By: Scott
DesMarais
Key
Takeaway: Afghanistan’s
powerbrokers are in the early stages of an intense competition as they prepare
for the planned 2019 presidential election. The multi-month disagreement
between President Ashraf Ghani and warlord and long-time Balkh Province
Governor Mohammad Atta Noor over the latter’s governorship is the first stage
of a much larger battle between the two politicians for the presidency. Atta is exploiting friction caused by how
President Ghani wields his power to build a network of alliances to challenge
President Ghani in 2019. Meanwhile, Ghani is actively using his immense
presidential power to undermine Atta’s attempts to build an opposing coalition.
The
Political Disputes Permitting Atta’s Rise
The
internationally negotiated National Unity Government agreement that set
President Ghani in place has failed to create a genuine power-sharing
arrangement between the president and his opposition.
Ghani’s
administration has not adhered to the terms of the internationally negotiated National
Unity Government (NUG) agreement that established him as President and his
Tajik rival Abdullah Abdullah as Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Ghani has used
the president’s significant constitutional authority and the vague terms of the
NUG agreement to marginalize CEO Abdullah
and to limit other Tajik rivals’ influence in governance.
The Ghani administration has not implemented the agreement’s required reforms aimed at ensuring transparent elections, so Ghani’s
administration is repeatedly able to delay parliamentary
and district council elections. Ghani has been able to postpone, on grounds of
process, calling the required Constitutional Loya Jirga to convert the Chief
Executive Officer’s (CEO) position into a constitutionally mandated premiership.[1] Such a constitutional change
would create a more balanced power-sharing agreement between Ghani and CEO Abdullah,
who is Jamiat’s most senior representative in the government.
Ghani’s corruption reforms could
drive Atta, Jamiat, and entrenched Pashtun powerbrokers to form an anti-Ghani
coalition in order to secure the patronage networks they benefit from. Ghani
is pushing a reform agenda that is intended to combat corruption and empower
government institutions over powerful regional personalities; as a result, Ghani
has attempted to remove
regional warlords and powerbrokers from Afghan politics—including First Vice
President General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta. Ghani’s anti-warlord initiatives
allow Atta to build and strengthen alliances against Ghani among traditional rivals.
Atta’s
coalition building
Atta
is attempting to unite Jamiat under his leadership by courting other Tajik
powerbrokers and by leveraging his governorship to increase Jamiat’s influence
in government. Jamiat’s negotiations with President
Ghani over the Balkh governorship are an effort to reset the Afghan political
system in order to increase Jamiat’s power and influence in the government.
Based on Jamiat’s current demands, Atta would
resign from the Balkh governorship if Ghani appoints Jamiat leaders to key
government positions and if Ghani alters the parliamentary system to increase
the role of political parties, like Jamiat, in parliament. If Atta is able to
use his negotiated resignation to force Ghani to adhere to Jamiat’s demands,
Atta would accomplish what CEO Abdullah could not: getting
Jamiat leaders appointed to key positions in the government. This would be an
important step towards convincing the historically fractious Jamiat party to
support Atta in 2019 elections.
Atta
is trying to build a powerful and diverse coalition with ex-President Hamid
Karzai to challenge Ghani in 2019. Atta has already created the Coalition
for the Salvation of Afghanistan (CSA) with Dostum and Deputy CEO Mohammad
Mohaqiq in June 2017. This alliance has united three minority groups, the
Tajiks, Uzbeks, and a faction of the Hazaras. Atta is also trying to build alliances with Pashtun powerbrokers,
most notably with former President Karzai. President Ghani
prevented Atta from attending a December 2017 meeting of
opposition parties in Kandahar, indicating Ghani feels threatened by Atta’s
attempts to build alliances with Pashtun powerbrokers. Jamiat political figure Ahmad
Wali Massoud met with Shah Wali Karzai, Hamid Karzai's brother
and the head of the Pashtun Popalzai Tribe, in Kandahar on February 7, 2018. It
is possible Massoud is working as an emissary for Atta, given their January
2018 meetings. Additionally, the powerful Kandahar
provincial police chief, General Abdul Raziq has publicly supported Atta, who claimed he met with one of Raziq’s representatives in
Mazar-e Sharif on February 23. Raziq reportedly hosted the meeting, which several former Karzai
administration officials attended. One of the most prominent attendees was
Rahmutallah Nabil, Karzai’s director of the National Directorate of Security
and the leader of the Karzai-linked Mehwar-e Mardom party.
Atta
will struggle to create an enduring and strong partnership with Former
President Karzai. It is unlikely that Karzai will choose to support Ghani, but it is
also unlikely that he will fully support Atta in the presidential election.
Karzai cannot run for President again, but he will likely seek the best
opportunity to increase his own influence within the government. He may choose
to support a Pashtun, likely one who served in his administration, during the
2019 election instead of Atta. The leaders of Karzai-linked opposition groups
may have presidential ambitions of their own, so it may be difficult for Atta
to maintain support from these groups until 2019, especially if Karzai decides
to support one of their campaigns. Additionally, traditional tensions based on
past dealings with Karzai may make it difficult for Atta to convince all of
Jamiat to support an alliance with Karzai.
Ghani’s
efforts to undermine Atta
Ghani
can attack Atta’s fragile network of alliances in multiple ways as he prepares
for Atta’s challenge. Atta will need a united Jamiat, full support from the CSA, and alliances
with powerful Pashtun leaders to challenge Ghani realistically in the 2019
elections. Ghani will work to exploit intra-Jamiat tensions, the traditional
rivalries between the members of the CSA, and long-lasting tensions between
Karzai and most of Afghanistan’s northern power-elite. Ghani may also try to
limit the appeal of Atta and Jamiat’s current proposals to alter the Afghan
system of governance. If Ghani is able to secure deals with some
disenfranchised powerbrokers, both inside and outside of Jamiat, he may be able
to limit Atta’s ability to contend in 2019 elections.
Ghani
is trying to fracture the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan by creating
tensions between its members. Ghani is using historic
tensions between Dostum and Atta and their respective political parties to
weaken the CSA. Ghani reversed a decision to
replace the Jamiat deputy governor of Samangan
Province with a member of Dostum’s Junbesh-i Milli party after reaching
a deal with Jamiat on February 20. This led the spurned Junbesh member to
threaten to seize the deputy governor’s post by force. This incident
demonstrates an example of how Ghani can play one CSA member against the other.
Ghani also may be attempting to split Mohaqiq from the CSA, which would weaken the
coalition. Ghani met with Mohaqiq in early February 2018 reportedly to build a
“Council of Elders,” which may be Ghani’s attempt to create a rival coalition. Another
senior member of the CSA, Mohammad Natiqi, criticized both Ghani and
Jamiat for ignoring other opposition groups during their negotiations.[2] Natiqi said both Ghani and
Jamiat are to blame for excluding other parties that supported CEO Abdullah in
2014 from discussions on implementing the National Unity Government Agreement. Atta
will need the Uzbek and Hazara support he derives from the CSA to have a
legitimate chance at winning a national election. However, Atta’s primary
concern is likely to unite Jamiat and the Tajiks, so Ghani can use the
political disputes this causes to reduce Atta’s support from the CSA.
Atta
is engaged in a power-struggle with Jamiat’s acting-leader Salahuddin Rabbani
that may weaken Atta. Afzal Hadid, a close advisor to Atta and the Balkh Provincial
Council head, claimed a resolution
to the Balkh dispute was close following a private meeting between Atta
and representatives from Ghani’s administration in Mazar-e Sharif on March
04-05.[3] However, a Jamiat
spokesman denied any
negotiations between Atta and Ghani’s administration occurred, and Rabbani
reportedly does not support Atta’s direct
negotiations with Ghani’s administration. An anonymous source from Jamiat claimed Ghani is
negotiating directly with Atta in an attempt to find an alternative solution to
the Balkh dispute because multiple rounds of negotiations with Jamiat
representatives, led by Rabbani, have
failed to resolve the crisis. Like Atta, Rabbani may have been using his role
leading Jamiat’s negotiations over the Balkh dispute to improve his own
position in Jamiat by demonstrating his ability to support the party’s interests.
Rabbani may want a more prominent role in Afghan politics given reports that he
initially supported Atta’s removal
and rumors that he is interested in a unified
Ghani-Jamiat presidential ticket—presumably with himself as the Vice President.
Ghani may have offered an attractive deal to Atta that Ghani believes will
split Jamiat.
However, there are conflicting
reports about whether Atta and Ghani negotiated a settlement or simply set
conditions for Ghani-Jamiat negotiations to resume. Some anonymous sources claimed that Atta and
Ghani had reached a deal. Based on the rumored agreement, Atta plans to resign but
will choose his successor and a new Balkh police chief.[4] Additionally, Ghani will appoint Jamiat
members as Minister of Education and Minister of Information and Culture, and
Ghani will appoint six new Jamiat ambassadors to unnamed countries. In contrast,
other sources claimed Atta’s
negotiations had only paved the way for negations between Jamiat and Ghani to
resume in Kabul.
- If Atta and Ghani negotiated a deal, Atta would likely have expanded on Jamiat’s initial demands that sought Jamiat appointments to senior government positions.[5] While Jamiat and Atta’s demands gradually increased to include much broader electoral and constitutional reforms, Atta may believe he can use this agreement to consolidate his control of Jamiat.[6] Ghani may believe such an agreement will exacerbate a power-struggle in Jamiat. Alternatively, Ghani may be willing to make these concessions in order to reduce the pressure stemming from the growing support for Jamiat’s reform agenda combined with upcoming parliamentary elections. The parliamentary and electoral reforms Jamiat and Atta have demanded would make it difficult to hold parliamentary elections as scheduled so this possible agreement may indicate Ghani is trying to mitigate the potential consequences of delayed elections.
- If Atta set conditions for future negotiations, it would indicate limited progress, but given the broad reforms Jamiat demands, a resolution may not be imminent. This would also demonstrate that Atta is confident that Ghani will be unable to split Jamiat by offering a Jamiat faction a favorable deal to abandon Atta.
Ghani
may try to counteract growing support for Jamiat’s reform agenda. Multiple parties have announced
their support for the reforms Jamiat is demanding. Ghani has held separate
meetings with multiple opposition leaders whose parties either already have or
could ultimately support Jamiat and Atta. Ghani has met with Abdul Rasoul
Sayyaf, the leader of the Council for Protection and Stability in Afghanistan;[7] Hezb-e Islami leader
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar;[8] Deputy CEO Mohammad
Mohaqiq; CEO Abdullah Abdullah; and Hazara Hizb-e Wahdat leader Karim Khalili.
Ghani’s office said the meetings were “to discuss issues of national
interests;” however, anonymous sources claimed Ghani intended
to create “Council of Elders.” It is possible Ghani is trying to constrain Atta
and Jamiat by creating a rival coalition focused on implementing reforms but on
terms that are more favorable to Ghani.
Ghani’s
decision to release new electronic
National Identity Cards (e-NICs) that include nationality could drive a wedge
between several opposition groups. The Tajiks and Hazaras are opposed to including
ethnicity and nationality on the cards, while Uzbeks and Pashtuns support the
labels. One of Jamiat’s current negotiating demands includes the use of e-NICs
that do not include
nationality or ethnicity. Ghani may be able to use e-NICs to increase tensions
within the CSA and, more importantly, could use ethnic tensions to block Atta
from aligning with Pashtun leaders. As
an example, General Raziq said that anyone
opposed to listing nationality on the e-NICs as “Afghan” should leave the
country, while Atta criticized the e-NIC
release on February 17.[9] Atta’s February 23 meeting with Raziq’s
representative may indicate their emerging alliance can overcome the e-NIC
issue but impassioned disagreements
over e-NICs could pose challenges to Atta’s alliances.
Inflection
Points
The
ongoing Balkh dispute and continued parliamentary election delays could become
inflection points that lead to an uncontrollable destabilization in Afghan
domestic politics. The most likely indicator that either of these inflection points
will cause significant problems is the outbreak of protests in Kabul. Atta has
continually threatened to organize
mass protests in Kabul unless Jamiat’s demands are met. As long as the Balkh
dispute persists, large protests will remain a possibility. Atta said that it would
be difficult for him to control a “massive movement from Balkh” that could lead
to a crisis that caused the government to collapse.[10] Large anti-Ghani protests
in Kabul increase the risk of violent confrontation between security forces and
pro-Atta demonstrators, which would lead to an unpredictable escalation of
tensions. It’s also possible that
repeated election delays could catalyze destabilizing protests. Many political parties demand
timely and transparent elections, so the emerging anti-Ghani coalition may be
able to leverage electoral delays to organize protests. Parliamentary and
district council elections are still officially scheduled to occur on
July 7, 2018, but Independent Election Commission (IEC) officials have admitted elections will
likely be delayed until October. There are indications some parties will accept a delay to
October, but any announcement that elections will not be held in 2018 could prompt
destabilizing protests in Kabul. Given widespread demands for timely elections,
protests over elections delays could grow so large and intense that Ghani is forced
physically to resign and a transitional government is created.
[1]Parliamentary
and district council elections must be held before a Constitutional Loya Jirga
can be held.
[2] Natiqi is
Mohaqiq’s deputy in the Hizb-e Wahdat-e Mardom party. Natiqi is one the six
signatories of the original CSA agreement in Turkey in June 2017.
[3] Atta
reportedly met with the head of the National Directorate of Security, Massom
Stanekzai, and the head of the Office of the President, Abdul Salam Rahimi
(both of whom have been involved in the discussions with Jamiat’s
representatives). Hadid said he was not aware of the details of the
negotiations but said he
“can say it with confidence that the door for settling the tensions has
opened.”
[4] The current
Balkh police chief announced he would
remain loyal to the government should the dispute escalate into a violent
conflict on December 26 so Atta probably wants to appoint a more loyal
commander
[5] Jamiat and
Atta initially demanded Jamiat members be appointed Minster of Education, Minister
of the Economy and the ambassadors to Tajikistan and Bangladesh.
[6] Control of the Ministry of
Education is a crucial concession to Jamiat because the ministry is the largest
civil employer in Afghanistan and is a key component of Afghan patronage
networks.
[7] The Council for Protection
and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA) consists mostly of former Karzai
administration officials who had previously supported Abdullah in the 2014
election. They have previously demanded Ghani implement reforms
and hold timely and transparent elections.
[10] Atta was
referring to protests planned to coincide with the Kabul Process meeting that
he later postponed.
