Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 3, 2025

Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

May 3, 2025, 4:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:45 am ET on May 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal. Zelensky referred to Putin's May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire demand as a "theatrical production" that does not appear to be serious and is designed to create a sense of comfort and safety for participants of Russia's Victory Day celebration.[1] Zelensky once again articulated Ukraine's willingness to extend a short-term ceasefire to 30 days and stated that an effective ceasefire requires high-quality monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that any joint ceasefire should be comprehensive and last for at least 30 days with the possibility for renewal.[2] Kovalenko noted that shorter ceasefires with vague terms and a lack of monitoring mechanisms afford Russian forces the opportunity to seize on tactical pauses to better prepare ahead of a future summer offensive in Ukraine. Victory Day is Russia's principal patriotic holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), and Russia celebrates Victory Day on May 9. Putin first announced on April 28 Russia's intention to implement a Victory Day ceasefire between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11.[3] Putin's decision to unilaterally impose a fleeting ceasefire during Russia's Victory Day celebration is a deliberate attempt to project a sense of power and control in Russia to both domestic and international audiences. Putin likely also seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations by imposing such an agreement.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the purpose of Russia's unilateral Easter and Victory Day ceasefires is to "test" Ukraine's readiness to pursue paths towards a sustainable peace.[4] Peskov claimed that Russia will wait for "final," unambiguous statements from Ukraine and will look for Ukrainian actions aimed at de-escalating the war during the holiday. Ukraine and the United States have previously proposed a 30-day general ceasefire to Russia, but Russian officials continue to ignore or outright reject these general ceasefire proposals.[5] Ukraine has also repeatedly called for longer ceasefires so as to pave the way for negotiations toward a durable peace settlement — which is in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts to leverage a ceasefire as the foundation for a lasting peace agreement in Ukraine.[6] Russia is very likely to continue its pattern of leveraging short-term ceasefires to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in an effort to discredit Ukraine and to create tactical or operational pauses to conduct troop rotations, resupply units, and prepare for future offensive operations, as evidenced by the Easter and long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefires.[7] Russia's continued rejection of Ukrainian and US ceasefire proposals of any reasonable length with necessary monitoring mechanisms showcases Russia's disinterest in peace in Ukraine in the near term.

The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on May 2 that the US State Department approved and notified the US Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of equipment and maintenance services for Ukraine’s F-16s worth an estimated $310.5 million.[8] The DSCA reported that the sale will include aircraft modifications and upgrades; personnel training related to operation, maintenance, and sustainment support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; ground handling equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; studies and surveys; and US Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services.

Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3. Ukrainian forces launched an aerial drone, a naval drone, and missile strike against Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, and surrounding areas on May 3.[9] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed that Ukrainian forces used a SAM fired from a Magura naval drone to down a Russian Su-30 fighter jet over the Black Sea near Novorossiysk.[10] Ukrainian forces used missiles attached to a Magura naval drone to shoot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter in December 2024, but this is the first time that Ukrainian forces have downed a fixed-wing aircraft using this tactic.[11]

Russian milbloggers responded to the May 3 strike, claiming that Russia is lagging behind Ukraine on naval drone development and complaining that Russia has previously lost aircraft over the Black Sea due to Ukrainian drone dominance.[12] The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have the means to combat Ukrainian naval drones and protect Russian aircraft from missile strikes, but that Russian leadership is unwilling to prioritize Russian drone development and innovation. The milbloggers called for Russian coastal defense units and drone operators in the Black Sea to integrate lessons learned from Russian infantry fighting in Ukraine in order to integrate first-person view (FPV) drones with aerial reconnaissance.

Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states. Independent Russian media outlets Meduza and Agentstvo reported on May 2 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov authored the foreword of a new book titled "History of Lithuania," which the "Foreign Relations" publishing arm of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) published in March 2025.[13] Lavrov‘s foreword claimed that the national policies of Baltic countries, including modern Lithuania, leverage "falsified” historical narratives to "stimulate" Russophobic and anti-Russian sentiments in their domestic audiences.[14] Lavrov claimed that the book seeks to analyze the development of the "lands that were associated with Lithuania at different times." Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys stated that the book is a Russian propaganda tool designed to provide the Kremlin with scholarly literature to support its denial of neighboring countries’ statehoods and histories separate from that of Russia.[15] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have recently intensified their threats against Europe — particularly the Baltic States — due to Europe's alleged "Russophobia."[16] Kremlin officials have also indicated that Russia views independent states that were once part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union as part of modern-day Russia.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal.
• The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3.
• Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Alleged Ceasefire Violation
• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Limited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on May 2 and 3 as Russian forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the area.[18]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 2 that Ukrainian forces maintain unspecified limited positions in Kursk Oblast.[19]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating at the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border.[20]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground attacks in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on May 3.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 2 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Belgorod Oblast.[21]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 3 but did not advance.

Fighting continued north of Sumy City near Bilovody and Vodolahy and northeast of Sumy City near Loknya.[22]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillia (northeast of Sumy City).[23]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on May 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on May 2 and 3.[24]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Antagonist" drone detachment are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka on May 3.[26]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Kupyansk on May 2.[27]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Makiivka (southwest of Borova).[28]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahyrzove, Kolisnykivka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Serhiivka and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on May 2 and 3.[29]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces retook Pershotravneve (east of Borova).[30]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Torske (east of Lyman).[31]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to eastern Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[32]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Ridkodub, Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Myrne, and east of Lyman near Torske on May 2 and 3.[33]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeast Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[34]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hyrhorivka and Bilohorivka on May 2 and 3.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on May 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar toward Novomarkove and toward Mayske; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora on May 2 and 3.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced into central Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further in northern Novoolenivka (northwest of Oleksandropil), south of Romanivka (east of Oleksandropil), in southern Stara Mykolaivka (southeast of Oleksandropil), and east of Zelene Pole (south of Oleskandropil).[40] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized an intersection of the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Malynivka (southwest of Toretsk) and advanced near Nova Poltavka (northeast of Malynivka) on May 2, but do not current maintain positions in the settlement.[41] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized positions on the southeastern outskirts of Novo Poltavka, however.[42] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Krymske (northeast of Toretsk) toward the Novotoretska Mine near the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway northwest of Toretsk.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske and Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Stara Mykolaivka, Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, and Yelyzavetivka and in the direction of Nova Poltavka on May 2 and 3.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are attacking Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[46] Elements of the Russian "Orcs" drone detachment are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 3 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) and are advancing west of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), and near Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[48] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized Mykhailivka and Lysivka (both southeast of Pokrovsk), and most of Myrolyubivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), except for the settlement's industrial zone in the eastern part of the settlement.

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Chunyshyne, Shevchenko, Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on May 2 and 3.[49]

The senior communications officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 3 that Russian forces are taking an average of 150 casualties per day in this direction and that Russian forces are attempting to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by May 9.[50] The officer stated that Russia recently reinforced its units in the Pokrovsk direction either with redeployments from the Kursk direction or newly recruited troops. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction posted footage on May 3 purportedly showing the brigade striking a Russian ammunition depot in an unspecified area of this direction.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Myrnohrad direction (east of Pokrovsk).[52]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Kotlyarivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[53]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) seized Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[54] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced between Novooleksandrivka and Nadiivka (south of Novooleksandrivka), west of Nadiivka, to eastern Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), and to the outskirts of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka).[55]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Preobrazhenka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on May 2 and 3.[56]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Bohdanivka.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Troitske; elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are reportedly operating near Kotlyarikva; and elements of the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) are reportedly operating near Nadiivka.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove) and advanced southwest of Odradne (southwest of Kurakove).[60]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Odradne, Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on May 2 and 3.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Bahatyr.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 200th Artillery Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), and 11th Air Defense and Air Force Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[63] Elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Odradne.[64]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on May 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[66]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Burlatske, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and toward Zelene Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and toward Novopil on May 2 and 3.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko.[68]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Vysoke (formerly Chervone) on May 2 and 3 but did not advance.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove; and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky and Kamyanske on May 2 and 3.[70]

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on May 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system in an unspecified location in southern Ukraine.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Shaman” detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka and elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[72]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on May 3.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[73]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of May 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea, and 183 strike and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, Oryol cities and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 77 Shahed and other drones over eastern, northern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 73 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure and commercial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[75]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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[1] https://suspilne dot media/1009061-rosiani-masovano-atakuvali-harkiv-bezpilotnikami-ukraina-priskorit-stvorenna-vlasnoi-balistiki-1165-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746262169&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[2] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9187

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825

[4] https://ria dot ru/20250503/peremirie-2014781779.html

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325 ;

[8] https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4173182/ukraine-f-16-training-and-sustainment; https://x.com/statedeptpm/status/1918400116135755966?s=52; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/united-states-has-approved-the-possible-sale-of-f-16-training-support-and-modernization-services-to-ukraine/; https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-state-dept-oks-possible-sale-f-16-training-sustainment-ukraine-2025-05-02/

[9] https://t.me/kondratyevvi/8772 ; https://suspilne dot media/1009189-u-rf-zaavili-pro-ataku-droniv-na-novorosijsk/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313141 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/313142; https://t.me/tass_agency/313145; https://t.me/tass_agency/313154; https://t.me/tass_agency/313162; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87948 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87960 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87968 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87970 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87973 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87977 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87980 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87983 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87985 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/87988 ; https://t.me/chpnvrsk_official/88004 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1918494321440936304 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1918496033060876706; https://t.me/andriyshTime/36751; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91015; https://t.me/opershtab23/13413; https://t.me/kravchenko_glava_nvrsk/11567; https://t.me/dva_majors/70384 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70412 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70421; https://t.me/dva_majors/70408; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63960;

[10] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5792 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/03/vpershe-u-sviti-%e2%80%95-morskyj-dron-magura-znyshhyly-vorozhyj-bojovyj-litak/ ; https://t.me/sotaproject/97317; https://t.me/rybar/70094; https://t.me/dva_majors/70442 ; https://t.me/astrapress/80341; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163331; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163351; https://t.me/rusich_army/23120; https://t.me/dva_majors/70409

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5792; https://kyivindependent dot com/ukraine-war-latest-in-world-first-ukrainian-sea-drone-downs-russian-helicopter/#:~:text=Ukraine's%20military%20intelligence%20(HUR)%20destroyed,missiles%20from%20the%20Magura%20drone.

[12] https://t.me/rybar/70097; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9189;

[13] https://t.me/sotaproject/97306; https://t.me/agentstvonews/10096; https://www dot lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2550460/ministr-istoricheskaia-kniga-o-litve-izdannaia-v-rossii-popytka-opravdat-imperializm; https://kantiana dot ru/news/prezentatsiya-knigi-istoriya-litvy-sostoyalas-v-bfu-im-i-kanta/; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/05/03/v-rossii-vyshla-kniga-istoriya-litvy-s-predisloviem-sergeya-lavrova-v-ney-govoritsya-chto-gosudarstvo-vozniklo-iz-za-sobytiy-na-territorii-sovremennoy-belarusi

[14] https://democracyfund dot ru/userfiles/%D0%9C_%D0%A1_%20%D0%93%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8C%D0%B5%D0%B2%20%D0%B8%20%D0%B4%D1%80_%20%D0%98%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%8F%20%D0%9B%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%8B.pdf

[15] https://www.lrt dot lt/ru/novosti/17/2550460/ministr-istoricheskaia-kniga-o-litve-izdannaia-v-rossii-popytka-opravdat-imperializm

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections;; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023

[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795

[19] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1918382806461264210; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zavdannya-maksimalno-priskoryuvati-stvorennya-ukrayinskoyi-b-97521

[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163347

[21] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1918382806461264210; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/zavdannya-maksimalno-priskoryuvati-stvorennya-ukrayinskoyi-b-97521

[22] https://t.me/wargonzo/26292

[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/70438

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795

[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/163381

[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798

[27] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22789

[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9054; https://t.me/opbr_zsu/531

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/synegubov/14137

[30] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35240

[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9053; https://t.me/bbps_vidarr/204

[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63976; https://t.me/yurasumy/22737, https://t.me/motopatriot78/35212

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824

[34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9048; https://t.me/apachi_fpv/355

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795

[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795

[37] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35257; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35258; https://t.me/t3mny/2270

[38] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91018

[39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63969

[40] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63976; https://t.me/yurasumy/22737

[41] https://t.me/yurasumy/22737 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90989 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35212

[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35269

[43] https://t.me/yurasumy/22739

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795 ;

[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63969

[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/70373; https://t.me/dva_majors/70400 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70432 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70439

[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/70449

[48] https://t.me/yurasumy/22735 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63970 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27974

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795

[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/02/propagandystska-czil-dijty-do-dnya-peremogy-rosiyany-rvutsya-do-kordoniv-dnipropetrovshhyny/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[51] https://t.me/fifthbrUA/938 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/05/03/zdetonuvav-boyekomplekt-rf-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-nashi-bijczi-vluchyly-u-sklad-bk/

[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90996 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/91032

[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9055; https://t.me/btr80/27185

[54] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63972; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35248; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35207; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63959

[55] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63958; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63959; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63970

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63958; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63972; https://t.me/yurasumy/22734; https://t.me/wargonzo/26292

[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35201

[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35201

[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9049; https://t.me/hunterfpv/77

[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/22733; https://t.me/voin_dv/14732

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63974; https://t.me/wargonzo/26292; https://t.me/yurasumy/22733

[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63974; https://t.me/yurasumy/22733

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/35249; https://t.me/voin_dv/14717; https://t.me/voin_dv/14726

[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14720

[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9052; https://t.me/Poltavska_brigadeNGU/475

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/14732

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795

[68] https://t.me/voin_dv/14732

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23798; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23795; https://t.me/rusich_army/23109

[71] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12414

[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/70450; https://t.me/motopatriot78/35203

[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/70451

[74] https://t.me/kpszsu/33739

[75] https://t.me/synegubov/14137 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2480 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/97301 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14129 ; https://t.me/police_kh_region/38516 ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22808 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14118 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/33739 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2476 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14130 ; https://t.me/synegubov/14137 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2472 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70393 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14063 ; https://t.me/suspilnemykolaiv/49823 ; https://t.me/suspilnemykolaiv/49824 ; https://www.facebook dot com/mykoda/posts/1083565613805251?rdid=V1Qam9fYWbqX3uZS# ; https://suspilne dot media/1009061-rosiani-masovano-atakuvali-harkiv-bezpilotnikami-ukraina-priskorit-stvorenna-vlasnoi-balistiki-1165-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746250063&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35371 ; https://suspilne dot media/1009061-rosiani-masovano-atakuvali-harkiv-bezpilotnikami-ukraina-priskorit-stvorenna-vlasnoi-balistiki-1165-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1746249152&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35372

Iran Update, May 1, 2025

 Kelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore,
Ben Schmida, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel would “not allow the [Syrian] Druze ... to be harmed” and threatened additional airstrikes if the violence does not stop, suggesting that Israel aims to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the violence against Druze.[1] An effort to pressure the government to respond as directed assumes that the Syrian government has control over the Sunni fighters attacking Druze communities outside Damascus. Many of these fighters are ad-hoc collections of locals who are attacking the Druze.[2] Some government forces have attacked the Druze.[3] The government deployed General Security Service (GSS) units to cordon off the Druze areas, however, and some of these forces fought alongside local Druze fighters to repulse attacks by Sunni fighters.[4] The government’s deployments alongside local fighters, while other government-linked fighters attack local Druze, suggest that the government does not exert perfect command and control over its forces. The government’s limited control over some extremist elements of its ruling coalition, as well as the localized nature of some of the attackers, indicates that it will be impossible to use airstrikes to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the attacks.

Damascus very likely already wants to stop the violence because the attacks on the Druze make it more difficult to secure the external support Damascus needs to maintain its hold on power. The government faces an extremely dire economic situation and needs external aid and economic support, particularly from the West. Many countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, have repeatedly emphasized that Syria must prevent violence and hold those responsible accountable.[5] The government will need to convince these countries that the government is deserving of their support.

The airstrikes are unlikely to pressure the Syrian government to stop extremists from conducting attacks. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff ordered the IDF to strike Syrian government targets “if the violence against the Druze does not stop.”[6] The government’s limited ability to demand that extremists stop their attacks means that even if the airstrikes did successfully pressure the Syrian government to make demands of Sunni fighters, it is unclear that government demands would have any effect. The government also has significant capacity issues, and airstrikes targeting the Syrian government will only make government efforts to stop the violence more difficult.

It is unclear how Israel can secure the Druze population in and around Damascus if the airstrikes fail. Airstrikes—if they fail to pressure the government—cannot prevent Druze from being killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Only ground forces prepared to physically defend the Druze communities by force can protect the Druze. It is unclear if Israel is willing or able to protect the Druze in places like Sahnaya and Jaramana, which are roughly 45km and 58km from the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights, respectively. Such a ground operation would be an extremely complex military undertaking. The lack of Druze support for Israeli intervention and the destabilizing effects of a ground operation in Syria mean a ground operation would likely fail and increase the threat to Israel by empowering extremists. Some Druze have protested against Israeli interference in Syria.[7]

Only the formation of a combined Druze-Transitional Government force could successfully secure Druze locals from Sunni extremists while also sidelining pro-Regime elements in the Druze community. The ongoing violence is not solely government against Druze violence. The current violence involves pro-government Druze factions, Druze militias associated with former Assad regime networks, local Sunni fighters, and government forces that are responsive to former Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) networks, and others.[8] The Syrian Druze are a politically diverse community (see discussion on different Druze positions below). Some key Druze powerbrokers are negotiating with the government to end the ongoing violence, as GSS and Druze forces have cooperated on the ground.[9] A decision by Damascus to rely on joint Druze-government units could successfully de-escalate the situation while extending government control over well-known bastions of pro-regime sentiment in Jaramana.[10] The government has already taken steps to form joint units.[11] The government’s decision to immediately engage local leaders and cooperate with some Druze militias suggests that Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara and his allies have learned from the experiences with Alawite militias in western Syria, where the failure to engage local leaders and Alawites contributed to continued tension.

Damascus has made serious efforts to curb confessional-motivated violence between Sunni extremists, Druze fighters, civilians, and security services. GSS units reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented additional external Sunni groups from participating in the clashes targeting Druze militants and civilians.[12] Government officials immediately ordered former Ahrar al Sham commander and 40th Division Commander Colonel Binyan al Hariri (Abu Fares Daraa) to deploy the 40th Division to Soura Kabira to secure the area after fighting between tribal fighters and Druze militiamen along the Damascus-Suwayda highway.[13] Government forces also began to deploy along the border between Suwayda and Daraa provinces on April 1.[14] These deployments follow several attacks that tribal groups launched on Druze towns along the western Suwayda border.[15] Security forces are expected to soon deploy across Suwayda Province.[16] These are tangible steps that suggest that the transitional government appears to be learning how to better contain violence targeting minorities and rebuild local trust since sectarian-motivated violence swept coastal Syria in March 2025.

CTP-ISW defines violence between the Muslim and Druze communities as “confessional” rather than “sectarian” because “sectarian violence” refers to violence between different religious denominations. “Confessional violence” refers to violence between different religions. Most Druze consider themselves a distinct religious group from Islam.[17]

Top Druze leaders continued to engage with the Syrian transitional government, even though Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced the government. Men of Dignity leader Laith al Balous and two prominent Druze sheikhs met with the governors of Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra provinces on April 30 and agreed to a ceasefire in Jaramana and Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya. Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri released a fiery statement after the meeting that compared the recent attacks on the Druze community to the massacres that targeted Alawites on the coast in early March.[18] The number of civilians killed and harmed in the recent attacks on Druze-majority areas in and around Damascus is several orders of magnitude lower than the number of civilians killed and harmed in Alawite areas along the coast.[19] Syrian and Turkish media reported that fewer than five civilians were killed in southern Syria.[20] Armed groups affiliated with the transitional government killed 420 unarmed people in western Syria in early March, including 39 children.[21] Hijri, who has consistently criticized the government, announced that he “no longer trusts a government that kills its own people” and called upon "international forces to intervene immediately.”[22] The clear fractures between Druze leaders on engaging the government did not prevent Balous and other Druze leaders from presumably negotiating the deployment of GSS forces across Suwayda Province.

Iraqi media reported on May 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar formed an election-related agreement that “resembles reconciliation.”[23] Halbousi’s Progress Party and Khanjar’s Sovereignty Party will reportedly compete in the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections together or form a post-election alliance, according to a recent Iraqi media report. CTP-ISW assessed on April 28 that Halbousi may be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework to unseat his rival and current Parliament Speaker, Mahmoud al Mashhadani.[24] The recent report about a Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with the April 28 assessment and could suggest that Halbousi may not be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Mashhadani, Khanjar, and Halbousi’s other historical rivals are members of the United Sunni Leadership Coalition that formed in early January 2025 and has explicitly supported long-held Sunni political demands.[25] Halbousi has also recently called for political action to achieve Sunni political demands, such as after the Federal Supreme Court suspended the implementation of a law that favored Sunnis in February 2025.[26] A Halbousi-Khanjar alliance would greatly increase Sunni electoral strength, as Halbousi’s party and Khanjar’s former party were the two highest-performing Sunni parties in the 2021 elections.[27]

The Houthis may attempt to pressure the UN into ending the UN Verifications and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships in Houthi-controlled ports until the UN ends the mechanism. The United Nations implemented UNIVIM in 2016 to stop prohibited cargo, such as weapons, from being exported to Yemen, while ensuring that Yemen retained access to food and other necessary supplies.[28] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on May 1 that the Houthis are prohibiting oil tankers and cargo ships, including UNVIM cleared vessels, from leaving Ras Issa Port on the Hudaydah coastline.[29] The Houthis reportedly fired warning shots after one vessel attempted to exit, and armed Houthi fighters boarded other vessels.[30] There were at least 14 vessels anchored near Ras Issa Port on May 1, according to Maritime Traffic data. Many of these vessels travelled from Djibouti, where UNVIM officials inspect vessels transporting cargo to Yemeni ports. Houthi Foreign Minister Gamal Amer also recently called for the termination of UNIVIM in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and the UN Security Council President, suggesting the Houthis may be using the vessels as hostages to renegotiate UNVIM or pressure the UN to change how the UNVIM operates.[31]

The fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on May 3 was postponed.[32] The Iranian Foreign Ministry reported on May 1 that US-Iran talks were rescheduled at the suggestion of the Omani foreign minister.[33] Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi said the talks were rescheduled for "logistical reasons."[34] Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized in recent months that Iran will not negotiate under military threat or economic pressure.[35] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth threatened military action against Iran in response to Iran’s support for the Houthis in an April 30 tweet.[36] US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, who has led the US delegation in the first three rounds of US-Iran talks, retweeted Hegseth's comments. The United States separately sanctioned several entities and vessels on April 29 and 30 that were involved in Iran's ballistic missile program and Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products trade, respectively.[37] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 1 that US sanctions are not helping the US and Iran resolve nuclear disputes, and the next round of talks will be scheduled "depending on the US approach."[38] An Iranian expert close to the regime stated on May 1 that talks were postponed due to what unspecified Iranian sources called “contradictory US positions.“[39] The sources also said that the United States was trying to change the general framework of the talks. The Wall Street Journal reported on April 26 that one of the key disputes between Iran and the United States is whether a final agreement should address the Iranian missile program, which Iran has repeatedly indicated it is unwilling to make concessions on.[40] Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) were also scheduled to hold talks in Rome on May 2 ahead of US-Iran talks.[41] It is unclear if Iran-E3 talks will also be postponed.

Iran continued to expand economic cooperation with China to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reported on May 1 that Iran exported 1.6 million barrels per day of crude oil in April 2025.[42] United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) estimated that Iranian oil exports to China made up 97 percent of Iran's total oil exports in April.[43] Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian separately met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS security summit in Brazil on May 1.[44] Both officials emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral economic ties to "challenge unilateralism in the international arena.” Iran's participation in BRICS is part of its broader efforts to establish a parallel international order that challenges Western “dominance."[45] UANI also reported that Iran increasingly used tankers previously involved in Russian oil trades, further illustrating cooperation between major US adversaries.[46]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel in Syria: The Israeli prime minister and foreign minister said that Israel would “not allow the [Syrian] Druze...to be harmed” and threatened additional airstrikes if the violence does not stop, suggesting that Israel aims to pressure the Syrian government into stopping the violence against Druze. The airstrikes are unlikely to pressure the Syrian government to stop extremists from conducting attacks, because the government cannot order the extremists to stop. It is unclear how Israel can secure the Druze population in and around Damascus if the airstrikes fail. Airstrikes—if they fail to pressure the government—cannot prevent Druze from being killed or injured by Sunni extremists. Only the formation of a combined Druze-Transitional Government force could successfully secure Druze locals from Sunni extremists while also sidelining pro-Regime elements in the Druze community.
• Violence in Southern Syria: Damascus has made serious efforts to curb confessional-motivated violence between Sunni extremists, Druze fighters, civilians, and security services. GSS units reportedly cordoned off Sahnaya and prevented additional external Sunni groups from participating in the clashes targeting Druze militants and civilians.
• Druze-Damascus Relations: Top Druze leaders continue to engage with the Syrian transitional government, even though Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri publicly denounced the government. This demonstrates the political diversity among Syria’s Druze community.
• Iraqi Politics: Iraqi media reported on May 1 that former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi and his Sunni rival Khamis al Khanjar formed an election-related agreement that “resembles reconciliation. The recent report about a Khanjar-Halbousi reconciliation is inconsistent with CTP-ISW’s April 28 assessment and could suggest that Halbousi may not be cooperating with the Shia Coordination Framework.
• Houthis and the UN: The Houthis may attempt to pressure the UN into ending the UN Verifications and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) by holding oil tankers and cargo ships in Houthi-controlled ports until the UN ends the mechanism.
• Iran-US Talks: The fourth round of US-Iran nuclear talks in Rome on May 3 was postponed.
• Iran-China Cooperation: Iran continued to expand economic cooperation with China to undermine the US maximum pressure campaign.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial depreciated from 815,000 rials to one US dollar on April 30 to 820,000 rials to one US dollar on May 1.[47]

Senior Iranian military officials appear to be preparing for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and energy infrastructure. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Southwestern Air Defense Zone on May 1 to inspect the site’s operational readiness and capabilities.[48] Sabahi Fard inspected radar and missile systems and stressed the zone’s critical role in protecting Iranian airspace. The site is located in Khuzestan Province, where there are many key Iranian ports and oil and gas infrastructure. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi separately inspected the 4th Tactical Airbase in Dezful, Khuzestan Province, on May 1.[49] Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi and other senior officers accompanied Mousavi during the visit. Israel previously weighed potential strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure in October 2024, a move former US President Joe Biden opposed.[50]

Iran continues to strengthen economic ties with African countries, likely to bolster trade and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. Iran hosted the third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit from April 27 to May 1 in Tehran.[51] This summit focused on opportunities to bolster trade in the areas of oil, gas, petrochemicals, mining, and energy. Representatives from 38 African countries and senior Iranian political officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, attended the summit.

Syria

Turkey appears to be resuming its campaign to pressure the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate into the Syrian state. An unspecified Turkish Foreign Ministry source claimed that Turkey seeks to “implement” the March 10 agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF.[52] The agreement called for the representation of all Syrian communities and their participation in the political process, as well as the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the Syrian state.[53] The March 10 agreement established a seven-point framework to guide future negotiations over the details of the agreement‘s implementation. Those negotiations have not occurred yet.[54] The official did not define what mechanisms Turkey would use to ”implement” the agreement. Turkey threatened to conduct a full-scale assault on SDF-held territories between December 2024 and March 2025 to compel the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state.[55] Turkish officials have consistently demanded that the SDF fully disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[56] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Kurdish political parties remain at odds over Syria’s form of government, however. Neither side has made any major adjustments to their positions on Syrian centralization or military integration despite the March 10 Agreement between the two parties.

Iraq

Iran is reportedly attempting to avoid a major rift between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025.[57] An Iraqi Dawa party member told Saudi media on May 1 that Iran would choose between Maliki and Sudani if Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr runs in the elections. Sudani and Maliki are both members of the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. CTP-ISW assessed on April 30 that Iran is likely urging the Shia Coordination Framework unity ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[58] Maliki and Sudani reportedly plan to run on opposing lists.[59] Sadr won the largest share of parliament seats in the 2021 election because his Shia National Movement ran on a single list, which would necessitate unity between Sudani and Maliki if Sadr participates in the elections.[60]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since 1:00 pm ET on April 30.[61] CENTCOM conducted an airstrike targeting Houthi fortifications in al Hawak District, south of Hudaydah.[62] The Houthis issued an evacuation order to residents in areas of the al Hawak District in November 2024, likely to use the land to construct these fortifications.[63] CENTCOM also conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi underground facilities in Kitaf District, Saada Governorate, on April 30.[64] CENTCOM also struck Houthi infrastructure in al Khab al Shaaf District, al Jawf Governorate, on May 1 at least six times, which is approximately 50 kilometers (km) behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[65] A Yemeni analyst reported on April 13 that the Houthis had a training camp in Khab al Shaaf District.[66]

The Houthis claimed on April 30 that they launched an unspecified number of drones at the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea.[67] Local sources reported on April 30 that the Houthis launched drones from the al Jawba area, south of Marib Governorate.[68]

The Houthis claimed on April 30 that they had launched two drones targeting an unspecified “vital” target in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area and Ashkelon, southern Israel.[69] The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a drone from Yemen on April 29.[70] Local sources reported on April 30 that the Houthis launched drones from sites in the Haradh area, Hajjah Governorate.[71]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing Significant to Report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks in the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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[1] https://allisrael.com/amidst-clashes-in-syria-netanyahu-threatens-israeli-strikes-to-defend-druze-in-syria

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-29-2025; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917955888352051332;

[3] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l?__cft__[0]=AZXuWQ3OdcLnmR5SXeyvNF5fYPHeBF2bbjAxLPZxwbu1rrSEyd6iEZe5epVZ3tgRgqfDGhdyf8HTveI-tk98B1VvDxPsHGFIwqgU8TXp1_UN_Hyu7gljtWVACyUUqtfvLXPw3tBM5vB3UA3qq5HKZnwFZ3Ix0aIii9V-1t-coDCnCQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R;

[4] https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917946008106836318 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917516256892141682 ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917404525280776500 ; https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0AZ94tv4czygGaDS7zvfHU9HvkuNpGscrdhVhwD8wuXgDhhJYH1Nf3jjDUT1brfjnl

[5] https://x.com/SecRubio/status/1898833468441981178; https://www.reuters.com/world/uk-lifts-sanctions-against-syrias-defence-ministry-intelligence-agencies-2025-04-24/

[6] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1917566064788992133

[7] https://www.newarab.com/news/syrians-protest-against-israeli-attempts-divide-south

[8] https://x.com/sameersaboungi/status/1917435513415348358; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917955888352051332; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917946008106836318

[9] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917516256892141682; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917602765250965546

[10] https://x.com/sameersaboungi/status/1917435513415348358;

[11] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l?__cft__[0]=AZUETTAmKqqsN1qeXt7N6XQzMtFKE-N3RfNkYAv3ORN8LA3x43rIh0sAv1wi38rnXjPqW6gAuysogSkJoHIEkpLCfdfbVBb_3AskQ_0MwkADI8MFmiI6cAs4rNgPjJypGTGTYqEgF1Zfh3ucfu0_Ss-ygztWLIMkB_M6lfbHzAAirOnJqmepUrjikKZyOxsR27MuW4Nw9drS938ADbbunoV_&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917602765250965546; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917649465143427525/photo/1

[12] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1917603572507722204

[13] https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/posts/pfbid0SdFRSPeN9sYq4MgmqLY44H1NpFR9ExRLrS1dZUfrLMBhjyg2xWR87vFgGrMqRPi9l ; https://t.me/AjaNews/375808; https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128797

 

[14] https://t.me/SyrianArabNewsAgency/128816

[15] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917639052536275128; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1917662312330125701; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1917675308385288581

[16] https://x.com/Daraa24_24/status/1918001746846101646; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1917988217489362964

[17] https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/03/21/5-facts-about-israeli-druze-a-unique-religious-and-ethnic-group/; https://www.ifcj.org/learn/resource-library/who-are-the-druze

[18] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1115236280646181&set=a.607854068051074

[19] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/16-killed-in-attacks-by-outlaw-groups-in-southern-syria-authorities-say/3553530 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917925886193442946 ; https://www.npr.org/2025/03/09/nx-s1-5322458/syria-revenge-killings-alawites-latakia

[20] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/middle-east/16-killed-in-attacks-by-outlaw-groups-in-southern-syria-authorities-say/3553530 ; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1917925886193442946 ; https://apnews.com/article/syria-israel-druze-clashes-sahnaya-jaramana-40f8aeec865c1d81f128b05ef21dfa59

[21] https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/R250305E-1.pdf

[22] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1115236280646181&set=a.607854068051074

[23] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AB%D9%82%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%85-%D8%B5%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B3%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-28-2025

[25] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B3%D9%86-%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025

[26] https://x.com/AlHaLboosii/status/1886773790987763821 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-5-2025

[27] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/386432

[28] https://vimye.org/about

[29] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1917904883648270600

[30] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1917904883648270600

[31] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1917866771086016569

[32] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-talks-postponed-new-date-depends-us-approach-iranian-official-says-2025-05-01/

[33] https://t.me/MFAIran/27078

[34] https://x.com/badralbusaidi/status/1917941337736827292

[35] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28066 ; https://x.com/araghchi/status/1898858793934467171 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/irans-president-trump-i-will-not-negotiate-do-whatever-hell-you-want-2025-03-11/

[36] https://x.com/SecDef/status/1917741093392707886

[37] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0116 ; https://www.state.gov/maximum-pressure-sanctions-on-illicit-traders-of-iranian-petroleum-and-petrochemical-products/

[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-talks-postponed-new-date-depends-us-approach-iranian-official-says-2025-05-01/

[39] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1917961234391224733

[40] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-and-iran-divided-by-key-question-in-nuclear-talks-59b26210 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2025-67e1e57f7311a ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-28-2025

[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-uk-france-germany-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-2025-04-30/

[42] https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934236/download?inline

[43] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/april-2025-iran-tanker-tracker

[44] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6453139/

[45] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-24-2023#_edn468e988744e943807520b659438a957122 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/84859472

[46] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/april-2025-iran-tanker-tracker

[47] https://www.bon-bast.com/

[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/11/3303226

[49] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/11/3303222

[50] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/09/biden-netanyahu-call-israel-attack-iran

https://www.axios.com/2024/10/02/iran-israel-missile-attacks-response

[51] https://en.isna dot ir/photo/1404020704425/The-3rd-Iran-Africa-Economic-Cooperation-Conference ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6453407/

[52] https://www.cnnturk dot com/turkiye/disisleri-kaynaklari-turkiyenin-beklentisi-suriye-yonetimi-ile-sdg-arasinda-varilan-mutabakatin-uygulanmasidir-2278259

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/facilitating-new-sdf-agreement-key-stabilizing-syria

[54] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025

[55] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-19-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-3-2025

[56] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/12/19/turkiye-refutes-us-claims-of-ceasefire-with-syrian-kurdish-fighters ; https://www dot kurdistan24.net/en/story/828282/turkish-fm-sdf-must-dissolve-before-we-launch-a-military-operation ; https://damascusv dot com/archives/66220

[57] https://aawsat dot com/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7/5138335-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A8%D8%AE-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%83%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%84

[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025

[59] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[60] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly

[61] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917669019672248537 ;

https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917705935494975509 ;

https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917902106599580118 ; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1917860097830899749

[62] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917669019672248537; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917705213315788814

[63] https://yemenfuture dot net/news/27279

[64] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917705935494975509

[65] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1917902106599580118; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1917860097830899749

[66] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1911509908660314565

[67] https://t.me/army21ye/2899?single

[68] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917718160347717811

[69] https://t.me/army21ye/2899?single

[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1917308196181393507

[71] https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1917718160347717811