By Emily Anagnostos
Iraq’s “rump” Council of Representatives (CoR) formed on
April 14, 2016 when some members of Parliament staged a sit in after months of
stalled reforms. The rump CoR, at its zenith, was supported by multiple
prominent political parties, including the Sadrist al-Ahrar Bloc and the Badr
Organization. These parties largely walked out of the rump CoR by April 20. The
rump CoR could not reach a quorum as a result and failed to gain recognition as
a legal entity. Most of its members have
refocused their efforts on forming a new opposition bloc, the “Reform Front,” first
reported on April 27. The Reform Front claims to have at least 98 members,
consisting of 42 pro-Maliki Dawa Party members, all of the members from Iyad
Allawi’s Wataniya Bloc, and an unverifiable number of members who defected from
their parties. If the claim is accurate, then the Reform Front will become the
largest bloc in the CoR, surpassing the State of
Law Alliance which stands to lose substantial numbers to the Front.
The Reform Front is likely steered by former Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki, though several members have denied his involvement. Maliki has
contested Abadi’s leadership of the Dawa Party since he lost the premiership in
2014 amidst growing domestic and international pressure for political change.
The recent resignation of Hassan al-Sinid on April 28, the placeholder for
Maliki’s seat in the CoR during his tenure as Vice President, could indicate
that Maliki looks to resume his seat in the CoR. [Note:
In our May 6 post, we said that holding a seat in the CoR was a prerequisite
for becoming Prime Minister. It is not.] Maliki has denied the rumors of his return.
The largest bloc in Iraq’s parliament constitutionally has
the right to select
the Prime Minister and form the Council of Ministers after general
elections or after a no-confidence vote in the Prime Minister. Maliki formed a government in 2010 even
though he did not win the elections outright by creating a legal challenge
about how to define the “largest bloc.” The
Front’s emergence could facilitate Maliki’s return as prime minister if the
parliament ousts Abadi.
The withdrawal of confidence from Abadi is also not likely
imminent over the next few weeks barring an unexpected event that creates a
further state of emergency. Many of Iraq’s political leaders are engaged in
intense behind the scenes meetings to help break the deadlock without a vote of
no-confidence. There is no clear coalition emerging within the CoR that can
achieve an absolute majority of 165 members to vote no-confidence or select a
successor. Anti-Maliki sentiment remains strong among elite politicians,
undercutting the likelihood that he will be able to generate sufficient support
for a no-confidence vote and government formation himself. The Reform Front’s
tenuous position as a coalition of convenience may collapse. Both Maliki and
Allawi seek power, and they cannot both have it.
Maliki, therefore, is most likely to try to ride the
political wave by positioning himself as a potential unifier who can bridge the
gap between the Reform Front and other blocs – a gap that he has helped create
and maintain. He issued a statement on
May 6 calling for all CoR blocs to reconvene a session to find a solution to
the political crisis. He is likely to
try to rally Abadi’s Dawa Party supporters to his side along with other
consensus-minded political blocs while aligning temporarily with Allawi, his
rival for the premiership in 2010, with the ultimate intent of acquiring the
165 votes necessary to achieve an absolute majority in the CoR. It is not even
clear whether the CoR will even be able to resume sessions soon. It is next
scheduled to meet on May 10, and it can only make decisions if a quorum of 165
members is reached. The 34 members of the Sadrist al-Ahrar Bloc, however,
withdrew from the CoR on April 30 and at least 60 members of the Kurdistan
Alliance agreed on May 6 to not return to the CoR. The absence of as many as 94
members will make it more difficult for Speaker Salim al-Juburi to achieve quorum.
The Kurds have likely presented a set of political demands regarding the
cabinet reshuffle and the size of their representation in government to other
Shi’a parties as a condition for their return and may return to the CoR before
the Sadrists if the other blocs agree to their demands. Other political blocs
may also boycott the CoR, less ostentatiously, as the cabinet reshuffle drags
on. Political impasse will therefore likely persist.
This graphic is an approximate depiction of the current
state of the Council of Representatives. It shows the number and party
affiliation of CoR members who have boycotted future parliamentary sessions. It
also shows the number and party affiliation of CoR members whom ISW assesses
may be part of the Reform Front based on the Reform Front's unconfirmed claim
that it is at least 98-members strong. The graphic demonstrates the tumultuous
current state of the CoR and the difficulty for a session to achieve quorum.
