UA-69458566-1

Wednesday, July 2, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2, 2025

  

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros

July 2, 2025, 8:45pm ET
 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on July 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. Western media outlets reported that sources stated on July 2 that the US pause on weapons supplies to Ukraine will affect dozens of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems, dozens of Stinger man-portable air defense systems, thousands of 155mm high explosive howitzer munitions, over 100 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, over 250 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets, dozens of grenade launchers, and dozens of AIM air-to-air missiles.[1] Familiar sources told Politico on July 1 that the United States decided in early June 2025 to withhold some of the aid that the United States promised Ukraine under the Biden administration but that the decision is only now taking effect.[2] Politico reported that the halted weapons come from two different streams of Biden administration-era support — weapons from drawdowns of current US stockpiles that the US Department of Defense (DoD) received money to replenish, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, in which the United States funds the purchase of weapons for Ukraine from US defense firms. White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly stated on July 1 that US authorities made the decision following a DoD review of US military support to states around the world.[3] Six defense officials, congressional officials, and other sources told NBC that the Pentagon ordered the pause after a review of US munitions stockpiles.[4] NBC's defense and congressional sources stated that the United States could hold up the weapons flow to Ukraine until the assessment of US stockpiles is complete but that the United States could extend the pause of military assistance to Ukraine even longer if the weapons are in short supply or if the United States needs to supply them to other parts of the world.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on July 2 that continued deliveries of previously allocated US defense packages are critically important, particularly in order to strengthen Ukraine's air defense.[5] The Ukrainian MFA emphasized that any delay in supporting Ukraine's defense capabilities will encourage Russia to continue its war — and not seek peace. The Ukrainian MFA stated that US-Ukrainian consultations about defense supplies are ongoing at all levels and that Ukraine will speak with the United States about finding mutually beneficial solutions to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.

The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukraine had not received any official notifications about any suspension or revision to the delivery schedules of the agreed US military aid prior to the US announcement.[6] The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials stated that the United States had not scheduled to ship the affected munitions to Ukraine for several months, but the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US weapons shipments already in Poland were halted as of July 1.[7] A Trump administration official told Politico that the administration had not requested any further aid but that there is enough aid left over from the Biden administration to last Ukraine "several more months."[8] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion told the Washington Post in an article published on July 2, however, that Ukrainian forces already have to concentrate on holding positions and conserving resources rather than advancing.[9] Ukrainian forces have had to husband critical materiel, including air defense interceptors, GMLRS rockets, and artillery shells, during previous suspensions of US aid. Ukraine's European partners are increasing their efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues its efforts to become self-sufficient, but only the United States can provide certain weapons systems at scale and quickly.[10] Ukrainian forces very likely will have to conserve materiel again should the United States continue to suspend weapons deliveries.

The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past. Delays in US military aid in Fall 2023 and Winter-Spring 2024 set conditions for Russian forces to make more accelerated battlefield gains than Russian forces had previously been able to make.[11] Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in mid-January 2024 and concentrated significant manpower and materiel to their effort to seize the settlement in mid-February 2024 amid the protracted debate in the US (from October 2023 until April 2024) about passing supplemental aid for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces also faced significant artillery constraints during the Russian offensive against Avdiivka, allowing Russian forces to attack under less pressure from Ukrainian counterbattery fire. Russian forces sustained a high tempo of offensive operations after seizing Avdiivka in order to push as far west as possible, and Russian forces subsequently launched offensive operations in Spring 2024 intended to seize Pokrovsk when the suspension of US assistance was still greatly constraining Ukrainian materiel supplies.[12] ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers per day between the suspension of US aid to Ukraine on December 6, 2023 and the resumption of aid on April 24, 2024, much of which was in Donetsk Oblast — as compared to the six months prior to the December 2023 aid suspension when Russian forces actually lost a total of roughly 203 square kilometers at a rate of 1.1 square kilometers lost per day (due to Ukraine’s gains during the 2023 counteroffensive, which was enabled by the US and other allies surging military aid to Ukraine).

 

 

Russian forces also notably intensified offensive operations in Kursk Oblast following the suspension of US intelligence sharing in early March 2025.[13] Russian forces, augmented by North Korean forces, had been trying to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding advances since the start of Ukraine's incursion in August 2024. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, and Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7.[14] Ukrainian sources reportedly stated at the time that Russian forces started making more rapid advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5 and that the suspension of US intelligence sharing impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most. Kremlin officials at the time announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground."[15] Russian forces very likely exploited the US suspension of aid and intelligence sharing in March 2025 to accelerate Russia’s ongoing counteroffensive operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at a rate of about 31 square kilometers per day in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 3, 2025 and the resumption of intelligence sharing on March 11, 2025 — as opposed to a rate of advance of about 19 square kilometers per day in the six months prior to the intelligence sharing suspension.

 


The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine. Putin articulated a theory of victory in June 2024 — and has emphasized this same theory of victory since — that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.[16] Putin's theory assumes that Russia will be able to outlast pledged Western security assistance and that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel needed to prevent these gradual Russian gains or to contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations to liberate Ukrainian territory. The latest US suspension of aid will strengthen Putin's belief that time is on Russia's side and his commitment to delaying negotiations toward a peace settlement and protracting the war.

Russia remains unlikely to make operational-level breakthroughs in the near future. Future Russian gains — even relatively accelerated advances following the suspension of US aid — will likely remain gradual and creeping and result in disproportionally high losses as Russian forces still have not restored operational maneuver to the increasingly transparent battlefield. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in May 2025 and roughly 466 square kilometers in June 2025, and Russian gains in January to April 2025 ranged from roughly 175 to 590 square kilometers per month. These Russian gains are remarkably smaller than the 1,265 square kilometers per day that ISW assesses Russian forces were gaining at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in March 2022.

Russia appears, however, to be preparing to undertake likely months- and years-long offensive campaigns — demonstrating the Russian military command's acceptance of continued slow, gradual advances and Putin's belief in his theory of victory. The Russian military command has recently prioritized efforts to attack Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast, a campaign that is likely to take Russia years to achieve at Russian forces’ current tempo.[17] Russian forces may not be able to achieve these objectives by themselves. CNN reported on July 2 that a Ukrainian intelligence assessment stated that North Korea will likely send an additional 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers to Russia in the coming months and that there is a "great possibility" that the North Korean forces will augment Russian forces in Ukraine, including "during large-scale offensive operations."[18]

Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin's theory of military victory as successful — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 2 in response to the suspension of US military aid that the "fewer weapons that are supplied to Ukraine, the closer the end of the [Russian invasion of Ukraine] is."[19] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev, who has been heavily involved in diplomatic and rhetorical efforts vis-à-vis Ukraine and the United States, stated that the suspension "raises questions about the West's ability to continue supporting Ukraine."[20] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev suggested that the US military aid suspension will degrade Ukraine's ability to "hold out" against Russian offensive operations and claimed that the United States will not be able to "hide" any future arms deliveries to Ukraine from Russia.[21] These Russian statements underscore how the Kremlin perceives Putin's theory of victory as it relates to Western — particularly American — military assistance to Ukraine and flout the Kremlin's goal of coercing the United States and other Western states into ceasing military assistance to Ukraine.[22] The Kremlin is capitalizing on the US aid suspension to intensify its messaging that Europe should also cease weapons supplies to Ukraine. Putin had a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron on July 2, the first Putin-Macron call in nearly three years, and used the call to reiterate boilerplate Kremlin narratives aimed at discouraging further Western military assistance to Ukraine.[23] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also criticized continued European military assistance to Ukraine.[24] The Kremlin's messaging about the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine is yet another indicator that Russia remains committed to achieving its war goals by force and is uninterested in meaningful peace negotiations to end the war.[25] These senior Russian officials’ statements indicate that suspending US military aid to Ukraine very likely will not compel Russia to conduct meaningful negotiations with Ukraine as President Trump desires, but rather embolden Moscow to continue protracting Russia’s war.

The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed on July 2 that the European Union's (EU) increased defense spending and development of its DIB show that the EU is becoming an “aggressive military bloc” that Russia will have to defend itself against.[26] Grushko claimed that the EU carries out NATO's tasks and that the two organizations are deeply linked. Zakharova also claimed that the EU is turning into a military bloc and is "pumping" Ukraine with weapons.[27] Russian Ambassador to Norway Nikolay Korchunov told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti in an interview published on June 30 that Norway is trying to benefit from the "militarization" of Europe and is "pumping up" the Ukrainian military.[28] Korchunov claimed that Norway is intensifying NATO military exercises on Norwegian territory near the Russian border and that Norway's militarization will increase tension and escalation risks in the Arctic and destabilize European security. Russian officials continue to mischaracterize increased NATO defense spending that is aimed at deterring war in Europe by building defense capabilities in response to Russia’s ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia’s military capabilities.[29] The Kremlin's efforts to deter Western military assistance to Ukraine and European rearmament efforts are part of its wider cognitive warfare efforts that aim to shape Western decision-making and erode the West's will to act against Russian interests and resist Russia.[30]

The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump's stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine. US provisions of Patriot air defense systems and interceptors have been critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's missile strikes, particularly those with ballistic missiles.[31] Russia's long-range strikes have increasingly targeted densely populated cities far from the frontline.[32] Russia has recently prioritized expanding its long-range drone and missile production and stockpiling its ballistic missiles, enabling Russia to conduct larger, more effective combined missile and drone strike series against Ukraine.[33] Russia has notably conducted five of its largest combined strikes against Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion between March and June 2025 and is launching an increasingly high number of Shahed and decoy drones that overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, allowing more Russian missiles to hit their targets.[34] Russia has also recently adapted its strike tactics to inflict maximum damage to civilians, including by deploying cluster munitions with delayed detonations, and Shahed drones equipped with capsules of chemical weapons and conducting "double tap" strikes that maximize casualties of civilian first responders.[35] Russia will very likely continue to increase the size of its combined strikes against Ukraine as Russia remains committed to accelerating its missile and drone production. The US suspension of critical Patriot interceptor supplies to Ukraine will likely impact Ukraine's ability to protect its critical, industrial, and civilian infrastructure. Russian forces exploited pauses in US military aid to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024 to conduct large-scale combined strikes designed to exhaust Ukraine's degraded air defense umbrella that was suffering from the lack of Western aid.[36] A dwindling supply of Patriot interceptors will force Ukraine to continue to make difficult defense prioritization decisions.

 


Key Takeaways:

  • The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets.
  • The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time.
  • The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past.
  • The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine.
  • Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin's theory of military victory as successful — in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace.
  • The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense.
  • The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump's stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 2.

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 1 and 2.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Gornal (southeast of Tetkino).[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) reportedly continue operating in Kursk Oblast.[39] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Darino (east of Tetkino).[40]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 1 that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratovorgsintez oil refinery in Saratov Oblast, causing a fire at the refinery and damaging a technological installation.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant produces fuel and lubricants for the Russian military.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

 

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[42]

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy Oblast border area on July 1 and 2.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and Yunakivka.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 237th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating between Loknya and Yunakivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[45] Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly conducting reconnaissance missions near the Sumy-Kursk Oblast international border area, and other elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly fighting near Yunakivka.[46] Elements of the Russian 11th Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating along the H-07 Yunakivka-Sumy City highway near Yunakivka.[47] Fiber-optic drone operators of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and artillery elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on June 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[49]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Vovchansk.[50]

Russian forces conducted ground operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on July 1 and 2.[51]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 2 that Russian forces have recently changed tactics in northern Kharkiv Oblast and are now conducting infantry assaults in groups of up to 25 servicemen and are no longer attacking in small, two-to-three personnel fire teams.[52] The spokesperson reported Russian forces are using underground pipelines including sewage pipes to accumulate personnel for assaults as well as ammunition and supplies.[53] A spokesperson for another Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 2 that Russian forces somewhat intensified offensive operations in the area to take advantage of weather conditions and are increasing the use of fiber optic drones in an attempt to take forward positions.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in unspecified areas of Kharkiv Oblast.[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Kupyansk direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[56]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Radivka, and near the international border toward Milove, Mytrofanivka and Ambarne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Novoosynove on July 1 and 2.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[58]

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Borova direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced near Hrekivka (southeast of Borova) and west of Stepy (formerly Pershotravneve, east of Borova).[59]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Kolisnykivka, east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Cherneschyna, and Novovodyane on July 1 and 2.[60] A Russian source claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nadiya (east of Borova).[61]

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Lyman direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to southern Karpivka, near Ridkodub, and west and east of Lypove.[62]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Serednye and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Myrne, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on July 1 and 2.[63]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, Hryhorivka, and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk toward Vyimka; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka and toward Bondrane on July 1 and 2.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar) and advanced to Chervone (southwest of Mykolaivka) and near Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) and Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[65]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself north of Chasiv Yar toward Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on July 1 and 2.[66]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones pose the biggest challenge for Ukrainian forces in the area.[67] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces use FPV drones to repel infrequent Russian mechanized assaults and that Russian forces are leveraging small teams of about two to three personnel on motorcycles.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy the dominant heights along the Toretsk-Kurdyumivka-Chasiv Yar line, complicating the Ukrainian defense of Kostyantynivka, which is located in lowlands.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[69]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 2 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Toretsk.[70]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[71]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Rusyn Yar and Pleshchiivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on July 1 and 2.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepanivka (northwest of Toretsk).[73]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 2 that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike (the Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drone) against Ukrainian positions near Yablunivka.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Rusyn Yar and Yablunivka.[75] Drone operators of the Russian "Typhoon" Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Stepanivka.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Koptieve; northwest, west, and south of Myrne; north of Novoekonomichne; south and southeast of Razine; west and southwest of Malynivka; in western Mykolaivka; and to central Novotoretske (all northeast of Pokrovsk).[77]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Malynivka and toward Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Novotoretske, Razine, and Koptieve; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Molodetske on July 1 and 2.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoekonomichne.[79]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are leveraging summer foliage as concealment.[80] The commander stated that Russian forces temporarily decreased the tempo of their attacks before May 9, 2025, but that Russian forces are again trying to reach the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in this direction. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are no longer using heavy armored vehicles due to the terrain and that Russian forces are instead deploying fire teams of one to two personnel, sometimes on motorcycles, scooters, and bicycles.[81]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bilytske, Novyi Donbas (both north of Pokrovsk), Koptieve, and Dobropillya (northeast of Pokrovsk).[82]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[83]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on July 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced to Voskresenka and Piddubne and southwest of Zirka, northwest of Yalta, and southwest of Fedorivka (all south of Novopavlivka).[84]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Oleksiivka, and Dachne; and south of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Myrne, Zaporizhzhia, Perebudova, Voskresenka, and Vesele on July 1 and 2.[85] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasing counterattacks near Zirka.[86]

Ukrainian military officials reported on July 2 that Russian forces have not consolidated in Dachne (south of Novopavlivka) and that fighting continues in the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[87] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Russian forces are attacking on the flanks of Novopavlivka in the north and south along the Solona River due to the lack of cover in the main Novopavlivka direction.[88]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Zirka.[89] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly operating along the T-0428 Dachne-Novopavlivka highway.[90] Drone operators of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly remotely mining roads near Voskresenka.[91]

Russian force continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 1 that Russian forces advanced to Maliivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[92]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Maliivka and Voskresenka and near Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on July 1 and 2.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 1 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole, Novodarivka, and Levadne.[94]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued ground assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on July 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole) and advanced north of Stepanivka (southeast of Hulyaipole).[95]

A Russian milblogger claimed on July 2 that Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole toward Olhivske.[96]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervone (east of Hulyaipole).[97]

Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 2 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on July 1 and 2.[98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[99]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 2.

 

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.[100]

Ukrainian military intelligence reportedly assassinated the first deputy commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF). Ukrainian media sources amplified a claim from a private Russian Telegram account on July 2 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assassinated BSF Chief of Staff — First Deputy Commander Vice Admiral Ildar Akhmerov in occupied Crimea.[101] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. Neither Russian nor Ukrainian officials have commented on Akhmerov's unconfirmed assassination.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 114 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 40 drones and that 39 drones were ”lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles struck civilian and residential infrastructure facilities in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[103]

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov reported that Russian forces attempted to strike, Yuzhe, Odesa Oblast with unmanned naval drones in early June 2025 but that Ukrainian forces repelled the drones.[104] Budanov reported that Russia is attempting to domestically produce naval drones but has not yet been successful.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated on July 1 that Belarus will reduce the number of military personnel set to participate in the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise by nearly half and reposition the main maneuver away from Belarus' western borders.[105] It is unclear whether Lukashenko meant that the total number of Zapad participants is to be reduced in half, or whether the Belarusian contingent in the joint exercise is to be reduced by half.

Russia continues efforts to formalize Russian-Belarusian governmental integration. Russian state media outlet Parlamentskaya Gazeta reported on July 1 that Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a bill to the Russian State Duma to ratify a protocol that would allow Belarusian citizens permanently residing in Russia to vote and run in local Russian elections.[106] Putin and Lukashenko signed the protocol on March 13, 2025, amending the 1998 Russian-Belarusian treaty on Equal Rights of Citizens. Lukashenko signed a similar protocol in January 2025.[107]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://www.ft.com/content/b69e327d-95a3-487d-a9b6-6a72ef48ba61; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-halts-weapons-shipment-ukraine-concerns-us-stockpile-rcna216358

[2] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048?s=09

[3] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048?s=09; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-halts-weapons-shipment-ukraine-concerns-us-stockpile-rcna216358

[4] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/pentagon-halts-weapons-shipment-ukraine-concerns-us-stockpile-rcna216358

[5] https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/mzs-zaprosilo-timchasovogo-povirenogo-u-spravah-ssha-dlya-obgovorennya-pidtrimki-ukrayini-v-protidiyi-rosijskij-agresiyi

[6] https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/13066;

[7]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/01/us/politics/trump-ukraine-weapons.html; https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/u-s-halts-key-weapons-for-ukraine-in-new-sign-of-weakening-support-for-kyiv-35d78cfc?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgroeMA-XpoBkhywqAKIXyx10RmZXqsPeBWDKi-dnsMJFWvvKT-qx2a&gaa_ts=686575bf&gaa_sig=bb_7hoXRbQWpv0liIWv-c4kfg-BQAEfLDtEIrJ5HMFrlJy0zECN8-4uKj0FLJnFxGT8xVx7TbhfhTxh5iCcykw%3D%3D

[8] https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048?s=09

[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/02/russia-ukraine-war-offensives-ceasefire/2b29644c-570c-11f0-b45b-dc9aeb848c03_story.html

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025;

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030925

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030925

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030925

[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625

[18] https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/02/europe/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-intl-cmd

[19] https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/rossiya-i-mir/peskov-chem-menshe-oruzhiya-postavlyaetsya-ukraine-tem-blizhe-okonchanie-svo

[20] https://t.me/kadmitriev/149

[21] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/07/02/v-gosdume-nazvali-sroki-protivostoyaniya-vsu-bez-postavok-zapadnogo-oruzhiya/

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425

[23] https://www.elysee dot fr/emmanuel-macron/2025/07/01/entretien-telephonique-avec-le-president-de-la-federation-de-russie-vladimir-poutine-1; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77337; https://t.me/tass_agency/323383

[24] https://t.me/tass_agency/323436 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/24407615; https://t.me/tass_agency/323446

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525

[26] https://tass dot ru/politika/24408985

[27] https://tass dot ru/politika/24412709

[28] https://ria dot ru/20250630/korchunov-2025829378.html ; https://norway dot mid.ru/ru/embassy/press-centre/news/intervyu_posla_rossii_v_norvegii_n_v_korchunova_agentstvu_ria_novosti_30_iyunya_2025_g_/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/62072

[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032725

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062325; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061725 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040625; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325

[33] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925

[35] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl?__cft__[0]=AZWrKiNB8Vzer-mB-dZhqhOOjuM8uSFnMHxsO004PtDNanCXsm4xFvbC8jiX_hy3s1kWPNOlzGsRcx1QhLAEExKDug3_y8dVRzpDQzZbPPnIpZKAZQn_C9BBYT72Yp_l25KCpssCXBov0iQ75cSLdiahgM7T_Cy_-4QvBJNTRkTpQg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/74509; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/9783; https://t.me/sashakots/54668; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171053; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30702

[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171030

[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682; https://t.me/basurin_e/19655

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26143

[42] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1940092514884554825; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1939760514717855923; https://t.me/ua_regteam/340

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl?__cft__[0]=AZWrKiNB8Vzer-mB-dZhqhOOjuM8uSFnMHxsO004PtDNanCXsm4xFvbC8jiX_hy3s1kWPNOlzGsRcx1QhLAEExKDug3_y8dVRzpDQzZbPPnIpZKAZQn_C9BBYT72Yp_l25KCpssCXBov0iQ75cSLdiahgM7T_Cy_-4QvBJNTRkTpQg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/74509

[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682;

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682; https://t.me/epoddubny/23976; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38123

[47] https://t.me/rusich_army/24462

[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171007; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171015

[49] https://t.me/osirskiy/1195; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1940332907526283322;

[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30708

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6830

[52] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056619-do-25-vijskovosluzbovciv-u-grupi-prikordonna-brigada-gart-pro-zbilsenna-rosijskih-sturmiv-na-harkivsini/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVMUSS0B0yo ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/cze-vzhe-ne-mali-shturmovi-grupy-poblyzu-vovchanska-rosiyany-vtrachayut-do-100-lyudej-shhodnya/

[53] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056657-u-vovcansku-vijskovi-rf-perehovuutsa-u-kanalizacii-ta-pidzemnih-komunikaciah-prikordonna-brigada-gart/

[54] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056783-na-pivdenno-slobozanskomu-napramku-rosiani-namagautsa-zajnati-vigidni-pozicii-hartia/

[55] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/9149; https://t.me/wargonzo/27643

[56] https://t.me/tass_agency/323427

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6830

[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/171033

[59] https://t.me/yurasumy/23860 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38130

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/323435

[62] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38114 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38105 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23860

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23859

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[65] https://t.me/rybar/71839; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38131; https://t.me/yurasumy/23858

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144; https://t.me/wargonzo/27645; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962

[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aEBreSv3UuQ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/zbyvayemo-starym-didivskym-metodom-u-sylah-oborony-nazvaly-najbilshu-problemu-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku/

[68] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962

[69] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38131; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30682; https://t.me/mod_russia/54304

[70] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1940327598296633671; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1261

[71] https://t.me/dva_majors/74509

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144; https://t.me/rybar/71839; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170962; https://t.me/yurasumy/23857; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65578

[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/74541

[74] https://t.me/mod_russia/54317

[75] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13979

[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/74541

[77] https://t.me/motopatriot78/38113; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65578; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30673; https://t.me/motopatriot78/38131

[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144; https://t.me/rybar/71839; https://t.me/yurasumy/23856; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65578; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30706

[79] https://t.me/rybar/71839

[80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/prykydayutsya-derevom-i-mriyut-pro-dnipropetrovshhynu-typova-povedinka-rosiyan-bilya-pokrovska/

[81] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/vorog-hoche-vyjty-na-nash-riven-za-den-pozycziyi-pid-pokrovskomu-atakuye-50-60-shturmovykiv/

[82] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13979

[83] https://www.facebook.com/37obrmp/videos/1680665412635223/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9498

[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30673 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23852 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94907 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/15774

[85] https://t.me/yurasumy/23852 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/23854 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/170988 ; https://t.me/rybar/71815 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[86] https://t.me/wargonzo/27645

[87] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1056721-vijsk-rf-u-dacnomu-na-dnipropetrovsini-nemae-osuv-hortica/ ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9477 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26178

[88] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1057059-e-kadri-de-vze-peretnuli-adminkordon-ale-ih-pidkiduvali-aka-situacia-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku/

[89] https://t.me/voin_dv/15774

[90] https://t.me/yurasumy/23854

[91] https://t.me/voin_dv/15787

[92] https://t.me/voin_dv/15774

[93] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/15774

[95] https://t.me/yurasumy/23851 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65582

[96] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65582

[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/15773

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26180 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hEY3Ujh5T4c8q9FJTegBFWiUyBr2MDcsGW47QiMJd6TqoPRQcr3ZSp4qKvf85AnAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26144

[99] https://t.me/wargonzo/27657 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54304 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/74503; https://t.me/dva_majors/74518

[100] https://t.me/tass_agency/323430

[101] https://focus dot ua/voennye-novosti/712692-ildar-ahmerov-pogib-v-krymu-vse-podrobnosti; https://t.me/c/2059151819/1045; https://war.obozrevatel dot com/v-okkupirovannom-kryimu-likvidirovali-komanduyuschego-chernomorskim-flotom-rf-pervyie-podrobnosti.htm

[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/37488  

[103] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22585 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/raketni-udary-ta-ataky-droniv-po-dnipropetrovshhyni-v-ova-pokazaly-naslidky-seriyi-obstriliv/ ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1055689-vijska-rf-vdarili-raketou-po-kamanskomu-rajonu-stalasa-pozeza/; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.phpstory_fbid=pfbid02s9XT3KqE3ZsNkcs3QbVVqxiuaT3HpQ7v7a3hzCFiCRMSpsz5RSehhbMK2azuhjw5l&id=61558717479769 ;https://t.me/OP_UA/16107 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/22569; https://suspilne dot media/1056303-na-vijni-zaginuv-komandir-110-i-ombr-sergij-zaharevic/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/u-nas-ye-chitka-informaciya-i-partneri-ce-pidtverdzhuyut-sho-98781 ; https://t.me/kramatorsk_rada/23128 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/vorog-vdaryv-po-kramatorsku-geranyamy-ye-rujnuvannya-infrastruktury/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/15397 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/02/vorog-atakuvav-harkiv-dronamy-ta-aviabombamy-ye-postrazhdali/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1056495-po-odnopoverhovomu-budinku-v-novobavarskomu-rajoni-harkova-vdariv-sahed-foto-naslidkiv/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2749 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15393 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15394 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15395 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2747 ; https://t.me/synegubov/15396 ; https://suspilne dot media/1056451-makron-pogovoriv-z-putinim-unaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-zaginuv-komandir-110-brigadi-zaharevic-1225-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751409233&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/IzmailRDA/36256

[104] https://suspilne dot media/1056451-makron-pogovoriv-z-putinim-unaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-zaginuv-komandir-110-brigadi-zaharevic-1225-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1751461721&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[105] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/321007 ; http://belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-raskryl-prichiny-izmenenija-parametrov-uchenij-zapad-2025-724155-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025

[106] https://www.pnp dot ru/politics/putin-vnes-na-ratifikaciyu-protokol-ob-uchastii-belorusov-v-rossiyskikh-vyborakh.html

[107] https://www.pnp dot ru/in-world/lukashenko-razreshil-belorusam-golosovat-na-mestnykh-vyborakh-v-rossii.html

 

 

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