Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and George Barros
July 2, 2024, 7:30pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 2. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the July 3 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The interplay between ongoing
Russian offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Avdiivka
directions indicates that the Russian military command may intend to
leverage the ongoing Toretsk push to create operational opportunities
for advances in either the Chasiv Yar or Avdiivka areas. Russian
preparations that can support multiple future branch plans suggest a
more developed level of operational planning and foresight than the
Russian command has proven capable of executing thus far in the war
since early 2022. The ability of this operational planning to come to
fruition, however, will be bounded by the overall poor tactical-level
capabilities of Russian forces currently fighting in these areas. Ukrainian
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar
Voloshyn stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Donbas
on July 2 that Russian forces are beginning to storm Chasiv Yar from
the Toretsk direction (south of Chasiv Yar) and have been attacking in
the direction of Toretsk-Chasiv Yar using mainly small infantry groups
and occasional mechanized assaults.[1]
Voloshyn's suggestion that Russian forces are trying to attack towards
the southern flank of Chasiv Yar from the Toretsk area is noteworthy. If
Russian forces are able to develop a larger salient in the general
Shumy-Pivdenne-Pivniche-Toretsk area, then they may be able to more
credibly threaten Chasiv Yar from the south, complementing ongoing
offensive Russian efforts north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka. Russian
forces have continued attacks in the area south and southeast of Chasiv
Yar, particularly near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka,
suggesting that the Russian command remains interested, at least in
principle, in maintaining access to the southern flank of the Chasiv Yar
area. Recent Russian advances in Mayorske (east of Toretsk) affords
Russian forces positions on the east (left) bank of the Siversky
Donets-Donbas Canal, allowing them to advance towards Chasiv Yar from
the south along one bank of the canal as opposed to trying to cross the
canalizing terrain in northern and eastern Chasiv Yar.
Ukrainian
military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets, however, linked Russian efforts
in the Toretsk direction with efforts to break through to the Pokrovsk
direction (also referred to as the Avdiivka direction or the area
west/southwest of Toretsk).[2]
Mashovets noted on July 2 that Russian forces have intensified attacks
on Toretsk in the past 24 hours and that the Russian Central Grouping of
Forces (the command of which is also notably responsible for Russian
troops attacking west of Avdiivka) has deployed additional battalions
and assault companies near Toretsk to support ongoing offensive
operations.[3]
Mashovets noted that operational factors in the Toretsk direction "are
directly related" to the Avdiivka direction and assessed that Russian
troops of the Central Grouping of Forces are trying to interdict
Ukrainian positions along the H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka road (a major
Ukrainian ground line of communication [GLOC] that supplies Ukrainian
forces in Toretsk).[4]
Mashovets'
and Voloshyn's separate observations on the prospects of Russian
offensive operations near Toretsk reflect a noteworthy battlefield
dynamic — the Russian command may have chosen to escalate offensive
operations near Toretsk in mid-June exactly because this area offers
Russian forces a flexible point of departure from which they can either
attack north towards Chasiv Yar or west/southwest in the Avdiivka
direction, depending on whatever route of attack the Russian command
deems the most immediately promising. The apparent decision to attack
near Toretsk emphasizes that the Russian command may be planning
operations with more foresight and understanding of the operational
situation than previously, when the Russian command pushed for
incoherent offensive operations on unrelated parts of the front. The
ability of the Russian command to actually bring these operational plans
to bear, however, is contingent on the tactical-level performance of
the troops in the Toretsk area and their ability to exploit tactical
successes into operationally-significant breakthroughs.[5]
As ISW previously noted, the main Russian forces concentration in the
Toretsk area is formed of lower-quality forces of the Donetsk People's
Republic (DNR) and Territorial Troops, which will likely struggle to
properly execute attacks, especially as Ukraine receives additional
military aid over the coming weeks and months.[6]
Hungarian
Prime Minister Viktor Orban likely used his unannounced visit to Kyiv
on July 2 to posture himself as a peacemaker following Hungary's
accession to the European Union (EU) Council presidency on July 1, but
Orban’s efforts are very unlikely to bring about any robust peace in
Ukraine. Orban met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
in Kyiv, and the Hungarian government readout emphasized that Orban met
with Zelensky specifically to ask him to "consider a time-bound
ceasefire" and "speed up the peace negotiations" given that "the rules
of international diplomacy are slow and complicated."[7]
The Hungarian readout suggested that Orban specifically made this
request to coincide with Hungary's EU Council presidency. Zelensky
stated that he and Orban discussed bilateral issues, infrastructure,
energy issues, and "how to bring a just and lasting peace closer."[8]
Ukrainian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Ihor Zhovka stated
that Zelensky listened to Orban's proposal before emphasizing that
Ukraine is working to draft a peace plan and hold another peace summit,
which Zhovka stated Russia can attend "in one way or another."[9]
Zhovka noted that Hungary is not the first country to discuss a
possible ceasefire but emphasized that "such [peace and negotiations]
processes cannot be perceived in isolation."[10]
ISW continues to assess that a ceasefire in Ukraine on the current
lines is unlikely to deter further Russian aggression and only allow
Russia critical time to rebuild its forces and prepare for future
aggression against Ukraine.
The Kremlin
is waging an intensified information campaign aimed at pushing Ukraine
to negotiate with Russia on Russian terms, and any Russian, Western, or
other efforts to cajole Ukraine to prematurely negotiate with Russia
would only weaken Ukraine and embolden further Russian aggression inside
and beyond Ukraine.[11]
Orban’s recent messaging about a ceasefire could support the Kremlin’s
larger strategic messaging that seeks to establish a Russian-preferable
operational pause or convince Ukraine’s international partners to
abandon Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently articulated a
theory of victory that posits that gradual and indefinite Russian
advances within Ukraine will eventually enable Russian victory.[12] Putin likely assesses that Russia can protract the war indefinitely and win a war of attrition so long as he can deny decisive international support to Ukraine.[13]
Russia’s slow but steady battlefield gains since late 2023 likely
reinforce Putin’s assessment and incentivize Putin to avoid any kind of
true ceasefire that would end the war. Putin and other senior Russian
officials have consistently reiterated that Russia is uninterested in
any negotiations that do not result in further Ukrainian territorial
concessions of areas that Russia does not already occupy.[14]
Freezing the current lines in Ukraine would provide Russia with
operationally and strategically significant Ukrainian territory from
which Russia can launch renewed aggression with an experienced military
and revitalized defense industrial base.
Several
Russian State Duma deputies proposed a bill that would exclude a
significant number of ethnicities from Russia's "compatriots"
resettlement program, undermining the Kremlin's efforts to leverage its
"compatriots abroad" to offset Russian labor shortages and set
informational conditions to justify potential hybrid operations against
other countries with Russian and Russian-speaking populations. Just
Russia Party Duma Deputy Dmitry Kuznetsov and Communist Party Duma
Deputy Mikhail Matveyev authored a bill that would exclude citizens of
countries formerly within the Soviet Union from using the "compatriots"
program to resettle in Russia and that would limit the definition of
"compatriots" eligible for resettlement as ethnicities historically
living in the territory of Russia and the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic (RSFSR).[15]
Kuznetsov and Matveyev claimed that 50 to 70 percent of applicants for
the "compatriots" resettlement program in recent years are citizens of
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia and claimed that "several
generations of citizens" of post-Soviet countries after the collapse of
the Soviet Union have grown up with their own countries' "traditional,
cultural, and moral values" and do not have any "blood, historical,
cultural, spiritual, or any other connection" with Russia or its people.
The Russian government notably eased the requirements for “compatriots”
living abroad to apply to resettle in Russia in February 2024 by no
longer requiring an applicant to prove their Russian-language
proficiency if they previously renounced Russian citizenship; were born
or permanently resided in the Soviet Union and had Soviet citizenship;
or have relatives who were born or permanently resided on territory
formerly part of the Soviet Union or Russian Empire.[16]
Russian ultranationalist milbloggers have been increasingly critical of
the Russian government's decision to provide migrants with Russian
citizenship, while others have supported this practice on the condition
that migrants with acquired Russian citizenship serve in the Russian
military in Ukraine.[17]
Russian ultranationalists' increasing animosity toward migrants may
have influenced Kuznetsov and Matveyev to propose implementing
restrictions against many citizens that would be eligible for
resettlement in Russia and by extension, greatly limiting the number of
people the Russian government can include in its "compatriots abroad"
narrative. Setting strict definitions on Russia's classification of its
"compatriots" directly undermines ongoing Kremin efforts to set
informational conditions to justify potential hybrid operations against
other countries with Russian and Russian-speaking populations and to use
"compatriot" resettlement to offset labor shortages and long-term
population decline.[18]
Ukrainian
forces struck an ammunition depot at a Russian military base in
occupied Crimea on July 1 that reportedly housed Shahed drones. Ukrainian
Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated on July 2
that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in occupied Crimea on
July 1.[19]
A Russian source posted a photo on July 2 purportedly of the aftermath
of a Ukrainian cruise missile strike against a Shahed drone warehouse
near occupied Sevastopol on the evening of July 1, and the geolocated
photograph indicates that Ukrainian forces struck the base of Russian
military unit 99375 near occupied Flotske (south of Sevastopol).[20] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported
on July 2 that Ukrainian forces launched at least six Storm Shadow
missiles at Sevastopol on the evening of July 1 and that one missile
struck the Russian Black Sea Fleet's 758th Logistics Center in occupied
Sevastopol.[21]
A Crimea-based Telegram channel stated on July 1 that Russian air
defense systems activated near occupied Flotske and Sevastopol and that
there were explosions near an unspecified Russian military unit near
Flotske.[22]
Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed that Russian
forces shot down five unspecified air targets over the water and near
Balaklava and that small fires started.[23]
Russia
may be intensifying its efforts to conduct reconnaissance and disrupt
communications in the underwater and air space near NATO states. Bloomberg reported
on July 1, citing three unspecified sources, that Russian Kilo-class
submarines operated in unspecified areas near the Irish Sea once 18
months ago (in December 2022 or January 2023) and once at an unspecified
"more recent" date.[24] Bloomberg reported
that the sources stated that these submarine movements "went beyond
what UK officials had previously seen," but did not offer specifics on
how the new events were anomalous. Bloomberg noted that Cork,
Ireland is a landing point for the EXA Atlantic submarine cable that
connects the UK and Canada and that a spokesperson for the Irish
Department of Defense stated that government agencies are working to
protect Ireland's data cables. Sources reportedly stated that Russian
submarine deployments to the Irish Sea area could be part of efforts to
identify potential weaknesses in Irish and British maritime defenses or
to intimidate the UK due to British support for Ukraine. Bloomberg reported
that a source noted that the varying depths of the Irish Sea would make
it difficult for a Russian submarine to traverse the entire Irish Sea
submerged. It is unclear why the Russian submarines were operating near
the Irish Sea, but the submarines may have been conducting
reconnaissance on the defense and communications of NATO members Canada
and the UK.
The United Nations' International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) reviewed concerns from Luxembourg,
Sweden, France, and the Netherlands about recent interference to their
satellite networks that jammed GPS signals, endangered air traffic
control, and interrupted children's TV shows to display footage of the
war in Ukraine.[25]
The ITU reported that two satellite operators both geolocated the
source of the interference against French and Swedish satellite networks
to near Moscow, Kaliningrad, and Pavlovka (there are numerous Pavlovkas
in Russia and it is unclear to which Pavlovka, Russia the ITU is
referring). ISW has also observed high levels of GPS jamming over Poland
and the Baltic region since late 2023, which some analysts and experts
have attributed to Russian electronic warfare (EW) activity near
Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg.[26] ISW has also observed increased reports of disruptions in air communications near the UK and Ireland.[27] The Telegraph,
citing flight tracker data, also reported on June 30 that roughly 28
percent of the UK's Royal Air Force transport and surveillance flights
over Eastern Europe and 16 percent of flights over northwestern Europe
between January and April 2024 experienced GPS interference.[28]
Air traffic control communications reportedly from the Shanwick Oceanic
Control (overseeing the international airspace zone covering the
northeastern Atlantic Ocean between the west coast of Scotland and
Ireland to the southwestern coast of Iceland) indicated that a June 2024
flight between Madrid, Spain, and Toronto, Canada, was unable to ascend
to a higher altitude due to apparent GPS jamming affecting other
aircraft at the higher altitude.[29] The
Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, a nonprofit advocating for
improved GPS security, noted, however, that a GPS jammer is not always
able to recover after experiencing jamming and assessed that the
aircraft that experienced the jamming over the Atlantic was likely
flying from the Baltic region or Middle East and that one of its GPS
receivers had not recovered by the time it entered the Shanwick Oceanic
Control Zone. Anomalous Russian submarine activity in the Irish
Sea and apparent Russian GPS manipulations in a nearby area and across
much of NATO airspace may not be directly related, but both represent
Russian efforts to interfere with the water and air space of NATO
members.
Russian authorities appear to be publicly
fixating on crackdowns against fight clubs and restricting the niqab to
signal that Russian authorities are adequately combatting terrorist
threats in the North Caucasus instead of addressing systemic issues of
Islamist extremism in the region. Russian outlets reported on
June 28 that security forces searched a mixed martial arts (MMA) sports
club with links to former Russian MMA fighter Khabib Nurmagomedov in
Dagestan Republic since an attacker involved in the June 23 terrorist
attacks in Dagestan reportedly trained at the sports club.[30] Russian outlet RBK reported
on July 1 that the Russian Federal Tax Service (FNS) seized
Nurmagomedov's bank accounts due to a debt of 297 million rubles (about
$3.4 million).[31]
Russian media reported on July 2 that Russian law enforcement also
detained a former coach of the Russian national youth wrestling team in
Moscow in a terrorism case.[32]
Russian milbloggers have criticized the purported widespread
participation of Dagestani youth in MMA fight clubs, which milbloggers
claim encourage Islamist extremist ideology.[33] Along with MMA clubs, Russian authorities are also cracking down against niqabs (a
garment worn by some Muslim women to cover their entire body and face,
excluding their eyes), which they have framed as symbolic of Islamic
extremism. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin
voiced indirect support for banning niqabs, but Dagestan Head Sergei
Melikov stated that he is personally against the practice.[34]
The Muftiate of Dagestan, which was expected to issue a fatwa (a legal
ruling issued by an Islamic jurist on the grounds of Islamic law)
against wearing the niqab, stated on July 2 that it could not find
sufficient grounds for a general ban on niqab but that local and
temporary bans are permitted for security reasons.[35]
Russian ultranationalists also claimed that Dagestani officials know
the identities of extremist thought leaders but have allowed radical
Salafi-Jihadists to control entire spheres of public life within the
republic.[36] Residents of Sergokala, Dagestan who reportedly knew some of the assailants in the June 23 terrorist attacks told RBK in
a July 1 article that all the attackers attended a "Wahhabi" mosque
whose imam had not been approved by the Muftiate of Dagestan.[37]
Russian authorities' fixation on cracking down on fight clubs and
regulations on niqabs while ignoring systemic issues of Islamist
extremism and rising ethnic and religious tension in Russia may actually
fuel radicalization in the region and ethnic and religious friction.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 2 assigning the
Russian 999th Air Base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan the "guards" honorific for
"mass heroism and bravery."[38]
The 999th Air Base is part of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization's (CSTO) Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. Russian
milblogger and Kremlin Human Rights Committee member Alexander "Sasha"
Kots claimed that Putin's decree suggests that the 999th Airbase may be
supporting combat missions in or near Ukraine.[39]
Key Takeaways:
- The
interplay between ongoing Russian offensive operations in the Chasiv
Yar, Toretsk, and Avdiivka directions indicates that the Russian
military command may intend to leverage the ongoing Toretsk push to
create operational opportunities for advances in either the Chasiv Yar
or Avdiivka areas. Russian preparations that can
support multiple future branch plans in Donetsk Oblast suggest a more
developed level of operational planning and foresight than the Russian
command has proven capable of executing thus far in the war since early
2022. The ability of this operational planning to come to fruition,
however, will be bounded by the overall poor tactical-level capabilities
of Russian forces currently fighting in these areas.
- Hungarian
Prime Minister Viktor Orban likely used his unannounced visit to Kyiv
on July 2 to posture himself as a peacemaker following Hungary's
accession to the European Union (EU) Council presidency on July 1, but
Orban’s efforts are very unlikely to bring about any robust peace in
Ukraine.
- The Kremlin is waging an intensified
information campaign aimed at pushing Ukraine to negotiate with Russia
on Russian terms, and any Russian, Western, or other efforts to cajole
Ukraine to prematurely negotiate with Russia would only weaken Ukraine
and embolden further Russian aggression inside and beyond Ukraine.
- Several
Russian State Duma deputies proposed a bill that would exclude a
significant number of ethnicities from Russia's "compatriots"
resettlement program, undermining the Kremlin's efforts to leverage its
"compatriots abroad" to offset Russian labor shortages and set
informational conditions to justify potential hybrid operations against
other countries with Russian and Russian-speaking populations.
- Ukrainian
forces struck an ammunition depot at a Russian military base in
occupied Crimea on July 1 that reportedly housed Shahed drones.
- Russia
may be intensifying its efforts to conduct reconnaissance and disrupt
communications in the underwater and air space near NATO states.
- Russian
authorities appear to be publicly fixating on crackdowns against fight
clubs and restricting the niqab to signal that Russian authorities are
adequately combatting terrorist threats in the North Caucasus instead of
addressing systemic issues of Islamist extremism in the region.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 2 assigning the
Russian 999th Air Base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan the "guards" honorific for
"mass heroism and bravery.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- Russia
is reportedly recruiting women from Russian penal colonies to fight in
Ukraine, and some of these recruits are reportedly fighting on the
frontline.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
The Ukrainian General Staff
reported on July 2 that Russian forces are conducting sabotage and
reconnaissance activities in the international border area in Sumy and
Chernihiv oblasts, suggesting that the previously observed geolocated
footage published on June 30 showing Ukrainian forces firing at limited
Russian positions in houses and a forest area just north of Zhuravka,
Sumy Oblast (less than two kilometers from the border and about 35
kilometers northeast of Sumy City) were likely a part of a limited
Russian cross-border raid and not reflective of an enduring Russian
presence in this area.[40]
The Russian military still maintains reserves and the flexibility to
launch offensive operations in Sumy Oblast, if it decides to do so,
nonetheless.
Russian forces recently advanced within
Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued Russian ground
attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 2. Geolocated footage
published on July 1 showing elements of the Russian 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade
(Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) operating along
Soborna Street indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in
northern Vovchansk.[41]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Siverskyi
Donets River east of Buhruvatka (southwest of Vovchansk), but ISW has
not observed visual evidence of this claim.[42] Fighting continued north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Lyptsi and near and within Vovchansk on July 2.[43]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaliy
Sarantsev stated on July 2 that Russian forces operating in northern
Kharkiv Oblast are transferring reinforcements from other unspecified
sectors of the frontline to replenish losses and that Russian forces
have transferred three assault groups of unspecific echelon from the
Russian 138th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA],
Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to Vovchansk.[44]
Russian and Ukrainian sources have stated that elements of the 138th
Motorized Rifle Brigade have been operating near Vovchansk since mid-May
2023.[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 2 but did not make any confirmed
advances. Russian milbloggers continued to exchange competing claims on
the status of Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk), with some claiming
that Russian forces have advanced up to two kilometers towards
Stelmakhivka and entered eastern parts of the settlement, and another
conversely reporting that Russian forces barely managed to advance 200
meters towards Stelmakhivka and have not even attempted to enter the
settlement.[46]
ISW's control of terrain assessment currently places Russian forces
about one kilometer from Stelmakhivka. One Russian milblogger also
claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the O-131306 Svatove-Makiivka
highway just east of Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna), although ISW has
not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian forces operating this
close to the highway.[47]
Several Russian milbloggers continued to discuss Ukrainian
counterattacks in the forest west of Kreminna and claimed that Ukrainian
forces have advanced up to 400 meters in this area over the past 24
hours.[48]
Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting on July 1 and
July 2 northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near
Stelmakhivka, Berestove, Pishchane, and Stepova Novoselivka; northwest
of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, and Hrekivka; and west of Kreminna
near Terny and Torske.[49]
Elements of the Russian 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized
Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District
[MMD]) and 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle
Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly
operating east of Terny.[50]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July
2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Siversk near
Spirne, Vyimka, and Ivano-Daryivka; east of Siversk near
Verkhnokamyanske; and northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on July 1
and 2.[51] Russian milbloggers noted that Russian forces have not completely seized Spirne.[52]
Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk
People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near
Vyimka.[53]
Russian
forces recently advanced within easternmost Chasiv Yar amid continued
Russian offensive operations in the area on July 2. Geolocated footage
published on July 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
within the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Chasiv Yar near
Ivanivske and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka on July 1 and 2.[55]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have partially
occupied western Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), generally consistent
with ISW's assessment of Russian positions in western Kalynivka along
Lisova Street.[56]
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel
Nazar Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are conducting mechanized
assaults near Chasiv Yar and using small groups of up to five soldiers
to break through to the Novyi and Kanal microraions (eastern Chasiv
Yar).[57]
Elements of the "Night Wolves" drone detachment of the "Pyatnashka"
International Volunteer Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC)
are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[58]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk on July 2, but there
were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces
continued offensive operations near Toretsk; northeast of Toretsk near
Druzhba; east of Toretsk near Pivdenne, Pivnichne, Zalizne, and Shumy;
and southeast of Toretsk near Niu York on July 1 and 2.[59]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements
of the Russian 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (27th Motorized
Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District
[CMD]) are likely operating near Mayorske (east of Toretsk).[60]
Russian
forces recently advanced near Avdiivka amid continued Russian offensive
operations in the area on July 2. Geolocated footage published on July 2
indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka
within Sokil, northeast of Novooleksandrivka, and south of Voskhod, and
southwest of Avdiivka in the area north of Karlivka.[61]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced over
1.5 kilometers northwest of Novopokrovske (northwest of Avdiivka and
south of Voskhod).[62]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further north
of Karlivka, east of Voskhod, northwest of Novooleksandrivka, and south
of Novoselivka Persha (northwest of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed
confirmation of these claims.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones are hampering Russian advances near Sokil.[64]
Fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Vozdvyzhenka,
Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Novoselivka Persha, Lozuvatske, Sokil,
and Voskhod; west of Avdiivka near Umanske and Yasnobrodivka; and
southwest of Avdiivka near Netaylove on July 1 and 2.[65] Mashovets stated that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are operating near Yasnobrodivka.[66]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk
City on July 2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in
this area. Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk
City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City
near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, and Vodyane on July 1 and 2.[67]
Elements of the Russian 110th and 5th motorized rifle brigades (both of
the 1st DNR AC) and 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military
District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction
(west and southwest of Donetsk City).[68]
Russian
forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area
amid continued positional engagements in the area on July 2. Geolocated
footage published on July 2 indicates that Russian forces recently
advanced north of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[69] Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Makarivka and Urozhaine on July 1 and 2.[70]
Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military
District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia
Oblast border area.[71]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Fighting
continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 2, but there were no
confirmed changes to the frontline. Fighting continues near Robotyne,
Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne), Mala Tokmachka (northeast of
Robotyne), and Verbove (east of Robotyne) on July 1 and 2.[72]
A Russian milblogger claimed on July 1 that unspecified Russian
Airborne Forces (VDV) elements may have advanced near Verbove but that
this information is unconfirmed.[73]
Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized
Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military
District [SMD]) and BARS-1 (Russian Combat Army Reserve) formation
reportedly continue operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[74]
Fighting
continued in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on July
2, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[75]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struggle to conduct
effective counterbattery fire in the Kherson direction because the east
bank’s elevation is lower than that of the west (right) bank and
Ukrainian artillery has longer ranges than Russian artillery, making it
difficult for Russian forces to spot and hit Ukrainian artillery
systems.[76] The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces in the Kherson direction lack sufficient artillery shells for counterbattery fire.[77]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 2 that Russian forces
conducted an Iskander-M ballistic missile strike against Myrhorod Air
Base in Poltava Oblast on June 1 and damaged and destroyed seven
Ukrainian aircraft.[78]
Former Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that
the strike damaged some Ukrainian aircraft, but not as many as Russia
claims.[79]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russia
is reportedly recruiting women from Russian penal colonies to fight in
Ukraine, and some of these recruits are reportedly fighting on the
frontline. The New York Times (NYT) reported on June 10, citing
former inmates, that Russian military recruiters removed a group of
several women from a penal colony in St. Petersburg in late May 2024.[80] The NYT
noted that Russian authorities began enlisting female penal recruits in
Fall 2023 but had not yet pulled these recruits from prison, and the NYT
noted it is unclear whether the May 2024 group is an isolated case of
part of a broader Russian recruitment effort. ISW has previously
observed reports of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and its
"Redut" private military company (PMC) attempting to recruit women in
Fall 2023.[81]
Russian Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova stated on June 11
that there are "isolated cases" of female convicts asking to fight in
Ukraine but that no female convicts so far have gone to Ukraine.[82]
A Ukrainian brigade fighting in the Pokrovsk (Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast)
direction reported on July 2 that there are "isolated cases" of Russian
female penal recruits fighting in the Pokrovsk direction and across the
theater, and that Ukrainian forces observed "even a whole detachment
[of female fighters]" in another unspecified operational direction.[83]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger recently complained that
bringing women to fight on the frontline would cause a variety of
discipline issues.[84]
Russian independent media and milbloggers continue to criticize Russian
government structures and state initiatives for failing to adequately
support Russian military personnel and veterans who fought in Ukraine.
Russian independent outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain)
claimed that the Russian state "Defenders of the Fatherland" foundation,
led by Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva, is failing Russian
soldiers because it lacks specialists who can treat post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD).[85] Mozhem Obyasnit
noted that many Russian soldiers suffering from mental trauma from the
war are not seeking treatment due to Russian societal norms and
attitudes towards mental health treatment and that the Russian state
hides veterans struggling with mental illnesses rather than effectively
treating them. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian command sent
injured personnel from the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank
Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District) back to the
frontline without medical care and that the Russian military only later
provided these soldiers with medical care due to outcry from the Russian
ultranationalist community.[86] One milblogger claimed that the Russian command confiscated the personnel's mobile phones, however.[87]
The injured Russian personnel only gained the attention of the Russian
ultranationalist community by publishing a video appeal for assistance,
and seizing the soldiers' phones would complicate their ability to
publish another video appeal if necessary.[88]
Another milblogger criticized the Russian military command for having
an irresponsible attitude towards saving Russian military personnel.[89]
The Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved a project on July 2 that
would send confiscated firearms to Russian forces fighting in Ukraine,
and a Russian milblogger claimed this approval was the result of Russian
milbloggers appealing to Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov about
this issue.[90]
Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers on June 10,
including the milblogger who made this claim, and is likely further
cultivating ties with and loyalty of these milbloggers by addressing
smaller complaints that individually are unlikely to meaningfully affect
the war through addressing systemic issues.[91]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises and frontline Russian
forces continue efforts to protect Russian military assets and other
objects from Ukrainian drone strikes. The Russian airship company JSC
"First Airship" announced on June 1 that it created the "Barrier"
floating barrier system inspired by World War II-era Zeppelins to
protect Russian objects from drone strikes.[92]
The "Barrier" system consists of balloons armed with nets deployed over
targets. Russian Telegram channels also amplified footage of a Russian
"ZVeraBoy" buggy consisting of jerry-rigged turrets, shotguns, and
close-range defense charges to combat Ukrainian drones.[93]
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian
authorities continue to illegally deport, militarize, and passportize
Ukrainian children. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration
Head Artem Lysohor stated on July 1 that Russian authorities deported
138 Ukrainian children from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Volgograd, Russia
to attend camps where they will receive military training, including on
radiation, chemical, and biological protection and drone operation.[94]
Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova
stated on June 29 that Russian authorities deported about 400 children
from occupied Mariupol to St. Petersburg under the guise of attending
the "Scarlet Sails" graduation celebration.[95]
The Russian Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] ministry of internal
affairs stated on July 1 that Russian authorities issued Russian
passports to 15 Ukrainian children from the Russian-state "Movement of
the First" youth military organization.[96]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin approved a list of instructions on June 29
officially tasking the Russian Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) to
take measures to forcibly integrate occupied Ukraine further into the
Russian socioeconomic sphere.[97]
The list of instructions demands that the ASI implement national
projects and strategic planning initiatives in the Azov Region (covering
the parts of occupied southeastern Ukraine that are adjacent to the Sea
of Azov) to bring the region up to the Russian "standard" by September
1, 2024.[98]
The Russian strategy for the Azov Region will impact territorial
planning and industrial strategy, according to ASI General Director
Svetlana Chupsheva.[99]
Russian occupation authorities will likely use this initiative to
further seize control of Ukrainian territorial and industrial assets and
absorb them into the Russian system.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
The
Russian government is continuing to charge current and former Ukrainian
officials with invented crimes in absentia as part of its ongoing
efforts to enforce Russian federal law outside of Russia's jurisdiction
and insinuate that Ukraine should not exist as an independent state. The
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) charged former Ukrainian
Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, former Foreign Minister Pavlo
Klimkin, former Finance Minister Oleksandr Slapak, Lieutenant General
Ihor Dovhan, and Southern Operational Command's deputy commander
Brigadier General Vladyslav Lishchynskyi for using "prohibited means and
methods of warfare."[100]
The Kremlin's prosecution of current and former Ukrainian officials
continues to highlight Russia's enduring belief that the Ukrainian state
does not and should not exist as a political entity separate from
Russia.[101]
Russian
Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya
used Russia's one-month-long rotating presidency of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC), which started on July 1, to promote
long-standing Kremlin information operations, as ISW assessed.[102]
A
Russian milblogger continued to amplify criticisms made by a Ukrainian
official against Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr
Syrskyi.[103]
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian President
Aleksander Lukashenko claimed on July 2 that Ukrainian officials
overacted to a recent Russian military contingent’s arrival to Belarus
since the contingent only plans to participate in a military parade.[104]
Lukashenko claimed that Belarus would respond harshly in the event of a
Ukrainian provocation on the border. Belarusian military authorities
recently claimed that Ukrainian forces were increasing their drone
activity near the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, and the Ukrainian Center
for Countering Disinformation reported recently that Belarusian and
Russian propagandists are falsely presenting Ukraine as a threat to
Belarus.[105]
Russia
and Belarus continue efforts to grow joint import substitution
programs, likely to offset the effects of sanctions. Belarusian
Ambassador to Russia Aleksander Rogozhnik stated on July 2 that Russia
and Belarus are working on import substitution projects in the fields of
microelectronics, aviation, and machine tools.[106]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/781165-rosijski-vijska-pocali-sturmuvati-casiv-ar-z-toreckogo-napramku-osuv-hortica/
[2] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2002; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2000
[3] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2000
[4] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2002
[5] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1088
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar06272024
[7] https://kormany dot hu/hirek/orban-viktor-a-tuzszunet-megfontolasat-kerte-zelenszkijtol
[8]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/07/02/ukrayina-ta-ugorshhyna-gotuyut-dvostoronnij-dogovir/;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/07/02/volodymyr-zelenskyj-zustrivsya-z-viktorom-orbanom-i-nazvav-temy-peregovoriv/;
https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/videos/1169064960795896;
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/10992
[9] https://en.interfax dot com.ua/news/general/997505.html
[10] https://en.interfax dot com.ua/news/general/997505.html
[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061624; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/denying-russia%E2%80%99s-only-strategy-success
[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024
[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024; https://www.aei.org/research-products/one-pager/if-the-west-cuts-aid-to-ukraine-russia-will-win-if-the-west-leans-in-ukraine-can-win/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine-part-2-%E2%80%94-military-threat-and-beyond; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reframing-us-policy-debate-%E2%80%98long-war%E2%80%99-ukraine; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11
[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061524; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424
[15] https://ria dot ru/20240702/gosduma-1956771544.html
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2024
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070124
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024
[19] https://t.me/ComAFUA/330
[20] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/553; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8863
[21] https://t.me/astrapress/58775
[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2024
[23] https://t.me/razvozhaev/7038
[24] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-01/russia-twice-sent-kilo-attack-submarine-toward-the-irish-sea
[25] https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-r/md/24/rrb24.2/c/R24-RRB24.2-C-0012!!PDF-E.pdf; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/un-body-condemns-russian-satellite-interference-europe-2024-07-01/
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2024
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar063024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024
[30] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/968489 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/257711
[31] https://www.rbc dot ru/business/01/07/2024/668274f69a7947fb5bd230b6
[32]
https://t.me/tass_agency/258115 ; https://meduza dot
io/news/2024/07/01/v-moskve-po-delu-o-terrorizme-zaderzhali-trenera-molodezhnoy-sbornoy-rossii-po-volnoy-borbe
; https://news dot
ru/incidents/uchil-russkih-detej-terrorizmu-chto-izvestno-o-zaderzhannom-trenere-migrante/
[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062524 ; https://t.me/rybar/61475 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/46563
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062924 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/25/06/2024/667a7d129a79470918b28877
[35] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/02/07/2024/66845b379a794799b23ddec7
[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062924
[37] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/01/07/2024/667e6f809a7947bbc82b9e66
[38] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/21254235
[39] https://t.me/sashakots/47644
[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2024
[41] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1807864623904796777; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1807864466165714951
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12403
[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/46572 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/20821
[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/07/02/protyvnyk-peremistyv-u-vovchansk-try-shturmovi-grupy/
[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2024
[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12385; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71639; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18278
[47] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27175
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12370; https://t.me/motopatriot/24460
[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wECUxbzhiRKzpJL3FyodJcBwTb9aSayT2BuMaH3SeZz9x2YtMspTu9yoagRGhjoXl
[50] https://t.me/motopatriot/24458
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wECUxbzhiRKzpJL3FyodJcBwTb9aSayT2BuMaH3SeZz9x2YtMspTu9yoagRGhjoXl; https://t.me/dva_majors/46572; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12392
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12392; https://t.me/motopatriot/24489
[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/40578 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71658 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/20283; https://t.me/sashakots/47641
[54] https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/3062; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5959
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wECUxbzhiRKzpJL3FyodJcBwTb9aSayT2BuMaH3SeZz9x2YtMspTu9yoagRGhjoXl; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12402;
[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/12402
[57] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/781165-rosijski-vijska-pocali-sturmuvati-casiv-ar-z-toreckogo-napramku-osuv-hortica/
[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/20830
[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wECUxbzhiRKzpJL3FyodJcBwTb9aSayT2BuMaH3SeZz9x2YtMspTu9yoagRGhjoXl; https://t.me/dva_majors/46572
[60] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2000
[61] https://t.me/rusich_army/15539; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5957; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/625; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5954; https://t.me/godsworkfpv/101; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/16820
[62] https://t.me/rybar/61487
[63] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27179; https://t.me/motopatriot/24495 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27181; https://t.me/motopatriot/24487
[64] https://t.me/rybar/61487
[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wECUxbzhiRKzpJL3FyodJcBwTb9aSayT2BuMaH3SeZz9x2YtMspTu9yoagRGhjoXl; https://t.me/dva_majors/46572
[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2000; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2002
[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wECUxbzhiRKzpJL3FyodJcBwTb9aSayT2BuMaH3SeZz9x2YtMspTu9yoagRGhjoXl; https://t.me/dva_majors/46572; https://t.me/wargonzo/20821
[68] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12444; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12445
[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/40580; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5961
[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wECUxbzhiRKzpJL3FyodJcBwTb9aSayT2BuMaH3SeZz9x2YtMspTu9yoagRGhjoXl
[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/128627
[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wECUxbzhiRKzpJL3FyodJcBwTb9aSayT2BuMaH3SeZz9x2YtMspTu9yoagRGhjoXl; https://t.me/wargonzo/20821;
[73] https://t.me/motopatriot/24458
[74] https://t.me/dva_majors/46550; https://t.me/stringer_donetsk/12485 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/37302
[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02XFjb4FT67ypJ4jhiHZhKASYnt9jjHUWzdwA1VxTcLkKmBQrY1oC9qX5qCunvBQXsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031o2pnrL1aZo8Fnxostw2FBvuMgxHovJ1LBRzhRESWq6R3YYai7Vey9BaVumbHsg4l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wECUxbzhiRKzpJL3FyodJcBwTb9aSayT2BuMaH3SeZz9x2YtMspTu9yoagRGhjoXl; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/10256
[76] https://t.me/dva_majors/46555; https://t.me/osetin20/8747
[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/46604; https://t.me/dva_majors/46556; https://t.me/osetin20/8752
[78] https://t.me/mod_russia/40570
[79] https://www.facebook.com/yuriy.ignat/posts/7917666638255359
[80] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/10/world/europe/russia-women-inmates-ukraine.html
[81] https://t.me/sotaproject/63865; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2023
[82] https://m.business-gazeta dot ru/news/636589; https://t.me/shot_shot/67487; https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2024/06/11/23222035.shtml
[83] https://t.me/brygada47/819
[84] https://t.me/wargonzo/20768
[85] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/5173; https://pointmedia dot io/story/6683d584dc48800406e0f483
[86] https://t.me/akashevarova/7385; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1086
[87] https://t.me/akashevarova/7391
[88] 7385
[89] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1087
[90] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10838; https://t.me/tass_agency/258237
[91] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-10-2024
[92] https://ria dot ru/20240701/drony-1956642571.html
[93]
https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1808128711201300944;
https://t.me/btvt2019/13199;
https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1808129342523748831;
https://t.me/btvt2019/13203 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/125239
[94] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/19830
[95] https://t.me/malvovabelova/3531
[96] https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/6461
[97] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/74442
[98] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2024/07/02/1047430-putin-poruchil-utverdit
[99] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2024/07/02/1047430-putin-poruchil-utverdit
[100] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/07/02/sud-v-moskve-zaochno-arestoval-eks-glavu-mid-ukrainy-i-byvshego-glavu-minfina
[101] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024
[102] https://t.me/russiaun/5168 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/258106 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2024
[103] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/71638 ; https://t.me/marybezuhla/1734
[104] https://t.me/tass_agency/258305
[105] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2024
[106] https://www.belta
dot
by/economics/view/belarus-prorabotaet-s-rossiej-vydelenie-dopolnitelnyh-sredstv-na-importozameschajuschie-proekty-645099-2024/
