By Genevieve Casagrande
Pro-regime forces supported by
Russian airpower are continuing operations to encircle and besiege the Syrian
opposition in Aleppo City following the expiration of a series of temporary
ceasefires on May 12. Russian air operations in Aleppo from April 19 – May 12 demonstrate
Russia’s continued prioritization of support to its client regime in Damascus. Russia
has nonetheless continued to present itself as a constructive international
arbiter to the Syrian conflict through a series of Russian- and U.S.-brokered partial
ceasefire deals from May 4 – 11. Russia maintains a robust military presence in
Syria and has continued its military campaign, following Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s announcement of a partial
withdrawal on March 14 and subsequent reports
of continued Russian drawdown. Russia has rather begun to reshape
its military deployment in Syria, withdrawing certain airframes from the
Bassel al Assad airbase while deploying additional rotary wing aircraft, developing
new basing
near Palmyra, and maintaining “several
thousand” Russian ground forces in the country. “Dozens”
of Russia’s fixed wing aircraft reportedly remain at its airbase in Latakia and
continue air operations against both the armed opposition and ISIS across
Syria.
Russian air operations seek to
preserve strategic regime-held terrain and Russia’s military basing in Syria.
Russian airstrikes escalated against ISIS’s positions throughout Syria to
include areas in Homs, Deir ez-Zour, and Raqqa, following ISIS’s resumption of large-scale
operations against pro-regime forces in central Homs on May 3. These
operations have been primarily focused on seizing strategic gas fields that
serve as the regime’s primary source of natural gas for areas in western Syria.
ISIS seized the Sha’er Gas Field from pro-regime forces on May 5 and
subsequently severed
the primary regime ground line of communication (GLOC) between Homs City
and Palmyra on May 10, inhibiting the ability of pro-regime forces to redeploy to
critical frontlines with ISIS in the area. Russian airstrikes responded to this
threat, targeting ISIS’s positions in the Sha’er Gas Field and the nearby Mahr
Gas Field. ISIS’s operations also pose a threat to Russian’s own military
contingent in central Homs, which includes its newest military base near Palmyra
as well as its reported rotary wing deployment in the regime’s T4 and Shayrat
airbases. Western journalists brought to Palmyra by Russia as well as local activists reported
that Russia established a new military base in Palmyra, following the regime’s
recapture of the ancient city on March 27. The base reportedly facilitates
Russian demining operations and is guarded by air
defense systems and armored vehicles. Russian advisors are likely deployed
near active frontlines, as indicated by the death of a Russian
soldier in Homs Province on May 11 in addition to ISIS’s claims to kill at
least five
Russian Spetnaz personnel during regime operations to seize Palmyra in late
March.
Russia is using the series of
strained and intermittent ceasefires in Aleppo to reset its operations against
opposition forces in the area. Russian air operations have continued in Aleppo,
which was once the
primary focus of Russia’s air campaign, albeit at decreased and sporadic rates.
The Syrian regime has in turn barraged Aleppo with intense
airstrikes beginning on April 22, making Russian airstrikes in the area
difficult to discern. Regime and Russian strikes in Aleppo from April 22 – 30 killed
and injured over 145, including a strike
on a Doctors Without Borders hospital that killed over 60. ISW was not able
to assess any Russian strikes with low confidence in Aleppo from April 30 – May
4, but airstrikes resumed targeting the Syrian opposition in the city on May 5.
Russia has also reportedly begun to deploy additional assets to Aleppo,
including ground
forces to the Efrin Canton in northwestern Aleppo to support the Syrian
Kurdish YPG and artillery
units north of Aleppo City. The opposition meanwhile launched major
operations against regime forces south of Aleppo City, securing the town of Al Eis on
April 1 as well as Khan Touman on May 5 - 6. Delayed and limited Russian
airpower was unable to reverse gains made during the opposition’s offensive against
the town of Khan Touman south of Aleppo led by al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate
Jabhat al Nusra and Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al Sham. The offensive was
timed alongside a Russian-organized
concert in the ancient ruins of Palmyra, which required a significant
number of Russian attack
helicopters and armored vehicles to secure the guests in attendance. Iranian
forces, without the support of major Russian airstrikes, suffered heavy
losses in the Khan Touman offensive. Pro-regime forces, however, resumed operations
to encircle opposition forces in Aleppo City through its northern
industrial outskirts on May 12 as the as the temporary 48-hour ceasefire expired.
Opposition forces reportedly prevented pro-regime advances
in the area despite Russian airstrikes.
The
following graphic depicts ISW's assessment of Russian airstrike
locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, Syrian
state-run media, and statements by Russian and Western officials. This
map represents locations targeted by Russia's air campaign, rather than
the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence reporting. ISW
places high confidence in reports corroborated both by official
government statements reported through credible channels and
documentation from rebel factions or activist networks on the ground in
Syria deemed to be credible.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in secondary sources that have not been confirmed or sources deemed likely to contain disinformation.
