Iran’s Role in the Kirkuk Operation in Iraq

By Jennifer Cafarella with Omer Kassim

Key Takeaway: Iran provided decisive military support to compel Iraqi Kurds to surrender in Kirkuk, Iraq, on October 16, 2017. Military forces from three major Iranian proxies participated in the operation: Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al Haq, and the Badr Organization. Iran did not attempt to outshine Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in public. Iran instead allowed Abadi to take credit, while quietly positioning its proxies to influence Kirkuk in the future. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) conducted a rigorous study of social media activity and other reporting of troop movements in Iraq in order to assess the role of Iran’s proxies in Kirkuk and across Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries.

Iranian military proxies in Iraq supported Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s retaking of Kirkuk by compelling Iraq’s Kurds to withdraw from their positions on October 16. ISW assesses that forces from three major Iranian proxies helped compel the Kurdish surrender in Kirkuk: Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), Asa'ib Ahl al Haq (AAH), and the Badr Organization, as this report will detail. The Kurdish collapse in Kirkuk was a turning point in the conflict between Iraqi Kurdistan and the Iraqi Government. Iran and Abadi are now exploiting their success in Kirkuk and expanding their operations against Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran’s proxies continue to play a central role. 

Methodology

The evidence of Iran’s involvement in the initial confrontation in Kirkuk requires careful analysis of openly available sources. Official media channels of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) released little information about which units participated in the initial military operations in Kirkuk on October 16. ISW assesses that the PMF imposed a media blackout, since they went dark for an abnormal duration. One Facebook page affiliated with an Iranian proxy militia took down photos and videos about its involvement in Kirkuk that it posted from October 13-16. Social media outlets that normally report on PMF units were also unusually quiet. This media blackout may have extended to Iraqi press, which also did not report details on PMF units. Iraqi sources also rarely reported on Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) unit numbers in Kirkuk, referring instead to general “Iraqi forces.” The media blackout and some retrospective removal of materials posted on unofficial social media links suggest that some authorities within the PMF, Iraq, or Iran wished to conceal evidence that the PMF participated.

Furthermore, some Kurdish press and social media sources published old, recycled imagery to argue that the Iranian-backed proxies were present, undermining the credibility of the official Iraqi Kurdish case. U.S. uniformed military spokesmen, senior general officers, and State Department officials have added to the confusion by dodging press questions about the involvement of PMF forces.

ISW conducted a rigorous study of the available evidence in social media and other reporting of troop movements in Kirkuk and across the disputed internal boundaries in order to assess which units comprised the PMF forces whose involvement Iraqi sources generally reported. Forces from three major Iranian proxies were present south of Kirkuk before the operation and advanced along with Iraqi forces: the 43rd and 42nd AAH Brigades and a Badr Organization unit also known as the PMF 24th Brigade. ISW has provided a list of indicators of the presence of these units below. ISW cannot assess the specific KH unit with confidence at the time of publication. KH, AAH, and the Badr Organization are lethal Iranian proxies that attacked U.S. forces in Iraq, particularly between 2006 and 2008.

Iranian Proxy Leadership in Kirkuk

• Badr Organization leader Hadi al Ameri met with Federal Police (FP) commander Raed Jawat and the deputy head of the PMF and leader of KH Abu Mehdi al Muhandis in Bashir. An official Badr Organization media site provided pictures of this meeting on Facebook on October 15.* 

Hadi al Ameri, Abu Mehdi al Muhandis, and Raed Jawat near Bashir on or around October 15, 2017.

• Hadi al Ameri and Abu Mehdi al Muhandis attended the flag raising in Kirkuk City along with Iraq’s Counterterrorism Services (CTS) commander General Yarallah. The Iraqi Army’s Twitter account posted a photo of the flag raising, showing all three in attendance. Facebook accounts affiliated with the Badr Organization also posted photos and videos showing the flag raising.* The Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman said that he had not seen” the photos in response to a reporter’s inquiry during a press briefing on October 17.

Hadi al Ameri, Abu Mehdi al Muhandis, and General Yarallah in Kirkuk City on October 16, 2017.

• Hadi al Ameri toured the Bai Hasan oil field on October 16 after Peshmerga forces withdrew. A Facebook account linked to the Badr Organization posted a video of Hadi al Ameri touring the Bai Hasan oil field. Ameri, during an interview from the field, thanked the Peshmegra for not clashing with the ISF. An Emergency Response Division (ERD) officer was standing next to Ameri. When asked if there were oil fields under PMF control, Ameri stuttered, saying that “oil fields… I don’t think so except for Daybaka oil field which is important to control. Besides that, I don’t think we have a problem.” *

Hadi al Ameri tours the Bai Hasan oil field on October 16, 2017.

• Additional photos and videos that circulated on social media also show Hadi al Ameri and Abu Mehdi al Muhandis touring sites in Kirkuk Province.

Iranian Proxy Militia Deployments to Kirkuk

Asa'ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

• Photos and videos taken in the vicinity of Kirkuk City that circulated on social media included AAH flags. Western reporters also cited examples of AAH flags raised near Kirkuk. 
•  A Facebook page affiliated with the AAH 42nd PMF Brigade shared photos with a caption stating that the 42nd Brigade led by Haj Abu Bakr Jubouri was deploying to Daquq for further movement to Kirkuk, and included a photo of a fighter with an AAH flag.

Photo of Asa'ib Ahl al Haq fighter either on the way to or near Kirkuk City.

• A Facebook page affiliated with AAH’s 42nd PMF Brigade posted photos on October 16 of fighters holding an AAH flag with a caption stating the photo was taken at a Peshmerga position in central Kirkuk.*
• ISW assessed on October 19 that the AAH 43rd PMF Brigade was also present within proximity of Kirkuk as of at least October 15. The 43rd PMF Brigade was deployed in Salah al Din province before the Kirkuk operation.* A Facebook page affiliated with AAH’s 43rd PMF Brigade published information, including photos and videos, that supported ISW’s assessment that fighters from the Brigade deployed close to Kirkuk in early October.* Screenshots from the AAH 43rd Brigade’s Facebook page are included below.

Badr Organization

• The Badr Organization’s Turkmen brigade, also known as the 16th PMF Brigade, was already stationed near Bashir and may have received reinforcement from 16th PMF Brigade units in the vicinity of Hamrin and Qara Tapa.*
• An Iraqi news outlet shared a video from September 18 that shows a column of fighters from the 24th Badr Brigade arriving near southern Kikuk with Abu Mehdi al Muhandis.

Abu Mehdi al Muhandis arrives close to southern Kirkuk and sits in an apparent Badr Organization office on September 18, 2017.

• A Facebook account affiliated with Ansar Allah al-Awfiya posted a photo from IVO Bashir showing civilians offering food to the PMF and security forces.* The post included photos from al-Ghadeer channel (affiliated with the Badr Organization).
• The communications directorate of the PMF announced that its force,s along with ISF, control Bai Hasan oil fields in Kirkuk. The PMF in Bai Hasan most likely included a Badr Organization unit, given Hadi al Ameri’s visit.

Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH)

• Al Arabiya published a video on October 16 from a location near Kirkuk City showing two trucks laden with fighters carrying KH flags, in addition to fighters carrying KH flags stationed at a checkpoint. 

Al Arabiya video on October 16, 2017 shows Kata'ib Hezbollah fighters near Kirkuk.

These units joined the local Iranian-backed forces stationed south of Kirkuk, which included: Kita’ib Jund al Imam, Liwa Kirkuk al Thani, and Firqat Imam Ali al Qitaliya. Qiyadat Quwat Abu Fadl al Abbas and a Hawza-affiliated PMF unit named Firqat al Abbas al Qitaliya may also have been present.

Iran’s proxies joined an Iraqi force including the CTS and units from the 9th Iraqi Armored Division. It is unclear from publicly available information which specific CTS and 9th Iraqi Armored Division units participated. The deployment of elite Iraqi units supported by armored artillery indicates Abadi intended both to deter the Peshmerga from fighting and to prepare for that possibility. Abadi also deployed troops from the FP and ERD, which constituted the only government-controlled infantry force. The FP and ERD likely included units penetrated by Iran. These combined forces staged south of Kirkuk city in order to allow an avenue for retreat for Kurdish forces to the north. 

ISW mapped these forces on October 19 and updated that assessment on October 29. ISW will continue updating its assessment and map if and when new information becomes available.

Implications

Iran’s role in Kirkuk was decisive. The leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Qassem Suleimani traveled to Iraq on October 14 to convey Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s support for Abadi’s response to the referendum. He also issued an ultimatum to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and possibly to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Leader of the Badr Organization, Hadi al Ameri, also threatened “internal war” if the Peshmerga did not withdraw from Kirkuk. The deployment of Iran’s proxies to Kirkuk tipped the scales against Iraqi Kurdistan enough to compel it to withdraw from Kirkuk and large portions of Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries. 

Iran achieved a second goal through its support in Kirkuk: to further legitimize its proxies in Iraq while sidelining the United States. Iran seeks to subordinate the Iraqi government from within, and was careful to frame the Kirkuk operation as a sovereign Iraqi action. Iran quietly provided critical support that ensured Abadi’s success while positioning its proxies to have influence in Kirkuk moving forward. Iran also took action to keep the U.S. on the sidelines by deploying an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) against U.S. forces in early October. The Kirkuk operation thus bears signs of Iraq’s most likely future on current trajectory: Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi notionally in control, Iran’s proxies acting on Tehran’s orders but as legitimate arms of the Iraqi state, and the U.S. on the sidelines.

Iran’s proxies will capitalize politically and militarily on their role in Kirkuk and across Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBS). The battlefield circulations of major proxy leaders around Kirkuk bolstered their public image ahead of Iraq’s elections scheduled for early 2018. Their subordinates may compete in local Kirkuk politics. Their forces will likely control or contest Iraqi government control of Kirkuk’s military infrastructure and oil installations. Prime Minister Abadi placed an Iranian client, Ali Fadhil Imran, at the head of a new Kirkuk Operations command on October 28. Imran is the former head of the Iranian-influenced 5th Iraqi Army Division. Unconfirmed reports indicate Abadi also appointed an Iranian client, Abdul-Amir al-Zaydi, as the head of “redeployment operations” across Iraq’s DIBS and border crossings on November 5. Zaydi is the former head of the Iranian-influenced Dijla Operations Command. These appointments enable Iran’s proxies to consolidate militarily in Kirkuk and across the DIBS. 

The U.S. remains multiple steps behind Iran. President Donald Trump rolled out a new anti-Iran strategy days before the Kirkuk operation, without specifying prescriptions for containing and reversing the strength of Iran’s proxy networks. The Trump Administration’s initial apathy toward Iran’s role in the Kirkuk operation appeared to indicate the U.S. will not meaningfully push back against Iran in Iraq. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson provided a more forceful, but still sluggish, U.S. response to Iran’s role in Kirkuk in a subsequent trip to the Middle East from October 22-23. Tillerson said “Iranian militias that are in Iraq…need to go home” during a press conference with Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir on October 22. Secretary Tillerson’s statement recognizes the threat Iran’s proxies in Iraq pose, but rolling back their influence is not achievable through rhetoric alone. Abadi reportedly responded to Secretary Tillerson by stating the PMF “defended their country and made the sacrifices that contributed to the victory over ISIS. Abadi subsequently stated that he will disarm Iran’s proxies if they refuse to submit to his control, in an effort to reaffirm his intent to remain aligned with U.S. policy. He does not have the capability to do so without direct American military support, however. Only a serious change in U.S. policy in Iraq can save Abadi from de facto cooptation by Iran. 

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* Please contact ISW directly to request citations for these data. 

Post-ISIS Insurgency Looms in Northern Syria

By Genevieve Casagrande and the ISW Syria Team

Key Takeaway: Resistance to the Kurdish political project in northern Syria is increasing the risk of an insurgency that would reverse U.S. gains against ISIS and facilitate the return of Salafi-jihadi groups to the area. Turkey and ISIS are exacerbating tensions between local Sunni Arabs and the Syrian Kurdish YPG, which dominates the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Turkish support to anti-Kurdish insurgent groups in SDF-held areas may support the reemergence of Al Qaeda, which also seeks to exploit ethnic strife and hostility toward the SDF, in northern Syria.

The continued dominance of the Syrian Kurdish YPG and its political project in northern Syria is driving local hostility toward the anti-ISIS Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Locals held demonstrations and closed shops to protest a recent SDF conscription law in Manbij City and neighboring towns in Eastern Aleppo Province from November 3 - 5. Turkish-backed rebels also held demonstrations in solidarity with Manbij in Jarablus in Northern Aleppo and areas west of Manbij. The SDF sent reinforcements from Ayn al Arab to Manbij, reportedly to force store owners to reopen their shops. The SDF Legislative Council and local tribal leaders agreed to the conscription law on November 2.  However, some local Arab tribal leaders reportedly refused to attend the discussions, one of whom SDF-affiliated security forces temporarily arrested. The conscription law will reportedly begin in early 2018 and calls for mandatory “self-defense” service for Manbij residents between the ages of 18 and 30.  The protests follow reports of the arrests of “dozens” of civilians in Manbij over recent months for forced military service. The demonstrations threaten to exacerbate grievances between Kurds and Sunni Arabs in Manbij that could facilitate the return of ISIS or Al-Qaeda.

Post-ISIS tensions between the SDF and local Sunni Arabs have also escalated in areas of ar-Raqqah City, where SDF fighters fired upon a civilian protest demanding re-entry to their homes in the Mashlab District on October 26. Residents of Mashlab were later allowed to return to the district on November 5. The incident will nonetheless deepen the pre-existing tensions between the mostly Arab residents of Ar-Raqqa City and the SDF, particularly after the YPG displayed in public a large photo of Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the Turkish- and U.S.-designated terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), on October 20. Continued YPG prominence in the city will likely inflame tensions and may lead to insurgent violence against the SDF in Ar-Raqqa City.

Turkey and allied militant organizations seek to further fuel instability in SDF-held areas by supporting targeted violence and protests against the SDF. Anti-YPG insurgent group Harakat al Qiyam released a statement in solidarity with ongoing demonstrations against the Syrian Kurdish YPG and SDF in Manbij City on November 5. Harakat al Qiyam is likely backed by Turkey and is active in SDF-held areas of Eastern Aleppo and Raqqa Provinces. The group appears relatively small in size, but has carried out a series of targeted attacks against the YPG, primarily via motorcycle, since early October 2017. Harakat al Qiyam claimed an attempted assassination of Manbij Military Council leader Mohammad Abu Adel in Manbij on November 1, for example. Turkey, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda all likely intend to support or form militant groups similar to Harakat al Qiyam to undermine security in SDF-held areas in Northern Syria. Small insurgent groups like Harakat al Qiyam could be directed by Al-Qaeda or ISIS or facilitate their return to ar-Raqqa.

ISIS likewise seeks to drive further hostility between local Arabs and Syrian Kurds through spectacular attacks against civilians. ISIS detonated an SVBIED near a makeshift IDP camp near the SDF-held Conoco and Al Isbah gas fields east of Deir ez Zour City on November 4, killing 75 and wounding over 140 others. ISIS had previously launched a joint SVBIED-SVEST attack against another SDF-held IDP camp in Southern Hasakah Province on October 12, killing over 50. ISIS may seek to leverage spectacular attacks against these IDP camps to demonstrate that the SDF is either unable or unwilling to provide security for Arabs in Kurdish-held terrain.

Further Military Escalation Remains Likely in Iraqi Kurdistan

Jennifer Cafarella and Omer Kassim

America’s Ambassador to Iraq is attempting to restart negotiations between Iraq’s Kurds and the Iraqi Government. The U.S. is hoping the resignation of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leader Masoud Barzani on November 1, 2017 will incentivize the Iraqi Government to accept a compromise with Iraq’s Kurds. Masoud Barzani was the driving force behind the Kurdish independence referendum on September 25th, which provoked the ongoing retaliation by the Iraqi Government and Iran. The US state department is attempting to unite Iraq’s Kurds behind the region’s Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and his deputy Qubad Talabani in order to resolve the dispute with Baghdad ahead of the 2018 elections. U.S ambassador to Iraq Douglas Silliman met with them in Arbil on November 2nd. He relayed the US position that the long term stability of Iraqi Kurdistan depends on a unified and federal Iraq, and that the two sides must find a “peaceful resolution of disputes under the Iraqi constitution.”

Iraq’s Kurds have thus farrefused to negotiate on Baghdad’s terms. Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al Abadi demanded the handover of the Fishkhabur and Ibrahim Khalil border crossings on October 26th. The Kurds instead continue to appeal for a ceasefire and return to political negotiations. Barzani’s resignation does not appear to have seriously changed Kurdish calculus.The KRG reiterated its appeal for “constructive and genuine negotiations to reach a comprehensive agreement” on November 1st after the Iraqi Government rejected a Kurdish proposal for the U.S. – led anti-ISIS coalition to deploy observers to the Fishkhabur area in order to enforce joint Iraqi Government-Peshmerga control. The KRG also called for joint control over disputed territories until their final status is determined through a three step process outlined in article 140 of the Iraqi constitution.[1]

Iraq and Iran’s proxies are poised to take new military action against Iraqi Kurdistan if the US diplomatic effort fails,as ISW initially warned on October 30th. The combined force positioned near the Fishkhabur crossing include elements of the 15th Iraqi Army division, the Emergency Response Division (ERD) and a considerable deployment of Iranian proxies including forces from three brigades of the Badr Organization as well as units from Asai’b Ahl al Haq, Katai’b Sayyid al Shuhada, and Harakat al-Nujaba. Iranian proxy leaders are coordinating with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) commanders and may even direct the military operation. 

[1] Article 140 calls for 1) rectifying the demographic changes that took place in disputed territories; 2) conducting a census; 3) holding referendum on whether to integrate these territories into Iraqi Kurdistan.

Russia Unfazed in Syria

By Matti Suomenaro and the ISW Syria Team

Russia has continued facilitating Iran's expansion in Syria following President Donald Trump's new Iran strategy rollout. Russia sustained its air campaign in October 2017 to support ground operations led by pro-Bashar al Assad regime forces, including Iran and its proxies. Russian forces conducted this campaign across two fronts, targeting anti-regime opposition forces in Western Syria as well as ISIS in Eastern Syria.

Russia continued airstrikes across opposition-held terrain in Idlib and Hama Provinces that it began after an offensive launched by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria – in Northern Hama Province on September 19. Russia also supported pro-regime forces in a major offensive along the Euphrates River Valley towards the Syrian-Iraqi Border that included the seizure of Mayadin on 14 October. Russia forward-deployed Su-25 ‘Frogfoot’ close-air-support aircraft to T4 (Tiyas) Airbase in Central Homs Province in order to support its operations in Eastern Syria. Pro-regime forces later seized multiple districts in Deir ez-Zour City with significant air support from Russia on October 25 - 30. Pro-regime forces likely intend to advance upon the key border town of Albu Kamal on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. ISIS reportedly relocated a significant portion of its leadership, media, and external attack cells to Mayadin and Albu Kamal in response to the successful offensives by the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition against Mosul and Ar-Raqqa City.

Russia continued to masquerade as a legitimate counter-terrorism actor while prosecuting an aggressive campaign against vulnerable civilian populations in Hama, Idlib, and Deir ez-Zour Provinces. Russia simultaneously targeted both legitimate military targets and illegitimate civilian targets in order to obscure the real nature of its air campaign in Syria. Russia targeted key civilian infrastructure in regions held by ISIS in Eastern Deir ez-Zour Province including multiple civilian ferries fleeing the fighting in Mayadin on October 10 -12. Russia also expanded its air campaign beyond strikes against HTS in Idlib Province. Russia targeted a headquarters belonging to Islamist group Faylaq al-Sham – an opposition group formerly backed by the U.S. – on October 13. Russia also conducted airstrikes targeting at least two schools and three internally displaced persons’ camps in Idlib Province from October 9 – 20. Russia will continue to publicize its strikes against Salafi-Jihadi groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda in order to distract from its wider punitive campaign against civilians in opposition-held regions of Western Syria.

The preceding graphic depicts ISW's assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia's air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

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Turkey’s Silent Al Qaeda Partner in Syria

By Elizabeth Teoman

Key Takeaway: Turkey is cooperating with al Qaeda to threaten the Syrian Kurdish YPG in northern Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s intervention in Idlib Province is setting conditions for a de facto safe haven for jihadists in Syria that will jeopardize the U.S. campaign against al Qaeda.

Turkey is positioned to launch operations against the Syrian Kurdish YPG in northern Syria. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) deployed armored vehicles and around 100 special forces troops to establish an ostensible ‘de-escalation zone’ in greater Idlib Province, Syria, on October 12. The cross-border intervention occurred as part of a wider deal brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran at the Astana Talks on September 14 - 15. Turkey deconflicted its deployment with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) - al Qaeda’s Syria affiliate – despite presenting its operation as a counterterrorism mission to constrain both al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Turkey instead intends to use its intervention as a launchpad for future operations against the majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton in northern Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated the next stage of TSK operations will focus on the “issue” of majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton on October 24. Turkey also seeks to regulate refugee flows and humanitarian aid along the Syrian-Turkish border in Idlib Province ahead of anticipated pro-Bashar al Assad regime clearing operations.

Russia is taking military and diplomatic steps to block Turkey. Russia declared a ‘de-confliction zone’ over Tel Rifaat and Menagh Airbase north of Aleppo City on September 6. The Russian Armed Forces have also maintained a detachment of military observers in Afrin Canton since March 20. Russia is attempting to leverage these deployments to preempt a potential Turkish offensive targeting the YPG. Russia also seeks to expand its partnership with the YPG to constrain and ultimately expel the U.S. from northern Syria. Russia is actively attempting to coopt the YPG into a diplomatic rapprochement with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad at the expense of the U.S Anti-ISIS Coalition. The U.S. – YPG partnership is vulnerable following the U.S. decision to support Baghdad over the Kurdistan Regional Government’s independence aspirations in northern Iraq. Russia could successfully exploit this seam to deprive the U.S. of its primary source of influence in Syria. Russia is also positioned to frustrate Erdogan’s strategic ambitions in northern Syria, driving Turkey into deeper partnership with al Qaeda.

Russia Seizes Syria Diplomacy Reins

By Bradley Hanlon and Bryan Amoroso

Key Takeaway: Russia is accelerating its efforts to subvert the Syrian political process by establishing a new diplomatic framework that sets conditions to expel the U.S. from Northern Syria. Russia announced its intent to host delegates from all major opposition, ethnic, and tribal factions at a “Syrian Congress on National Dialogue” in Sochi on November 18. Russia may exploit the conference to broker a wider reconciliation deal between the Bashar al Assad Regime and the Syrian Kurdish YPG under conditions that preclude long-term U.S. influence in Syria.

Russia will reportedly host a political conference called the “Syrian Congress on National Dialogue” in Sochi on November 18. Russian media claims that the conference will include up to 1,500 participants representing major political and armed opposition groups, local councils, tribal gatherings, and various factions of Syrian Kurds.^[1] The Russian Foreign Ministry published an official list of invitees that includes the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its rival Kurdish National Council (KNC); the exiled High Negotiations Committee (HNC) backed by Saudi Arabia and the Bashar al Assad regime-tolerated Moscow and Cairo Platforms; and armed anti-Assad opposition groups including the Southern Front.^[2] It remains unclear which if any of these groups will attend the conference, although the public invitations are likely intended to signal inclusiveness. Syrian Ambassador to the UN Bashar al-Jaafari also stressed the Assad regime’s willingness to participate.^[3] Russia will reportedly use the venue to propose constitutional reforms, the formation of a transitional government that retains Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and new municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections for Syria by 2021, according to unidentified sources familiar with the conference.^[4]

The conference, if successful, will undermine or coopt international efforts to reach a political settlement to the Syrian Civil War. Russia has used alternative diplomatic venues - such as the trilateral Astana Talks with Turkey and Iran - to capture and shape the UN Geneva Process. Russia uses these measures to demonstrate its legitimacy as an international arbiter while simultaneously ensuring a favorable political outcome that preserves its interests in the Syrian Civil War. Russia could also use the conference to broker a deal with the Syrian Kurds at the expense of the U.S. in Northern Syria. Russia is reportedly prepared to offer federal status to the Syrian Kurds in exchange for their wider reconciliation with the Assad Regime.[5] The Syrian Kurdish PYD has previously been barred from participation in political negotiations at the Geneva Talks at Turkey’s insistence. Russia reportedly excluded Turkey from active participation in the Syrian Congress on National Dialogue - likely to encourage meaningful engagement by the Syrian Kurds.^[6] The outcome of these negotiations could include an agreement that constrains or ultimately expels the U.S. Anti-ISIS Coalition from Northern Syria.

Russia has recently deepened its increased cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish PYD to assert itself as a viable partner ahead of the Syrian Congress on National Dialogue. The Russian Armed Forces reportedly assumed full control of the Menagh Military Airbase north of Aleppo City on October 27 following a withdrawal by the Syrian Kurdish YPG. Russia previously deployed military personnel to Menagh Airbase and nearby Tel Rifaat on October 20 to preempt military operations by Turkey against the majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton in Western Aleppo Province.^[7]  Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov also met with officials from the Syrian Kurdish PYD in Qamishli in Hasaka Province on October 18 to discuss Syria’s future political outcome.^[8] Russian Senator Ziad Sabsabi conducted a near-simultaneous visit to Qamishli in coordination with the Russian Ministry of Defense to secure the release of twenty-one Russian Chechens and Dagestanis from Afrin Canton.^[9] Russia has also mounted long-standing efforts to generate a unified bloc of Syrian Kurds. Russian Gen. Alexander Dvornikov hosted a conference for representatives from 24 Syrian Kurdish political parties - including the PYD and KNC - at the Hmeymim Airbase on the Syrian Coast in December 2016.^[10] Russia nonetheless faces challenges from its partner in the Assad Regime. Assad reportedly rejected calls to consider federalism and favorable constitutional reforms for the Syrian Kurds by Russia in October 2016.^[11] The upcoming Syrian Congress on National Dialogue in Sochi will likely encounter similar hurdles. Russia nonetheless stands to use its leadership of the political process to further subvert the future influence of the U.S. in Syria.

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^[1] https://ria(.)ru/syria/20171031/1507926606.html

^[2] http://www.mid(.)ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2927253

^[3]http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-jaafari/syrian-government-says-ready-to-take-part-in-moscow-backed-congress-idUSKBN1D02CX

^[4] http://www.rudaw.net/arabic/kurdistan/1910201715

[5] https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/10/syria-federal-state-kurds-turkey-russia.html; https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/turkey-russia-mediates-between-kurds-and-assad.html; http://in.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-russia-syria/russia-says-federal-model-is-possible-for-syria-in-future-idINKCN0W21TP

^[6] http://www.shaam.org/news/syria-news/الخطة-الروسية-في-الوصول-للحل-السلمي-في-سوريا-والتحضيرات-لـ-مؤتمر-الشعوب-في-حميميم.html

^[7] https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/180946; https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/82378/

^[8] https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/179024; http://www.rudaw.net/arabic/kurdistan/1910201715

^[9] https://sputniknews(.)com/middleeast/201710221058441116-russia-syria-rescue-operation/; https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/179105

^[10] http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/371034

^[11]http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/turkey-russia-mediates-between-kurds-and-assad.html

The Kremlin Targets Ukraine Through Hungary

By Nataliya Bugayova with Franklin Holcomb

Key Takeaway: Russia has likely exploited recent tensions between Hungary and Ukraine to support its campaign to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its neighbors. The Kremlin has also revived its subversion in Western Ukraine focusing on minorities’ autonomy issues. It is unlikely that the Kremlin intends to create an insurgency there as it did in Eastern Ukraine, but it may create another fissure that destabilizes Kyiv. The Kremlin is also likely to attempt to stoke tensions between Ukraine and its other neighbors with minorities in Western Ukraine, such as Poland. The U.S. must watch these trends, which are likely to be slow-burning and subtle. They have implications for Ukraine’s stability and provide insight into Russia’s evolving methods of irregular warfare.

Key Facts

o Ukraine passed an educational bill that mandates the use of the Ukrainian language in schools on September 25.

o Nationalists in Hungary, which shares a border with Ukraine, condemned the bill for infringing upon the rights of 150,000 Hungarians in Western Ukraine’s Zakharpatiya (Trans-Carpathia) region. Hungary’s Russia-linked extreme nationalist[1] Jobbik party participated in a rally calling[2] for the self-determination of Zakharpatiya in Budapest on October 13.

o The Hungarian government threatened to halt Ukraine’s integration with the EU, though it received no support from key EU states. It also blocked[3] the next Ukraine-NATO Commission meeting[4] on October 27.

o Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban also has a relatively strong relationship[5] with Russia. Hungary is the only EU country Russian President Vladimir Putin visited twice in 2017. The Kremlin also agreed[6] on a $12 billion nuclear plant modernization project in Hungary planned for early 2018.

o Other Eastern European countries with ethnic communities in Ukraine criticized the bill but did not take as confrontational a stance as Hungary.[7]

o The Russian media launched a campaign to amplify this self-determination narrative, which it has propagated in the past, and criticize the Ukrainian law as “anti-European.”[8] 

o Although Ukraine and Hungary might have come to a compromise[9], the Kremlin intervened and set conditions to exploit this vulnerability in the future.

The Kremlin has likely attempted to foster separatist narratives within Hungarian minorities in 
Western Ukraine for years.

o Russia likely developed and leveraged its ties with a far-right Hungarian party, Jobbik, to propagate the idea of Zakharpatiya’s autonomy. ISW assesses that the Kremlin supports Jobbik. The U.S. has reportedly been investigating[10] Russian funding of political parties in Europe, where Jobbik is a potential Kremlin target. A Jobbik Member of the European Parliament, Bela Kovacs, has been under investigation[11] by Hungarian authorities since 2014 over suspicions of working for Russian intelligence. Kovacs has had an office in Berehove, a key Ukrainian town with Hungarian minorities, since December 2010[12]. Kovacs advocated[13] for the creation of a special administrative district for Hungarian-speaking towns in Zakharpatiya as a necessary precondition to Ukraine’s joining the EU Association Agreement in 2013. Jobbik members were among the observers in support of the illegitimate Russian referendum[14] in Crimea[15] in March 2015 and the illegal election held in the Russian proxy “Donetsk People’s Republic” in November 2014[16]. Jobbik members conducted a rally calling for self-determination[17] of Hungarians in Zakharpatiya in Budapest after the Russian occupation of Crimea in March 2014. Jobbik’s leader, Gábor Vona, called[18] Russia the “Eurasian power that could spearhead a real…resistance against the Euro-Atlantic bloc.”

o The Russian media created false narratives that dramatically overstated the aspirations of Hungarian minorities to gain autonomy. Two notable disinformation campaigns included reports[19] about the Ruthenes, another ethnic group in Zakharpatiya, holding a congress demanding their autonomy in March 2015. Another Russian media campaign[20] claimed that Rusyn and Hungarian communities of Zakharpatiya held a congress in Budapest, where they allegedly called for the federal status of their region in August of 2015. The respective communities’ leaders have debunked both Russian narratives.

o The Kremlin likely attempted to build local organizations to use as a subversion tool. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) issued a warning[21] to the Zakarpatiya Regional Organization for the Protection of Workers Rights about its potential criminal liability for encroachment on the territorial integrity of Ukraine in July 2015. The organization, registered only one month earlier[22], promoted the idea of a special self-governing territory for Hungarian minorities as being essential for ensuring workers’ rights. Local investigative journalists soon exposed[23] the organization’s connections to Russia, and the SBU’s warning followed shortly thereafter.

Russia may have exploited the recent tensions between Ukraine and Hungary to revive its subversion efforts on Ukraine’s Western border.

o Jobbik called for the autonomy of Hungarian minorities in Western Ukraine. Jobbik reportedly organized[24] a “Zakharpatiya self-determination” rally in Budapest on October 13, calling for the autonomy of the region. News reports showed some of the participants holding signs reading “Hungary wants Transcarpathia back![25]” Jobbik renewed its push for a regular all-Hungarian roundtable[26] on the Transcarpathian issue on September 29. Jobbik promised to launch a significant “struggle[27] for the autonomy of Hungarian communities living abroad” within the context of its election campaign. Both Jobbik and Hungary’s ruling nationalist Fidescz party are likely to use the issue of Hungarian minorities abroad to gain political capital ahead of Hungary’s 2018 elections.

o The Kremlin launched a media operation to amplify Hungarian nationalist criticism of the Ukrainian educational bill.[28] The Hungarian Government threatened to ask the EU to revise its association agreement[29] with Ukraine, and strongly condemned the bill. Poland, Romania, and others with ethnic communities in Ukraine criticized the bill but did not further press their concerns. Polish officials stated on October 23 that they do not view the bill as a threat and that minority groups should be able to know both Ukrainian and Polish[30] languages. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin stated that Ukraine and Hungary found a compromise[31] and will cooperate on the execution of the law on October 19. Nevertheless, the Hungarian government escalated by blocking[32] the next Ukraine-NATO commission meeting on October 27. Russian propaganda boosted the Hungarian nationalist narrative and continued to frame Ukraine as an oppressor of minorities, suggesting that Ukraine is about to lose additional territory[33] and push away its European[34] and NATO[35] partners.

o The Russian media campaign is also likely targeting Hungarian minorities in Ukraine to inflame ethnic tensions. The Russian media narratives warn of alleged Ukrainian repressions against ethnic Hungarians in Western Ukraine, which greatly resembles Russia’s propaganda in Ukraine’s Donbas region.[36]

The Kremlin is likely pursuing a broader campaign aimed at driving a wedge between Ukraine and its European[37] neighbors. Ukrainian authorities arrested a group of saboteurs on October 2 who were attempting to destroy a Hungarian monument in Zakharpatiya. Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov stated the detained individuals were connected to the defunct pro-Russia Party of Regions in Ukraine. Avakov stated that the gang was responsible for at least eight other incidents intended to inflame tensions between Ukraine and EU in 2016-2017. Earlier in 2017, for example, protest participants claimed that Russia-backed elements paid them to instigate anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalist protests at the Polish embassy in Kyiv on July 7.[38]

Implications

It is unlikely that Russia intends to or is able to create a Donbas-like insurgency in Zakharpatiya. This Western Ukrainian region has strong pro-Ukrainian sentiments, small minority communities, and other differentiating factors. However, sustained Russian subversion may create another destabilization problem for Kyiv to solve. Growing pre-election rhetoric from Hungarian nationalist parties about protecting Hungarians abroad has amplified the Kremlin’s continued cultivation of minorities’ self-determination and autonomy movements. The Kremlin’s information operations in turn amplify Hungarian messaging. The cumulative effect may lead to more discussions about special status for the region and, potentially, to a referendum in the longer term. Kyiv’s increased focus on its own 2019 elections and the continued war in Eastern Ukraine may prevent the Ukrainian government from allocating necessary resources to address underlying concerns in Zakharpatiya and otherwise resisting Russia’s subversion. The complexity of the situation may allow Russia to effectively conceal its hand and portray any escalation as indigenous confrontation between ethnic groups within Ukraine or Ukraine and its neighbor. Additional destabilization may stretch Kyiv’s already thin resources and damage Ukraine’s relations with its European partners. Finally, the Kremlin’s reinforcement of regional self-determination narratives and the rhetoric about protecting minorities abroad among Eastern European states helps Russia legitimize its own expansionist actions, which it claims are motivated by its desire to “protect” Russian minorities.

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[1] “Intent on unsettling the EU, Russia Taps Soldiers from the Fringe,” The New York Times, December 24, 2016. Available https://www(.)nytimes.com/2016/12/24/world/europe/intent-on-unsettling-eu-russia-taps-foot-soldiers-from-the-fringe.html,

[2] “Jobbik Party is the Organizer of Rally for Zakarpattia Self-Determination,” 122 UA, October 12, 2017. Available https://112.international/politics/jobbik-party-is-organizer-of-rally-for-zakarpattia-self-determination-21600(.)html

[3] “Hungary blocks Ukraine-NATO Commission meeting in December due to education law” UNIAN, October 27, 2017. Available https://www(.)unian.info/politics/2212494-hungary-blocks-ukraine-nato-commission-meeting-in-december-due-to-education-law.html

[4] “Hungary cannot support Ukraine's integration aspirations” [Russian] Kormany, October 27, 2017. Available http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/hirek/magyarorszag-nem-tudja-tamogatni-ukrajna-integracios-torekveseit

[5] “Why Putin need Orban,” Politico EU, February 1, 2017. Available https://www(.)politico.eu/article/why-vladimir-putin-needs-viktor-orban-russia-hungary/ ; “Russia-Hungary relations continue developing – Medvedev” TASS, August 20, 2017. Available http://tass.com/politics/961091 

[6] “Putin Tells Hungary's Orban Nuclear Plant Expansion To Start Next Year” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty August 29, 2017. Available https://www(.)rferl.org/a/putin-hungary-orban-judo/28700669.html

[7] “Poland not to support Hungary’s protest against Ukraine’s education law” UNIAN October 20, 2017. Available https://www(.)unian.info/politics/2198011-poland-not-to-support-hungarys-protest-against-ukraines-education-law.html ; “Waszczykowski critical of Putin visits Hungary” [Polish] Rzeczpospolita October 19, 2017 Available http://www(.)rp.pl/Dyplomacja/171018766-Waszczykowski-krytycznie-o-wizytach-Putina-na-Wegrzech.html

[8] “Ukraine’s law on education undercuts legal norms of any state, official says” TASS September 26, 2017 Available http://tass(.)com/politics/967613

[9] “Ukraine and Hungary will work together to implement the Law on Education” [Russian] Pravda, October 19, 2017 Available http://www(.)pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2017/10/19/7158982/ ; “Paruby - Venice Commission: The discussion about the Law on Education has more political than legal grounds” [Russian] Censor.net October 31, 2017. Available https://censor.net.ua/news/461178/parubiyi_venetsianskoyi_komissii_diskussiya_vokrug_zakona_ob_obrazovanii_imeet_bolshe_politicheskie

[10] “Russia accused of clandestine funding of European parties as US conducts major review of Vladimir Putin's strategy” The Telegraph, January 16, 2016. Available http://www.telegraph(.)co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/12103602/America-to-investigate-Russian-meddling-in-EU.html

[11] Hungary: European Parliament Lifts Immunity for Spy Suspect,” The New York Times, October 14, 2015. Available https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/world/europe/hungary-european-parliament-lifts-immunity-for-spy-suspect.html; New Dimension of diplomatic Conflict between Ukraine and Hungary [Ukranian] Euromaidan Press October 18, 2017. Available http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2017/10/17/separatism-transcarpathian-style-is-hungary-aiming-to-grab-a-part-of-ukraine/#arvlbdata; “Is the Hungarian far-right Jobbik party financed by Russia?” Hungarian Spectrum January 20, 2017. Available http://hungarianspectrum(.)org/2016/01/20/is-the-hungarian-far-right-jobbik-party-financed-by-russia/

[12] “Hungary Intend to Legally Deprive Transcarpathia. Infographics,” [Ukrainian] March 12, 2017. Available https://www(.)volynnews.com/news/policy/uhorshchyna-planuye-lehalno-vidibraty-zakarpattia-infohrafika/

[13] “Baile Kovacs states that Ukraine will not be in the EU without Prityansky district in Transcarpathia” [Ukrainian] Mukachevo.net October 19, 2013. Available http://www(.)mukachevo.net/ua/news/view/81604-Бейла-Ковач-заявляє-що-Україна-не-буде-в-ЄС-без-Притисянського-округу-на-Закарпатті-ФОТО

[14] “Jobbik: Crimea referendum is Exemplary” Jobbik March 18, 2014. Available http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik_crimea_referendum_exemplary

[15] “The Kremlin Connections of the Hungarian Far-Right,” Stratfor April 20, 2015. Available https://worldview(.)stratfor.com/the-hub/kremlin-connections-hungarian-far-right

[16] “Potemkin Observers” The Economist, November 4, 2014. Available https://www(.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/11/ukraines-rebels-and-eurosceptics

[17] “Petition to the Government of Hungary for Transcarpathia,” gaudinagytamas, April 3, 2014. Available http://gaudinagytamas(.)hu/petition_government_hungary_transcarpathia; “The Kremlin Connections of the Hungarian Far-Right,” Stratfor April 20, 2015. Available https://worldview(.)stratfor.com/the-hub/kremlin-connections-hungarian-far-right; New Dimension of diplomatic Conflict between Ukraine and Hungary [Ukranian] Euromaidan Press October 18, 2017. Available http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2017/10/17/separatism-transcarpathian-style-is-hungary-aiming-to-grab-a-part-of-ukraine/#arvlbdata; “Experts elaborate on nature of Hungary-Ukraine Tensions,” Unian, October 17, 2017. Available; https://www.unian(.)info/politics/2190989-experts-elaborate-on-nature-of-hungary-ukraine-tensions.html; “Hankering for Transcarpathia? Hungary is attacking Ukraine,” UKrop News, October 12, 2017 Available https://ukropnews24(.)com/hankering-for-transcarpathia-hungary-is-attacking-ukraine/

[18] “The Voice of Russia-Exclusive interview with Gabor Vona” Jobbik September 4, 2013. Available http://www(.)jobbik.com/voice_russia_-_exclusive_interview_g%C3%A1bor_vona

[19] “Long Live Ruthenia,” The Economist, April 3, 2015. Available http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21647828-russian-press-cooks-up-ethnic-separatism-transcarpathia-long-live-ruthenia; “Rusyns in Transcarpathia demand recognition of their nationality and autonomy edge through dialogue” [Russian] TASS March 14, 2015. Available http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1828915

[20] “Carpatho-Rusyns Deny Reports on their struggle for their Region’s Federal Status,” StopFake, August 14, 2014. Available https://www.stopfake(.)org/en/carpatho-rusyns-refuted-information-about-their-struggle-for-the-federal-status-of-their-region/; “Information Hygiene: Who Spreads Rumors and Fake News” [Ukrainian] MediaSapiens, September 17, 2014. Available http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/ethics/manipulation/informatsiyna_gigiena_khto_poshiryue_chutki_ta_feyki/

[21] “In Transcarpathia, The SBU Announced the Closure of an Organization associated with the Separatist Gatsk,” [Ukrainian] Tyzhden, July 28, 2015. Available http://mobile(.)tyzhden.ua/news/142108

[22] “Regular Kremlin-“Rusyn" project (DOCUMENTS) (VIDEO) was registered in Uzhhorod under the guise of "Zarobitchan" organization,” [Ukrainian] Zakarpattya, June 10, 2015. Available http://zakarpattya(.)net.ua/News/141042-V-Uzhhorodi-pid-vyhliadom-zarobitchanskoi-orhanizatsii-zareiestruvaly-cherhovyi-kremlivsko-rusynskyi-proekt-DOKUMENTY-VIDEO “Transcarpathia in the context of threats to the territorial Integrity of Ukraine” [Ukrainian] Nbuviap 2015. Available. http://nbuviap(.)gov.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1271:zakarpattya-2&catid=63&Itemid=393

[23] “Regular Kremlin-“Rusyn" project (DOCUMENTS) (VIDEO) was registered in Uzhhorod under the guise of "Zarobitchan" organization,” [Ukrainian] Zakarpattya, June 10, 2015. Available http://zakarpattya(.)net.ua/News/141042-V-Uzhhorodi-pid-vyhliadom-zarobitchanskoi-orhanizatsii-zareiestruvaly-cherhovyi-kremlivsko-rusynskyi-proekt-DOKUMENTY-VIDEO

[24] “Ukraine Crisis: Hands Off Transcarpathia!” Huffpost, 2014. Available https://www(.)huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/ukraine-crisis-hands-off_b_5358893.html; “I’ve lost my illusions about a united Europe, not hope,” Kyiv Post, Oct 17, 2017. Available https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/veronika-melkozerova-ive-lost-illusions-united-europe-not-hope.html; “Jobbik Party is the Organizer of Rally for Zakarpattia Self-Determination,” 122 UA, October 12, 2017. Available https://112.international/politics/jobbik-party-is-organizer-of-rally-for-zakarpattia-self-determination-21600(.)html; “Experts elaborate on nature of Hungary-Ukraine Tensions,” Unian, October 17, 2017. Available; https://www.unian(.)info/politics/2190989-experts-elaborate-on-nature-of-hungary-ukraine-tensions.html;

[25] “Ukraine Crisis: Hands Off Transcarpathia!” Huffpost, 2014. Available https://www(.)huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/ukraine-crisis-hands-off_b_5358893.html; “Self-determination from the "bobby" and "great Hungary" from Orban. What is happening in Transcarpathia” [Russian] Ctpaha October 14, 2017. Available https://strana(.)ua/articles/analysis/98659-stanet-li-zakarpate-ukrainskoj-kataloniej.html

[26] “Jobbik initiates all-Hungarian roundtable discussion on Transcarpathian situation” Jobbik, 2017. Available http://jobbik(.)com/jobbik_initiates_all_hungarian_roundtable_discussion_on_transcarpathian_situation

[27] “Gábor Vona promises real struggle for autonomy after 2018” Jobbik 2017. Available http://www(.)jobbik.com/gabor_vona_promises_real_struggle_for_autonomy_after_2018; “Jobbik stands for Hungarians in Transylvania and Partium” Daily News Hungary, April 24, 2017. Available https://dailynewshungary(.)com/jobbik-stands-hungarians-transylvania-partium/

[28] “No place for Ukraine in EU, Hungary says after Kiev outlaws education in minority languages” RT, September 26, 2017. Available https://www(.)rt.com/news/404683-hungary-outraged-ukraine-education/; “’Major impediment’: PACE says Ukraine education law violates ethnic minority rights” RT October 12, 2017 Available https://www(.)rt.com/news/406519-pace-ukraine-education-law/

[29] “Hungary Steps up pressure on Ukraine over new education Law” Washington Post, October 10, 2017. Unavailable https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/hungary-steps-up-pressure-on-ukraine-over-new-education-law/2017/10/10/473b0324-ad8d-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html?utm_term=.1c2c74a82ff8

[30] “Poland not to support Hungary’s protest against Ukraine’s education law” UNIAN October 20, 2017. Available https://www(.)unian.info/politics/2198011-poland-not-to-support-hungarys-protest-against-ukraines-education-law.html, “Waszczykowski critical of Putin visits Hungary” [Polish] Rzeczpospolita October 19, 2017 Available http://www(.)rp.pl/Dyplomacja/171018766-Waszczykowski-krytycznie-o-wizytach-Putina-na-Wegrzech.html

[31] “Ukraine and Hungary will work together to implement the Law on Education” [Russian] Pravda, October 19, 2017 Available http://www(.)pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2017/10/19/7158982/

[32] “Hungary blocks Ukraine-NATO Commission meeting in December due to education law” UNIAN, October 27, 2017. Available https://www(.)unian.info/politics/2212494-hungary-blocks-ukraine-nato-commission-meeting-in-december-due-to-education-law.html

[33] “From Hungary the Hungarian piece will fall off” [Russian] YTOP.py October 12, 2017. Available https://utro(.)ru/politics(/)2017/10/12/1342545.shtml

[34] “"Forget about the European future." Why Hungary became the enemy of Ukraine” AIF.ru September 26, 2017 Available http://www(.)aif.ru/politics/world/zabudte_o_evropeyskom_budushchem_pochemu_vengriya_stala_vragom_ukrainy

[35] “Not on My Watch: Hungary Vetoes NATO-Ukraine Summit” Sputnik October 29, 2017. Available https://(s)putniknews.com/europe/201710291058630471-hungary-vetoes-nato-ukraine-summit/

[36] “Fake: Ukraine Begins Repression of Hungarians in Transcarpathia” StopFake, May 25, 2017. Available https://www(.)stopfake.org/en/fake-ukraine-begins-repression-of-hungarians-in-transcarpathia/; Propaganda piece: “Hungarians create autonomy in Transcarpathia” [Russian] YTPO.py May 19, 2017 available https://utro(.)ru/articles/2017/05/19/1327600.shtml; Hungarian Community in Transcarpathia set a Stele in the Native Language [Russian] May 18, 2017 Available http://ru.golos(.)ua/uncategory/vengerskaya_obschina_zakarpatya_ustanovila_stelyi_na_rodnom_yazyike_video_5307

[37] “In MVD tied series resonant crime audio band, whose members are detained (added)” [Russian] Donbass News October 2, 2017 Available http://novosti(.)dn.ua/news/274911-v-mvd-svyazaly-ryad-rezonansnykh-prestuplenyy-s-odnoy-bandoy-uchastnyky-kotoroy-zaderzhany ; “Ukraine busts gang plotting to blow up Hungarian monument in Zakarpattia to boost tensions UNIAN, October 2, 2017 Available https://www(.)unian.info/society/2165641-ukraine-busts-gang-plotting-to-blow-up-hungarian-monument-in-zakarpattia-to-boost-tensions.html” ; “Avakov Said that the arrest of a groupof performers of nine resonant crimes” [Ukrainian] Ukrinform October 2, 2017. Available https://www(.)ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2316491-avakov-zaaviv-pro-zatrimanna-grupi-vikonavciv-devati-rezonansnih-zlociniv.html ; “Interior Ministry of Ukraine told about the arrest of the gang, "incited xenophobia"” [Belarusian] Radio Svaboda, October 2, 2017. Available https://www(.)svaboda.org/a/28769533.html

[38] “Provocative rally at the Polish Consulate in Kiev was ordered by the secret services of Russia - Security [Ukrainian] УНІАН July 7, 2017, available : https://www.unian.ua/incidents/2017391-provokativna-aktsiya-bilya-konsulstva-polschi-v-kievi-bula-zamovlena-spetsslujbami-rf-sbu.html”