Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 19, 2024

 Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan

May 19, 2024, 5:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on May 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against Russian military infrastructure and oil refineries in occupied Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, and Leningrad Oblast on the night of May 18 to 19. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed nine ATACMS missiles over occupied Crimea.[1] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 12 ATACMS against Sevastopol Bay — nine of which Russian forces shot down near Sevastopol and Belbek airfield, and three of which struck a vessel in Sevastopol port.[2] Footage published on May 19 purportedly shows Russian forces attempting to repel Ukrainian drones over the port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[3] Krasnodar Krai Governor Venyamin Kondratyev claimed that Russian air defense suppressed over 10 drones near Novorossiysk and that falling debris caused fires.[4] Sources in Ukrainian intelligence told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Unmanned Systems Forces conducted successful drone strikes against the Slavyansk oil refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai and against the Kushchyovskaya airfield in Krasnodar Krai where Russian forces station Su-34, Su-25, Su-27, and MiG-29 aircraft used to conduct strikes in Ukraine.[5] The sources stated that the Ukrainian drone strikes damaged several aircraft at the Kushchyovskaya airfield and several distillation columns at the Slavyansk oil refinery. Slavyanskiy Raion Head Roman Sinyagovsky claimed that six drones fell on the Slavyansk oil refinery, and Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters reported that Russian air defense suppressed at least 10 drones over Slavyanskiy and Kushchyovskiy raions.[6] Ukrainian forces previously conducted successful drone strikes against the Kushchyovskaya airfield in April 2024 and the Slavyansk oil refinery in March and April 2024.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also destroyed the Russian Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) Kovrovets Natya-class minesweeper, although it is unclear if Ukrainian forces destroyed the minesweeper near occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, or Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai as the BSF has redeployed the majority of its naval assets to Novorossiysk over the past year.[8] Suspilne also reported on May 19 that its sources within Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) caused explosions at an unspecified number of vertical fuel tanks at the Vyborg oil depot in Leningrad Oblast with three explosive devices.[9] Geolocated footage published on May 18 shows a large fire at the oil depot, although Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko denied reports that drone strikes caused the explosions and claimed that pyrotechnics caused the explosions near the oil depot.[10]

Russian milbloggers appear to be experimenting with different ways to express critical opinions of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) following the recent appointment of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov. A prominent Russian milblogger posted a photo on May 18 of an undated document allegedly from the Russian MoD's Head of the Missile and Artillery Weapons Service responding to an appeal about the inaccuracy of Russian artillery.[11] The document claimed that any issues with artillery ammunition are due to Russian servicemen's improper handling of the rounds and demanded that Russian servicemen follow the Russian Chief of the General Staff's previously issued order prohibiting military personnel from disassembling and weighing artillery ammunition. The milblogger then described the alleged issues by using general terms as well various code words, such as names of other countries or places from popular science fiction films, that multiple Russian milbloggers have repeatedly used recently to cautiously discuss issues in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[12] The milblogger claimed that Russian military personnel noticed that artillery systems were performing strangely, subsequently discovered that the amount of gunpowder in the ammunition shells widely varied, and reported the issue to the Russian military command but to no avail. Another Russian milblogger responded and used some of the same code words to criticize the Russian MoD and to express hope that Belousov will make reforms that solve the larger bureaucratic issues in the MoD.[13] A third milblogger, who previously served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor, however, was direct with his criticisms of the Russian military and claimed that he has previously heard information from Russian servicemen about the inconsistent amounts of gunpowder in some artillery shells.[14] The milblogger claimed that this issue began in Spring 2022 and that the alleged order from the Russian General Staff described in the document indicates that the Russian military leadership has been aware of the issue for some time. The milblogger criticized the Russian military command for not finding a solution and claimed that Russian artillery systems are also suffering from barrel wear (which is very likely given their extremely heavy use).

Founder of the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel, Mikhail Zvinchuk, whom the Kremlin likely co-opted as part of the Kremlin's wider efforts to gain control over the Russia information space, gave an uncharacteristically public interview in which he criticized the Russian MoD and directly connected some of the milbloggers' code words to the Russian MoD on May 18.[15] Although it is unclear if Zvinchuk gave this interview with Kremlin approval or not, the Kremlin's permittance of criticisms by select prominent Russian milbloggers of the Russian MoD could increase public pressure for reforms, that would, if implemented, assist Russia's war effort in Ukraine.[16]

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened Russian internet technology and telecommunications company Yandex because its large language model failed to provide responses that cohere with ongoing Russian information operations. Medvedev criticized Yandex's Alisa voice assistant (ostensibly similar to Amazon's Alexa) on May 19 for being unable to answer questions about the US law approving the seizure of Russian foreign assets or supposed monuments in Ukraine to Nazi sympathizers.[17] Medvedev asserted that Yandex's artificial intelligence (AI) is a "coward" for failing to provide his desired answers to these questions and suggested that Yandex may be concerned about offending its Western clients. Medvedev suggested that Yandex's supposed unwillingness to provide answers to these questions greatly undermines trust in Yandex's products and could provide grounds for the Russian government to recognize Yandex's services as "incomplete" and even identify Yandex's current managers as "foreign agents." Russian news outlet RBK reported that Russian officials have previously submitted complaints against similar large language models for failing to generate sufficiently patriotic responses.[18] Russian officials will likely continue to struggle with shortcomings of large language models that are well known to others with more experience of those systems as the Kremlin continues efforts to solidify its control over the Russian information space.

A St. Petersburg court ruled that Russian authorities can seize over 700 million euros ($760 million) of assets from three large European banks on May 18 on behalf of a Gazprom subsidiary.[19] The court determined that Russian authorities could seize assets, accounts, property and shares belonging to Deutsche Bank, German Commerzbank, and Italian bank UniCredit after ruling in favor of a suit from Gazprom subsidiary RusChemAlliance.[20] The European banks were among the guarantor lenders under a contract for the construction of a gas processing plant in Russia with German-based engineering company Linde, which involved parties terminated due to Western sanctions following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[21] The court also ruled that Deutsche Bank cannot sell its subsidiary businesses in Russia without the approval of Russian President Vladimir Putin and stated that the measure is necessary to prevent the bank from "alienating its property in Russia."[22]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against Russian military infrastructure and oil refineries in occupied Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, and Leningrad Oblast on the night of May 18 to 19.
• Russian milbloggers appear to be experimenting with different ways to express critical opinions of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) following the recent appointment of Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened Russian internet technology and telecommunications company Yandex because its large language model failed to provide responses that cohere with ongoing Russian information operations.
• A St. Petersburg court ruled that Russian authorities can seize over 700 million euros ($760 million) of assets from three large European banks on May 18 on behalf of a Gazprom subsidiary.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced within Vovchansk and near Chasiv Yar and Donetsk City.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus
  
  

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Lyptsi (northeast of Kharkiv City) on May 19, but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 19 that Russian forces advanced up to 800 meters deep in an unspecified area in the direction of Lyptsi on May 18, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks south of Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) and Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi) and that Russian forces continue assaults in the direction of Zelene (northeast of Lyptsi).[24] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Lyptsi.[25]

 

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances within Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and continued offensive operations in the area on May 19. Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northeastern Vovchansk.[26] Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Russian forces have advanced along Haharina Street within northwestern Vovchansk and that Russian infantry recently marginally advanced to the southern (left) bank of the Vovcha River under the now destroyed bridge on Haharina Street.[27] ISW has not observed Russian forces operating vehicles on the southern bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk nor Russian forces maintaining more than an individual limited position on the southern bank. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Starytsya and Buhruvatka (both southwest of Vovchansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[28] Russian forces also continued ground attacks near Starytsya and in the direction of Prylipka (both southwest of Vovchansk) and near Tykhe (east of Vovchansk).[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to a kilometer in width and 1.75 kilometers in depth near Berestove (northwest of Svatove).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 18 that Russian forces entered Myasozharivka (west of Svatove) and entrenched themselves within the settlement.[31] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; northwest of Svatove near Ivanivka, Berestove, Kyslivka, Stepova Novoselivka, and Stelmakhivka; southwest of Svatove near Novosadove; west of Kreminna near Torske, and south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka.[32]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces significantly increased their activity in the Siversk direction (northeast of Bakhmut) and attacked near Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk), Rozdolivka (south of Siversk), and Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[33]

 

Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar during recent mechanized assaults amid continued fighting in the area on May 19. Geolocated footage published on May 18 indicates that Russian forces advanced during mechanized assaults on May 17 and 18 within and southeast of the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[34] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced within the Kanal Microraion on May 19.[35] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near the Novyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar) and from Ivanivske (east of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[36] Fighting continued north of Chasiv Yar near Vasylivka and Kalynivka; near the Novyi and Kanal microraions (eastern Chasiv Yar); east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Shumy.[37] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near the Novyi and Kanal microraions; elements of the Russian 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Army Corps (AC)) and the 17th Artillery Brigade (3rd Army Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar; and elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC) and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating south of Chasiv Yar.[38]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on May 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Netaylove (southwest of Avdiivka), northwest of Umanske (west of Avdiivka), and towards Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[39] Russian sources noted that the tempo of Russian advanced near Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) has slowed recently.[40] Fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novokalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Solovyove, Novoselivka Persha, and Novopokrovske; west of Avdiivka near Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove.[41] Elements of the Russian "Atlant" Battalion are reportedly operating near Ocheretyne.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are striking Ukrainian equipment near Sokil.[43] ISW has not observed other Russian sources claiming that elements of the 98th VDV Division are operating in the Avdiivka direction, and multiple sources have repeatedly indicated that the 98th VDV Division is heavily committed to the Chasiv Yar direction.[44]

 

Russian forces recently advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City amid continued fighting in the area on May 19. Geolocated footage published on May 19 indicates that Russian forces advanced southwest of Marinka (west of Donetsk City) and in eastern Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[45] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Marinka and Paraskoviivka.[46] Fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka; southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Paraskoviivka, and Novomykhailivka; and southeast of Vuhledar near Volodymyrivka.[47] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka, and elements of the 200th Artillery Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Yelyzavetivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[48]

 

Positional engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on May 19. Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine and southeast of Velyka Novosilka near Novomayorske.[49] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VSK] and EMD) are reportedly operating near Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka).[50]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed on May 19 that Russian forces recently advanced up to two kilometers towards Hulyaipole.[51] ISW observed geolocated footage on May 18 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced roughly 1.5 kilometers southeast of Hulyaipole.[52]

 

Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations to clear Ukrainian forces from Robotyne on May 19.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized an unspecified Ukrainian position northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[54] Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[55]

 

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 19 that Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian attacks near Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[56]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian Air Force Commander Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched 37 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk Oblast on the night of May 18 to 19 and Ukrainian forces destroyed all the drones over Kyiv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy, and Kherson oblasts.[57] Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Spokesperson Dmytro Chubenko reported that Russian forces struck a recreation center in Kharkiv City with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles.[58] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported that Russian forces conducted two separate strikes against the recreation center roughly 20 minutes apart, possibly to kill first responders who arrived at the scene after the first strike.[59] The Russian strike reportedly wounded at least 27 people and killed six people, including a pregnant woman.[60] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed condolences to the victims' families and reiterated that two Patriot air defense systems would fundamentally improve Ukraine's air defense capabilities around Kharkiv City.[61]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The press service of Russia's National Technology Initiative (NTI) told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on May 18 that NTI has developed a method to 3-D print anti-bullet and anti-fragmentation body armor with an unspecified polymer that can be integrated into military uniforms.[62] NTI official Igor Bederov noted that China has a similar production method for certain types of body armor.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin officials continue to promote established Kremlin information operations alleging that the West is trying to destabilize Georgia. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 19 that the West has recently failed to destabilize the political situation in Georgia like they did in Ukraine, likely referencing a longstanding Kremlin information operation falsely alleging that Ukraine's Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 was an externally organized and funded Western coup.[63] Ruling Georgian Dream party members recently promoted similar information operations to accuse the West of orchestrating protests against Georgia's "foreign agent" law in order to overthrow the Georgian government.[64] Kremlin officials and Georgian Dream actors likely intend to purposefully derail long-term Georgian efforts for Euro-Atlantic integration, which play into continued Russian hybrid operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)|

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

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[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/38885

[2] https://t.me/rybar/60201

[3] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15033 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124185 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/11304  

[4] https://t.me/kondratyevvi/7140

[5] https://suspilne dot media/749157-vijskovij-aerodrom-kusevska-ta-slovanskij-npz-vrazili-droni-sbu-dzerela/

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/249695 ; https://t.me/rsinyagovskij/3542 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/246064 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/249682 ; https://t.me/astrapress/55788

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031724

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PKibUxfaj1hRJcX1YyETbMJUoepvERDPMt7GU2ZpPvNs43agiPMin81FmHrovPa9l

[9] https://suspilne dot media/749189-gur-atakuvalo-viborzku-naftobazu-v-leningradskij-oblasti-rf-dzerela/

[10] https://t.me/bazabazon/27889 ; https://t.me/feodosiyachat/141350 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1792004783072518484 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1792011436958335331 ; https://t.me/drozdenko_au_lo/4810

[11] https://t.me/dva_majors/42948

[12] https://telegra dot ph/Tatuinskie-hroniki-05-14 ; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/11213 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42948

 

[13] https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10294

[14] https://t.me/philologist_zov/985

[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DEUk1ot4z6Y; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051824

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024

[17] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/496

[18] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/19/05/2024/6649cc009a794757a17df201

[19] https://www.ft.com/content/481d418e-9366-4152-8ec5-92b81d020991 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-17/russian-court-freezes-unicredit-assets-on-gazprom-venture-claim ; https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/russian-court-seizes-deutsche-bank-assets-part-lawsuit-2024-05-18/ ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/20837629

[20] https://www.ft.com/content/481d418e-9366-4152-8ec5-92b81d020991 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-17/russian-court-freezes-unicredit-assets-on-gazprom-venture-claim ; https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/russian-court-seizes-deutsche-bank-assets-part-lawsuit-2024-05-18/ ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/20837629

[21] https://www.ft.com/content/481d418e-9366-4152-8ec5-92b81d020991 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-17/russian-court-freezes-unicredit-assets-on-gazprom-venture-claim ; https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/russian-court-seizes-deutsche-bank-assets-part-lawsuit-2024-05-18/ ; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/20837629

[22] https://www.ft.com/content/481d418e-9366-4152-8ec5-92b81d020991

[23] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68507

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MhFXMepXgoUU4yYPtQtyYwnoYe51UAwh1xaYGVMp4Knmwb5Dfhj3VafmtNwxnpqsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PKibUxfaj1hRJcX1YyETbMJUoepvERDPMt7GU2ZpPvNs43agiPMin81FmHrovPa9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0J9iavEQgVdRfp35nVSpvaX1Wven3iX3mDvshMU1eV5FkzCkhDUCey8xVnXUmFyDol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a839sG54vZ7YnVrh8UrdwtUNnhWk869Jh6AjsA2YcdseG2Ab4sMRPCw3zGhBDawpl   

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10872 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68507

[26] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15037

[27] https://t.me/staleviy_kordon/703 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1792104273083290076 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1792106218682552353

[28] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10872 ; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/16103 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20014

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MhFXMepXgoUU4yYPtQtyYwnoYe51UAwh1xaYGVMp4Knmwb5Dfhj3VafmtNwxnpqs ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0J9iavEQgVdRfp35nVSpvaX1Wven3iX3mDvshMU1eV5FkzCkhDUCey8xVnXUmFyDol ; The report states that UAF are holding their positions and counterattacking. https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a839sG54vZ7YnVrh8UrdwtUNnhWk869Jh6AjsA2YcdseG2Ab4sMRPCw3zGhBDawpl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10872 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68511 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38891 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42952 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/23113 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124187

[30] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68511

[31] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/11281

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0J9iavEQgVdRfp35nVSpvaX1Wven3iX3mDvshMU1eV5FkzCkhDUCey8xVnXUmFyDol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a839sG54vZ7YnVrh8UrdwtUNnhWk869Jh6AjsA2YcdseG2Ab4sMRPCw3zGhBDawpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PKibUxfaj1hRJcX1YyETbMJUoepvERDPMt7GU2ZpPvNs43agiPMin81FmHrovPa9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MhFXMepXgoUU4yYPtQtyYwnoYe51UAwh1xaYGVMp4Knmwb5Dfhj3VafmtNwxnpqsl ; https://t.me/synegubov/9561 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42969 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MhFXMepXgoUU4yYPtQtyYwnoYe51UAwh1xaYGVMp4Knmwb5Dfhj3VafmtNwxnpqsl

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a839sG54vZ7YnVrh8UrdwtUNnhWk869Jh6AjsA2YcdseG2Ab4sMRPCw3zGhBDawpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0J9iavEQgVdRfp35nVSpvaX1Wven3iX3mDvshMU1eV5FkzCkhDUCey8xVnXUmFyDol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PKibUxfaj1hRJcX1YyETbMJUoepvERDPMt7GU2ZpPvNs43agiPMin81FmHrovPa9l

[34] https://t.me/in_factum/24784 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1791968193629569077 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1791973161241571566 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1792052191479439588 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1792057146135220496 https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/15048; https://t.me/kraken_kha/577; https://x.com/DI_Ukraine/status/1791894759130198314; https://x.com/GermanObserver1/status/1791985558786277710; https://t.me/diu_legion/12

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10865; https://t.me/rusich_army/14725

[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68492 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14721

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a839sG54vZ7YnVrh8UrdwtUNnhWk869Jh6AjsA2YcdseG2Ab4sMRPCw3zGhBDawpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0J9iavEQgVdRfp35nVSpvaX1Wven3iX3mDvshMU1eV5FkzCkhDUCey8xVnXUmFyDol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PKibUxfaj1hRJcX1YyETbMJUoepvERDPMt7GU2ZpPvNs43agiPMin81FmHrovPa9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MhFXMepXgoUU4yYPtQtyYwnoYe51UAwh1xaYGVMp4Knmwb5Dfhj3VafmtNwxnpqsl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38891 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68492; https://t.me/rusich_army/14725

[38] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68492; https://t.me/rusich_army/14721 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14725 (98th Division) ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68516 (58th Battalion) ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124131 (17th Brigade) ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124167 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/122522 (4th Brigade and Akhmat)

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10848; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10864; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10877

[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/42969; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56370

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a839sG54vZ7YnVrh8UrdwtUNnhWk869Jh6AjsA2YcdseG2Ab4sMRPCw3zGhBDawpl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PKibUxfaj1hRJcX1YyETbMJUoepvERDPMt7GU2ZpPvNs43agiPMin81FmHrovPa9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MhFXMepXgoUU4yYPtQtyYwnoYe51UAwh1xaYGVMp4Knmwb5Dfhj3VafmtNwxnpqsl; https://t.me/mod_russia/38891; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10877; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68511; https://t.me/wargonzo/20014; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68511; https://t.me/motopatriot/23124; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56369

[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68523

[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10864

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10864; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68492; https://t.me/rusich_army/14721 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024

[45] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8400; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1792230097577038087; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/516 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1792230726588326158; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1792234500480495820

[46] https://t.me/motopatriot/23120; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56369; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56370

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0J9iavEQgVdRfp35nVSpvaX1Wven3iX3mDvshMU1eV5FkzCkhDUCey8xVnXUmFyDol https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PKibUxfaj1hRJcX1YyETbMJUoepvERDPMt7GU2ZpPvNs43agiPMin81FmHrovPa9l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38891; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MhFXMepXgoUU4yYPtQtyYwnoYe51UAwh1xaYGVMp4Knmwb5Dfhj3VafmtNwxnpqsl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42969; https://t.me/wargonzo/20014; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56369; https://t.me/mod_russia/38888

[48] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68489 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68522 (238th Brigade); https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/11288 (200th Brigade)

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0J9iavEQgVdRfp35nVSpvaX1Wven3iX3mDvshMU1eV5FkzCkhDUCey8xVnXUmFyDol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PKibUxfaj1hRJcX1YyETbMJUoepvERDPMt7GU2ZpPvNs43agiPMin81FmHrovPa9l https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9267 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MhFXMepXgoUU4yYPtQtyYwnoYe51UAwh1xaYGVMp4Knmwb5Dfhj3VafmtNwxnpqsl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38892 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/38888; https://t.me/dva_majors/42969;

[50] https://t.me/voin_dv/8627

[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10876

[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024

[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/42969 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20014 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/124181 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10879 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/23114

[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10879

[55] https://t.me/motopatriot/23114

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0J9iavEQgVdRfp35nVSpvaX1Wven3iX3mDvshMU1eV5FkzCkhDUCey8xVnXUmFyDol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a839sG54vZ7YnVrh8UrdwtUNnhWk869Jh6AjsA2YcdseG2Ab4sMRPCw3zGhBDawpl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PKibUxfaj1hRJcX1YyETbMJUoepvERDPMt7GU2ZpPvNs43agiPMin81FmHrovPa9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MhFXMepXgoUU4yYPtQtyYwnoYe51UAwh1xaYGVMp4Knmwb5Dfhj3VafmtNwxnpqsl

[57] https://t.me/ComAFUA/292

[58] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/742539-raketnij-udar-po-harkovu-u-misti-prolunali-vibuhi-19-travna/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/749121-naslidki-podvijnogo-udaru-iskanderami-po-cerkaskij-lozovij-na-harkivsini/ ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/16150

[59] https://t.me/synegubov/9565 ; https://t.me/synegubov/9566 ; https://t.me/synegubov/9571

[60] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/742539-raketnij-udar-po-harkovu-u-misti-prolunali-vibuhi-19-travna/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/749121-naslidki-podvijnogo-udaru-iskanderami-po-cerkaskij-lozovij-na-harkivsini/ ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/16150 ; https://t.me/ukrpravda_news/45318

[61] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/10390 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/05/19/volodymyr-zelenskyj-znovu-vymagaye-vid-zahodu-dva-patriot-dlya-harkova/

[62] https://ria dot ru/20240518/zaschita-1946837866.html

[63] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051724

[64] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051624

[65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051624

 

Iran Update, May 19, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.|

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on May 18 and 19, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume on Monday, May 20, 2024.

A helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian crashed near Uzi, East Azerbaijan Province, Iran, on May 19.[1] It remains unclear at the time of this writing whether Raisi and Abdollahian survived the crash. First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber would temporarily serve as president if Raisi died in the crash, according to the Iranian constitution.[2] Mokhber, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei would then have 50 days to organize a presidential election.[3] Mokhber previously served as the head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO)—a parastatal organization directly controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—between 2007 and 2021.[4] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Mokhber and the EIKO in January 2021.[5] Mokhber also previously served as the chairman of the US-sanctioned Sina Bank and as the Mostazafan Foundation’s vice president for commerce and transportation.[6] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Sina Bank in October 2018 for financially supporting the Basij—a paramilitary organization responsible for civil defense and social control in Iran—and sanctioned the Mostazafan Foundation in November 2020.[7]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei wields ultimate decision-making authority in Iran, but Raisi still holds significant power within the regime. Raisi is the deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts, a regime entity constitutionally responsible for monitoring the supreme leader and selecting his successor.[8] Iranians re-elected Raisi to serve as a representative of South Khorasan Province in the Assembly of Experts during the recent March 2024 Assembly of Experts elections.[9] Raisi also holds numerous ex officio positions. He is a member of the Expediency Discernment Council and the chairman of the Supreme National Security Council, Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, and Supreme Cyber Space Council.

Raisi’s death would have serious implications for supreme leader succession. Raisi is considered one of the top contenders—along with Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei—to succeed Khamenei as supreme leader. Khamenei appointed Raisi to the position of judiciary chief in 2019 and endorsed Raisi during the August 2021 presidential elections.[10] The next several days have the potential to reshape the immediate and long-term dynamics of the regime, including supreme leader succession. Raisi’s death would ultimately not change the regime’s current trajectory toward more hardline and conservative domestic policies and more aggressive regional policies, however.

Israeli War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz threatened to leave Israel’s coalition government if the three-member war cabinet does not approve a new strategy for the war in the Gaza Strip by June 8.[11] Gantz appealed for a strategy that prioritizes the release of hostages over the destruction of Hamas and allows residents in northern Israel to return home by September 1.[12] Gantz also called for Israeli security control of the Gaza Strip alongside the formation of a US-European-Arab-Palestinian group to take charge of civilian administration in the Gaza Strip. This civil administration would exclude both Hamas and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.[13] Gantz also called for an Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization deal.[14] The normalization deal currently calls for Palestinian statehood.[15] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office responded to Gantz’s ultimatum saying that Netanyahu is “determined to eliminate the Hamas battalions [and he] opposes the introduction of the Palestinian Authority into Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state.”[16] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant—the third member of the war cabinet—also publicly called on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to define a political end state in the Gaza Strip on May 15.[17]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: A helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian crashed in East Azerbaijan Province, Iran.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Three IDF brigades continued operations in Jabalia.
• Southern Gaza Strip: The IDF deployed an additional reservist brigade to Rafah.
• Gaza Strip Post War: Israeli War Cabinet Minister Benny Gantz threatened to leave Israel’s coalition government if the three-member war cabinet does not approve a new strategy for the war in the Gaza Strip by June 8. Gantz appealed for a strategy that prioritizes the release of hostages over the destruction of Hamas and allows residents in northern Israel to return home by September 1.
• West Bank: Israel’s Central Command conducted a previously unannounced training exercise to prepare Israeli forces in the West Bank for “extreme scenarios.”
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 11 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 18.
  
  

 

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
  
  

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 98th Division continued to conduct clearing operations in Jabalia on May 19. Three IDF brigades are currently operating in Jabalia under the 98th Division.[18] The IDF 7th Brigade engaged Palestinian fighters and located explosives, rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, grenades, and small arms.[19] Israeli forces also seized a lathe for producing rockets.[20] The IDF 636th Reconnaissance Unit directed dozens of airstrikes on Palestinian cells and additional targets to support ground operations in Jabalia.[21] Several Palestinian militias defended against Israeli advances into Jabalia using rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), anti-tank fire, improvised explosive devices, rockets, and mortars in at least 20 attacks.[22]

Two IDF brigades continued operations along the Netzarim corridor and near the US-built humanitarian aid pier.[23] Two Palestinian militias targeted Israeli forces with small arms and mortar fire along the corridor on May 19.[24] Palestinian fighters have reduced their rate of attack on the Netzarim corridor since early May, when the IDF began clearing operations in the southern and northern Gaza Strip.

The IDF Air Force struck and killed several Hamas commanders in the Gaza Strip on May 19. The IDF Air Force killed two tactical-level Hamas commanders in Rafah who were preparing to attack Israeli forces.[25] The IDF Air Force also killed senior Hamas logistics commander Azmi Abu Daqa in an unspecified area of the Gaza Strip. The IDF said that Daqa facilitated weapons and money transfers to the Gaza Strip.[26] An IDF drone strike also reportedly killed Palestinian police investigations chief Zahar al Kholi in the central Gaza Strip.[27]

The IDF deployed an additional brigade to eastern Rafah. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF 12th Reservist Infantry Brigade entered Rafah.[28] The IDF said that it “deepened” operations in Rafah on May 18.[29] A Palestinian journalist reported on May 19 that Israeli armor advanced westward deeper into the Jninah, Salam, and Brazil neighborhoods of eastern Rafah.[30] Three Palestinian militias claimed attacks on Israeli forces advancing in the al Salam neighborhood.[31] Hamas fighters continued to mortar the Rafah crossing area, where Israeli forces have set up a military position.[32] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF assesses that about 800,000 Palestinians have already evacuated eastern Rafah into Khan Younis, al Mawasi, Deir al Balah, and western Rafah.[33]

 

Palestinian militias have conducted at least two indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since CTP-ISW's data cut off on May 18.[34] The IDF said one rocket fired from the central Gaza Strip landed in the Mediterranean Sea near Ashkelon on May 18.[35] PIJ and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is a leftist Palestinian militia aligned with Hamas in the war, fired at least one rocket at Sderot in a combined attack on May 19.[36]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel
  
  

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut off on May 18.[37] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades targeted Israeli forces with improvised explosive devices and small arms fire in Qalqilya and Nablus.[38]

Israel’s Central Command conducted a previously unannounced training exercise to prepare Israeli forces in the West Bank for “extreme scenarios.”[39] Israeli forces trained alongside the Israeli Air Force and Special Units to simulate mobilization for offensive and defensive operations in “complex terrorist incidents” and other scenarios.[40]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria
  
  

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least 11 attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 18.[41] The IDF intercepted a ”suspicious aerial target” that entered Israeli airspace from Lebanon.[42] The IDF Air Force bombed Hezbollah fighters operating near a military building in Maroun al Ras, southern Lebanon.[43]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting Eilat, Israel, on May 18.[44] Israeli officials and media have not commented on the claimed attack at the time of this writing.

 

---

[1] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/30/3088772

[2] https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989

[3] https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989

[4] https://www.president dot ir/en/130489 ;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-22-2023

[5] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1234

[6] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm524 ;

https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/mohammad-mokhber-first-vice-president-of-iran

[7] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1185 ;

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm524

[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-30-2023 ;

https://parsi.euronews dot com/2024/03/07/a-look-at-iran-assepmbly-of-experts-elections-who-will-be-the-leader

[9] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202403020274

[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-sole-moderate-presidential-candidate-congratulates-raisi-his-victory-state-2021-06-19/

[11] https://www.axios.com/2024/05/18/benny-gantz-israel-netanyahu-gaza-war

[12] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/gantz-sets-out-the-6-strategic-goals-the-coalition-must-adopt-or-his-party-will-bolt/

[13] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/gantz-sets-out-the-6-strategic-goals-the-coalition-must-adopt-or-his-party-will-bolt/

[14] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/gantz-sets-out-the-6-strategic-goals-the-coalition-must-adopt-or-his-party-will-bolt/ ; https://www.axios.com/2024/05/18/benny-gantz-israel-netanyahu-gaza-war

[15] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/17/us/politics/israel-saudi-arabia-gaza.html

[16] https://t.me/moriahdoron/10289

[17] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/gallant-to-pm-reject-israeli-military-civil-rule-of-gaza-after-hamas-i-wont-allow-it/

[18] https://t.me/moriahdoron/10288

[19] www dot idf.il/201866

[20] www dot idf.il/201866

[21] www dot idf.il/201866

[22] https://t.me/AymanGouda/6148 ; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6150 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6465 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6466 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6467 ;https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2209 ;https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2210 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2216 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17889 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17891 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17900 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17901 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17902 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17905 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17907 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17908 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17909 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/4758

[23] https://t.me/moriahdoron/10288

[24] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2211 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6462

[25] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1792156387809657121

[26] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1792156384793903363

[27] https://t.me/moriahdoron/10300

[28] https://t.me/moriahdoron/10288

[29] https://www.idf dot il/201523

[30] https://twitter.com/ytirawi/status/1792183300435435539

[31] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4252 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17897 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17899 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6463

[32] ﷟HYPERLINK "https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1789620688350785979"https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1789620688350785979 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2213

[33] https://t.me/moriahdoron/10301

[34] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1791908676397060511 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17892 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4251 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1792076706800681003

[35] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1791908676397060511

[36] https://t.me/sarayaps/17892 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4251           

[37] https://t.me/jeninqassamm/7224; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6460; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6456

[38] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6456;

https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6456;

https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6460;

[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1792228456521941088

[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1792228456521941088; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1792228467288789413

[41] https://t.me/mmirleb/4016 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/51080 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/51081 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/4017 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/4019 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/4021 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/4023 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/4025 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/4027 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/4028 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1792241777119723616

[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1792241777119723616

[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1792188282643849374

[44] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1133