By: Franklin
Holcomb and Catherine Harris
Key Takeaway: Eastern European security could be seriously undermined should the
closely contested October 30 elections in Moldova lead to civil strife. Clashes
between pro-western and pro-Russia movements in Moldova are likely. Russian President
Vladimir Putin supports the pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon, who is leading in the polls,
in an effort to both undermine what he perceives as the threatening expansion
of the EU and NATO and increase Russia’s control over former Soviet states. Dodon
and his Party of Socialists have a high chance of winning, or at least performing
well enough that they will be able to contest the election results. Clashes
between pro-Russia and pro-EU forces in Moldova might provoke a response from
Russian soldiers stationed in the pro-Russia separatist region of Transnistria,
critically destabilizing the region and threatening Ukraine’s western border
and NATO member Romania.
Putin openly supports the pro-Russia candidate Igor Dodon and his
Party of Socialists in order to expand Russia’s influence in the region and
remove the current pro-western government.[i]
Dodon has called for the “restoration of strategic relations with Russia” and
accused pro-western forces of “taking orders from Washington.”[ii] Pro-Russia
forces held a series of military
exercises in Transnistria, a pro-Russia separatist region where Russia has
maintained a military presence since it helped the region separate from Moldova
in 1992, from September 30 – October 7. The Russian Ministry of Defense
reported on October 17 that it was conducting readiness checks on its forces
deployed in Transnistria.[iii]
The timing of these actions indicates that Russia is attempting to intimidate
Moldova and discourage it from further pursuing a pro-western path.
Divided pro-western forces in Moldova face significant challenges
in their effort to retain control of the presidency and may prove unable to
keep pro-Russia forces from power. The pro-western movement in Moldova has
struggled to maintain power in the face of charges of corruption, destabilizing
levels of disunity, and the
ongoing public dissatisfaction and from the theft of $1 billion (roughly 1/8th of Moldova’s GDP) in 2015.
Pro-western forces are attempting to unify behind former
Education Minister Maia Sandu to stop pro-Russia forces from exploiting the fragile
coalition’s disunity. A defeat for pro-western forces in Moldova would
critically undermine the country’s efforts to integrate with western structures
and significantly increase Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe.
Political unrest is likely regardless of the result of the
election. Both pro-Russia and pro-western forces have laid the groundwork to
contest the results of the election. The speaker of Moldova’s parliament accused the Kremlin of
funneling resources to pro-Russia parties and promoting anti-government
protests on October 4. Sandu warned of the
potential of “massive fraud” in the coming election and claimed that unless
Moldova received EU support “we will have people in the streets and a
pro-Russia president.” Pro-Russia forces announced that they planned protests
in the event of the victory of a pro-western candidate. They further accused
the government of “illegally” interfering in the election by issuing an arrest warrant
for Renato Usatii, the leader of Moldova’s second largest pro-Russia party, on
charges of attempted murder.[iv] A
close victory or a contested result could draw both factions to the streets,
which would dramatically increase the chance of civil strife.
The security interests of the US, Russia, and their allies overlap
in Moldova to a sufficient degree that severe civil strife would challenge NATO
and undermine the stability of Eastern Europe. Putin perceives Moldova’s open courtship of the EU and
NATO as a direct threat to Russia’s security interests and a provocative act of
defiance. Putin will likely act to support pro-Russia forces in the event of
conflict in Moldova against what he perceives as an aggressive and expansionist
West. Putin also sees increased Ukrainian-Moldovan cooperation as a threat to
his military bases in Transnistria.[v]
Ukraine and Moldova share security concerns about Russia and have increased security
cooperation in recent years. Ukraine would probably consider Russian
intervention in its western neighbor a dangerous threat to its security. This
could provoke a Ukrainian military response to civil conflict in Moldova,
particularly in the case of overt Russian intervention, although Ukraine’s
military weakness and overextension makes so dramatic an eventuality unlikely.
NATO member Romania shares deep cultural,
political, and economic ties with Moldova that have led to discussions of the
unification of the two states. Romania would also strongly oppose further
Russian intervention on Moldovan territory and may feel compelled to act to
stabilize or check Russian military aggression on its eastern border. This
dangerous convergence of clashing security concerns threatens to escalate
already-high tensions in Eastern Europe and create yet another challenge to
NATO and US policy.
[i] “Vladimir
Putin met with Moldova Socialist leader Igor Dodon in the Kremlin,” Bloknot,
November 5, 2014 [Russian]. Available: http://bloknot(.)ru/politika/vladimir-putin-prinyal-v-kremle-lidera-sotsialistov-moldavii-igorya-dodona-126529.html
[ii] “Igor
Dodon: if I am elected, I commit my first visit to Moscow,” TASS, October 11,
2016 [Russian]. Available: http://tass(.)ru/opinions/interviews/3694005
[iii] “Peacekeeping
battalion of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria is ready
for rotation in the Security Zone,” Russian Ministry of Defense, October 17,
2016 [Russian]. Available: http://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12100002@egNews
[iv]
“Moldovan court issues warrant for arrest of opposition figurehead,” TASS,
October 25, 2016. Available: http://tass(.)com/world/908451
[v]
“Russian FM: Kiev contributes to economic blockade of Transnistria,” TASS,
March 18, 2015. Available:
