Al Qaeda Resumes Offensive Operations in Syria

Jennifer Cafarella

Al Qaeda in Syria has resumed offensive operations against the Syrian regime in northern Syria after the fall of Aleppo City. The recapture of Aleppo City by Syrian president Bashar al Assad and his external backers was a turning point in the Syrian civil war, but it did not seal Assad’s victory. It was instead a victory for Al Qaeda because it defeated Al Qaeda’s main competitors in northern Syria. Al Qaeda consolidated its strength and resumed offensive operations against pro-Assad forces in February 2017. Pro-Assad forces could begin to lose terrain to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda will increasingly pose a threat to the West as its strength in northern Syria grows. The contest between Al Qaeda and pro-Assad forces, which include Iran and Russia, will increasingly challenge U.S. policy options in Syria.

Al Qaeda won a victory in Aleppo in two important ways. First, it won favor with opposition groups in August and October 2016 by launching two offensives to break the regime’s siege of opposition held neighborhoods of the city, the first of which temporarily succeeded. Al Qaeda’s effort – and temporary success – demonstrated its value to the Syrian opposition and its commitment to defending populations in opposition-held areas. Al Qaeda did not test whether it was strong enough to prevent Aleppo from falling after failing to keep the siege broken. Assad and his external backers used horrifying tactics to recapture Aleppo City, which Al Qaeda exploited to recruit. The fall of Aleppo City also neutralized opposition groups that had constrained Al Qaeda’s influence in northern Syria. Al Qaeda meanwhile preserved its own military strength and resources for future operations.

Al Qaeda took steps to advance its goal of merging all northern opposition groups under its leadership after the battle for Aleppo. Al Qaeda attacked numerous U.S.-backed groups in Idlib in January and February 2017 and forced them and other independent groups to merge under Ahrar al Sham on January 26. Prior to the merger, Ahrar al Sham’s leader reaffirmed the group's ideology and goals, which align with Al Qaeda. The statement served as a guarantee that the absorption of moderates would not dilute Ahrar al Sham. Al Qaeda’s formal affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Fatah al Sham (JFS), then absorbed four smaller, allied opposition groups and siphoned off hundreds of fighters from Ahrar al Sham on January 28 and rebranded itself into Hayyat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS). The creation of HTS involved a full merger of all military forces into a single fighting force, according to the statement announcing the formation. Al Qaeda intends to demonstrate how a full merger can increase the combat effectiveness of the whole. HTS will now lead a major offensive campaign in order to revive the opposition’s war effort after the fall of Aleppo City.

Al Qaeda obfuscated the success of its merger by appointing a veteran Al Qaeda commander formerly within Ahrar al Sham named Hashim Al-Sheikh to command HTS. Al Qaeda likely chose to elevate Hashim Al Sheikh because of his reputation as an effective military commander and because the U.S. has not listed him as a specially designated terrorist. Al Qaeda continues to prioritize staying below the threshold of American policy as it proceeds with its program to transform the Syrian opposition in Syria into a global Salafi-Jihadi base. Hashim al Sheikh is also likely viewed more favorably by Syrian opposition elements that remain hesitant to merge fully with Al Qaeda. Former JFS leader Abu Mohammad al Joulani meanwhile took control of HTS military forces in order to build his reputation as an effective anti-Assad commander.

HTS resumed offensive operations against pro-Assad forces in late February 2017. HTS launched a complex, coordinated attack against two regime military installations in Homs City on February 25. Five HTS sleeper cell members detonated Suicide Vests (SVESTs) outside the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in the al-Mahatta and al-Ghouta Districts of Homs City. The attack killed dozens of regime soldiers including two high-ranking generals. It set conditions for follow-on military operations by disrupting the regime’s command and control and possibly fixing pro-regime forces in Homs City. HTS’ most likely operational objective is to attack Hama City, which has symbolic resonance for the Salafi Jihadi movement because of the 1982 massacre conducted by former Syrian president Hafez Al Assad against the Muslim Brotherhood and its alleged supporters. HTS may alternately launch an offensive against the regime’s coastal stronghold in order to shake the regime’s confidence and possibly to threaten Russia’s military bases in Latakia and Tartous.

A major HTS-led campaign against pro-Assad forces would require Assad and his external backers to dedicate significant resources to defense. It would likely deny them the ability to launch clearing operations in Idlib Province after consolidating in Aleppo City. It may force Russia and Iran to dedicate more resources to the Syrian theater in order to defend key regime-held terrain. HTS could degrade the regime’s defenses enough to create opportunities for ISIS to advance after the regime’s recapture of Palmyra. ISIS has conducted regular attacks deep into Homs City, indicating that it is positioned to exploit regime vulnerabilities that HTS may inflict and vice versa. It is also possible, although less likely, that HTS and ISIS will coordinate tactically against the regime in the Homs-Hama corridor. Most dangerous possibilities include simultaneous and possibly coordinated Al Qaeda and ISIS offensives that overmatch the Syrian regime’s defenses north of Damascus. Russia and Iran are taking steps to bolster the regime’s ability to defend terrain against major offensives, but it is unclear how rapidly they can respond or how many positions they can defend at once.

President Trump will face a decision point on how to respond to the resumption of large-scale violence in western Syria. Russia will attempt to draw the U.S. into a counterterrorism partnership in Syria in reaction to HTS’ upcoming offensive. President Trump must avoid ceding more power to Russia in Syria in return for a counterterrorism partnership that would only radicalize Syria’s population further. Al Qaeda’s continued rise demonstrates that a counterterrorism strategy is inappropriate, furthermore. The U.S. will not destroy Al Qaeda’s army in Syria through precision airstrikes against individual high profile Al Qaeda operatives. President Trump must instead adopt a new long-term strategy that integrates American efforts against Al Qaeda and ISIS to destroy both armies while depriving them of local support. 

Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 26 – February 28, 2017

By Jonathan Mautner

Russia waged an aggressive air campaign against critical civilian infrastructure in southern and northern Syria from February 12 – 27, marking the continuation of a policy Russia has implemented since the start of its intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Russia conducted heavy waves of airstrikes against opposition terrain in southern Dera’a Province during this period, supporting pro-regime forces after U.S.-backed Southern Front-affiliated groups and prominent Salafi-jihadi factions launched a joint offensive to capture the regime-held Manshiya District in Dera’a City. Russian warplanes repeatedly targeted medical facilities and other vital civilian infrastructure in the area, aiming to depopulate opposition-held districts of the city and draw opposition forces away from front lines. Russian airstrikes also targeted hospitals in southern Idlib and western Aleppo Provinces, likely in anticipation of a pending opposition offensive against regime-held Hama City. Notably, the UN concluded two weeks prior that Russian and regime airstrikes extensively targeted hospitals in Aleppo City from July – November 2016, such that “no hospitals were left functioning” in December. The UN findings and recent wave of hospital strikes indicate that Russia will continue to flout international humanitarian law and target civilian infrastructure as part and parcel of its way of war in Syria.

The Russian air campaign in southern and northern Syria also rendered acceptable opposition groups increasingly vulnerable to Salafi-jihadist attacks. Russian airstrikes in and around Dera’a City enabled ISIS affiliate Jaysh Khalid ibn al Walid to seize several towns from opposition forces in the vicinity of the nearby Yarmuk Basin, an area dominated by the Southern Front. Russian warplanes also targeted a headquarters of former U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Jaysh Idlib al Hur in southern Idlib Province on February 15, likely emboldening al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate to threaten the weakened group ten days later. Although Russian airstrikes facilitated pro-regime gains against ISIS in eastern Homs Province from February 8 – 11 and 26 – 28, the ambit of Russia’s anti-ISIS effort extends only so far as it aligns with its goal to preserve the Syrian regime. In contrast, Russia will continue to invest heavily in the targeting of acceptable opposition groups, so as to make them more susceptible to recruitment and attack by ISIS and al Qaeda. As Russia continues to both violate international legal norms and accelerate the radicalization of the armed opposition, it all but disqualifies itself as a viable partner for the U.S. counter-terrorism coalition.

The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.

High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.

Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.

Syria Situation Report: February 24 - March 2, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

Opposition groups backed by Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield attacked the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near Manbij in Northern Aleppo Province on March 1. The SDF-affiliated Manbij Military Council later claimed on March 2 that its fighters will turn over a number of frontline villages outside of Manbij to pro-regime ‘border guards’ as part of a deal brokered by Russia to deescalate the clashes and prevent further expansion by Turkey in Northern Syria. Meanwhile, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) - the successor of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fatah al-Sham - conducted simultaneous attacks targeting two regime intelligence branches in Homs City with gunfire, IEDs, and SVESTs on February 25. HTS Military Emir Abu Mohammad al-Joulani stated that the attacks aimed to undermine the ongoing Geneva Talks on the Syrian Civil War. Finally, pro-regime forces recaptured Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province on March 2 after ISIS withdrew from the city. ISIS recaptured Palmyra in December 2016 while pro-regime forces conducted operations to seize full control of Aleppo City.

These graphics mark the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of February 16, 2017.

The Campaign for Mosul: February 22 - March 1, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) isolated Mosul completely on March 1 as units advanced within the city towards the government center. The Popular Mobilization are nearing Tel Afar from the west and could breach the city in the coming weeks.

Increased U.S. investments in Mosul since December 2016 have ensured smoother and quicker operations in the western half of the city. The U.S. increased its involvement in December 2016 when the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared close to culminating in eastern Mosul. The U.S. and Coalition embedded advisors at the brigade- and battalion-level, rather than at the division-level, improving the ISF’s cross-axis coordination. Recent reports also revealed that the December directives granted advisors the ability to call in airstrikes without going through a joint operations cell in Baghdad. The new directive was lauded as adding “precision” to ground operations; it also underscores that U.S. personnel are increasingly at the frontlines of the operation. Indicators from the new U.S. Administration, including a proposed 10% budget increase for the Department of Defense, suggest that it may expand the level of U.S. involvement in Iraq, beyond the Mosul operation. 

The ISF isolated Mosul completely after units from the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division took the Tel Afar-Mosul road on March 1. The division will continue along the road to the west, looking to retake the ISIS-held town of Badush on the Tigris River, and will likely turn east as well in order to breach Mosul’s northwestern neighborhoods. Operations inside of Mosul have steadily advanced after the initial push to recapture the airport and military base on February 24. Units from the Iraqi Army, Federal Police, and Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) retook three adjacent neighborhoods from February 25 to 28 and have seized the western side of the Fourth Bridge, marking full control of one of five bridges that span the Tigris River in Mosul. All five bridges are inoperable, but the ISF may now be able to repair the Fourth Bridge to transit supplies and personnel in from the east. The ISF is now preparing to advance further into Mosul’s city center. 

ISIS’s resistance remains capable and deadly, despite these advances. ISIS launched indirect fire at the Mosul airport after the ISF declared it under control, killing four Iraqi soldiers on February 23. ISIS also began to burn civilian homes and vehicles on February 27, producing thick black smoke. ISIS similarly burned tires and oil in eastern Mosul to produce smoke cover in October 2016. ISIS’s resistance may increase as the ISF nears the Old City and government center, especially if escape routes are cut. However, ISIS could also attempt a counteroffensive in eastern Mosul in order to draw forces back across the river. 

The Popular Mobilization, meanwhile, is nearing Tel Afar, now a primarily Sunni Turkmen town and a historic insurgent hotspot. The militias, alongside two army brigades, will likely breach the city from the west within the coming weeks. Other militias currently operating further east of the city may make up ground during that time and match the western axis’s advance. The Popular Mobilization has cited the Iraqi Army Aviation (IAA) as a key participant in their advance towards the city and the IAA has been increasingly assessed to be providing the bulk of airstrikes for the militia operations. Doing so, however, reduces the U.S.’s ability to effectively leverage its airstrikes in order to condition militia participation in operations. The U.S. must establish a strategy that secures sufficient leverage over Iran to reduce its influence over Iraq’s security forces and ensure continued U.S. presence in Iraq beyond the Mosul operation.

Turkey Prepares Offensive Against Syrian Democratic Forces in Manbij

By Christopher Kozak

An open conflict will likely erupt imminently between Turkey and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the town of Manbij in Northern Syria. Turkey considers the Syrian Kurdish YPG – the main component of the SDF - to be an extension of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is currently waging an insurgency in Southern Turkey. The fight for Manbij will derail the U.S.-backed campaign against ISIS and create opportunities for al Qaeda to expand further in Syria. The U.S. must reduce its dependence upon both Turkey and the Syrian Kurdish YPG.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan has repeatedly stated his intent to expel the Syrian Kurdish YPG – the main component of the SDF – from Manbij to the Euphrates River’s eastern bank. 

• Turkish President Recep Erdogan reiterated on February 28 that Turkish-backed opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield will advance against Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province after they finish consolidating control over Al-Bab, located twenty five miles to the west. Turkish-backed forces in Operation Euphrates Shield seized Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province on February 23 after ISIS withdrew from the city and its environs toward Ar-Raqqa City. 

• The end of combat operations in Al-Bab frees Erdogan to pursue his strategic aim to roll back the de-facto contiguous autonomous zone controlled by the YPG along the Syrian-Turkish Border.

The U.S. reportedly gave a deadline of February 27 for Turkey to present an alternative operational plan to seize Ar-Raqqa City as part of a wider review of the campaign against ISIS due to U.S. President Donald Trump on the same day.

• Turkey proposed inserting opposition forces into Tel Abyad in Northern Ar-Raqqa Province and forming a ‘corridor’ through terrain held by the SDF as part of a its preferred plan for an offensive against Ar-Raqqa City during a meeting between Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar and U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford on February 17. 

• Senior U.S. officials remain unwilling to contemplate proposals to exclude the SDF from operations against Ar-Raqqa City despite high-level lobbying by Turkey. Instead, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gen. James Mattis met with Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik on February 15 and offered increased intelligence support for operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq. 

• Erdogan has already demonstrated his willingness to take actions in Syria that undermine U.S. policy positions and admonitions. Turkey threatened to partner with Russia to conduct joint airstrikes against ISIS in Al-Bab, and then did so after the U.S. ignored its repeated requests for air support. 

The U.S. has taken overt actions to deter an attack by Turkey and reaffirm its support for the SDF over the past several weeks given the growing risk of a direct military conflict.

• U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Joseph Votel and Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend met with senior SDF leaders in Northern Syria on February 24. Anonymous sources claimed that the U.S. pledged to protect Manbij against attacks from Turkey. CENTCOM denied any such assurances. 

• CENTCOM publicized several photos over the past week highlighting the role of the Manbij Military Council (MMC) in the campaign against ISIS in Northern Syria. The MMC is a component of the Syrian Democratic Forces that retains close organizational ties to the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) - the political wing of the YPG. 

• The U.S. led a field inspection with a delegation from the Turkish Armed Forces in December 2016 to demonstrate that the YPG had withdrawn completely from Manbij. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu later stated that the visit failed to satisfy concerns that the town remains controlled by proxies of the group. Thousands of residents held demonstrations in Manbij on February 13 calling for the release of imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan. 

• Unconfirmed activist reports claim that some of the 500 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) currently present in Northern Syria may have been deployed to frontlines on the Sajur River near Manbij within the past several days in order to deter further aggression by Turkey. 

Turkish leaders met on February 27 and likely made the decision to proceed with operations against Manbij rather than wait on coalition support for an offensive against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City.

• Erdogan called unscheduled meetings with Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik and Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar in Istanbul on February 27. 

• Turkish Presidential Advisor Ilnur Cevik claimed on February 27 that Turkey plans to end its military operations in Syria after establishing a fifty-mile “buffer zone” in Manbij. 

• Turkey has continued to deploy additional armored vehicles to Northern Aleppo Province in recent weeks. These reinforcements could be deployed against Manbij as well as the isolated Kurdish Afrin Canton in Western Aleppo Province. 

Further escalation between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds would severely jeopardize – and likely halt indefinitely - the campaign against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City.

• The U.S. has relied extensively upon the YPG as the main component of the SDF – the preferred coalition partner on the ground against ISIS in Northern Syria. 

• Open fighting between Turkey and the SDF would allow ISIS to retain its hold on Ar-Raqqa City and potentially secure new gains across Northern Syria. 

• The U.S. must exercise all of its sources of leverage over Turkey – including its military presence in Syria as well as bilateral military-to-military assistance, humanitarian support, and economic investment – in order to prevent a Turkish offensive against the SDF. 

• The U.S. should also consider slowing down or halting further SDF advances in order to avoid fueling a wider conflict between Arabs and Kurds in Northern Syria. The U.S. must not sacrifice long-term stability for a quick victory against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City. 

• The U.S. must ultimately build an alternative partner force of Syrian Sunni Arabs that is both willing to fight Salafi-jihadi groups and is independent from the political project of the PYD. The U.S. cannot rely upon the Turkish-backed opposition force due to its inclusion of Salafi-jihadi groups, including Ahrar al-Sham, that serve as a vector for al Qaeda in Syria. 

Further Reading

• 24 FEB 2017: “The Campaign for Ar-Raqqa: February 24, 2017,” Tom Ramage, Institute for the Study of War. 

• 13 FEB 2017: “Warning Update: Turkish Aggression Against Syrian Kurds Threatens to Halt U.S. Anti-ISIS Operations in Syria,” Tom Ramage, Institute for the Study of War. 

• 22 NOV 2016: “The Road to Ar-Raqqah: Background on the Syrian Democratic Forces,” Genevieve Casagrande, Institute for the Study of War. 

• 30 AUG 2016: “Turkish Incursion in Northern Syria Signals Turning Point in Anti-ISIS Fight,” Jennifer Cafarella with Leah Danson, Institute for the Study of War. 

• 10 JUN 2016: “The Competing Campaigns Against ISIS in Northern Syria,” Christopher Kozak, Institute for the Study of War.

Iraq Situation Report: February 17-28, 2017

By the ISW Iraq Team

ISIS could be facing difficulty coordinating successful attacks in Iraq as losses in Mosul are forcing it to transform from a governing to guerrilla style terrorist organization. ISIS did not carry out the wave of complex attacks predicted to occur in response to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) launching operations to retake western Mosul on February 19. The deviation from the expectation may be a result of ISIS losing coordination between cells across Iraq as it takes time to regroup or as the ISF puts pressure on lines of communication in northern Iraq. The ISF may also be improving in its ability to preempt or thwart attacks. ISIS launched a major attack against checkpoints near the Syrian-Jordan-Iraqi border from February 22 to 24 and targeted checkpoints in Diyala Province on February 23. However, these attacks alone do not match the intensity of ISIS’s previous responses, in which ISIS either carried out major attacks in generally quiet areas, such as Kirkuk City or Sinjar, or ramped up the frequency or scale of attacks in usual attack zones, such as Baghdad. ISIS may have planned for attacks in Samarra, Karbala, and Abu Ghraib to reach the response threshold, but these attacks were thwarted by the ISF over the course of February 21 to 24. The decline in ISIS’s response is not likely a sign of permanent loss of ability to attack, but rather an indication that ISIS may take time to sufficiently regroup its command and logistical hubs as it deals with losses in Mosul and northern Iraq. 

ISIS Sanctuary Map Update: February 27, 2017

By Alexandra Gutowski and the ISW Research Team 

Update: The Syrian regime seized additional towns from ISIS southeast of al-Bab on 27 FEB 2017 after ISIS withdrew. Regime control now abuts US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and also Turkish-backed opposition forces. ISIS will continue to launch spectacular attacks along this seam at which the interests of local and global anti-ISIS actors compete directly.

Key Takeaway: ISIS launched offensives against the Syrian regime in Deir ez Zour, eastern Homs province, and eastern Damascus province in January 2017, exploiting the regime’s focus on Aleppo and attempting to offset or divert regime operations near al-Bab. Regime forces began to reverse ISIS’s gains in Homs province on February 14. ISIS lost additional territory in Mosul to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in early 2017. ISIS also lost al-Bab, Syria to Turkish-backed Operation Euphrates Shield on February 23. ISIS may increasingly infiltrate opposition-held territory in northwest Syria as U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Operation Euphrates Shield threatens its control of Raqqa. ISIS-linked opposition group Liwa al-Aqsa conducted numerous attacks in northern Hama and southern Idlib provinces against opposition groups in early 2017, especially those affiliated with al-Qaeda’s de facto affiliate in Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Liwa al-Aqsa subsequently negotiated a withdrawal from villages in northern Hama province, which may remain an attack zone for ISIS. ISIS’s affiliate in southwest Syria, Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid, also seized towns in Dera’a province in February, exploiting the focus of local opposition groups on an offensive in Dera’a City. ISW is placing a watch on ISIS in Damascus province and in Jordan, where ISIS may have latent potential to launch attacks in response to further losses in Raqqa and Mosul. A depiction of ISIS sanctuary in Jordan is forthcoming.

ISIS Sanctuary Map: February 26, 2017

By Alexandra Gutowski and the ISW Research Team 

ISIS launched offensives against the Syrian regime in Deir ez Zour, eastern Homs province, and eastern Damascus province in January 2017, exploiting the regime’s focus on Aleppo and attempting to offset or divert regime operations near al-Bab. Regime forces began to reverse ISIS’s gains in Homs province on February 14. ISIS lost additional territory in Mosul to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in early 2017. ISIS also lost al-Bab, Syria to Turkish-backed Operation Euphrates Shield on February 23. ISIS may increasingly infiltrate opposition-held territory in northwest Syria as U.S.-backed, Kurdish-dominated Operation Euphrates Shield threatens its control of Raqqa. ISIS-linked opposition group Liwa al-Aqsa conducted numerous attacks in northern Hama and southern Idlib provinces against opposition groups in early 2017, especially those affiliated with al-Qaeda’s de facto affiliate in Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Liwa al-Aqsa subsequently negotiated a withdrawal from villages in northern Hama province, which may remain an attack zone for ISIS. ISIS’s affiliate in southwest Syria, Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid, also seized towns in Dera’a province in February, exploiting the focus of local opposition groups on an offensive in Dera’a City. ISW is placing a watch on ISIS in Damascus province and in Jordan, where ISIS may have latent potential to launch attacks in response to further losses in Raqqa and Mosul. A depiction of ISIS sanctuary in Jordan is forthcoming. 

The Strategic Convergence of Russia and Iran

By Christopher Kozak

Key Takeaway: The U.S. cannot drive a wedge between Russia and Iran in the near term. Tehran and Moscow share regional and global interests across the Middle East, North Africa, Caucasus, and Central Asia. Their common interests and overarching objective of expelling the U.S. from the Middle East will likely bind Iran and Russia together into an enduring partnership.

The Trump administration reportedly seeks to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran in Syria. Officials have suggested that the U.S. could exploit natural tensions between the two states and persuade Russia to check Iran in the Middle East. This notion assumes that cooperation between the two countries is limited to tactical efforts in Syria and misses the deep strategic convergence between Moscow and Tehran. Iran and Russia share many fundamental and enduring common interests and strategic objectives, most notably the expulsion of the U.S. from the Middle East.

Iran and Russia are historic rivals and dissimilar regimes. Each poses a unique threat to the existing international order. Russia aims to reestablish itself as a global superpower and restore the multipolar world of the Cold War at the expense of the U.S. and Europe. Iran aims to become a regional hegemon by expelling the U.S. from the Middle East, undermining Saudi Arabia, and eliminating Israel. These aims do not diverge over the short to medium term. Iran remains far from its goal of regional hegemony – a position that would likely draw concern from Moscow. Russia is also not close to achieving parity with the U.S. and NATO. Russia and Iran will thus likely continue to partner closely until one or the other comes within striking distance of its goals – a condition unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future.

Strategic Convergence

Syria - Iran and Russia support the Syrian regime against all its opponents.

Iran needs a friendly regime in Damascus to provide a secure base from which it can support Lebanese Hezbollah and conduct operations against Israel. Russia requires a regime willing and able to guarantee long-term access to its air and naval bases on the Mediterranean Sea from which to challenge the U.S. and NATO. Minor divergences between Iran and Russia in their approach to the Syrian Civil War reflect the friction normal to any coalition rather than signs of fragility. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appears to view the continued rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a matter of personal honor while Russian President Vladimir Putin does not. Even if Putin agreed to abandon Assad, however, there is no reason to imagine that the partnership between Russia and Iran would collapse given their numerous other grounds for cooperation.

Iraq and Afghanistan – Iran and Russia seek to expel the U.S. from both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Russia and Iran both seek to eliminate the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tehran aims to prevent Iraq from becoming a hostile base of attack, remembering the existential struggle of the Iran-Iraq War against former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.  Tehran uses political parties and militias to pressure the weak government of Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, periodically threatening to replace him with a pro-Iranian leader who might order the U.S. out of Iraq. Meanwhile, Russian outreach in Iraq has been opportunistic.  Russia formed a joint intelligence-sharing cell with Iran, Iraq, and Syria and stands ready to further increase its involvement with support from political actors aligned with Iran in Baghdad. Iran and Russia both also desire a stable buffer state in Afghanistan that excludes the U.S. and NATO. Both countries prefer to work with the same set of allies on the ground within the Northern Alliance as well as the Afghan Taliban.

Turkey - Iran and Russia desire to peel Turkey away from the U.S. and NATO.

Iran and Russia both seek to pull Turkey out of the orbit of the U.S. and NATO while ending Ankara’s support to opposition groups in Syria. Both countries also oppose Turkish President Recep Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman strategic vision to reassert Turkish economic, cultural, and military dominance over the Middle East. Russia and Iran also have major economic interests in Turkey as a transit route for natural gas pipelines and a buyer of energy resources. Moscow and Tehran have coopted Turkey into diplomatic initiatives to end the Syrian Civil War that exclude the U.S. Both countries jointly took advantage of tensions between the U.S. and Turkey over coalition support for the Syrian Kurdish YPG, which Turkey considers to be an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Erdogan has expressed a willingness to pursue membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the rival to NATO led by Russia and China.

Egypt – Iran and Russia aim to accelerate Egypt’s drift away from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

Russia and Iran encourage Egypt’s movement away from the U.S. and Gulf States. Russia likely seeks new military basing on the Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea in Egypt that would give it control over the Suez Canal. Iran needs new points of access to support its illicit networks throughout Africa after losing its partners in Sudan and Eritrea. Both countries likely view Cairo as an acceptable counterweight to Saudi Arabia for leadership of Sunni Arabs in the Middle East. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has voted for Russian initiatives on Syria at the UN Security Council and reportedly sent a limited number of troops to Syria on behalf of the Russia and Iran.

Caucasus – Russia and Iran back Armenia against Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Russia maintains a strong alliance with Armenia that spans centuries. Moscow has sold billions of dollars’ worth of weapons to Yerevan over the past two decades and has permanent military bases in Yerevan and Gyumri. Iran supports Armenia as a counterweight to Azerbaijan. Tehran fears that Baku could support a secessionist movement within its own domestic Azeri population and accuses Azerbaijan of providing Israel with a base for intelligence-gathering and military training.

Global Stage – Russia and Iran seek to weaken and divide the EU and NATO.

Russia and Iran view the EU and NATO as tools of U.S. domination in Europe. Russia pressures NATO through continuous military exercises and violations of airspace or territorial waters as well as attacks against pro-Western governments in the former Soviet Union, with Ukraine being the most notable example.  Russia supports extremist political parties in Europe that seek to devolve power from the EU to national governments. Iranian rhetoric has recently begun incorporating greater criticism of the EU, including public expressions of support for Brexit.

Divergences

Russia and Iran diverge on only a few key points. Russia does not seek to usurp the regional and religious influence of Saudi Arabia or destroy the state of Israel. Iran’s quest for regional hegemony also likely poses a problem for Moscow, which would prefer a regional balance among Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as well as positive relations with Israel. Putin has done nothing to protest or contain Iranian efforts against Israel, however, even in the numerous instances when weapons Russia gave to Syria were reportedly transferred to Lebanese Hezbollah. Russia seems willing to accept increased tensions with Saudi Arabia and Israel in exchange for its partnership with Iran.

Russia and Iran also diverge on their stance towards the Kurds. Iran fears separatism among Kurds in Northern Iran amidst an increase in low-level domestic attacks over the past year. Russia by contrast views the Kurds as a source of leverage against regional and international powers including the U.S., Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Moscow has nevertheless offered no meaningful support for an independent Kurdistan – the one item that might fully draw the Kurds into the orbit of Russia. Iran and Russia seem quite capable of managing these differences to sustain their pursuit of common goals.

Conclusion

There is nothing unnatural, artificial, or inherently temporary about the coalition between Russia and Iran. Their relationship rests on a deep foundation of common strategic objectives and interests. The two countries are building a military coalition that can operate across the region – including a potential anti-access, area-denial zone stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf. Meaningful divisions between Moscow and Tehran will only materialize under extreme conditions when either or both are on the verge of victory or collapse, forcing the other to make hard choices about its long-term regional interests. The foreseeable future offers little prospect of any such development. The inflation of minor disagreements in Syria into opportunities to split Russia from Iran misses the depth of this alignment and opens the U.S. up to strategic surprise by a rising coalition that is already rewriting the rules of the game in the Middle East. 

The Campaign for Ar-Raqqah: February 24, 2017

By Tom Ramage

Key Takeaway: The Syrian Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have seized the majority of ISIS-held territory in the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah and is positioned to complete the isolation of the city in coming months. The U.S.’s main partners in Syria, the SDF and Turkey, are competing to lead the next phase of operations to seize ar-Raqqah City and thereby solidify their influence over post-ISIS governance. The SDF are currently the U.S. partner force best positioned to seize the city and have begun establishing governance structures comprised of local allied Arab leaders. Turkey’s alternative proposals for a Turkish-approved force to seize ar-Raqqah City risk an armed conflict with the SDF or pro-regime forces as well as the empowerment of Salafi-Jihadi group Ahrar al-Sham. The U.S. must work with its allies to both prevent an armed conflict between Turkey and the SDF that would detract from current anti-ISIS operations and while simultaneously setting conditions to ensure a representative governance structure for post-ISIS ar-Raqqah City.

The Syrian Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have seized the majority of ISIS-held territory in the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah in ongoing efforts to isolate the city. The SDF launched the third phase of Operation Euphrates Wrath on February 4 with the stated objective of seizing the eastern countryside of ar-Raqqah City. The SDF attacked south towards ar-Raqqah City along two axes from SDF-held territory east of the town of Ayn Issa, reportedly seizing 98 villages and hamlets northeast of ar-Raqqah City by February 12. The SDF connected these two axes on February 11 and was approximately 5 km northeast of ar-Raqqah City as of February 17. The SDF subsequently announced the second stage of phase three on February 17 and launched two axes of attack in a pincer movement to seize the Raqqa-Hasakah highway and encircle ISIS-held territory in Northern Deir ez Zour Province. The SDF simultaneously advanced south from newly seized territory on the Raqqah-Hasakah highway and seized the village of Judaydat Khabour on February 21, thereby weakening ISIS’s ability to resupply ar-Raqqah City. The SDF are now positioned to complete the isolation of ar-Raqqah City and subsequently transition to the next phase of seizing the city.

The U.S.’s main partners in Syria, the SDF and Turkey, are competing to lead operations to seize ar-Raqqah City and solidify their influence over post-ISIS governance. The SDF are currently advancing towards the city with increased U.S. material support, and have requested heavy weapons and additional armored vehicles to counter ISIS’s strength in urban combat. The SDF and affiliated political parties have also begun solidifying relationships and alliances with local Arab tribal leaders in order to create a governance structure of SDF-friendly local notables similar to the structure established by the SDF in Manbij City. Turkey, meanwhile, has demanded that the U.S. end its support for the SDF and proposed two alternative plans for a Turkish approved force to seize ar-Raqqah City. Turkey’s plans, however, will likely not beas effective in combating ISIS in ar-Raqqah City as a U.S.-supported SDF assault on the city and will fail to achieve U.S. strategic objectives for Syria. The first plan to advance along a 12-mile wide corridor from the town of Tal Abyad to ar-Raqqah City would bisect SDF-held territory east of the Euphrates. The SDF will not concede to this plan without major U.S. guarantees or Turkish concessions, and may launch counter-attacks if Turkey proceeds unilaterally. Turkey’s second proposal is an offensive from the recently seized town of al Bab, which would require Turkish troops to advance approximately 100 miles and seize at least two heavily fortified ISIS-held towns before reaching ar-Raqqah City. This second proposal violates a reported agreement between Turkey and Russia preventing Turkish troops from advancing south of al Bab, and pro-regime forces have already begun advancing east towards Lake Assad in an effort to prevent Turkish-backed opposition groups from seizing vast territory.

Turkish-backed opposition groups acceptable to the U.S. likely [DS1] cannot seize ar-Raqqah City without additional support from prominent Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al Sham. Turkey used Ahrar al Sham during the offensive on al Bab to seize territory when other Turkish backed opposition groups proved unable to effectively combat ISIS in and around the urban terrain. Turkey will likely utilize Ahrar al Sham in a leading role in a Turkish offensive on ar-Raqqah City. Ahrar al Sham’s seizure of the city would likely allow the group to dictate the composition of ar-Raqqah City’s governance structure, effectively trading control of ar-Raqqah from one Salafi-Jihadist group to another. A governance structure established by Ahrar al Sham is antithetical to U.S. strategic interests in Syria.

A U.S. failure to prevent conflict between its Kurdish- and Turkish-led partner forces in Syria could jeopardize the anti-ISIS mission in Syria. A Turkish attack on Manbij City or an attempt to bisect Kurdish territory could instigate a wider armed conflict that would distract both major U.S.-partner ground forces from the anti-ISIS fight in ar-Raqqah City. The U.S. must also set conditions to prevent the resurgence of Salafi-Jihadism after the seizure of ar-Raqqah City by ensuring that the city is governed by representatives of its population rather than another Salafi-Jihadist group or a Kurdish puppet.

The Campaign for Mosul: February 22-24, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos and ISW Iraq Team

Update: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) recaptured the Mosul Airport and Ghazlani military base on February 24 from where they advanced into neighborhoods in western Mosul. Units from the Federal Police and Emergency Response Division (ERD) completed the two-day operation to recapture the airport before moving into adjacent neighborhoods in western Mosul. The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) crossed the Tigris River, likely around Yarmjah in eastern Mosul, on February 22 and conducted a two-day operation on February 23 and 24 to clear the Ghazlani military base before likewise moving into nearby neighborhoods. The ISF will continue to use the airport and military base as a springboard and logistical and command hub for operations into western Mosul. Meanwhile, the 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division supported by a Hawza militia continued efforts around Mount Atshan on February 22 and 23 before moving into an outermost neighborhood in Mosul on February 24.

Syria Situation Report: February 16 - 24, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

Opposition groups backed by Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield seized full control over Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province as well as two neighboring towns, ending more than three months of heavy clashes. The fall of Al-Bab will enable Turkish President Recep Erdogan to pursue his next stated strategic priorities in Northern Syria – including an offensive to expel the Syrian Kurdish YPG from Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province. Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik warned that Turkey will “reevaluate” military operations against the town if the U.S. does not ensure the imminent withdrawal of the Syrian Kurdish YPG from Manbij. Meanwhile, UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura opened the Geneva IV Talks between regime and opposition delegations with the goal of reaching a political solution to the Syrian Civil War. The negotiations nonetheless appear primed to fail amidst deteriorating conditions on the ground - including an increasingly unstable nationwide ceasefire and a continued consolidation of power by Al-Qaeda in Syria. 

These graphics mark the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of February 16, 2017.

Warning Update: The Expansion of ISIS in Northwestern Afghanistan

By: Caitlin Forrest and Richard DeKold

Key Takeaway: ISIS Wilayat Khorasan may be developing a regional powerbase in northwestern Afghanistan. Former Taliban militants operating in the name of ISIS executed international aid workers and held others captive in a prison in Jowzjan Province in February 2017, a step change in ISIS’s operations in Afghanistan. ISIS may increasingly use this hub to regenerate manpower as it suffers losses elsewhere, threatening US and NATO interests in multiple regions across Afghanistan. Malign external actors like Russia and Iran could also use ISIS’s expansion in the region to validate their support of Taliban militants and undermine the U.S. and NATO.

Tripwire: The Jowzjan Provincial Governor claimed ISIS-linked militants killed six International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) workers on February 8 in Qush Tepah District. Militants are holding two more ICRC workers captive in an ISIS prison in Qush Tepah District, Jowzjan Province according to a local news source. This report comes one month after local officials and elders separately claimed that ISIS members destroyed homes in Darzab District, Jowzjan Province and forced up to 60 families to leave their homes in Sayad District, Sar-e Pul Province in December 2016. Another report emerged on February 8 that the son of the slain leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which pledged to ISIS in August 2015, is leading efforts to resettle up to 650 foreign Pakistani and Uzbek militants and their families in Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, and Faryab Provinces. ISW is issuing a warning based on these reports that ISIS may be developing a regional power base in northwestern Afghanistan. Neither ISIS Wilayat Khorasan nor ISIS’s central media has claimed the aforementioned events.

Pattern: The execution of international aid workers is a step change for ISIS in Afghanistan. The establishment of a prison and population displacement are new developments for ISIS in northwest Afghanistan, but typical of ISIS generally. ISIS militants previously used resettlement efforts to increase presence in Kunar in March 2016, and also established multiple prisons in their strongholds in Nangarhar Province. Reporting of ISIS-linked activity in northwestern Afghanistan accelerated in February 2017 compared to previous trends, but early indicators corroborate the presence of ISIS-linked fighters in this zone. Local security officials first claimed ISIS was recruiting and raising “black flags” in Jowzjan and Sar-e Pul Provinces in January 2015. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which historically operates in northern Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, pledged to ISIS in August 2015. ISIS militants reportedly clashed with security forces in Qush Tepah District, Jowzjan province in July 2016. Another report in August 2016 alluded to a local ISIS commander in Jowzjan. ISIS militants clashed again with security forces in Darzab District, Jowzjan Province in October 2016. ISIS-linked groups also killed a local prayer leader in for assaulting minors in Darzab District in October 2016.  

Timing: ISIS may be exploiting a gap in security by Dostum’s Junbish Militia in northwestern Afghanistan. ISIS’s expansion in the region comes as First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum, who maintains significant influence in the North through his Junbish Militia, remains confined to his home surrounded by his militia in Kabul City following a scandal involving the alleged assault of former Jowzjan Provincial Governor Ahmad Eschi in November 2016 by his bodyguards. The lack of reported Junbish militia action to combat ISIS-linked militants in Northern Afghanistan may represent the absence of Junbish militias. Alternatively, Dostum may be sanctioning the expansion of ISIS in the region in order to demonstrate his significance to Afghan security in an attempt to relieve the political pressure to prosecute him for the alleged assault. Meanwhile, the ANSF is currently undergoing a U.S.-led force regeneration process during their 2016-2017 winter campaign. The Afghan National Unity Government has historically relied on a joint force of ANSF units and Junbish militiamen to provide security in northwestern Afghanistan. The lessened presence of Dostum’s militia while the ANSF rests and refits units may be granting ISIS-linked militants increased freedom of movement in the region.  

Assessment: The prison in Qush Tepah District, Jowzjan province is the first indicator of social control by ISIS in Afghanistan outside of its strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. The prison is run by former Taliban shadow governor Qari Hekmat, who reportedly joined ISIS in mid-2016 a few months after he was expelled from the Taliban due to his excessive brutality. Qari Hekmat is one of several ISIS-linked groups operating in the area, including Abdul Rahman Yuldash, the son of the slain leader of the IMU, who has also been implicated by local sources in recent reporting. The Jowzjan Provincial Governor claimed on February 8 that five ISIS factions with up to 200 fighters are present in Qush Tepah District alone. The successful recruitment of former-Taliban and IMU militants in Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, and Faryab Provinces will allow ISIS to regenerate manpower and absorb losses incurred in its strongholds in eastern Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. ISIS seeks to take advantage of the vast ungoverned and remote spaces in Afghanistan to establish camps where it can recruit, train, and deploy local and foreign fighters. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan has trained recruits from India, planned successful attacks in Kabul, and deployed expeditionary recruiters to remote provinces from its strongholds in Nangarhar and Zabul according to local sources. ISIS will likely use its growing presence and influence in the northwestern provinces to establish an additional regional base in which it can implement social control and expand ISIS’s Caliphate as it loses territory in core terrain.  

Implications: The expansion of ISIS’s Caliphate in Afghanistan would grant ISIS an additional logistical hub to receive and train foreign fighters as it becomes more difficult for foreign fighters to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan is likely strengthening its ties with IMU militants in order to expand its regional network and coopt local groups and fighters. Russia may use the expansion of ISIS in northwestern Afghanistan, which borders former Soviet satellite states Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, to continue undermining the U.S. and NATO by supporting Taliban militants and claiming that Taliban militants are fighting ISIS rather than the U.S. The expansion of ISIS outside of its bases in eastern Afghanistan will also strain the ongoing U.S. counterterrorism mission as it will have to shift resources to remote northwestern provinces. This shift may allow ISIS in Nangarhar to reconstitute sanctuaries lost to joint U.S.-ANSF operations in 2016. Any remaining Junbish militias under Dostum’s control in the area would further complicate U.S. response if Dostum faces backlash from his alleged assault against Eschi and orders his militias not to cooperate with the U.S. as a result. Both ISIS and Russia stand to benefit from the expansion of ISIS into the northwest at the expense of the U.S.

Indicators: Increased reports of ISIS conducting executions and establishing courts or prisons in the northwestern provinces would indicate ISIS is solidifying social control in the region. Reports that the group is suddenly flush with cash or is able to procure explosive materials may indicate a transfer of capabilities from either ISIS in core terrain, ISIS militants in eastern Afghanistan, or both. Any recognition of these ISIS-linked groups in official ISIS media, either coming from core or with official ISIS Wilayat Khorasan branding, would indicate ISIS is consolidating ties with these groups and attempting to expand the Caliphate in northwestern Afghanistan. The continued successful recruiting of former-Taliban militants would increase the likelihood that ISIS will establish a regional stronghold as it coopts is main competitors in the area. If Dostum’s militia remains disengaged, it could further deteriorate security in the northwestern provinces and allow ISIS to make significant gains in the region. These gains may prompt Russia to take action against ISIS in the northwest, which would severely undermine and complicate the U.S. and NATO missions.