by: Christopher Kozak
Key Takeaway: The Syrian regime has not
gained much terrain in the first week of its large-scale ground offensive
against rebel forces, despite support from intensified Russian airstrikes and
hundreds of Iranian proxy reinforcements. Operations against the Syrian
opposition will likely prove harder and slower than anticipated by either
Russia or Iran, protracting the conflict and exacerbating extremism.
The Syrian
regime achieved only limited tactical gains in the week after it announced
the start of a “vast
offensive” that aimed to “defeat terrorist groups and liberate areas and
villages that have suffered from terrorism” in northwestern Syria. The
offensive reportedly included reinforcements in the form of “hundreds”
of Iranian troops and proxy fighters, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah
and Iraqi Shi’a militias. Unverified images on
social media indicated that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Quds
Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani personally oversaw operations in
Latakia Province along the Syrian Coast. Meanwhile, pro-regime forces also
received direct assistance from Russia in the form of airstrikes “synchronized”
with the ground operations as well as artillery
support from howitzer and multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) on the
ground. Senior rebel sources also alleged
that Russian personnel participated in the clashes and directly supervised the
operation via a joint Russian-Iranian operations room. The location and
targeting of these operations underscore that Russia and Iran intend to bolster
the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rather than defeat ISIS.
Nonetheless,
the Syrian regime and its allies have thus far failed to achieve significant
gains. They are fighting against rebel forces along the three primary fronts in
northern Hama Province, the al-Ghab Plain, and northeastern Latakia Province,
creating a front line roughly 120 kilometers long. Confirmed reports indicate
that pro-regime fighters have seized only six villages and towns, while rebel
forces repelled heavy attacks against several key positions. At the same time,
regime forces suffered heavy losses in manpower and materiel in the face of
heavy rebel resistance. Free Syrian Army (FSA)-affiliated rebels forces claimed
to destroy at least twenty tanks and armored vehicles as well as a helicopter
gunship in a “tank
massacre” on the first day of the offensive. Meanwhile, pro-regime ground forces suffered
several high-profile casualties with the deaths
of two Hezbollah commanders including senior leader Hassan Hossein al-Hajj
as well two
Iranian veterans who had formerly commanded IRGC brigades. Continued heavy
casualties may leave pro-regime forces vulnerable to a counterattack by Syrian
rebels; the Idlib-based Jaysh al-Fatah Operations Room later released a
statement on October 13 calling for a major rebel
counteroffensive against Hama City.
Operations
against the Syrian opposition will likely prove harder and slower than
anticipated by either Russia or Iran. On October 2, head of the Russian Duma's
Foreign Affairs Committee Alexei Pushkov predicted that Russian operations in
Syria would only last "three
or four months" although he noted that there is "always a risk of
getting bogged down.” Russian President Vladimir
Putin has also suggested that Russian air support will be sufficient to "stabilize
the legitimate authorities and create conditions for finding a political
compromise” in Syria. Meanwhile, Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy
Committee chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi insisted during a visit to Damascus on
October 14 that cooperation between Syria, Iraq, Iran and Russia has already
been “positive and successful.” The stiff defense mounted by rebel forces thus
far belies this wishful thinking. The foreign allies of the Syrian regime may
be forced to expend further financial and military resources in order to
preserve their initial gains. The expanded interventions of both Russia and
Iran will likely incentivize the Syrian regime to prioritize a military
solution to the Syrian Civil War, protracting the conflict and leading to
further bloodshed rather than movement towards a political solution. The
heightened pressure being brought to bear upon the Syrian opposition may also
drive moderate rebel factions towards closer relationships with Syrian al-Qaeda
affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and other malign Salafi-jihadist groups, further
constraining U.S. policy options in the country.
