By Jennifer Cafarella and Kimberly Kagan with Aaron Hesse, Samantha Leathley, and Jason Zhou
An intra-Shi’a civil war is beginning in Iraq. Iraqi Prime
Minister Haider al Abadi and Iranian proxy leader Hadi al Ameri are locked in a
power struggle to dominate the formation of the next Iraqi government. The U.S.
is backing Abadi and temporarily disrupted Iran’s play in late August. ISW warned on August 28th that Iran could escalate militarily
in response. Abadi and Ameri separately
declared coalitions of Council of Representatives (CoR) members
sufficient to gain the status of the “largest bloc” on September 2nd.
The largest CoR block has the constitutional right to choose the next Iraqi
Prime Minister. The resulting
stalemate has protracted government formation negotiations past legal
deadlines. Each side is escalating with force in order to break
this political stalemate.
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Iran’s proxies conducted a warning shot against the U.S. embassy in
Baghdad in an attempt to compel Abadi to back down. Abadi visited the
headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) on September 3rd
and declared
his authority over all of Iraq’s armed forces. [1] His goal was likely to disrupt
Ameri’s ability to use Iranian proxies within the PMF as coercive leverage
against either Abadi or members of Abadi’s coalition. In response, ten Iranian
proxy militias within the PMF declared
they will respond to Abadi’s “irresponsible takeover” of Iraqi
institutions and called on the Dawa party to limit Abadi’s behavior on
September 4th. [2] The groups stated they will use “all possible means”
to force coalition troops out of Iraq. Multiple mortars
landed near the U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad at night on
September 6th. ISW assesses that an Iranian proxy, likely Asa’ib Ahl
Al Haq (AAH), conducted the attack.
Shi’a actors aligned with Abadi and with Ameri are also escalating
within a pre-existing protest movement in Basra. Abadi has lost control in
Basra, where Shi’a protesters have defied
a curfew and unidentified Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units have used
live fire ammunition against protesters on multiple occasions since August 31st.
An appeal
by Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani on September 4th did not prevent
future use
of live ammunition. Attacks in Basra targeted multiple
government buildings in addition to Iranian
proxy militia headquarters and the headquarters of militias and political
parties aligned with Abadi on September 6th. It is possible but
unlikely that protesters alone conducted these attacks. Militias aligned with
nationalist Shi’a Cleric Muqtada al Sadr, a member of Abadi’s coalition, were
likely involved in the attacks against Iranian proxy militia headquarters.
Iranian proxies were likely similarly responsible for attacks against the Dawa
party and possibly government buildings. At minimum, the deteriorating conditions in Basra raise
the likelihood of intra-Shi’a violence at a time when Shi’a powerbrokers have
resorted to armed action to affect a protracted government formation
struggle in Baghdad.
Mutual kinetic escalation between actors aligned with Abadi and those
with Ameri will escalate into a full-blown civil war unless one side
capitulates. ISW is monitoring the situation closely and will provide updates
as appropriate.
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[1] "Abadi leads the Popular Crowd," All Iraq News. September 3, 2018. Available: http://www.alliraqnews(.)com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=77269
[2] "10 Iran-backed Shia militia groups threaten Abadi, Foreign troops in Iraq," September 5, 2018. Available: http://www.kurdistan24(.)net/en/news/382a3b08-dc0c-4b3a-8703-90d9f37b8b26
