By: Michael Land
Key Takeaway: The pro-regime coalition is poised to make further gains in Greater Idlib province, adding on to already substantial territorial advances. Russia will govern the speed at which these advances happen based on its political calculus, both in Syria and elsewhere. The conflict has the potential to escalate dramatically, posing a risk to the U.S. and its allies.
The situation in Syria’s
northwest is dynamic and has the potential to escalate dramatically. This
escalation threatens the interests of the U.S. and its allies as Russia and
Turkey face off in a region dominated by al Qaeda-affiliated groups.[1] A
Russian-backed military campaign that began as a limited seizure of terrain for
the Assad regime has since evolved into a major undertaking within the Syrian
conflict. Russia has set the conditions for the retaking a large swath of
terrain along a key highway running through the area, and will likely continue
the ground offensive until it achieves that objective. Turkey is moving
reinforcements into Idlib in reaction to Russia’s push.[2]
Russia may decide to support the pro-regime seizure of significantly more
territory in the coming months. Russia will determine the pace of the advance,
independent of Assad, based on the balance it has established between its
potential diplomatic benefits with its potential military risks.[3]
Vladimir
Putin’s Russia has long engaged in a series of parallel strategic endeavors
aimed at expanding its presence in and projecting its power into the Middle
East and surrounding regions.[4]
Russia launched its intervention in Syria in 2015 to preserve a
Russian-amenable regime that allows Russia to use Syria for military basing
that supports these goals.[5]
Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime have undertaken a series of operations to
seize terrain and rebuild the Syrian state under Syrian President Bashar
Al-Assad. Russia has launched a complementary diplomatic campaign to solidify
its political legitimacy in Syria among Syrians, Russians, and the
international community, strengthen the Assad regime at home and abroad, and
set favorable conditions for a long-term Russian presence in Syria’s political
and information spheres. [6]
A key component of this diplomatic campaign is the Astana Process, a series of
meetings organized by Russia, Iran, and Turkey to discuss the Syrian conflict
that operates independently of the UN peace process.[7]
The Astana Process allows Russia to portray itself as a global power with the
ability to negotiate settlements to local conflicts while marginalizing Western
powers.[8]
Idlib
Province, a rebel-held area of northwest Syria, represents the largest remaining
obstacle in the pro-Assad coalition’s campaign to restore the Assad regime’s
territorial control of Syria. Russia, Assad, and their allies are now in the
tenth month of a grueling ground offensive to retake this terrain from a
variety of anti-Assad forces.[9]
Russia has used the phases of this military operation to strengthen its
diplomatic position, particularly with regard to Turkey. Russia
has alternated between military and diplomatic phases in the campaign, slowing
its progress, but facilitating Russian and pro-regime gains both territorially
and diplomatically. The changes between these phases often coincide with major
Astana meetings. The offensive has accelerated significantly since mid-December as
Russia stepped up its support for the operation in the form of fighters,
equipment, and air support.[10] Independent of Assad,
Russia has decided the pace of the pro-regime offensive to suit its political
and diplomatic goals.
The
anti-Assad
forces that control much of Idlib Province and portions of neighboring Latakia
and Aleppo provinces (a.k.a. “Greater Idlib”) constitute the last remaining area
of Syria outside the control of the Assad regime, the Kurdish-led Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), or Turkish occupation. The rebel forces in Greater
Idlib threaten the security of Russia’s main base in Syria with
weaponized drones and indirect fire.[11] These forces also control
a stretch of the key M5 Highway, which connects Syria’s two largest cities of
Damascus and Aleppo. Al Qaeda-affiliated Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) dominates control over
much of Greater Idlib, although the Turkish-backed National Liberation Front
(NLF) and an array of smaller factions retain a presence in much of the region.[12]
Pro-regime forces began their offensive in May 2019 and have since seized several
key cities, including Khan Sheikhoun on August 21, Ma’arat al Nu’man on January
28, and Saraqib on February 7.[13]
Russia
and Assad have undertaken a massive campaign to displace the local population
and worsen the already dire humanitarian situation in the region.[14]
This campaign not only puts pressure on local factions who must divert
resources to maintain security, but also Turkey, which has closed its border to
additional refugees from Syria.[15]
Greater Idlib is home to approximately 3-4 million civilians and internally
displaced persons (IDPs).[16]
The latest phase of the pro-Assad offensive has displaced approximately 700,000
people since November.[17] Both Syrian and
Russian forces regularly strike civilian infrastructure, including urban
centers and hospitals.[18]
ISW
assesses that Russia and the regime’s displacement of civilians toward the Turkey-Syria
border is a component of a larger Russian campaign to contain Turkish actions
in Syria. Despite an often-pragmatic relationship between Russia and Turkey in
Syria, the two countries ultimately have extremely different desired end states
and priorities in the country.[19]
Russia views Turkey primarily as a NATO actor in Syria, along with the United
States. Russia is taking a two-pronged approach to undermine the possibility of
a synchronized U.S.-Turkey zone that could stretch from Deir ez Zour province in
the east to Latakia in the west.[20]
One prong of this effort is to constrain Turkey’s actions in Idlib, while the
other prong involves Russia working with Turkey to counter U.S. actions in eastern
Syria.[21]
Russia has been frustrated by Turkey’s
inability or unwillingness to control rebel factions in Greater Idlib per its
agreements with Russia.[22] Russia and Assad’s
efforts to exacerbate the humanitarian and displacement situation on Turkey’s
border is a means of warning Turkey of the consequences of their inaction
without needing to strike Turkish forces directly.
Conclusion
and Forecast
Russia has set conditions for a full retaking of the M5
Highway in the coming weeks. Russia may attempt to gain significantly more
terrain in Greater Idlib, including Idlib City, once the highway is secure. However,
the terrain of Greater Idlib beyond the M5 is tactically advantageous for the
defending anti-Assad forces. These groups have prepared extensive
fortifications and defenses, including tunnels, in several regions of Greater
Idlib, especially in the western mountainous regions.[23] As a result, even after
the capture of the M5, Russia may revert to a diplomatic phase of the fight. If
the Russian-led campaign gains sufficient initiative to move beyond the M5, the
ensuing battle will likely require forces to engage in urban warfare in Idlib
City, where the local powerbroker, Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, has likely prepared
for a siege. Russia would have to undertake a campaign to depopulate the city
through airstrikes and artillery, risking an increased response from Turkey and
the international community including the United States. Russia will likely be
able to achieve certain objectives beyond the M5 Highway, but the progress will
be slow and driven by Russia’s diplomatic concerns as well as its military
might. The Syrian Civil War remains far from over.
[1]
Jennifer Cafarella and Emily Estelle, “Al Qaeda Attempts to Unify Forces in
Syria,” Institute for the Study of War,
September 5, 2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-attempts-unify-forces-syria;
Louisa Loveluck, “Syrian Offensive against Rebel Enclave More Likely after
al-Qaeda-Linked Fighters Take Control,” Washington
Post, January 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrian-offensive-against-enclave-more-likely-after-al-qaeda-linked-fighters-take-control/2019/01/19/0ced22f0-142b-11e9-ab79-30cd4f7926f2_story.html.
[2]
Orhan Coskun, “Turkey Ready to Act after Reinforcing Syria’s Idlib: Official,” Reuters, February 9, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey/turkey-ready-to-act-after-reinforcing-syrias-idlib-official-idUSKBN2030F2;
Sarah El Deeb and Suzan Fraser, “Syrian Advance Sends Hundreds of Thousands Fleeing
in Idlib,” AP News, February 7, 2020;
https://apnews.com/89a39cb12ebce65cb440b1b68cebee3a;
“Turkish reinforcements head to Syria,” BBC
News, February 3, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-51359622/turkish-reinforcements-head-to-syria-s-idlib.
[3]
Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin Controls the Pace of Operations in
Syria's Idlib,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/09/russia-in-review-kremlin-controls-pace.html.
[4] Frederick
W. Kagan, Nataliya Bugayova, and Jennifer Cafarella, “Confronting the Russian
Challenge: A New Approach for the U.S.” Institute
for the Study of War / Critical Threats Project, June 19, 2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20CTP%20Report%20-%20Confronting%20the%20Russian%20Challenge%20-%20June%202019.pdf; Nataliya
Bugayova, “How We Got Here with Russia: The Kremlin’s Worldview,” Institute for the Study of War / Critical
Threats Project, March 13, 2019, https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/The-Kremlin%E2%80%99s-Foreign-Policy-Worldview_v5-1.pdf.
[5] “Russian
Deployment in Syria: Putin’s Middle East Game Changer,” Institute for the Study of War, September 17, 2015, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-deployment-syria-putin%E2%80%99s-middle-east-game-changer;
Frederick W. Kagan, Nataliya Bugayova, and Jennifer Cafarella, “Confronting the
Russian Challenge: A New Approach for the U.S.” Institute for the Study of War / Critical Threats Project, June 19,
2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20CTP%20Report%20-%20Confronting%20the%20Russian%20Challenge%20-%20June%202019.pdf; Nataliya
Bugayova, “How We Got Here with Russia: The Kremlin’s Worldview,” Institute for the Study of War / Critical
Threats Project, March 13, 2019, https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/The-Kremlin%E2%80%99s-Foreign-Policy-Worldview_v5-1.pdf.
[6] Jennifer
Cafarella with Jason Zhou, “Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, November
2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20-%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20Dead-End%20Diplomacy%20in%20Syria%20-%20November%202019.pdf.
[7] Jennifer
Cafarella with Jason Zhou, “Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, November
2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20-%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20Dead-End%20Diplomacy%20in%20Syria%20-%20November%202019.pdf.
[8] Jennifer
Cafarella with Jason Zhou, “Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, November
2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20-%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20Dead-End%20Diplomacy%20in%20Syria%20-%20November%202019.pdf.
[9] Michael Land, Matti Suomenaro, Mason Clark, and Elizabeth Teoman,
“Pro-Assad Regime Forces Locked in Battle of Attrition in Idlib Province,”
Institute for the Study of War, June 28, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/06/pro-assad-regime-forces-locked-in.html; Vivian
Yee and Hwaida Saad, “Syrian Government Starts Campaign to Retake Last
Opposition Stronghold of Idlib,” New York
Times, May 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/world/middleeast/syria-retaking-idlib.html; Tom Perry
and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Assad Hits a Wall in Syrian War as Front Lines
Harden,” Reuters, July 10, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-northwest-analysis/assad-hits-a-wall-in-syrian-war-as-front-lines-harden-idUSKCN1U51TC.
[10]
Anna News, YouTube, December 27,
2019, https://www.youtube(.)com/watch?v=Ng_Eqyiqz-M;
[“Regime Forces Take Control of al Ghadfa Village, Southeast of Idlib,”] SMART News Agency, January 26, 2020, https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/419997/قوات-النظام-تسيطر-على-قرية-الغدفة-جنوب-شرق-إدلب;
Charles Lister, Twitter,
December 20, 2019, https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1208064430610821120;
[“Local Sources: The Regime Mobilizes Its Militia near Sinjar in
the Eastern Idlib Countryside,”] Qasioun
News, December 16, 2019, https://www.qasioun-news(.)com/ar/news/show/206849/مصادر_محلية_النظام_يحشد_ميليشياته_قرب_سنجار_في_ريف_إدلب_الشرقي;
[“12
Civilians Were Killed in the Bombing of Idlib.. the Displacement Movement is
Escalating,” Enab Baladi, December
17, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/349767;
[“After the Regime Mobilized its Militias, the Hmeimim Center Called on the People
of Sinjar to Vacate the Town,”] Qasioun
News, December 17, 2019, https://www.qasioun-news(.)com/ar/news/show/206945/بعد_حشد_النظام_لميليشياته_مركز_حميميم_يطالب_أهالي_سنجار_بإخلاء_البلدة;
[“Two Thousand Families Fled Idlib and Its Countryside within One Day,”] Enab Baladi, December 17, 2019, https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/349877;
[“Collected Bulletin on Monday for All Field and Military Events in Syria
16-12-2019,”] Shaam News
Network, December 17, 2019, www.shaam.org/news/bulletins/نشرة-حصاد-يوم-الإثنين-لجميع-الأحداث-الميدانية-والعسكرية-في-سوريا-16-12-2019.html;
[“Midday Bulletin on Monday for All Field and Military Events in Syria 17-12-2019,”]
Shaam News Network, December 17,
2019, www.shaam.org/news/bulletins/نشرة-منتصف-اليوم-لجميع-الأحداث-الميدانية-في-سوريا-17-12-2019.html;
[“The Regime Commits Three Massacres in Idlib and Musters Its Forces in Its
Vicinity,”] SMART News Agency,
December 17, 2019, https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/reports/414278/النظام-يرتكب-ثلاث-مجازر-في-إدلب-ويحشد-قواته-في-محيطها;
[“Military Reinforcements Arrive to the Regime Forces in Idlib Governorate,”] SMART News Agency, December 17, 2019, https://smartnews-agency.com/ar/wires/414187/وصول-تعزيزات-عسكرية-لقوات-النظام-في-محافظة-إدلب;
[“Civilian Casualties by Russian Shelling of Idlib, and the Regime Raining
‘Kabana’ with Barrels,”] Baladi News,
December 16, 2019, https://www.baladi-news.com/ar/articles/54493/ضحايا-مدنيون-بقصف-روسي-على-إدلب-والنظام-يمطر-كبينة-بالبراميل;
Caleb Weiss, “Russian Special Forces Train Palestinian Militia in
Syria,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March
6, 2019, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/03/russian-special-forces-train-palestinian-militia-in-syria.php;
Joseph Daher, “Three Years Later: The Evolution of Russia’ Military
Intervention in Syria,” Atlantic Council,
September 27, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/three-years-later-the-evolution-of-russia-s-military-intervention-in-syria/.
[11] “Two
Drones Downed near Syria’s Hmeimim Air Base: State TV,” Reuters, February 3, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-drone/two-drones-downed-near-syrias-hmeimim-air-base-state-tv-idUSKBN1ZX2A2;
“Russia Says It Has Downed Almost 60 Drones in Syria This Year,” AFP, September 28, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190928-russia-says-it-has-downed-almost-60-drones-in-syria-this-year.
[12]
“Syria: Who’s in Control of Idlib?” BBC News,
June 22, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45401474;
Philip James Walker, Esq. “Consequences of the HTS Take-Over in Northwest
Syria,” Atlantic Council, January 30,
2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/consequences-of-the-hts-take-over-in-northwestern/.
[13]
“Explainer: Why the War in Syria’s Idlib Escalated Again,” Reuters, May 9, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-northwest-explainer/explainer-why-the-war-in-syrias-idlib-escalated-again-idUSKCN1SF0P7;
“Khan Sheikhoun: Syria Rebels Pull Out of Key Town after Five Years,” BBC News, August 20, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49404741;
Liz Sly, “Syrian Military Recaptures Strategic Town Held by Rebels as Civilians
Flee,” Washington Post, August 22,
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syrian-military-recaptures-strategic-town-held-by-rebels-as-civilians-flee/2019/08/22/7c0cd614-c4e1-11e9-8bf7-cde2d9e09055_story.html;
Bethan McKernan, “Assad Regime Captures Town in Syria’s Last Rebel-Held
Territory,” Guardian, January 28,
2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/28/syrian-regime-captures-maarat-al-numan-in-idlib;
Sarah Dadouch and Asser Khattab, “Syrian Army Takes Key Town in Last Major
Rebel Bastion of Idlib, “Syrian Army Takes Key Town in Last Major Rebel Bastion
of Idlib,” Washington Post, January
29, 2020; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syrian-army-takes-key-town-in-last-major-rebel-bastion-of-idlib/2020/01/29/dcb58438-41ec-11ea-99c7-1dfd4241a2fe_story.html;
“Factions Withdraw from Saraqib Town Not to Be Besieged and the Regime Forces
Break into the City Sweeping Its Neighborhoods,” Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, February 5, 2020, http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=154502;
“Saraqib falls out of opposition control… What will happen to Turkey’s military
observation post?” Enab Baladi,
February 7, 2020, https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2020/02/saraqib-falls-out-of-opposition-control-what-will-happen-to-turkeys-military-observation-post/.
[14]
Deborah Amos, “Millions of Civilians Affected as Syrian Military Advances on
Idlib Province,” NPR, January 28,
2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/28/800559423/millions-of-civilians-affected-as-syrian-military-advances-on-idlib-province;
Amid Humanitarian Crisis, Syrian Regime Intensifies Idlib Offensive,” United States Institute of Peace,
February 4, 2020, https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/02/amid-humanitarian-crisis-syrian-regime-intensifies-idlib-offensive.
[15] Pavel
Felgenhauer, “Russia and Turkey Reach Shaky Agreement on Syrian Idlib
Province,” Jamestown Foundation,
September 5, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/russia-and-turkey-reach-shaky-agreement-on-syrian-idlib-province/;
“Turkey/Syria: Border Guards Shoot, Block Fleeing Syrians,” Human Rights Watch, February 3, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/03/turkey/syria-border-guards-shoot-block-fleeing-syrians#;
“Turkey: Syrians Pushed Back at the Border,” Human Rights Watch, November 23, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/23/turkey-syrians-pushed-back-border;
Ceylan Yeginsu and Karam Shoumali “Turkey Moves to Close All Gates at Border
with Syria,” New York Times, March
30, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/30/world/europe/turkey-moves-to-close-all-gates-at-border-with-syria.html.
[16]
Bethan McKernan, Sahar Atrache, “500,000 flee Syrian Regime’s Deadly Offensive
in Idlib,” Guardian, February 5,
2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/04/syria-half-a-million-displaced-in-idlib-says-un-body;
“3 Million Civilians Are Under Threat in Idlib. Here’s What They’re Telling
Us.” Refugees International, Devember
27, 2019, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/12/27/3-million-civilians-are-under-threat-in-idlib-heres-what-theyre-telling-us.
[17]
“International Crisis Looms as 700,000 Flee Syria’s Idlib: U.S. Envoy,” Reuters, January 30, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-us/us-envoy-700000-displaced-in-northwest-syria-idUSKBN1ZT1SU.
[18]
Evan Hill, Christiaan Triebert, Malachy Browne, Dmitriy Khavin, Drew Jordan,
and Whitney Hurst, “Russia Bombed Four Syrian Hospitals. We Have Proof.” New York Times, October 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000005697485/russia-bombed-syrian-hospitals.html;
Christiaan Triebert, Evan Hill, Malachy Browne, Dmitriy Khavin, and Aaron Byrd,
“We Proved Russian Pilots Bombed a Hospital. Then They Did It Again.” New York Times, November 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000006815692/syria-hospitals-russia.html;
“Russian Air Strikes on Syria Market Kill 23: Monitor,” AFP, July 22, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190722-russian-air-strikes-syria-market-kill-23-monitor.
[19] Jennifer
Cafarella with Jason Zhou, “Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, November
2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20-%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20Dead-End%20Diplomacy%20in%20Syria%20-%20November%202019.pdf;
Elizabeth Teoman, “Navigating the U.S.-Turkey Relationship Beyond the Quagmire,”
Institute for the Study of War, July
25, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/07/navigating-us-turkey-relationship.html; Jennifer
Cafarella and Elizabeth Teoman with Matti Suomenaro, “Turkey Attempts to Block
Russian-Led Push in Western Syria,” Institute
for the Study of War, January 11, 2018, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-attempts-block-russian-led-push-western-syria.
[20] Jennifer
Cafarella with Jason Zhou, “Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, November
2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20-%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20Dead-End%20Diplomacy%20in%20Syria%20-%20November%202019.pdf; Elizabeth
Teoman with the ISW Syria Team, “Turkey and Russia Prepared to Launch Joint
Military Patrols in Syria’s Idlib,” Institute
for the Study of War, March 9, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/03/turkey-and-russia-prepared-to-launch.html;
“Lavrov Slams Intitiative to Set up NATO-Controlled Safe Zone in Syria,” TASS, October 25, 2019, https://tass(.)com/politics/1085353.
[21]
Elizabeth Teoman and Jennifer Cafarella with Bradley Hanlon, “Turkey’s Erdogan
Pivots to Target U.S.-Backed Force in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, January 16, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/01/turkeys-erdogan-pivots-to-target-us.html;
Jessica Donati, “U.S. Troops in Standoffs with Russian Military Contractors in
Syria,” Wall Street Journal, February
5, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-troops-in-standoffs-with-russian-military-contractors-in-syria-11580947976;
“Turkey Says Talking with Russia over Kurdish YPG in Northeast Syria,” Reuters,
November 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey-russia/turkey-says-talking-with-russia-over-kurdish-ypg-in-northeast-syria-idUSKBN1XV0WL;
Suzan Fraser and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia, Turkey Seal Power in Northeast
Syria with New Accord,” AP News,
October 22, 2019, https://apnews.com/185d5d93b4d747dfbd63e60f296d4b1e;
“Lavrov Slams Intitiative to Set up NATO-Controlled Safe Zone in Syria,” TASS, October 25, 2019, https://tass(.)com/politics/1085353.
[22] Jennifer
Cafarella with Jason Zhou, “Russia’s Dead-End Diplomacy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, November
2019, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20-%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20Dead-End%20Diplomacy%20in%20Syria%20-%20November%202019.pdf; “Moscow
Encourages Ankara to Fulfill Memorandum on Idlib – Lavrov,” TASS, March 3, 2019, https://tass(.)com/politics/1047227; Gleb
Stolyarov, “Russia, Turkey Agree Steps to Tackle Militants in Syria’s Idlib:
Putin,” Reuters, August 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-russia-turkey/russia-turkey-agree-steps-to-tackle-militants-in-syrias-idlib-putin-idUSKCN1VH0M8;
Zeynep Bilginsoy, “Turkey, Russia Face Conflicts over Syria’s push into Idlib,”
AP News, June 1, 2019, https://apnews.com/f5a871d375d54996ad454c6b60844171.
[23]
Mariya Petkova and Farah Najjar, “Everything You Need to Know about the Looming
Battle for Idlib,” Al Jazeera,
September 8, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/looming-battle-idlib-180908142026400.html;
OGN, YouTube, January 28, 2020, https://www.youtube(.)com/watch?v=50dfYMB9PQ4;
“Syrian Air Force Attempts to Destroy Jihadist Tunnel Network in Latakia,” Al Masdar, October 9, 2019, https://www.almasdarnews(.)com/article/syrian-air-force-attempts-to-destroy-jihadist-tunnel-network-in-latakia/;
“Syrian Army Uncovers Massive Network of Jihadist Tunnels in Idlib: Video” Al Masdar, January 2, 2020, https://www.almasdarnews(.)com/article/syrian-army-uncovers-massive-network-of-jihadist-tunnels-in-idlib-video/.
