Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, Andie Parry, Riley Bailey, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Key Takeaways:
- Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces on the Israeli forward line of advance in Khan Younis.
- Palestinian militias attacked Israeli military vehicles in Jabalia city as Israeli forces advanced east of the city.
- Israeli forces killed the Hamas Shujaiya Battalion commander during clearing operations in the neighborhood.
- Israel moved elements of its Artillery Corps into the Gaza Strip for the first time since the war began.
- The Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF has killed between 6,000 and 7,000 Palestinian militia fighters since the war began.
- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine called for greater coordination among Palestinian militias against Israel.
- Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted two indirect fire attacks into Israel.
- Al Qassem Brigades spokesperson Abu Obeida threatened that Hamas would conduct additional terror attacks against Israeli civilians.
- Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in five towns across West Bank.
- Lebanese Hezbollah conducted a one-way drone attack that injured Israeli soldiers in northern Israel. LH claimed seven other attacks on Israeli military positions in northern Israel.
- Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais al Khazali reiterated his commitment to expelling US forces from Iraq in a social media statement.
- Unspecified militants conducted two one-way drone attacks on US forces in eastern Syria, according to a US journalist.
- The French FREMM Multi-Mission Frigate Languedoc intercepted two incoming Houthi drones off the Yemeni coast while patrolling the Red Sea.
- Senior Iranian officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Syrian Prime Minister Hussein Arnous in Tehran.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
- Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.
Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces on the Israeli forward line of advance in Khan Younis on December 10. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued targeting Palestinian militia sites in Khan Younis, Jabalia, Shujaiya, and Beit Hanoun. Israeli forces attacked underground tunnels in Khan Younis and conducted airstrikes to support ground maneuvers.[1] The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed that its fighters detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli forces northeast of Khan Younis.[2] The militia claimed to kill 13 Israeli soldiers in the EFP attack and two more soldiers with small arms afterward the initial explosion. EFPs are particularly lethal improvised explosive devices designed to penetrate armored vehicles, such as main battle tanks.[3] This attack is consistent with the shift of Hamas and other Palestinian militias using increasingly sophisticated tactics since the humanitarian pause expired on December 1.
The al Qassem Brigades claimed several other attacks on Israeli soldiers and armored vehicles using anti-personnel munitions, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-tank rockets, and mortars. The militia claimed that it targeted an Israeli field command post with anti-personnel shells in one of the attacks.[4] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—conducted a complex attack on Israeli forces in a building northeast of Khan Younis using anti-personnel munitions and small arms. The militia also claimed three mortar attacks on Israeli soldiers advancing on east of Khan Younis.[5] The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP—claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli soldiers and vehicles east of al Bureij in the central Gaza Strip and Khan Younis.[6] A local resident captured footage of Israeli tanks operating on the Osama Elnajjar Road in Khan Younis on December 10.[7]
Palestinian militias attacked Israeli military vehicles in Jabalia city as Israeli forces advanced east of the city on December 10. Most of the attacks claimed by Palestinian militias across the Gaza Strip occurred around Jabalia. Fighting between Israeli forces and militia fighters concentrated in eastern Jabalia city near Jabalia refugee camp and in western Jabalia city adjacent to the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood. The al Qassem Brigades claimed several attacks on Israeli Merkava tanks and armored bulldozers using the al Yassin anti-tank munition west of Jabalia refugee camp.[8] The militia claimed attacks using anti-personnel munitions, grenades, and small arms against Israeli forces in the same area.[9] The militia also claimed that its fighters conducted two house-borne improvised explosive device (HBIED) attacks on Israeli forces west of Jabalia.[10] The al Quds Brigades and al Qassem Brigades claimed to fire RPGs, including tandem-charged RPGs, at Israeli military vehicles and soldiers as they advanced on al Fallujah Road.[11] A Palestinian journalist in Jabalia refugee camp reported that Israeli tanks advanced toward a UN Relief and Works Agency clinic.[12] Several other local journalists commented on Israeli forces operating around the camp.[13]
Israeli forces killed the Hamas Shujaiya Battalion commander during clearing operations in the neighborhood. The Shujaiya Battalion is a combat effective battalion under active and intense IDF pressure as Israeli forces advance into Shujaiya neighborhood.[14] Israeli forces killed the former commander of the battalion on December 2.[15] The IDF announced on December 10 that it killed the new battalion commander, Amad Abdullah Ali Qariqa.[16] Qariqa had served as the deputy commander of the battalion since 2019 and trained anti-tank operatives in Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade.[17] The IDF said on December 2 that it has “significantly damaged” the battalion’s capabilities.[18]
The IDF provided details on three units’ operations in Shujaiya neighborhood on December 10. The 282nd Fire Brigade attacked over 20 targets, including weapons storage facilities, booby-trapped houses, and other Hamas-affiliated military infrastructure.[19] The Golani Brigade has uncovered 15 tunnel shafts, located ammunition, and killed Palestinian fighters since the start of fighting in the neighborhood.[20] The 188th Brigade Combat Team raided a Hamas military headquarters and found various weapons.[21]
The al Quds Brigades claimed on December 10 that one it its "martyrdom” fighters blew up a house of 13 Israeli soldiers, who were searching for a tunnel entrance in Shujaiya.[22] The attack is one of few Palestinian militia claims of ”martyrdom” operations since the Israel-Hamas war began.[23] An Israeli Army Radio journalist on the ground noted that Israeli forces had encountered a compound of booby-trapped houses while clearing Shujaiya and after Palestinian militia fighters attempted to lure the forces into a trap.[24] The al Quds Brigades separately claimed to destroy an Israeli tank using an EFP in Shujaiya.[25] The National Resistance Brigades claimed on December 10 that two of its fighters, including a commander, died during clashes in Shujaiya.[26]
Israel moved elements of its Artillery Corps into the Gaza Strip for the first time since the war began. The Artillery Corps has been using fire to support ground maneuver and for shaping operations in the Gaza Strip since the war began.[27]
The al Qassem Brigades military spokesperson, Abu Obeida, boasted about Hamas’ alleged battlefield success in the Gaza Strip in a speech on December 10. Abu Obeida claimed that the al Qassem Brigades have destroyed Israeli vehicles in several neighborhoods around the northern Gaza Strip and Khan Younis.[28] Obeida referenced a failed Israeli operation to rescue a hostage on December 8 to say that neither Israel nor the United States is capable of freeing Hamas-held Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip.[29]
The Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF has killed between 6,000 and 7,000 Palestinian militia fighters since the war began.[30] The outlet stated that the IDF has killed 800 militia fighters since the resumption of fighting after the humanitarian pause expired on December 1.[31] The number of wounded of Hamas fighters is twice as high as the number of fatalities, between 12,000 to 14,000, since the beginning of the war began, according to the outlet.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) called for greater coordination among Palestinian militias against Israel. The PFLP called for the formation of a unified Palestinian emergency command to confront Israeli military operations.[32] Some Palestinian militias have claimed combined operations since the war began, although such claims are infrequent.[33] CTP-ISW previously reported that the IDF faces a loose coalition of Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip—not just Hamas.[34]
Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted two indirect fire attacks into Israel on December 10. The al Qassem Brigades and al Quds Brigades separately fired rockets at an Israeli military site adjacent to the Gaza Strip.[35] An unspecified senior military source told Israeli Army Radio that Hamas has hundreds of medium- and long-range rockets left in its arsenal and noted that 2024 will be a continuous year of fighting.[36]
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
Al Qassem Brigades spokesperson Abu Obeida threatened on December 10 that Hamas would conduct additional terror attacks against Israeli civilians. Obeida referenced a shooting attack conducted by two Hamas gunmen on a bus stop in Jerusalem on November 30, saying “what is coming is worse and greater.”[37] That shooting attack killed three Israeli civilians hours before the humanitarian pause in the Gaza Strip expired.[38] The spokesperson also acknowledged that Hamas has a military presence in the West Bank and mockingly asked if Israel is “able to eliminate [Hamas] in the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem.”[39]
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in five towns across West Bank on December 10. Palestinian fighters used small arms against Israeli forces in three towns around Nablus.[40] The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed that it shot at an Israeli military checkpoint in one of the Nablus clashes.[41] Palestinian fighters also engaged Israeli forces in Tubas and Hebron.[42] CTP-ISW did not record any IED attacks on Israeli forces in the West Bank on December 10. Israeli forces arrested 21 Palestinians and confiscated small arms, weapons components, and explosives in West Bank raids on December 10.[43]
Hamas and several other Palestinian groups called for a global strike, especially in the West Bank, on December 11. Hamas’ West Bank Telegram channel distributed flyers for the strike.[44] Hamas called on West Bank residents to fight Israeli forces and demonstrate against Israel on December 11.[45] The National and Islamic Forces—a coalition the major Palestinian political factions— announced that its parties would participate in the global strike as a show of unity.[46]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
- Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) conducted a one-way drone attack that injured Israeli soldiers in northern Israel on December 10. LH claimed that it launched several one-way attack drones at an Israeli command headquarters at the Yara barracks in northern Israel.[47] The IDF said that the attack moderately injured two soldiers and lightly injured others.[48] Israeli air defenses intercepted two of the several drones that entered Israel from Lebanon.[49] LH has only claimed seven drone attacks on Israeli positions along the Lebanese border since the Israel-Hamas war began, although the IDF frequently intercepts ”suspicious” aerial targets originating from Lebanon.[50] LH last claimed a drone attack on Israeli forces on November 20.[51]
LH claimed seven other attacks on Israeli military positions in northern Israel on December 10.[52] LH fired Burkan rockets at three Israeli military sites.[53] The al Qassem Brigades' Lebanon branch separately launched rockets at northwestern Israeli towns on December 10.[54] The al Qassem Brigades last claimed an attack from Lebanon on November 12.[55]
Top Israeli security and military officials discussed publicly on December 10 the threat that LH poses to Israel. Israeli National Security Adviser Tzachi Hangebi told Israeli media that Israel can no longer accept the presence of LH’s elite Radwan forces along its northern border and that the situation in the north must change.[56] Hangebi added that Israel will pursue a diplomatic solution but otherwise would “have to act.” IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi said that Israel emphasized similar sentiments about the need to address the LH threat, while visiting Israel’s northern border with Lebanon.[57] Halevi said that Israel can deter LH but can also achieve security through war. Halevi specified that war is not the preferred option. These statements follow Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warning on December 7 that “if Hezbollah makes a mistake, the IDF will turn Beirut and South Lebanon into Gaza and Khan Younis.”[58]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
- Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts
Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH) Secretary General Qais al Khazali reiterated his commitment to expelling US forces from Iraq in a social media statement on December 10.[59] Khazali’s statement follows recent indications of a division between AAH and other Iranian-backed Iraqi militant groups over attacks on US forces. Kataib Hezbollah (KH) has implicitly criticized the lack of AAH attacks on US positions since the Israel-Hamas war began.[60] AAH members also notably did not attend the December 5 funeral ceremony for five Iraqi militants killed during recent US self-defense strikes, though many other Iranian-backed Iraqi groups were present.[61] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors are exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to try to expel US forces from Iraq, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[62]
Unspecified militants conducted two one-way drone attacks on US forces in eastern Syria on December 10, according to a US journalist.[63] The militants targeted the US positions at Conoco Mission Support Site and al Omar oil field. US forces intercepted three drones used in the attacks. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has not claimed responsibility nor has any other actor for the attacks at the time of writing. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq previously claimed attacks on US positions at al Omar oil field on December 4 and Conoco Mission Support Site on December 8.[64]
The French FREMM Multi-Mission Frigate Languedoc intercepted two incoming Houthi drones off the Yemeni coast while patrolling the Red Sea on December 9.[65] The Houthi drone attack comes after the Houthi military spokesperson announced on December 9 that the Houthis will expand their attacks on maritime traffic around the Red Sea.[66] The New York Times also reported on December 8 that Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” plans to increase attacks on US and allied assets in the Middle East, including Houthi attacks on American-owned vessels operating in the Red Sea.[67] The Houthis have unsuccessfully targeted US naval vessels in the Red Sea with drones on multiple occasions, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[68] US Deputy National Security Adviser John Finer stated on December 7 that the IRGC is involved in planning and executing the Houthis’ drone and missile attacks on ships in the Red Sea.[69]
Senior Iranian officials discussed the Israel-Hamas war with Syrian Prime Minister Hussein Arnous in Tehran on December 10. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi boasted that the war has increased the global influence of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance.”[70] Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian praised the unity of the Axis of Resistance against Israel.[71] Arnous met with Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on December 9.[72]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian called on Europe to take “effective action” to facilitate a permanent ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war in a letter to EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell on December 10.[73] Abdollahian also called for the observance of international law and the provision of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. Abdollahian warned of the possibility of the “deep” expansion of the conflict if Israel continues its military operations in the Gaza Strip during a phone call with Borrell on December 3.[74] Iranian officials have tried to pressure international actors to pursue a ceasefire by repeatedly suggested that the war could evolve into a regional conflict, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[75]
Cypriot security forces arrested two Iranians on December 10 for allegedly plotting to assassinate prominent Israelis inside Cyprus.[76] Israel stated that it aided the operation to identify and arrest these individuals.[77] Cypriot and Greek authorities have previously arrested Iranian-backed individuals plotting to conduct similar attacks against Israelis in Cyprus and Greece.[78]
The PFLP said that attacks on US bases and interests in addition to removing US and Israeli forces from the region must remain a goal of the Palestinian resistance.[79] The PFLP criticized the United States for vetoing a resolution calling for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war at the UN Security Council on December 8.[80] Iranian-backed militias in the regional have attacked dozens of US positions in Iraq and Syria since the war began.[81]
The Kremlin continues to express an increasing anti-Israel position in the Israel-Hamas war despite feigning interest in being a neutral arbitrator in the conflict. NOTE: A version of this text appears in ISW December 10 Russia Offensive Campaign Assessment. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a telephone conversation on December 10, which reportedly lasted for 50 minutes and heavily focused on the Israel-Hamas war.[82] Putin reportedly noted that there is a “disastrous humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip” and stressed that avoiding consequences for the civilian population while countering terrorist threats is just as important as rejecting and condemning terrorism.[83] Putin’s comments are noteworthy in light of the devastation the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought to the civilian population there and Russia’s deliberate efforts to inflict suffering on Ukrainian civilians by attacking energy infrastructure going into winter. Putin reportedly reiterated the Kremlin’s initial rhetorical position on the Israel-Hamas war by claiming that Russia is ready to alleviate civilian suffering and deescalate the conflict.[84] Putin has increasingly shifted away from this more neutral rhetoric to a much more anti-Israel position in recent weeks, notably claiming that the war is leading to the ”extermination of the civilian population in Palestine.”[85] Netanyahu reportedly expressed dissatisfaction with Russian positions towards Israel that Russian officials have articulated at the United Nations (UN) and other multilateral organizations.[86] Netanyahu also reportedly criticized Russia for its ”dangerous cooperation” with Iran, notably following Putin’s meeting with Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi in Moscow on December 7.[87] Putin likely aimed to assuage Israeli concerns about Russian support for Hamas and the deepening Russian-Iranian security partnership, but Israeli and Russian rhetoric surrounding the conversation suggests that Putin likely failed to do so.[88] The Kremlin’s increasingly non-neutral framing of the Isarel-Hamas war signals potential increasing support for Iranian interests in the region and increased willingness to antagonize Israel.[89]
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[61] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-5-2023
[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-7-2023
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[67] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/08/world/middleeast/iran-israel-houthis.html
[68] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-29-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-3-2023
[69] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-involved-planning-executing-attacks-by-yemens-houthis-white-house-aide-2023-12-07/
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[76] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/cyprus-arrests-2-iranian-nationals-over-suspected-plot-to-attack-israelis/
[77] https://www.reuters.com/world/two-iranians-questioned-over-suspected-plots-attack-israelis-cyprus-newspaper-2023-12-10/
[78] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/iran-said-to-target-israeli-businessman-chabad-house-hotels-in-cyprus-terror-plot/ ; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/mossad-says-it-caught-cyprus-terror-plot-assassin-in-iran-airs-clip-of-confession/
[79] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/13583
[80] https://www.npr.org/2023/12/08/1218332312/israel-hamas-war-us-ceasefire-veto-un
[81] https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/12/07/attacks-on-us-troops-in-iraq-and-syria-have-resumed-pentagon-says/
[82] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72947 ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/category/3089#bykf8mx8p
[83] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72947
[84] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72947
[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023
[86] https://www.gov dot il/en/departments/news/spoke-russia101223
[87] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723 ; https://www.gov dot il/en/departments/news/spoke-russia101223
[88] https://isw.pub/UkrWar102623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120723
[89] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2023
