By: George Barros with Nataliya Bugayova
Key Takeaway: The Kremlin is successfully posturing as a legitimate, impartial mediator for the war in Donbas despite being a belligerent in the conflict. Claims that the Kremlin-initiated peace process is stabilizing the war in Donbas misrepresent the reality of the Kremlin’s actions and objectives. The Kremlin exploited Ukraine’s goodwill withdrawal of troops from portions of the front lines and continues to consolidate control over proxies in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials are advancing Kremlin-initiated peace processes while the Kremlin continues to pursue its objectives of regaining control of Ukraine’s decision-making and removing international constraints on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions.
The
Ukrainian military and Kremlin-backed forces agreed to vacate three areas in
Zolote, Stanitsa Luhanska, and Petrivske along the Donbas front line in 2019.
These disengagement points sought to test the feasibility of withdrawals from
the entire front line. Both sides completed their withdrawals from the three
points by November 11. Russia demanded the Ukrainian withdrawal from the
disengagement points as a precondition for peace talks among Ukraine, Russia,
Germany, and France.[1]
The Kremlin is exploiting the disengagement of Ukrainian troops from portions of the front. Kremlin-controlled forces launched an offensive on Ukrainian positions near
a disengagement point in eastern Ukraine on February 18.[2] The attack killed one Ukrainian serviceman,
injured at least three, and forced Ukrainian forces to retreat from a forward
observation post in the Zolote disengagement area.[3]
Ukrainian
officials confirmed the loss of one observation post, but continue to claim that
they control all their positions, as they do not define an observation post as
a “position.”[4] Testimony
from a local Zolote MP and video footage show Kremlin proxies shelling wide sectors,
including residential areas, using the same artillery barrage tactics employed
at the height of the war in 2015.[5]
The February 18 attack is the most significant to occur since the Ukrainian
elections in April 2019 because it demonstrates the willingness of the
Kremlin’s proxies to abuse disengagement points while Putin ostensibly advances
peace processes.[6]
The
Kremlin previously attempted to exploit Ukraine’s force disengagement along the
front line in Donbas. Kremlin-backed forces executed a false-flag attack on the
Petrivske disengagement point on January 26. Russian proxies infiltrated the
Petrivske disengagement point and fired upon their own positions with tracers
in an area under surveillance by the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE).[7] This
false-flag attack occurred less than three months after Ukraine withdrew its
troops and likely aimed to create the impression Ukrainian troops violated the
ceasefire inside the disengagement point.
The Kremlin may have used this false flag attack to assess Ukraine’s response
to such violations to assist planning for future violations.
The Kremlin used the attack in Zolote to shape the information space in advance of talks at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The attack coincided with a UNSC meeting to discuss
the Ukraine peace process on February 18. However, the Kremlin requested the
February 18 UNSC meeting on February 13.[8] Russia accused Ukraine of
“sabotage” in the peace process at the UNSC meeting.[9] The Kremlin likely used the
UNSC meeting to pressure Ukraine to grant more concessions, such as disengaging
from the full front line.
The Kremlin may have planned the attack in Zolote to coincide with the
UNSC meeting. The timing of the attack in relation to the UNSC meeting assisted
the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to pressure Ukraine and frame Ukraine as a spoiler
of the peace process. Putin’s primary objectives in the
renewed peace process are positioning Russia to regain control of Ukraine’s
decision-making and removing international constraints on his ambitions.[10]
Coordination between the Kremlin’s proxies in Donbas and Russian
diplomats at the UN would indicate high-level Kremlin operational planning, but
it is impossible to verify this interaction from open-source information. The
Kremlin likely either planned the attack in Zolote to coincide with the UNSC
meeting, or a Russian proxy commander executed an unauthorized attack and the
Kremlin quickly reacted to spin the event to advance the Kremlin’s objectives
in Ukraine.
Kremlin-controlled forces continued to inflict the same level of losses on Ukrainian forces while Moscow postured as a peacemaker in Ukraine. The
Kremlin has increasingly postured as a legitimate, neutral arbiter in its war
in Ukraine over the past six months.[11]
Putin claimed that Kremlin-initiated force withdrawals in Donbas, prisoner
exchanges with Ukraine, and renewed peace processes in 2019, culminating with talks
in Paris on December 9, were an “important step” to de-escalation and that
peace talks are “moving in the right direction” on December 10.[12]
Kremlin-controlled
forces in eastern Ukraine killed Ukrainian soldiers in Donbas at a higher rate
than the yearly average during
the past five-month period of disengagements and peace process talks. [13]
See Table 1.
Month
|
Corresponding
Political Event
|
Ukrainian
Servicemen KIA
|
Ukrainian
KIA as percentage[15]
|
January 2019
|
3
|
2.48%
|
|
February 2019
|
8
|
6.61%
|
|
March 2019
|
8
|
6.61%
|
|
April 2019
|
Ukrainian presidential elections
|
15
|
12.40%
|
May 2019
|
Zelensky takes office
|
9
|
7.44%
|
June 2019
|
8
|
6.61%
|
|
July 2019
|
14
|
11.57%
|
|
August 2019
|
8
|
6.61%
|
|
September 2019
|
The Kremlin renews push for
Ukraine to implement the Steinmeier Formula. Kremlin-initiated peace
processes resume
|
13
|
10.74%
|
October 2019
|
Ukraine agrees to the Steinmeier Formula.
The Kremlin sets Ukrainian force withdrawal from Zolote and Petrivske as a
condition for Normandy Format peace talks
|
9
|
7.44%
|
November 2019
|
Ukraine completes force withdrawal
from Zolote and Petrivske[16]
|
6
|
5.00%
|
December 2019
|
Normandy Format peace talks in
Paris
|
9
|
7.44%
|
January 2020
|
Kremlin-controlled
forces carry out false-flag attack in Petrivske[17]
|
11
|
9.09%
|
Total Since January 2019
|
121
|
100 %
|
|
Monthly Average since January 2019
|
9.31
|
7.70%
|
|
Monthly Average during renewed peace
process in September 2019 – January 2020
|
9.6
|
7.94%
|
The Kremlin is expanding control over its proxies in Donbas. The self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) appointed Vladimir Pashkov as
prime minister on February 5.[18]
Pashkov is a Russian citizen and the former deputy governor of Russia’s Irkutsk
Region. Pashkov’s appointment is another indicator of the Kremlin’s efforts to
control the DNR’s governance. The Kremlin has denied having any control over
the DNR since the beginning of the war in 2014.[19]
However, Moscow has consolidated control over the railway systems of the DNR
and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) and taken steps to integrate the DNR
and LNR’s banking systems with those in Russia.[20]
The
Kremlin is increasing Russian administrative capabilities in occupied Donbas by
issuing passports to Ukrainians en masse. The Kremlin likely intends to increase
Russia’s population with Ukrainian refugees to address Russia’s demographic
problems. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MFA) announced plans on January
29 to simplify the Russian citizenship process for Ukrainians and Belarusians by
removing the requirements for in-person meetings and knowledge of the Russian
language.[21]
The MFA says it granted Russian citizenship to over 220,000 Ukrainians in 2019.[22]
The MFA’s decision to simplify the Russian citizenship process for Ukrainians is
the latest development in the Kremlin’s ongoing campaign to increase leverage
over Ukraine.[23] Russian
officials opened a specialized migration center in Russia’s Rostov-on-Don
region in April 2019 to facilitate granting Russian passports to Ukrainians in
occupied Donbas.[24] The
Kremlin is setting conditions to expand, not limit, its control over occupied Donbas,
despite the Kremlin’s posturing as a legitimate, impartial mediator.
The Kremlin continues its subversion campaigns against Ukraine concurrently with the peace process.The Kremlin-linked Gamaredon
hacking group reportedly increased cyber operations against Ukrainian
government and military assets during peace talks involving France, Germany,
Russia, and Ukraine in December 2019.[25]
Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU) reported it dismantled a Russian bot
farm in Kyiv on January 29.[26]
The SBU claims Russian citizens and Kremlin proxies set up this bot farm,
operating more than 500 active accounts, to disseminate disinformation on
social media networks, instigate protests, attack government officials, and
reduce confidence in government institutions.[27]
The Kremlin continues to posture successfully as a peacemaker with both Europe and Ukraine.Putin recently spoke with German
Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron to discuss the
Ukraine peace process. Putin, Merkel, and Macron have praised Kremlin-initiated
military withdrawals, prisoner exchanges, and peace talks since September 2019 as
progress toward ending the war in Donbas.[28]
Macron claimed on December 9 that Ukraine’s three withdrawals from the front
line and prisoner swaps with Russia supported efforts to “stabilize the
situation” in Donbas and made it possible for the peace process to move forward.[29]
Merkel claimed on December 10 that she was "extremely satisfied" with
the outcomes of the December 9 meeting.[30]
Putin called Macron to discuss the Ukraine peace process on January 3 and
claimed both he and Macron gave a positive assessment of the agreements reached
in Paris on December 9.[31]
The Kremlin claimed Putin and Merkel shared the same positive assessment in a
similar phone call on December 16.[32]
The Kremlin claimed on November 11 that Merkel agreed with Putin that Donbas
should receive special status, a legal provision that could legitimize the
Kremlin’s proxies in Ukraine.[33]
The
Kremlin changed its Ukraine campaign manager in part to posture for diplomacy. The
Kremlin announced that Dmitry Kozak replaced Vladislav Surkov as manager of the
Kremlin’s Ukraine campaign on February 11.[34]
The Kremlin’s decision to appoint Kozak was likely in part to manage Ukraine’s
perceptions. Ukraine’s presidential administration head said he believes Kozak
is “more inclined to dialogue” than Surkov.[35]
Kozak successfully facilitated the return of the Kremlin’s influence in Moldova
under the veneer of diplomatic alignment with the West, a campaign ISW previously
analyzed.[36] Kozak
also oversaw the construction of the Kerch Strait Bridge connecting Crimea with
mainland Russia and a prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine in September
2019.[37]
The
Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine likely remain unchanged even though the Kremlin
replaced its campaign manager in Ukraine. The Kremlin likely aims to use Kozak’s
apparent reputation among the Ukrainian leadership as more pragmatic or
reasonable than Surkov to advance Russia’s agenda in the peace process. The
Kremlin might also be attempting to replicate Kozak’s success restoring Kremlin
influence in Moldova in Ukraine. Putin fired Surkov from Kremlin service on
February 18, likely in part because of Surkov’s failure to deliver on campaign goals
in Ukraine.[38]
Ukrainian officials are advancing Kremlin-initiated peace processes despite the Kremlin’s continued pressure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky described the February 18 attack near the disengagement point in Zolote as a provocation that would not derail the ongoing peace process.[39]A senior advisor on Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council announced plans to launch a potentially Kremlin-preferable “National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity” on February 19.[40] The rhetoric accompanying the platform indicates a risk that Ukrainian officials may legitimize Kremlin disinformation targeting Ukraine. Rhetoric from the platform’s organizers reiterates Kremlin propaganda tropes about Ukraine that the Kremlin has used to justify its annexation of Crimea and proxy war in Donbas. The platform favorably repeats aspects of Kremlin disinformation on Ukrainian linguistic, cultural, and national identity issues, and, in doing so, promotes larger Kremlin propaganda tropes about Ukraine being a deeply divided nation. Ukrainian officials’ legitimization of Kremlin disinformation used to subvert Ukraine would be an information warfare victory for the Kremlin. Zelensky said on February 11 that he earnestly believes Putin wants to end the war in Donbas.[41] Ukraine’s defense minister confirmed on February 10 that Ukraine is preparing three additional disengagement points in Donbas - despite the Kremlin’s persistent military pressure and the January 26 false-flag attack on the Petrivske disengagement point. [42] Zelensky said the additional force withdrawals “should” occur in March.[43] Ukraine’s defense minister, however, stated that he is against Ukrainian withdrawal from the whole front line.[44]
The Kremlin continues to push its false narrative that Ukraine is derailing the peace process. The Kremlin continues to frame
Ukraine as a “spoiler of peace,” despite the Kremlin’s ongoing escalation and
pressure campaigns.[45]
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused Ukraine of inhibiting the peace
process on February 17, claiming that Ukraine refuses to withdraw from the
entire front line. This accusation is based on a false premise: Lavrov claimed that
Ukraine agreed before the December 9 peace talks to disengage from the entire
front line but that Zelensky is now deliberately delaying the force withdrawal
by implementing it in a piecemeal manner.[46]
Lavrov’s claims are false, however, as there has been no formal agreement to
withdraw from the entire front line, and senior Ukrainian officials have explicitly
stated their opposition to Russia’s call for such a withdrawal.[47]
The Kremlin will continue attempting to portray Ukraine as the spoiler of peace
in Donbas, despite Ukraine’s
numerous concessions that Russia’s proxies have met with violence and
violations of agreements.
The West should call out the Kremlin’s attempts to manipulate the information space. The Kremlin’s proxies in Donbas
are not disengaging in good faith. The Kremlin will likely continue posturing
as a peacemaker to sell Russia as a mediator, despite being a belligerent, in
the war in Donbas. The Kremlin and its proxies will likely continue violating
ceasefires in Donbas and may seek to gain a tactical advantage in Donbas from
Ukrainian force withdrawal. The West should not allow the Kremlin to manipulate
the information space and advance its version of peace in Ukraine that is
actually Ukrainian surrender. The West should counter the Kremlin’s attempts to
manage perception by calling out the Kremlin’s disinformation.
[1] Illia Ponomarenko, “Ukraine military:
Disengagement near Petrivske in Donbas completed,” Kyiv Post, November 11,
2019, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-military-disengagement-near-petrivske-in-donbas-completed.html ; Ivan Apuleev, [“’Zelensky Cannot’: Putin on Force
Disengagement in Donbas,”] Gazeta, October 11, 2019, https://www.gazeta(.)ru/politics/2019/10/11_a_12749744.shtml.
[2]
“Evening Joint Forces Operation Press Briefing on 02/18/2020,” Joint Forces
Operation Facebook Page, February 18, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/pressjfo.news/posts/793317444494207?__tn__=K-R
; [“Since Morning in the Zolote Region an Intensive Battle has been underway
with all Types of Weapons, including 152 mm Artillery, 120 mm Mortars (Updated),”]
Censor, February 18, 2020, https://censor.net(.)ua/news/3176305/s_utra_v_rayione_zolotogo_idet_intensivnyyi_boyi_s_primeneniem_vseh_vidov_orujiya_vklyuchaya_artilleriyu.
[3]
[“Khomchak on the Details of the Battle Near Zolote: A Command was Given to
Pull out From the Observation Post – We had to Open Fire with Artillery
there,”] Censor, February 18, 2020, https://censor.net(.)ua/news/3176402/homchak_o_podrobnostyah_boya_pod_zolotym_byla_dana_komanda_otoyiti_s_nablyudatelnogo_punkta_prishlos
; Illia Ponomarenko. “Top General: Ukraine Repels Russian-Backed Offensive,
Loses Minor Observation Post,” Kyiv Post, February 18, 2020, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/top-general-ukraine-repels-russian-backed-offensive-loses-minor-observation-post.html ; “Currently, the battle near the settlements of Novotoshkivske,
Orikhove, Krimske, and Khutir Vilniy has ended,” Joint Forces Operation
Facebook Page, February 18, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/pressjfo.news/posts/792988247860460
; [“Since Morning in the Zolote Region an Intensive Battle has been underway
with all Types of Weapons, including 152 mm Artillery, 120 mm Mortars
(Updated),”] Censor, February 18, 2020, https://censor.net(.)ua/news/3176305/s_utra_v_rayione_zolotogo_idet_intensivnyyi_boyi_s_primeneniem_vseh_vidov_orujiya_vklyuchaya_artilleriyu.
[4]
[“Khomchak on the Details of the Battle Near Zolote: A Command was Given to
Pull out From the Observation Post – We had to Open Fire with Artillery
there,”] Censor, February 18, 2020, https://censor.net(.)ua/news/3176402/homchak_o_podrobnostyah_boya_pod_zolotym_byla_dana_komanda_otoyiti_s_nablyudatelnogo_punkta_prishlos.
[5]
[“Militants Covered Ukrainian Positions near Zolote with Artillery, TSN
Received Exclusive Shots of the Shelling,”] TSN, February 18, 2020, https://tsn(.)ua/ato/boyoviki-nakrili-artileriyeyu-ukrayinski-poziciyi-bilya-zolotogo-1493190.html.
[6]
The Kremlin’s proxies employed 152mm artillery, 120mm mortars, tanks, infantry
fighting vehicles, grenade launchers, and heavy machine guns. “Evening Joint
Forces Operation Press Briefing on 02/18/2020,” Joint Forces Operation Facebook
Page, February 18, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/pressjfo.news/posts/793317444494207?__tn__=K-R
; [“Since Morning in the Zolote Region an Intensive Battle has been underway
with all Types of Weapons, including 152 mm Artillery, 120 mm Mortars
(Updated),”] Censor, February 18, 2020, https://censor.net(.)ua/news/3176305/s_utra_v_rayione_zolotogo_idet_intensivnyyi_boyi_s_primeneniem_vseh_vidov_orujiya_vklyuchaya_artilleriyu.
[7] Petrivske is one of the three
withdrawal test sites Ukraine and the Kremlin’s proxies disengaged from in fall
2019 during the lead up to the Normandy Format talk in Paris. The Ukrainian
military and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) declared they completed force
withdrawal in Petrivske on November 11. Force withdrawal began on November 9.
Petrivsk was the last of three withdrawal pilot sites to test the feasibility
of a full-scale withdrawal from the front line in Donbas. Illia Ponomarenko,
“Russian-Backed Militants Attempt False Flag Operation in Front-Line
Disengagement Zone,” Kyiv Post, January 27, 2020,
https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/russian-backed-militants-attempt-false-flag-operation-in-front-line-disengagement-zone.html
; Illia Ponomarenko, “Ukraine military: Disengagement near Petrivske in Donbas
completed,” Kyiv Post, November 11, 2019,
https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/ukraine-military-disengagement-near-petrivske-in-donbas-completed.html.
[8]
Russia’s Deputy Representative to the UN announced on February 13 Russia would
initiate a UNSC meeting on the Minsk agreements for February 18. [“Russia
Requested UN Security Council Meeting to Discuss the Minsk Agreements,”]
Interfax, February 13, 2020, https://www.interfax(.)ru/world/695134 ; [“The UN
Security Council at the Request of the Russian Federation Will Hold a Meeting
on February 18 to Analyze the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements,”] TASS,
February 12, 2019, https://tass(.)ru/politika/7749221.
[9]
[“Many Officials in Kyiv Are Set on Sabotaging Minsk, Nebenzya Announced,”] RIA
Novosti, February 18, 2020, https://ria(.)ru/20200218/1564946422.html.
[10] Nataliya
Bugayova and George Barros, “The Perils of Talks on Russia's War in Ukraine,”
The Institute for the Study of War, December 7, 2019,
https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html.
[11]
Nataliya Bugayova and George Barros, “The Perils of Talks on Russia's War in
Ukraine,” The Institute for the Study of War, December 7, 2019,
https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html.
[12]
[“Exchange of Prisoners and Special Status: What Was Agreed Upon at the Summit
in Paris,”] RIA Novosti, December 10, 2019, https://ria(.)ru/20191210/1562189425.html
; [“Joint Press Conference Following the Meeting in the ‘Normandy Format,’”]
Kremlin, December 10, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/62277.
[13] Russian forces and Kremlin proxies killed 121 Ukrainian service members between January 2019 and January 2020. On
average, 9.31 Ukrainian service members died in action per month since January
2019. The standard deviation between the months is 3.15 deaths and the monthly
percentage standard deviation is 2.60 percent. The months during the Kremlin-initiated peace
processes of September – January 2020 contain a total 48 deaths,
averaging to 9.6 deaths per month, which is higher than the 13-month average of
9.31 deaths per month. Empirically, in terms of Ukrainian KIA, the months
during Ukraine’s force withdrawals and peace talks were not de-escalatory
compared to the past 13 months. January 2020 saw higher casualties than
October, November, and December 2019, but this is not a
statistically significant increase because it falls within the range of one
standard deviation from the mean. The Kremlin-preferable narrative that
Kremlin-initiated force withdrawals, prisoner exchanges, and peace talks in
late 2019 have stabilized the situation in Donbas is empirically untrue.
Ukrainian KIA data sources: [“Timeline of Ukrainian Army Losses: January 2020.
INFOGRAPHIC,”] Novynarnia, February 3, 2020, https://novynarnia(.)com/2020/02/03/taymlayn-vtrat-sichen-2020-infografika/.
[14] [“Timeline of Ukrainian Army Losses: January 2020. INFOGRAPHIC,”]
Novynarnia, February 3, 2020, https://novynarnia(.)com/2020/02/03/taymlayn-vtrat-sichen-2020-infografika/.
[15]
Percentages are rounded to the nearest hundredth.
[16]
The Ukrainian KIA count dropped in November 2019 when Ukraine was
withdrawing from Zolote and Petrivske, likely because Ukraine insisted on a
sustained ceasefire to execute their force withdrawal. The Kremlin’s proxies
likely de-escalated in November 2019 to meet the minimum conditions needed to
achieve the Ukrainian force withdrawal from Zolote and Petrivske. The Kremlin’s
proxies resumed previous levels of warfighting after Ukrainian forces finalized
their withdrawal from Zolote and Petrivske. “Ukraine Starts Withdrawal of Troops
in Rebel East,” Reuters, October 29, 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-withdrawal/ukraine-starts-withdrawal-of-troops-in-rebel-east-idUSKBN1X81CI.
[17] Illia Ponomarenko, “Russian-Backed
Militants Attempt False Flag Operation in Front-Line Disengagement Zone,” Kyiv
Post, January 27, 2020, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/russian-backed-militants-attempt-false-flag-operation-in-front-line-disengagement-zone.html.
[18] [A Former Official from Russia who
Worked for Kurchenko Took Charge of the ‘Government of the DNR,’”] Strana,
February 6, 2020, https://strana(.)ua/news/248392-vladimir-pashkov-novyj-premer-dnr-chto-o-nem-izvestno.html ; [“Former
Russian Vice-Governor Appointed by the Kremlin as New “Prime Minister” of the
‘DNR,’”] Ukrainskyi Novinini, February 6, 2020, https://ukranews(.)com/news/682340-novym-premerom-dnr-stal-byvshij-chinovnik-rossii-pashkov.
[19] “Kremlin Says It Has No Part in
Russian Citizen Becoming 'Prime Minister' In Ukraine's Separatist Region,”
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, February 6, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/kremlin-says-has-no-part-in-russian-citizen-becoming-prime-minister-in-ukraine-separatist-region/30420378.html.
[20] Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review:
Putin Advances in Ukraine and Its Neighboring States,” The Institute for the
Study of War, October 15, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/10/russia-in-review-putin-advances-in.html ; [“Fighters from 'DNR' and 'LNR'
Created a New Cross Border Concern,”] Lenta, August 8, 2019,
https://lenta((.))ua/boeviki-iz-dnr-i-lnr-sozdali-novyy-transgranichnyy-kontsern-20873/;
[“”’DNR’ and ‘LNR’ Combined the Railways in the Concern ‘Railways of
Donbass,’”] Antikor, August 19, 2019, https://antikor(.)com.ua/articles/320311-dnr_i_lnr_objedinili_heleznye_dorogi_v_kontsern_heleznye_dorogi_donbassa ; [“The Russian Federation is
Preparing Occupied Donbas’ Banking System for Integration – InformNapalm,”]
Gordon, August 21, 2019, https://gordonua(.)com/news/war/rf-gotovit-bankovskuyu-sistemu-okkupirovannogo-donbassa-k-integracii-informnapalm-1210939.html.
[21] [“The Procedure for Obtaining Russian
Citizenship Will be Simplified for Ukrainians and Belarusians,”] Interfax,
January 29, 2020, https://www.interfax(.)ru/russia/693163.
[22] [“The Ministry of Internal Affairs
Named the Number of Residents of the DNR and LNR who Received Russian
Citizenship,”] Izvestia, January 28, 2020,
https://iz(.)ru/969213/2020-01-28/v-mvd-nazvali-chislo-poluchivshikh-rossiiskoe-grazhdanstvo-zhitelei-dnr-i-lnr.
[23]
Mason Clark and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: May 9 - 13, 2019,” The Institute
for the Study of War, May 14, 2019,
http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/05/russia-in-review-may-9-13-2019.html.
[24]
“First Center for Issuing Russian Passports to Luhansk Residents Opened in
Rostov Region,” 112 Ukraine, April 29, 2019, https://112(.)international/politics/first-center-for-issuing-russian-passports-to-luhansk-residents-opened-in-rostov-region-39302.html.
[25] The California-based SentinelLabs
intelligence and malware analysis organization published this assessment on
February 5. Vitali Kremez, “Pro-Russian CyberSpy Gamaredon Intensifies
Ukrainian Security Targeting,” February 5, 2020, https://labs.sentinelone.com/pro-russian-cyberspy-gamaredon-intensifies-ukrainian-security-targeting/.
[26]
[“The Security Service of Ukraine Blocked in Kyiv the Work of a ‘Bot Farm’
Organized by Russian Citizens,”] State Security Service of Ukraine, January 29,
2020, https://ssu.gov(.)ua/ua/news/1/category/2/view/7054#.KnbLlhUI.dpbs.
[27] [“The Security Service of
Ukraine Blocked in Kyiv the Work of a ‘Bot Farm’ Organized by Russian
Citizens,”] State Security Service of Ukraine, January 29, 2020, https://ssu.gov(.)ua/ua/news/1/category/2/view/7054#.KnbLlhUI.dpbs.
[28] Katya Gorchinskaya, “The Normandy
Summit Ended With No Breakthroughs. What Has It Achieved?,” Forbes, December
10, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/katyagorchinskaya/2019/12/10/the-normandy-summit-ended-what-has-it-achieved/#496281053061
; “Putin, Macron Say Ukraine-Russia Prisoner Swap Gives Momentum For Peace
Talks,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, September 8, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-macron-ukraine-russia-prisoner-swap/30153209.html
; “Russia and Ukraine Exchange Prisoners in Move to Improve Ties,” Al Jazeera,
September 7, 2019, https://www.aljazeera(.)com/news/2019/09/russia-ukraine-prisoner-exchange-190907091503618.html
; Nataliya Bugayova and George Barros, “The Perils of Talks on Russia's War in
Ukraine,” The Institute for the Study of War, December 7, 2019,
https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html ; Sarah White “France's Macron, Germany's Merkel Welcome Prisoner
Swap in Ukraine,” Reuters, December 29, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-france-germany/frances-macron-germanys-merkel-welcome-prisoner-swap-in-ukraine-idUSKBN1YX0F7
; George Barros and Nataliya Bugayova, “Europe Cedes Opportunity in
Russia-Ukraine Energy Deal,” The Institute for the Study of War, January 30,
2020, https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2020/01/europe-cedes-opportunity-in-russia.html.
[29] [“Summit
of Paris in ‘Normandy’ format,”] French President Press Office, December 9,
2019, https://www.elysee(.)fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/12/09/sommet-de-paris-en-format-normandie.
[30] [“’Standstill
Now Overcome,’”] German Federal Chancellor Press Office, December 10, 2019, https://www.bundeskanzlerin(.)de/bkin-en/news/normandie-gipfel-in-paris-1705166.
[31] [“Telephone
Conversation with French President Emmanuel Macron,”] Kremlin, January 3, 2020,
http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/62539.
[32] [“Telephone
Conversation with Federal Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel,”] Kremlin,
December 16, 2019, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/62342.
[33] Maria Tsvetkova and Michael Nienaber, “Putin,
Merkel Say Ukraine's Donbass Should Get Special Status – Kremlin,” Reuters,
November 11, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-germany-ukraine/putin-merkel-agree-ukraine-should-give-special-status-to-donbass-kremlin-idUSKBN1XL252.
[34] [“In
the Kremlin Kozak is Named Curator for Ukraine,”] RIA Novosti, February 11,
2020, https://ria(.)ru/20200211/1564538952.html.
[35] [“Yermak Believes that in Russia
Kozak is More Inclined to Dialogue with Ukraine Surkov,”] Novosti Donbassa,
February 11, 2020, http://novosti.dn(.)ua/news/299046-ermak-schytaet-chto-v-rossyy-kozak-bolshe-nastroen-na-dyalog-s-ukraynoy-chem-surkov.
[36] Nataliya
Bugayova with Mason Clark and Andre Briere, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin
Reverses Setbacks in Moldova,” The Institute for the Study of War, December 6,
2019, https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/12/russia-in-review-kremlin-reverses.html
; Darina Regio and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: Opportunity in
Moldova,” The Institute for the Study of War, June 24, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/06/russia-in-review-opportunity-in-moldova.html.
[37] Oleksiy
Sorokin, “Who is Dmitry Kozak, Putin’s New Point Man for Ukraine?,” Kyiv Post,
January 30, 2020, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/who-is-dmitry-kozak-putins-new-point-man-for-ukraine.html
[38] [“Vladislav
Surkov Relieved of His Post as Presidential Aide,”] Kremlin, February 18, 2020,
http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/62818. Leaked Kremlin emails from 2016 demonstrated Surkov
was the Kremlin’s campaign manager for Russia’s political subversion campaign
in Ukraine.
[39] [“On
the Fifth Anniversary of the Debaltsevo Tragedy, Militants and Invaders Staged
a Cynical Provocation,”] Volodymyr Zelensky Facebook Page, February 18, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/zelenskiy95/posts/2464201587163536.
[40] [“February
19 - The Launch of the National Platform for Reconciliation and Unity,”] Sergei Sivokho Facebook Page, February 17,
2020, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=external&v=190295905372373.
[41]
Zelensky spoke favorably about his interaction with Putin at the Normandy
Format talk in Paris on December 9, saying, “I am sure [Putin] understood me,
very clearly understood. It seems that when you have eye-to-eye contact, you
suddenly understand what kind of person is in front of you. Despite all the
given intelligence, it seems to me [Putin] understood me. [Putin] understands
the war needs to end.” [“Zelensky Believes Putin Understands that the War Must
End,”] Interfax Ukraine, February 11, 2020, https://interfax.com(.)ua/news/political/640531.html.
[42] Ukrainian
Defense Minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk confirmed on February 10 that Ukraine is
preparing three new disengagement points. The three sites are a railway bridge
in the Stanytsia Luhanska area (16 km northeast of Luhansk), Novoselivka Druha
(36 km northeast of Mariupol), and entry-exit checkpoint "Hnutove" (20
km northeast of Mariupol). Zagorodnyuk said disengagement from these three
sites would not fundamentally change the security situation in Donbas because
their value is humanitarian and economic, rather than tactical or strategic.
Zagorodnyuk said Ukraine will not withdraw from areas if doing so would harm
Ukraine. Zagorodnyuk also claimed Zelensky asserted at the Normandy Format on
December 9 that Ukraine will not disengage along the whole front line.
Zagorodnyuk said the Ukrainian Defense Ministry “seriously examined” Putin’s
proposal to disengage across the entire 420-km front line and determined it
“contradicts the Minsk agreements.” Inna Kuznetsova, [“The Minister of
Defense on Troop Disengagement, Exposed Schemes, NATO Standards and the Paper
Army,”] Radio Svoboda, February 10, 2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30425356.html.
[43] Artur
Korniienko, “In Munich, Zelensky Calls for Repair of European Security,
Starting with Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, February 15, 2020, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/at-munich-conference-zelensky-calls-to-repair-european-security-starting-with-ukraine.html.
[44] Inna Kuznetsova, [“The Minister of
Defense on Troop Disengagement, Exposed Schemes, NATO Standards and the Paper
Army,”] Radio Svoboda, February 10, 2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30425356.html.
[45] Nataliya
Bugayova and George Barros, “The Perils of Talks on Russia's War in Ukraine,”
The Institute for the Study of War, December 7, 2019,
https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html.
[46] [“Answers
to Media Questions by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Sergey Lavrov Following the 56th Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich,
February 17, 2020,”] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 17, 2020, https://www.mid(.)ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4046843.
[47] Inna Kuznetsova, [“The Minister of
Defense on Troop Disengagement, Exposed Schemes, NATO Standards and the Paper
Army,”] Radio Svoboda, February 10, 2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30425356.html
; Nataliya Bugayova and George Barros, “The
Perils of Talks on Russia's War in Ukraine,” The Institute for the Study of
War, December 7, 2019, https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/12/the-perils-of-talks-on-russias-war-in.html.
