eastern Belarus on August 28.[1] Lukashenko stated the protests in the country and his claims of NATO pressure “are my problems, and I will solve them.” Lukashenko downplayed the possibility of a Russian intervention in Belarus, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August 27 announcement that Russia has prepared a unit of security forces to deploy to Belarus if necessary.[2] Lukashenko stated “we [Belarusians] will defend ourselves” and stated the Kremlin only seeks to defend itself through Belarus. Lukashenko claimed the Russian forces will only deploy in the event of NATO deployments on the “western border of the Union State.” The Kremlin, however, framed the reserve unit as “law enforcement officers” – not a military force aimed at protecting Belarus’ western border against NATO.

Lukashenko may be resisting Kremlin pressure to request Russian assistance and facilitate a Russian intervention. Lukashenko has acknowledged Russian support but deflected the need for Russian security forces since the Kremlin publicly offered to intervene in Belarus on August 15.[3] The Kremlin appears to want Lukashenko to formally request Russian support in order to justify a Russian deployment of military forces to Belarus, which would entrench Kremlin dominance over Belarus and establish a precedent for the use of Russian gendarmes in former Soviet states. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) flight to Minsk the night of August 26 may have facilitated a meeting in which Kremlin representatives pressured Lukashenko to stick to the Kremlin’s desired information campaign of framing protests as a NATO-backed effort to target both Belarus and Russia, justifying Russian involvement. The Kremlin will likely apply further pressure on Lukashenko and retains the option to deploy forces to Belarus without Lukashenko’s approval.

NEXTA announced plans for a third Sunday mass protest on August 30. The NEXTA Telegram channel posted protest instructions for August 30 protests the night of August 27.[4] NEXTA directed protesters to gather in Minsk’s Independence Square at 2:00 pm local time on Sunday for the third straight week. NEXTA will likely issue detailed instructions and direct protesters throughout the day, as during previous Sunday protests.[5] NEXTA directed protesters in other cities to gather in city centers “according to local plans,” continuing its strategy of issuing detailed instructions in only Minsk.

A NEXTA direction for protests to prepare “handmade gifts” for Lukashenko may provoke a response from Lukashenko and the Kremlin. August 30 is Lukashenko’s 66th birthday. NEXTA will likely direct protesters against locations specifically tied to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. NEXTA asked protesters to bring “creative handmade gifts for Lukashenko,” called on Belarusians to “let the usurper see what [we] will give him for his birthday,” and promised to publish a list of his residences. [6] NEXTA’s post may be simply referring to signs or art, but security forces may interpret the post as a threat to Lukashenko’s residences. Security forces may use the NEXTA post as a justification for a crackdown even though there is no evidence that NEXTA is calling for protester violence. If NEXTA posts addresses of Lukashenko’s residences and protesters approach them, conflicts may become more likely if security forces guard the locations.

Belarusian security forces contained sporadic demonstrations in Minsk on August 28. Several small protests with dozens to a few hundred participants occurred in Minsk on August 28 in the absence of protest instructions from NEXTA.[7] Security forces detained several protesters without violence throughout the day.[8] Belarusian police released the approximately 50 journalists detained the night of August 27 by the afternoon of August 28.[9] The journalists reported they were not harmed or formally charged but were warned against further coverage of the protests.[10] Belarusian security forces with likely Russian support have deployed in force and contained protests in the past week, likely as an intimidation tactic to prepare for larger weekend demonstrations.

ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.

Click here to download the PDF.


[1] http://president.gov((.))by/ru/news_ru/view/rabochaja-poezdka-v-orshu-24408/.

[2] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-announces-reserve-for....

[3] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-belarusian-president-lukashe... https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-begins-security-forc....

[4] https://t((.))me/nexta_live/9711.

[5] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-nexta-telegram-chan... http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-lukashenko-seems-la....

[6] https://t((.))me/nexta_live/9711.

[7] https://news.tut((.))by/society/698423.html.

[8] https://t((.))me/nexta_live/9745; https://t((.))me/nexta_live/9750; https://news.tut((.))by/society/698423.html.

[9] https://news.tut((.))by/society/698423.html.

[10] https://news.tut((.))by/society/698423.html; https://news.tut((.))by/society/698455.html.

Thursday, August 27, 2020

Warning: Kremlin Announces Reserve Force is Prepared to Intervene in Belarus

 August 27, 2020, 12:30 pm EDT

By Mason Clark

The Kremlin announced it has created a reserve force to intervene in Belarus if necessary. Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview to the state-run Russia 1 TV channel on August 27.[1] Putin stated the Kremlin has prepared a “reserve of law enforcement officers” but will not deploy it to Belarus unless the situation “gets out of control.” The Kremlin previously pledged it would intervene in Belarus in response to foreign intervention on August 15 and has claimed foreign intervention is ongoing since August 19.[2] Putin’s statement is the first Kremlin acknowledgment of preparations to intervene in Belarus. The Kremlin has supported Lukashenko with RT technical personnel, information support, and potentially covert security coordination since August 19.[3] ISW has previously assessed the Kremlin is prepared to intervene in Belarus to support Lukashenko if he is unable to control protests.[4]

Putin is likely issuing this statement as a dual warning – both to protesters and to Lukashenko – to stabilize the situation to avoid a Russian intervention. Putin stated the Kremlin hopes “the current problems in Belarus will be resolved peacefully,” but warned protesters that if they “go beyond the framework of the current law, the law will react accordingly.”[5] Putin acknowledged that problems exist in Belarus, but stressed protesters must follow the law. The Kremlin likely aims to intimidate protesters through the threat of a Russian security intervention.

The Kremlin is additionally likely warning Lukashenko to stabilize the protests or face further Russian involvement. A Russian aircraft known to be operated by the FSB (Russian intelligence) arrived in Minsk the night of August 26 and departed 5 hours later.[6] ISW cannot confirm who or what arrived in Belarus on the flight, but assesses the FSB likely sent dignitaries to speak with Lukashenko and may have sent Russian security personnel to remain behind as well. The aircraft made a similar trip to Minsk the night of August 19, after which Putin and Lukashenko publicly announced they had begun consultations for a possible Russian intervention.[7] Lukashenko has primarily cooperated with the Kremlin to respond to protests since August 15. However, the Kremlin likely seeks to cement its control over Lukashenko’s actions and pressure him to control protesters with the threat of further Kremlin involvement.

Lukashenko reiterated claim that NATO is backing protests. Lukashenko claimed Belarus’ neighbors are conducting a “hybrid war” to overthrow him during a ministerial meeting on August 27.[8] Lukashenko stated he has deployed “half the army [at] full combat readiness” to protect western Belarus, claiming Poland wants to annex the Grodno region. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry additionally formally summoned Polish diplomats to warn them against continued interference in Belarus.[9] Lukashenko previously mobilized the Belarusian military to the Polish and Lithuanian borders on August 22 and seeks to frame the organic domestic protests as a NATO attempt to overthrow him and target Russia.[10] The Kremlin and Lukashenko may attempt to leverage claims of Polish and Lithuanian interference to justify future aggressive action against both states.

Lukashenko reiterated threats against protesters and cracked down on journalists despite claiming to welcome dialogue. Lukashenko additionally stated he is willing to begin dialogue with the opposition, but only if “the street” ceases protesting; he also threatened to draft striking students as an alternative to dialogue.[11] Belarusian security forces detained roughly a dozen journalists, both Belarusian and foreign, in Minsk on August 27 around 6:00 pm local time.[12] The Belarusian Investigative Committee additionally interrogated Coordination Council leader Maria Kolesnikova for two hours the morning of August 27, but released her without further charges.[13]

Lukashenko has previously stated he will only talk to the opposition if protests cease, and will likely refuse any meaningful dialogue with the opposition Coordination Council, which he has labeled unconstitutional.[14] However, Putin may pressure Lukashenko to enter a dialogue with an opposition the Kremlin can dominate. Increasing numbers of Coordination Council members expressed a willingness to involve the Kremlin in negotiations on Belarus on August 26.[15] The Kremlin will likely dominate any potential negotiations process between Lukashenko and the opposition and may elect to leverage this process to cement its dominance over Belarus.

NEXTA is posturing for mass protests on Sunday, August 30, and announced plans to release a “strategic plan” on August 28. NEXTA called for small protests in Minsk on August 27, with a few hundred protesters gathering around a church in Minsk that was the site of security force detentions the night of August 26.[16] NEXTA explicitly called on local organizers to continue protests around the country following “their own traditions” and asking protesters to “protect their local leaders,” continuing its approach of focusing its efforts to control protests on Minsk but expanding its efforts to claim credit for country-wide protests it has not organized. NEXTA additionally stated it will announce plans on August 27 for a third Sunday protest and pledged to release a “global and important strategic plan” on August 28 on “how this autumn the people can return power to their own hands” – implicitly framing the protest movement as a long-running effort. NEXTA’s promised strategic plan will likely shape the focus of the protest movement in the coming weeks, as NEXTA retains dominant control over the protest movement. NEXTA may further align with opposition leader Sviatlana Tikanouskaya’s Coordination Council and diplomatic approach following supportive statements the night of August 26.[17]

ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.

Click here to download the PDF.


[1] http://kremlin((.))ru/events/president/news/63951.

[2] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-belarusian-president-lukashenko.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-begins-security-forces.html.

[3] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-moscow-sets-conditions-for.html.

[4] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-moscow-sets-conditions-for.html.

[5] http://kremlin((.))ru/events/president/news/63951.

[6] https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/ra-64523/; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belarus-election-russia-airplane/russian-government-plane-makes-second-belarus-flight-in-a-week-tracking-data-idUSKBN25M2CO.

[7] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-kremlin-begins-security-forces-support-lukashenko-following-regional-security.

[8] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/698314.html.

[9] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/698384.html

[10] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-lukashenko-mobilizes-military-western-border-local-protest-organization-emerges.

[11] https://news.tut((.))by/society/698330.html.

[12] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/698299.html.

[13] https://news.tut((.))by/economics/698299.html.

[14] https://eng.belta((.))by/society/view/belarus-constitutional-court-chief-coordination-council-is-unconstitutional-132865-2020/.

[15] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-opposition-continues-unify-lukashenko-continues-crackdown.

[16] https://t((.))me/nexta_live/9604.

[17] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-opposition-continues-unify-lukashenko-continues-crackdown.

 

Wednesday, August 26, 2020

Northeast Syria Patrol Routes Map: Russian and US Forces Collide

 By John Dunford

Key Takeaway: US and Russian forces are engaged in a competition for influence and control of the major roads in northeast Syria, threatening the safety of US personnel. Russia seeks to expand its presence toward the Syria-Iraq border in the far northeast corner of Hasakah Province to cut off key US ground supply lines between Iraq and Syria. US and Russian forces routinely disrupt each other’s patrols, leading to confrontations and risking escalation between the forces. A recent confrontation in the far northeast corner of Hasakah Province resulted in several US injuries after US and Russian vehicles collided. Russian helicopters also flew over US vehicles in an attempt to disperse them. Russia will continue its efforts to pressure the US presence through confrontations like these, while also threatening the security of US ground supply lines connecting US forces in Syria to Iraq.

Click the image below to enlarge. Click here to download the PDF.



Warning: Opposition Continues to Unify as Lukashenko Continues Crackdown

 August 26, 2020, 5:30 EDT

By George Barros

President Alexander Lukashenko effectively dispersed limited protests on August 26. There were almost no protests in Belarus on August 26, likely in part because NEXTA did not provide protest directions for August 26. A few hundred protesters arrived at the Belarusian parliament to initiate the recall of Belarusian MPs, but riot police dispersed the crowd and detained some participants.[1] Some protesters held small gatherings around Belarus, most of which consisted of fewer than 100 people.[2] Riot police dispersed these small gatherings, detaining some participants.[3]


The Lithuanian government is deepening its support for the opposition despite Kremlin warnings against “foreign interference” in Belarus. The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry proposed a list of targeted sanctions against 118 Belarusian officials, including President Lukashenko, for falsifying elections and committing violence against protesters on August 26.[4] Lithuania will ban the sanctioned individuals from entry if Lithuania’s interior Minister approves the sanctions.[5] Lukashenko and the Kremlin already accused Lithuania of “foreign interference” in Belarus and will likely reiterate those claims following these sanctions.[6]


The Belarusian Investigative Committee continues to interrogate Coordination Council members. The Investigative Committee summoned Coordination Council member and Belarusian Nobel laureate Svitlana Aleksievich for questioning on August 26.[7] Aleksievich’s questioning lasted approximately 40 minutes and ended after she refused to testify against herself.[8] Opposition figure and Coordination Councill member Maria Kolesnikova received a summons on the morning of August 26 from the Investigative Committee to appear for questioning on August 27.[9] The Investigative Committee will likely continue interrogating and intimidating opposition leaders.


More members of Svitlana Tikhanouskaya’s Coordination Council are reaching out to the Kremlin. Aleksievich made a statement following her questioning that the Coordination Council cannot succeed without international support, including that of the Kremlin.[10] Aleksievich said the Coordination Council should engage in dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin because currently only Lukashenko represents Belarus in talks with Russia.[11] Aleksievich said, “unfortunately, our civil society is strong, but not yet so strong, so we need help from the world, perhaps from Russia, if we can attract it together."[12] The Kremlin has not responded to Aleksievich’s comment as of this writing.


NEXTA’s rhetoric is increasingly supportive of Tikhanouskaya and Coordination Council initiatives, potentially indicating opposition consolidation behind Tikhanouskaya. NEXTA posted a statement at 12:51 am Minsk time that "Svitlana Tikhanouskaya is working more and more in the international arena every day, defending our interests. Today our President [Tikahouskaya] addressed the European Parliament with a statement that: ‘We are no longer the opposition. We are the majority. A peaceful revolution is taking place in Belarus.’"[13] NEXTA has praised Tikhanouskaya before, but its rhetoric focused more on the Coordination Council than on Tikhanouskaya directly. This statement could be an indicator that NEXTA is working to unify the opposition under Tikhanouskaya and her Coordination Council – a key first step for Belarus’ opposition to consolidate a base from which to organize and optimize its activity.


The Coordination Council launched new Telegram channel to organize recall petitions. NEXTA promoted the Coordination Council’s new "Regional Support Service" (RSS) Telegram channel in a post at 12:34 am Minsk time on August 26.[14] Both NEXTA and the Coordination Council encouraged protesters to contact the RSS via the RSS’ Telegram channel, phone number, and email in order to gain information about how to recall representatives, prepare recall appeals, and safely hold events.[15] NEXTA and the RSS Telegram channels directed protesters to the website of a Belarusian civil society organization called “Honest People.”[16] Honest People published tools on its website to help Belarusians find their officials and streamline the process of initiating recalls on August 25 or 26.[17] Kremlin-linked Belarusian opposition politician Viktar Babariko founded Honest People on June 9 in order to organize civil society activism regarding to the August 9 election.[18] Babariko served as the chairman of the Kremlin-affiliated Belgazprombank office in Belarus from 2000 to May 2020.[19] Babariko left his job at Belgazprombank in May 2020 to run against Lukashenko, but the Lukashenko-controlled Central Elections Commission blocked his candidacy on July 14.[20] Honest People’s website claims Svitlana Alexievich supports the organization, indicating Alexievich may be linked to the Kremlin via Babariko.[21]


Belarusians initiated the process to recall 20 Belarusian deputies on August 26.[22] Kolesnikova first urged Belarusians to initiate legal petitions to recall officials on August 24.[23] ISW assessed on August 24 that Lukashenko will likely not allow recall petitions to remove any officials, but the process of Belarusian opposition activists collecting signatures may facilitate the emergence of a better organized indigenous opposition network necessary for sustained and more organized protest activity.[24]


NEXTA is encouraging other activity that could lead to further local organization. NEXTA posted a statement at 3:18 am Minsk time on August 26 calling on volunteers to contribute information to another Telegram channel called "Black Book of Belarus" – a Telegram channel collecting information on Belarusian security personnel involved in violence against protesters.[25] Black Book of Belarus’ channel administrators are unknown as of this writing. NEXTA stated a "global plan" to “smash” the Lukashenko regime quickly "with minimal losses" is coming this week, suggesting NEXTA will continue to provide protesters detailed directions to coordinate activities, although NEXTA has not always followed throw on promises to provide such directions in the past.[26]


ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.

 



[1] https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1298670145154494464;  https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1298676180523114497 ; https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1298695335557160967

[2] https://t(.)me/tutby_official/12273 ; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9564 ; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9559 ; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9549 ; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9542 ; https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9546?single

[3] https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1298689573237686272

[4] https://tass(.)com/world/1193911 ; http://www.baltic-course(.)com/eng/baltic_states_cis/?doc=158626

[5] http://www.therepublic(.)com/2020/08/26/eu-lithuania-belarus-2/

[6] https://www.belta(.)by/politics/view/lavrov-vmeshatelstvo-v-belarus-izvne-proishodit-s-tseljju-navjazat-svoi-porjadki-403367-2020/ ; https://lv.sputniknews(.)ru/Latvia/20200815/14213027/My-ne-lezem-v-Belarus-Rinkevchs-nazval-bredom-slova-Lukashenko-o-inostrannom-vmeshatelstve.html

[7] https://www.rbc(.)ru/rbcfreenews/5f464dd39a7947609eb8ecd2

[8] https://gazetaby(.)com/post/dopros-aleksievich-dlilsya-40-minut-kak-tak-vyshlo/168299/

[9] https://lenta(.)ru/news/2020/08/26/kolesnikova/

[10] https://t(.)me/dimsmirnov175/14005 ; https://www.znak(.)com/2020-08-26/svetlana_aleksievich_prizvala_privlech_putina_k_obcheniyu_s_belorusskoy_oppoziciey ; https://www.forbes(.)ru/newsroom/obshchestvo/407813-nado-mozhet-byt-i-putina-privlech-aleksievich-zayavila-chto-belorusskoy-nobelevskogo-laureata-svetlany-al

[11] https://t(.)me/dimsmirnov175/14005 ; https://www.znak(.)com/2020-08-26/svetlana_aleksievich_prizvala_privlech_putina_k_obcheniyu_s_belorusskoy_oppoziciey ; https://www.forbes(.)ru/newsroom/obshchestvo/407813-nado-mozhet-byt-i-putina-privlech-aleksievich-zayavila-chto-belorusskoy-nobelevskogo-laureata-svetlany-al

[12] https://t(.)me/dimsmirnov175/14005 ; https://www.znak(.)com/2020-08-26/svetlana_aleksievich_prizvala_privlech_putina_k_obcheniyu_s_belorusskoy_oppoziciey ; https://www.forbes(.)ru/newsroom/obshchestvo/407813-nado-mozhet-byt-i-putina-privlech-aleksievich-zayavila-chto-belorusskoy-nobelevskogo-laureata-svetlany-al

[13] https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9534

[14] https://t.me/rada_vision/26 ;  https://t(

[15] https://t(.)me/rksby2020/5 ;

[16] https://t(.)me/rksby2020/5

[17] https://honest-people(.)by/ ; https://t(.)me/s/rksby2020

[18] https://vkurier(.)by/206208 ; https://babariko(.)vision/news/v-belarusi-zapustili-iniciativu-chestnye-lyudi-kak-prisoedinitsya ; https://www.instagram(.)com/p/CBEDgCBgD4A/ ; https://www.facebook.com/honestpeople.by ; http://borovljany.  Its website was registered on June 8 according to Whois information available at https://research.domaintools.com/research/whois-history/search/?q=honest..., last accessed 8/26/2020 at 3:45 p.m..

[19] https://belsat(.)eu/en/news/banker-and-philanthropist-babaryka-may-stand-in-2020-presidential-election/ ; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-belarussian-opposition-reach....

[20] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/russia-in-review-turmoil-in-belarus....

[21] https://honest-people(.)by/

[22] https://news.tut(.)by/economics/698211.html

[23] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-lukashenkos-security-forces.html

[24] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-lukashenkos-security-forces.html

[25] https://t(.)me/nexta_tv/3840 ; https://t(.)me/s/BlackBookBelarus

[26] https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9534