Andie
Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Kathryn Tyson, Katherine
Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Marcus Mildenberger, Johanna Moore and Brian
Carter
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events. Click here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.
CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq. Iranian-backed
Iraqi militias launched two one-way attack drones targeting US and
coalition forces at Ain al Asad Airbase in Anbar Province, Iraq on July
16, according to two Iraqi militia “officials” cited by Western media.[1] An anonymous US-led coalition source told Iraqi media that US air defense systems intercepted both drones.[2]
No group has officially claimed the attack at the time of writing,
though an Iraq-focused analyst reported that a propaganda outlet
affiliated with Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba claimed the attack on July
16.[3]
The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously threatened on or before
June 5 to attack US forces in Iraq if the Iraqi prime minister failed to
set a date for US troop withdrawal within 40 days, and the militias’
coordinating body also threatened to resume attacks on June 19.[4]
Ali al Fatlawi, a leader in Ansar Allah al Awfiya cited by Shafaq on
July 17, claimed that the drone attack on Ain al Asad Airbase meant
attacks against US forces had resumed.[5] Fatlawi did not specify which militia conducted the attack.[6] Fatlawi is also a member of Asaib Ahl al Haq‘s parliamentary bloc.[7]
This attack marks the second Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on a
US base in Iraq since Iraqi militias suspended their attack campaign
targeting US forces in February 2024.[8]
An
Iraqi delegation will travel to Washington, DC, on an unspecified date
in July 2024 to continue negotiations over the end of the International
Coalition’s mission in Iraq.[9]
Anonymous Iraqi political sources cited by Iraqi news outlet al Mada
claimed that the Iraqi delegation will request the withdrawal of US and
coalition forces from Iraq in three to four months. The same sources
believe the United States will request a longer withdrawal timetable
over three to five years. It is unclear how the anonymous Iraqi
political sources have access to this information about US calculations.
The United States and Iraq have been evaluating a timeline to withdraw
International Coalition forces from Iraq following the January 2024
Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack that killed three US servicemembers.[10]
Iran
is still attempting to establish a permanent naval base on Sudan’s Red
Sea coast following unsuccessful bilateral talks in March 2024. The Wall Street Journal initially
reported in March 2024 that Iran unsuccessfully tried to persuade Sudan
to allow Iran to build a permanent naval base in Port Sudan on the Red
Sea.[11]
France-based, Sudanese outlet the Sudan Tribune reported on July 16
that the Sudanese Armed Forces rejected an Iranian proposal to
permanently station an Iranian military vessel in Port Sudan in exchange
for continued Iranian military aid to the Sudanese Armed Forces.[12]
The July 16 report stated that Iran modified its initial proposal to
instead request to establish a dual-use commercial and military port at
Port Sudan. Iran’s initial proposal was to establish a solely
military-use port, according to the Wall Street Journal.[13] The
most recent proposal was also rejected by Sudanese officials, according
to the Sudan Tribune report. The July 16 report likely indicates that
Iran continued talks with Sudan after its initial talks as reported by
the Wall Street Journal in March 2024.
Sudanese
Armed Forces officials reportedly rejected these Iranian proposals due
to concerns about potential backlash from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and
Western countries. Port Sudan is located approximately 200 miles west of
Saudi Arabia—separated by the Red Sea. A senior Sudanese intelligence
adviser to the Sudanese Armed Forces stated in March 2024 that Sudan
rejected the initial proposal to ”avoid alienating the US and Israel.”[14]
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel all have direct access to the Red Sea,
and an Iranian presence on the Red Sea would enable Iran to support
longer-range naval operations to disrupt international shipping to any
of these states, should Iran choose to do so.[15]
Sudan’s rejection of these proposals has not visibly affected Iran’s
decision to supply drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Iran has
supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with drones, such as the Mohajer-6,
to use against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in the ongoing
Sudanese Civil War.[16]
CTP-ISW previously assessed in March 2024 that Iran would use a naval
base in Sudan to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on
international shipping in the Red Sea.
Hamas
likely retains the institutional knowledge and skilled commanders
required to reconstitute despite the loss of several high-ranking Hamas
commanders in the Gaza Strip since October 2023. The IDF has killed
three of five Hamas Brigade commanders in the Gaza Strip.[17]
The original Hamas Gaza City and Rafah Brigade commanders remain active
in the Gaza Strip, and the IDF has conducted operations in both Rafah
and Gaza City in recent weeks targeting forces under the command of the
last two pre-October 7 brigade commanders.[18]
Many of the senior Hamas military commanders whom Israel has killed in
this war have decades of experience fighting Israel, and their loss will
make reconstitution more challenging. Hamas made a deliberate choice to
structure its military wing to survive Israeli military action by
building a resilient military organization modeled on conventional
militaries, however. Militaries design their command structures to
ensure continuity of command during combat as units take casualties and
leaders die. Killed Hamas commanders are almost certainly backfilled by
their deputies and subordinates. These deputies and subordinates have
survived nine months in a Darwinian combat environment, which can help
lower-ranking commanders develop skills and teach them lessons they may
not otherwise develop in peacetime when the stakes are much lower. These
commanders will likely quickly assume and execute reconstitution tasks,
such as reorganization, recruiting personnel, and replenishing
stockpiles of military equipment and weapons across the Gaza Strip.[19]
Hamas
is deploying poorly trained new recruits in the Gaza Strip, probably
due to its inability to effectively train new fighters amid Israeli
military pressure. This inability to effectively train
fighters will not persist if military pressure—from Israel or a
different security force—does not continue. Hamas is recruiting
new fighters to replace the reportedly 14,000 Palestinian fighters
killed in the Gaza Strip since the start of the war.[20] The IDF reported that these new recruits are ”low quality,” however.[21]
The ”low-quality” of new fighters is unsurprising given that Hamas does
not have the freedom of movement or safe spaces to train new recruits
in the same way new fighters would have been trained before October 7th.
The IDF Air Force continues to strike with ease across the Gaza Strip.
Training would increase the signature of Hamas fighters and present them
as targets for the IDF Air Force. These fighters would be able improve
their capabilities without a non-Hamas security presence to continue to
disrupt training activities, however. An IDF withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip without a viable alternative security force to challenge Hamas’
monopoly on violence would provide Palestinian militias the space to
rebuild fighter capacity. Raids can temporarily disrupt but will not
stop a reconstitution process.[22]
Key Takeaways:
- Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias appear to have resumed their attack campaign targeting US forces in Iraq.
- Gaza Strip: Hamas
likely retains the institutional knowledge and skilled commanders
required to reconstitute despite the loss of several high-ranking Hamas
commanders in the Gaza Strip since October 2023. The IDF has killed
three of five Hamas Brigade commanders in the Gaza Strip.
- Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas
is deploying poorly trained new recruits in the Gaza Strip, probably
due to its inability to effectively train new fighters amid Israeli
military pressure. This inability to effectively train fighters will not
persist if military pressure—from Israel or a different security
force—does not continue.
- Iran in Africa: Iran is still
attempting to establish a permanent naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast
following unsuccessful bilateral talks in March 2024. Sudanese Armed
Forces officials reportedly rejected these Iranian proposals due to
concerns about potential backlash from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Western
countries.
- Lebanon: Nasrallah gave a
televised speech on July 17 commemorating the Shia holy Day of Ashura
and stated that Hezbollah would hit new Israeli targets if Israel
“continues to target civilians” in Lebanon. CTP-ISW has observed that
Hezbollah has attacked areas further south in Israel in retaliation for
recent Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah leaders.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck several targets in the northern Gaza Strip on July 17. Israeli aircraft struck a Hamas sniper and fighter in an unspecified area of the northern Gaza Strip.[23] The IDF Air Force also targeted the site and launcher that Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) used to target Sderot on July 16.[24]
The IDF 3rd and 8th Brigades continued clearing operations along the Netzarim Corridor on July 17.[25]
Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters and demolished buildings
that Palestinian fighters used to observe the IDF along the corridor.[26]
Palestinian journalists reported Israeli armor operated along the
southern side of the Netzarim Corridor near Nuseirat and Bureij.[27] Palestinian militias did not claim attacks targeting Israeli forces along the corridor on July 17.
The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operation in Rafah on July 17.
The IDF Nahal Brigade engaged a Palestinian militia cell and destroyed a
rocket launcher used to target Israeli forces in Rafah.[28]
IDF combat engineers are reportedly expanding the width of the
Philadelphi Corridor to 800 meters by demolishing structures along the
Gaza Strip-Egypt border.[29] Hamas targeted Israeli armor with a rocket-propelled grenade in eastern Rafah[30]
The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces holding the Rafah
border crossing and fired a sniper rifle at an Israeli infantryman in
Yabna refugee camp in central Rafah[31][32]
IDF combat engineers destroyed a tunnel complex in Rafah that Hamas fighters recently used in an attempted infiltration attack.
Reconnaissance and combat engineer units led by the IDF 143rd (Gaza)
Division demolished a three-kilometer tunnel network used by four Hamas
fighters to emerge 200-meters from the Israel-Gaza Strip border in Rafah
on June 6.[33]
Four Hamas fighters armed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades
(RPG) emerged from the tunnel under the cover of a thick fog during the
incident.[34] The IDF killed three of the four Palestinian fighters 400 meters from the Israeli border in the Gaza Strip.[35] One Israeli soldier died during the incident.[36]
Palestinian fighters have very rarely attempted to infiltrate Israeli
territory since the October 7, 2023, attack. The tunnel network
contained blast doors, electricity, and a living space for Hamas
fighters. [37]
Senior US military officials engaged with their Israeli counterparts over the past week. US Central Command Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla met with IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi in Israel.[38]
US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav
Gallant separately spoke on the phone about the IDF’s ongoing
operations in Gaza Strip, a possible ceasefire deal, and the specifics
of the July 13 strike targeting Hamas’ top military commander, Mohammad
Deif.[39]
Palestinian militias conducted at least two rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel on July 17. The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired rockets at an IDF headquarters and an Israeli town.[40]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Israeli
forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in seven locations in the West
Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on July 16.[41] The
al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired
small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting
Israeli forces in Jenin.[42]
Hamas
said on July 17 that it conducted a small arms attack that wounded
three Israeli civilians in Ramin, east of Tulkarm, on July 16.[43] Hamas
said that the attack was in response to Israeli action in the Gaza
Strip and West Bank and it threatened to conduct further attacks in the
West Bank.[44]
The US State Department imposed visa restrictions on a former IDF sergeant on July 17 for violating human rights in the West Bank.[45] The State Department designated Elor Azaria for his involvement in an extrajudicial killing in Hebron in 2016.[46]
Azaria was in the IDF at the time of the incident. The State Department
also said that it was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on an
additional group of individuals for ”having been involved in or
meaningfully contributed to undermining the peace, security, or
stability in the West Bank."[47]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Lebanese
Hezbollah conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into
northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on July 16.[48]
Hezbollah targeted seven civilian towns and one IDF barracks. The IDF
detected approximately 25 rocket launches from Lebanese territory on
July 16 and intercepted ”some” of them.[49]
The IDF sometimes elects not to shoot down rockets if the rockets are
on a trajectory that will hit a field or other uninhabited areas. The
IDF reported that neither attack resulted in casualties.[50]
Hezbollah claimed that the strikes were in retaliation for Israeli
strikes targeting Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure across southern
Lebanon on July 15 and 16.[51]
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah threatened to strike new locations inside Israel on July 17.[52]
Nasrallah gave a televised speech on July 17 commemorating the Shia
holy Day of Ashura and stated that Hezbollah would hit new Israeli
targets if Israel “continues to target civilians” in Lebanon.[53]
CTP-ISW has observed that Hezbollah has attacked areas further south in
Israel in retaliation for recent Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah
leaders. Nasrallah dismissed the idea that conflict between Israel and
Hezbollah would be resolved through diplomacy, instead stating that the
future of southern Lebanon will be decided by the “results of this
battle.” Nasrallah is presumably referring to Israel-Hezbollah fighting
along the northern border and a future Israeli military offensive into
Lebanon.[54]
The United States and other international partners have attempted since
fall 2023 to engage Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Israel to resolve the
ongoing escalation diplomatically.[55]
Israeli officials have said repeatedly that they are attempting to
reach a diplomatic agreement wherein Hezbollah will withdraw north of
the Litani River in Lebanon, but that Israel may need to resort to
military action against Hezbollah in the absence of a diplomatic
solution.[56]
UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon War, stipulates that
Hezbollah cannot maintain military positions south of the Litani. [57]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
The
Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias—claimed a drone attack targeting Ma’agalim base in Israel on
June 16.[58] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed a drone attack targeting "a vital target” in Eilat on June 17.[59] The IDF has not confirmed the attacks as of this writing.
Iranian
President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian conducted separate phone calls with
several global leaders, including the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Qatar,
on July 17.[60] Pezeshkian also spoke with the president of Uzbekistan, the vice president of Brazil, and the prime minister of Malaysia. The
various officials congratulated Pezeshkian on his election and
reaffirmed their intentions to deepen ties with Iran. Saudi Crown Prince
and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman said he hoped to continue
cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia across ”various fields.”[61]
Pezeshkian thanked Qatar for its help opposing Israeli military
operations in the Gaza Strip in his call with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim
bin Hamad al Thani.[62]
Brazilian Vice President Geraldo Alckmin and Uzbek President Shaukat
Mirziyoyev both separately proposed joint economic commissions with Iran
to increase bilateral trade.[63]
Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim expressed support for
the continuation of bilateral relations free from foreign interference
and commended Iran for its ”unwavering support for justice for the
Palestinian people.”[64]
Acting
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani discussed Iran’s
support for the Axis of Resistance during a speech at the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) meeting on July 16.[65]
Bagheri Kani called Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance a
”legitimate action” in the framework of international law. Bagheri Kani
separately met with his Russian, Kuwaiti, and Hungarian counterparts on
the sidelines of the UNSC on July 17.[66]
Bagheri Kani reiterated warnings against a potential Israeli offensive
operation against Lebanese Hezbollah in the meetings with his Russian
and Hungarian counterparts and in a separate July 17 speech about
Palestine.[67] Bagheri Kani separately gave interviews with Russian and American news outlets on the sidelines of the UN.[68]
[1]
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/islamic-state-attacks-track-double-iraq-syria-compared-112019184#:~:text=On%20Tuesday%2C%20two,requests%20for%20comment.
[2]
https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%81%D9%82-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B2:-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF
[3] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/akram-al-kaabi-shown-pretending-assemble-drone-fired-israel
[4]
https://www.shafaq dot
com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-40-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86
;
https://t.me/centerkaf/4413
[5] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/العصائب-بشأن-استهداف-عين-الأسد:-الهدنة-انتهت-ولن-نخاف-الأمريكان
[6] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/العصائب-بشأن-استهداف-عين-الأسد:-الهدنة-انتهت-ولن-نخاف-الأمريكان
[7] https://www.alssaa dot com/post/show/15781
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-22-2024;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drones-target-iraqs-ain-al-asad-airbase-no-casualties-say-military-sources-2024-07-16/
[9] https://almadapaper dot net/367564/
[10]
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3655790/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-the-start-of-working-gr/
[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922
[12] https://sudantribune dot com/article288335/
[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922
[14] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922
[15] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922
[16] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-24/iran-supplies-sudan-army-with-drones-as-civil-war-continues
[17] https://www dot idf.il/216950
[18] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1813237456155578723; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1787724613595586696 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1813453466326499434
[19] https://t.me/moriahdoron/11297; https://t.me/moriahdoron/11281
[20] https://www dot idf.il/216950 ; https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1807094084017819897 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate062524 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1813227004008779956
[21] https://t.me/moriahdoron/11862
[22]
For further information on reconstitution see Corps and Division
Planner’s Guide to Reconstitution Operations, Center for Army Lessons
Learned:
https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/20-01.pdf
[23] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1813453473737736246
[24] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1813453453923930233
[25] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1813453468859867194
[26] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1813453468859867194
[27] https://t.me/hamza20300/270761 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/270583 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/270613
[28] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1813453466326499434
[29] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1813227004008779956
[30] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2702
[31]https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6846
[32] https://t.me/AymanGouda/6205 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6846
[33] www dot idf.il/217190;
https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1813589379643847094
[34] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1798593324976087536; https://t.me/moriahdoron/10804; https://t.me/moriahdoron/10824
[35] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1798773593444372617
[36] https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-06-06-24/h_20ef6ac68a9840eb745908ccc00ba236
[37] www dot idf.il/217190
[38] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1813501704400171437 ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-810660
[39] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1813512064565961008;
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3840991/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-call-with-israeli-minister/
[40] https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14784 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/4975
[41] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6841; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6842; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6845; https://t.me/QudsN/436267; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1379; https://t.me/QudsN/436515; https://t.me/QudsN/436527; https://t.me/QudsN/436375; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6848
[42] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6841; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6845; https://t.me/QudsN/436267; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1379; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6848
[43] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2707; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2706
[44] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2707
[45]
https://www.state.gov/promoting-accountability-for-gross-violations-of-human-rights-and-actions-undermining-peace-security-and-stability-in-the-west-bank/
[46] https://www.state.gov/promoting-accountability-for-gross-violations-of-human-rights-and-actions-undermining-peace-security-and-stability-in-the-west-bank/; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/world/middleeast/elor-azaria-verdict-israel.html
[47]
https://www.state.gov/promoting-accountability-for-gross-violations-of-human-rights-and-actions-undermining-peace-security-and-stability-in-the-west-bank/
[48] https://t.me/mmirleb/5518 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5515 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5512 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5511
[49] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813303590871564307 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813409248048546007
[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813303590871564307 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1813409248048546007
[51] https://t.me/mmirleb/5518 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5515 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5512 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/5511
[52] https://alahednews dot com.lb/article.php?id=71976
[53] https://alahednews dot com.lb/article.php?id=71976
[54] https://alahednews dot com.lb/article.php?id=71976
[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-19-2024
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/17/world/middleeast/biden-netanyahu-hezbollah-israel.html
[56]
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/gallant-well-push-hezbollah-beyond-litani-river-before-residents-of-northern-israel-return-home;
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/28/israel-says-time-running-out-to-reach-diplomatic-solution-with-lebanon
[57] https://peacemaker.un.org/israellebanon-resolution1701
[58] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1221;
SITE
Intelligence Group, “Islamic Resistance in Iraq Claims Solo Drone
Strike on Military Base in Israel and Joint Attack with Houthis on Ship
in Mediterranean,” July 16, 2024, available by subscription at
www.siteintelgroup.com
[59] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1224
[60] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/801410/;
https://www.iranintl dot com/202407173405;
www.isna dot ir/news/1403042717995;
www.isna dot ir/news/1403042717989;
www.isna dot ir/news/1403042717985;
www.isna dot ir/news/1403042718016
[61] https://www.iranintl dot com/202407173405
[62] www.isna dot ir/news/1403042717989
[63] www.isna dot ir/news/1403042717995;
www.isna dot ir/news/1403042717985
[64] https://www.nst dot com.my/news/nation/2024/07/1077936/malaysia-iran-cooperation-will-not-be-influenced-foreign-parties-anwar
[65] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/04/26/3123214/
[66] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/04/27/3123277/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/04/27/3123282/ ;
[67] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/04/27/3123295/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/04/27/3123282/
[68] https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/16/world/video/ali-bagheri-kani-iran-fareed-zakaria-gps-sot-digvid ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/04/27/3123295/
