By: Omer Kassim
Key Takeaway: Iraqi Vice President Ayad Allawi is presenting himself as a
viable Shi’a reformist alternative to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in the
upcoming Iraqi legislative elections slated for May 12, 2018. Allawi is setting
internal conditions to recreate his strong 2011 bid to secure the premiership.
Allawi– a secular Shi’a politician– seeks to reunite the Sunni political
leadership under a secular platform akin to the Iraqiyya coalition that won 92
seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) under his leadership in 2010.
Allawi will likely leverage his opposition to the expansion of Iranian
influence in Iraq, reformist stance and support for the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) to draw Shi’a Sadrist and some Kurdish support in the
post-election premier selection phase. Allawi can then maximize on his strong
ties with Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, to augment
his premiership bid.
Allawi is using his secular and nationalist credentials as well as
his support for Sunni grievances as core pillars of his strategy to draw the
Sunni vote. Allawi has arguably been the most prominent secular figure in the
Iraqi political process since 2003. Allawi is highlighting his consistent
secular credentials and his rejection of the sect-based division of power as major
Sunni and Shi’a Islamist parties gravitate toward a secular campaign strategy.
This shift coincides with an apparent public discontent with Islamist rule
post-2003. The Vice President has also amplified his nationalist rhetoric,
rejecting Iranian influence in Iraq and calling for the integration of the
Iranian-backed PMF into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) following the defeat of
ISIS. Allawi has advocated for the ability for internally displaced Sunnis to
return to their homes as a condition for holding the elections. However, this
is unlikely to be implemented fully due to security concerns and lack of
infrastructure. Allawi has stated the Sunni communities in provinces formerly
held by ISIS were the first to sacrifice for the liberation of their areas,
identifying the failure in the political process as the reason for their
plight.
Allawi has created the Iraqi
National Alliance Coalition as a platform to unite Sunni political
class under his leadership. The new coalition formed on January 11
includes CoR Speaker Salim al-Jabouri, former Deputy Prime Minister Saleh
al-Mutlaq and Baathist-friendly elements outside the political process. Jabouri is building up his secular
credentials after quietly distancing himself from the Iraqi Islamic Party–closely
tied to the Muslim Brotherhood–to form the secular Civil Gathering for Reform.
An alliance with Jabouri helps Allawi highlight popular support for secular
rule, while capitalizing on Jabouri’s prominent stature to draw Sunni votes
particularly in home province of Diyala as well as Baghdad. Meanwhile, the
inclusion of Mutlaq–a secular Sunni and founding member of Allawi’s Iraqiyya
coalition of 2011– signals Allawi’s intent to recreate a similar coalition
despite the existence of power struggles between its prominent figures that
eventually contributed to its collapse. The inclusion of Mutlaq also allows
Allawi to draw the Sunni vote from Anbar–Mutlaq’s home province.
Allawi’s alliance is set to compete with Vice President Osama
al-Nujaifi’s Iraqi Decision Coalition for Sunni votes. Allawi has been
a political and ideological rival of Nujaifi since the collapse of their
Iraqiyya coalition. Power sharing disputes, Allawi’s dwindling chances of
securing the premiership and differences on Iraqiyya’s future strategy antagonized
tensions between the two leaders and contributed to the collapse of the
coalition after the 2010 elections. The rivalry also reflects regional
political divisions, with Allawi backing the Saudi Arabia-Egypt axis and
Nujaifi backing the Turkey-Qatar axis. Allawi also rejected Nujaifi’s push for increased
autonomy of Sunni areas post-ISIS, stressing his support for Iraqi
territorial integrity. Jabouri is also a major political rival of Nujaifi, as
both lead competing wings within the main Sunni bloc in the CoR the Sunni
Alliance of Forces. Jabouri and Nujaifi disagreed on the post-ISIS
Sunni vision for Iraq. Jabouri called for
facilitating talks with Shi’a parties to reach national consensus and Nujaifi
called for confidence building measures on limiting Iranian influence,
demographic changes in Sunni areas and freeing Sunni prisoners.
Allawi may intensify efforts to sway support from nationalist Shi’a
during post-election premiership talks. Allawi’s inability to draw cross-sectarian support
particularly from Shi’a parties contributed to the failure of his 2011 bid for the
premiership. He will likely look to rectify this issue by leveraging his
ideological proximity to Sadrists in order to sway their support for his
premiership bid. Allawi supported the 2016 Sadrist protest movement to
institute anti-corruption
reforms. Allawi also backed the unsuccessful Sadrist protest campaign to overhaul the electoral
process through the selection of a non-politicized electoral commission and
the passage of an electoral law that does not favor pre-existing dominant
parties. Allawi also supported Sadrist calls for a technocratic, non-sectarian
based form of government. Additionally, Allawi has joined Sadr’s identification
of Iranian-backed proxies within the PMF as “shameless militias.” Allawi’s
desire to maintain political independence and maneuverability likely prevented
him from entering into what was expected to be a
near pre-election alliance with the Sadrists.
The Vice President may seek Kurdish support for his premiership
ambitions. He could do this by leveraging his historical ties with the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and his support for Baghdad-Arbil dialogue to
prevent further military action following the October 16 military takeover of
disputed territories by Iraqi forces. Support for the Kurds during and
after the September 25 2017 Kurdish referendum period came at a political cost,
leading Allawi to pursue a nuanced approach to his relationship with both
sides. Allawi, while deeming the timing of the Kurdish independence referendum
“inappropriate,” blamed Baghdad for failing to address Kurdish power sharing
concerns at an earlier stage. Allawi also blamed Baghdad for not participating
in post-referendum talks that he attempted to sponsor with unidentified
regional Arab countries. Allawi also stated military operations in disputed
territories included the presence of Iranian forces, particularly in Kirkuk. He
has appeared to dismiss Baghdad’s accusations of KDP corruption. Allawi
also supports maintaining
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of the federal Iraqi budget at 17%–an
agreement that he secured in 2004 during his brief tenure as Prime Minister.
Allawi may be an alternative premiership option compatible with U.S
interests in Iraq. Allawi maintains friendly ties to the U.S and rejected Iranian
influence in Iraqi affairs. Allawi also maintains strong ties to the KRG; he
stressed the resolution of the Arbil-Baghdad disagreements must be constitutional
and within the framework of a united Iraq. Allawi also maintains strong ties
with U.S regional partners in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.
