Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter
April 13, 2025, 5:50 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on April 13. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the April 14 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry
Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result
in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's
stated objective of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace
agreement in Ukraine in the near future. Peskov told Kremlin
journalist Pavel Zarubin on April 13 that "everything is moving very
well" regarding US-Russian bilateral talks and discussions about the war
in Ukraine but that there will likely not be immediate results.[1]
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Second Department of
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Director Alexei Polishchuk gave
an interview to Russian state media group Rossiya Today (RT) and
stated that Russia is willing to engage in negotiations that “take into
account the modern realities” of the war and eliminate the “root
causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[2] Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that any peace process in Ukraine must address these so-called “root causes."[3]
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov previously defined "root causes"
as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and
Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in
Ukraine.[4]
These so-called ”root causes” are a reference to Russia’s pre-war
demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and the
installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine.[5]
Peskov's and Polishchuk's comments also reflect the Kremlin's continued
rejection of President Trump's stated approach of first establishing a
ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and the
Kremlin's commitment to war aims that are incompatible with President
Trump’s goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.
Any
future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust
monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray
Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes
ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the
lack of public details about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear
what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and
monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any
such mechanisms. Peskov and Polishchuk reiterated ongoing
Russian claims on April 13 that Ukraine is violating the temporary
moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure.[6]
Russian officials, led by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), have
accused Ukraine of violating the temporary ceasefire almost every day
since March 29 but have not provided evidence to substantiate most of
these claims.[7]
Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian forces are
striking energy infrastructure along Ukraine's northern border with
Russia, although it remains unclear if strikes with tactical
first-person view (FPV) drones or routine shelling would be a violation
of the energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire as the terms of the
ceasefire are publicly unclear. Russian officials appear to be
weaponizing the vague conditions of the ceasefire and exploiting the
absence of independent monitoring mechanisms to flood the information
space with unsubstantiated claims about supposed Ukrainian ceasefire
violations.
Russian officials may attempt to flood the
information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire
violations in the future if a general ceasefire does not include robust
independent monitoring mechanisms. Russian forces may conduct false flag
attacks along the frontline in the event of a future general ceasefire
in order to accuse Ukraine of violating the ceasefire and justify
reigniting the conflict. ISW has previously assessed that Russian
President Vladimir Putin's claims that the current Ukrainian government
is illegitimate are setting conditions to legitimize future Russian
ceasefire violations.[8]
The Kremlin is weaponizing the lack of monitoring mechanisms for the
temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, and any future
general ceasefire must have more robust monitoring mechanisms to deter,
adjudicate, or at least properly record future violations.
It
is unclear if Russian officials will agree to any meaningful monitoring
mechanisms, however, as Russian officials continue to reject the
possible future deployment of a European peacekeeping contingent to
Ukraine.[9]
Polishchuk responded to a question about whether Russia will agree to
sending peacekeepers to Ukraine on April 13 and stated that peacekeeping
deployments are "not on the agenda."[10]
Polishchuk insinuated that Russia and Ukraine must conclude a peace or
ceasefire agreement before considering the issue of peacekeepers and
claimed that the French- and British-led "Coalition of the Willing" is
attempting to intervene in Ukraine by forming what it is calling a
"reassurance force." Polishchuk accused the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine of falsifying reports on Russian violations of the Minsk
agreement between 2014 and 2022, despite indications that Russia itself
maintained significant influence over the OSCE and seriously hindered
the OSCE's monitoring and enforcement mandates during this time.[11]
The Kremlin's ongoing refusal to engage with US and European proposals
to establish a peacekeeping force in Ukraine and Polishchuk's accusation
that the OSCE has previously acted in Ukraine's — and not Russia's —
favor underscores the Kremlin's continued unwillingness to accept any
kind of monitoring mechanisms that could undermine Russia's ability to
attack Ukraine again in the future.
Russian
officials continue to weaponize the vague terms of the current ceasefire
on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure and ongoing
ceasefire negotiations in an effort to falsely portray Ukraine- and not
Russia- as unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue. Peskov
claimed on April 13 that Ukraine is "either unable or unwilling to"
honor the terms of the moratorium on energy strikes between Russia and
Ukraine.[12]
Polishchuk also claimed without evidence that Ukrainian forces have
violated the moratorium on energy strikes over 60 times since Russia
asserted that the agreement entered into force on March 18 and are
striking or attempting to strike Russian energy facilities "several
times a day."[13]
Polischuk claimed that Ukrainian authorities have either failed to
order Ukrainian forces to halt strikes against Russian energy facilities
or that Ukrainian forces are simply ignoring such an order and
insinuated that the Ukrainian government may not be in full control of
the Ukrainian military. Polischuk's and Peskov's statements reinforce
the Kremlin's effort to portray Russia as open to negotiations and
committed to honoring agreements, while portraying Ukraine as the
intransigent party. ISW continues to observe instances in which Russian
actions and official statements contradict this professed willingness to
engage in good faith negotiations, even as Ukrainian officials
consistently emphasize their openness to dialogue and their readiness to
offer compromises in future peace agreements.[14]
Russian
forces conducted a devastating ballistic missile strike against Sumy
City on April 13, causing more than 100 casualties. Ukrainian
officials reported that Russian forces struck the center of Sumy City
with two missiles on the morning of April 13, killing at least 34
civilians and injuring at least 118.[15]
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant
General Kyrylo Budanov reported that elements of the Russian 112th
Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District
[MMD]) and 448th Missile Brigade (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD)
launched the two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles that struck Sumy
City from near Liski, Voronezh Oblast and Lezhenki, Kursk Oblast.[16]
Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy
Kovalenko reported that the Russian missiles were equipped with cluster
warheads.[17] Images and footage of the aftermath show fires, casualties, and extensive damage in central Sumy City.[18] The BBC Russian Service
reported that Russian forces struck the Sumy State University’s
Congress Center and noted that locals reported that the Congress Center
hosts various classes and clubs, including classes for children.[19]
US
Special Envoy for Ukraine and retired General Keith Kellogg condemned
the Russian ballistic missile strike against Sumy City and stated that
the strike “crosses any line of decency.”[20]
US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink acknowledged that Russian forces
used ballistic missiles equipped with cluster warheads against Sumy
City and expressed condolences.[21]
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, European Council President Antonio
Costa, European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas, EU Ambassador to
Ukraine Katarina Maternova, French President Emmanuel Macron, Polish
Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, Moldovan
President Maia Sandu, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna, Finnish
Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen, Spanish Ambassador to Ukraine Ricardo
Lopex-Aranda, the Irish Embassy in Ukraine, and the Romanian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and a host of other Western officials condemned
the Russian strike against Sumy City.[22]
Ongoing
milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war
in Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade
Russia’s manpower and materiel resources and contribute to slowing
Russian advances along the frontline. A Russian milblogger and
former Storm-Z instructor claimed on April 12 that the Russian military
command is using a "thousand cuts" tactic against Ukraine to the
detriment of Russian forces and complained that deploying poorly
equipped and poorly trained Russian infantry to attack Ukrainian
defensive positions only results in marginal gains and heavy losses.[23]
The milblogger argued that the Russian military command is attempting
to present high manpower and materiel losses as necessary by falsely
portraying the preceding combat engagements as evidence of Russia‘s
coordinated "grinding" down of Ukrainian defenses.[24]
The milblogger claimed on April 12 and 13 that the Russian military
command is ignoring the fact that Russian forces are facing shortages of
materiel necessary for offensive operations, which contributes to
issues conducting assaults and to the failure of small group assaults
along the frontline in Ukraine.[25]
The milblogger claimed that frontline Russian commanders are under
significant pressure from their superiors to conduct more infantry
assaults, do not have sufficient time to plan new assault routes, and
that some frontline commanders order assaults simply to be able to
report something back to their superiors. ISW previously assessed that
these grinding assaults will likely degrade available Russian manpower
and materiel significantly enough that Russian forces will have to
decrease offensive tempo on lower-priority sectors of the front.[26]
The milblogger speculated that Russian forces are in a
self-perpetuating cycle, where poorly trained infantry killed or injured
in failed assault attempts are replaced with similarly poorly trained
infantry, who are again sent into doomed assaults.[27]
The milblogger’s claims reflect the general trend of slowing Russian
advances along the frontline recently and highlight some of the critical
issues that Russian forces will have to address if they intend to make
significant territorial gains or conduct more sophisticated offensive
operations in Ukraine in the future.[28]
Key Takeaways:
- Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations
are unlikely to result in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US
President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a general
ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future.
- Any
future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust
monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray
Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes
ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the
lack of public details about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear
what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and
monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any
such mechanisms.
- Russian officials continue to
weaponize the vague terms of the current ceasefire on long-range strikes
against energy infrastructure and ongoing ceasefire negotiations in an
effort to falsely portray Ukraine- and not Russia- as unwilling to
engage in constructive dialogue.
- Russian forces conducted a devastating ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13, causing more than 100 casualties.
- Ongoing
milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war
in Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade
Russia’s manpower and materiel resources and contribute to slowing
Russian advances along the frontline.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Borova, and Chasiv Yar.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
Ukraine
and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to
ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations
regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy
infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations
remains unclear.
The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) claimed without evidence on April 13 that Ukrainian forces shelled
and damaged two power facilities in Belgorod Oblast.[29]
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian
forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from remaining
positions in Kursk Oblast on April 13, but did not make any confirmed
advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian
milblogger claimed on April 12 that Russian forces are advancing toward
Gornal (southwest of Sudzha near the international border).[30]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Kashtan" Detachment
and the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Kursk
Oblast's border area.[31]
Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 13, but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing
Ukrainian forces from Demidovka and Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City)
while one Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have
completely seized Demidovka.[32]
Russian sources claimed that fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Demidovka and Popovka.[33]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
(Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine
along the international border and approach to within tube artillery
range of Sumy City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 13 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 13 that Russian forces
have completely seized Zhuravka (north of Sumy City).[34] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Loknya (north of Sumy City).[35]
Russian
forces attacked near Zhuravka, west of Zhuravka near Veselivka, east of
Zhuravka near Basivka, and southeast of Zhuravka near Loknya on April
13.[36]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates
that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Tykhe
(northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]
Russian
forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Kharkiv City near
Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 13, and the Ukrainian General
Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled two Russian sabotage and
reconnaissance groups along the international border northwest of
Kharkiv City near Ridne (formerly Perovske) and northeast of Kharkiv
City near Tykhe.[38]
The
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces published footage on April 12 of
Ukrainian drone strikes destroying a Russian Starlink terminal in an
unspecified area of Kharkiv Oblast.[39]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion
are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hraniv (north of Kharkiv
City), and drone operators of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment
(44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly
striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[40]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 13 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 13.[41]
The
commander of a Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk
direction reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian
mechanized assaults with light armored vehicles from April 4 to 12.[42]
The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces published footage of Ukrainian
forces repelling a roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault
in the Kupyansk direction on April 11, potentially the mechanized
assault previously reported near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Lozova (northeast
of Borova) - although the footage only shows isolated strikes against
Russian armored vehicles.[43]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on
April 13 that the brigade repelled another Russian reinforced
platoon-sized mechanized assault with five tanks in the Kupyansk
direction.[44]
Russian milbloggers amplified a complaint from a Russian soldier
purportedly of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank
Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD])
claiming that Russian forces have not been able to advance more than
five kilometers from Kotlyarivka (southeast of Kupyansk) since about May
2024 due to Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes.[45]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 9 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of
Borova).[46]
Russian
forces continued ground assaults northeast of Borova near Nova
Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of
Borova near Tverdokhlibove, Novoserhiivka, Olhivka, Makiivka, and
Hrekivka on April 12 and 13.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east
of Novomykhailivka and west of Zelena Dolyna and interdicted Ukrainian
ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Nove (all northeast of
Lyman).[48]
Russian
forces continued ground assaults northeast of Lyman near Hlushchenkove,
Novomykhailivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Nove and east of Lyman near
Zarichne and Torske on April 12 and 13.[49]
An
officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction
reported that Russian forces have intensified assaults in the Lyman
direction and ultimately aim to advance on Slovyansk (southwest of
Lyman).[50]
The spokesperson of the same Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman
direction stated that Russian infantry are attempting to advance in
Ukrainian near-rear areas to create chaos and that Russian forces
conduct either infantry or mechanized assaults daily.[51]
The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman
direction reported that Russian forces are attacking with one to three
poor quality vehicles to distract Ukrainian forces and enable infantry
to advance.[52]
The spokesperson reported that Russian forces continue assaulting with
poorly trained infantry, including personnel who only joined the Russian
military in February or March 2025.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed
territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces
continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and
Bilohorivka on April 12 and 13 but did not advance.[53]
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced
northeast of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) toward Siversk.[54]
Ukrainian
Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro
Zaporozhets stated on April 12 that Russian forces intensified shelling
in the Siversk direction and are mainly attacking on motorcycles in the
area.[55]
Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 12 indicates
that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east of Stupochky
(south of Chasiv Yar).[56]
Russian
forces continued assaults in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar
from Andriivka and in the direction of Predtechyne on April 12 and 13.[57]
A
senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion stated
on April 13 that Russian forces have marginally intensified infantry
assaults over the last month in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction.[58]
Zaporozhets noted on April 12 that Russian forces recently began using
more armored vehicles during assaults in the Kramatorsk and Toretsk
directions and have also intensified shelling in the Kramatorsk
direction.[59]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division,
including the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 5th Anti-Aircraft
Missile Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on April 13 but did not advance.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: ISW recessed Russian advances along the T-05-16
highway toward Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk) based on a prominent
Kremlin-affiliated milblogger’s claim on April 12 that Russian sabotage
and reconnaissance groups temporarily advanced to the area in an effort
to sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Nelipivka
and do not maintain enduring positions near Nelipivka.[61]
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk
direction reported on April 11 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a
Russian assault west of Toretsk, likely referring to the recent Russian
assault northeast of Nelipivka.[62]
ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely advanced near
Nelipivka as part of a Russian push that reached anomalously far ahead
of the main Russian line and that Russian forces did not maintain a
sustained presence in the area.[63]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 12 and 13 that elements of
the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th
Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) advanced west of Panteleymonivka
(southwest of Toretsk) and seized a section of the Donetsk
City-Kostyantynopil H-20 highway in the Ukrainian pocket southwest of
Toretsk.[64]
Russian forces appear to be attempting to rapidly collapse this pocket
following a recent advance into Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).[65]
Russian
forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and
Dachne; northeast of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka and Druzhba; southwest of
Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Panteleymonivka, Valentynivka, and
Oleksandropil; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Shcherbynivka on
April 12 and 13.[66]
Zaporozhets
stated on April 13 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in
southern and northern Toretsk and are concentrating equipment in central
Toretsk in an attempt to draw Ukrainian attention from the center of
the town and prevent Ukrainian forces from destroying the equipment.[67]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade
(51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC],
SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Toretsk, and elements
of a battalion of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kleban-Byk (northwest of
Toretsk).[68]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) claimed on April 12 and 13 that Russian forces advanced northeast
and southeast of Zelene Pole (east of Pokrovsk), in northern Kotlyne
(southwest of Pokrovsk), and south of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk)
and seized Yelyzavetivka (east of Pokrovsk).[69]
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Kalynove, east
of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Vodyane Druhe, southeast of Pokrovsk
near Lysivka, south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, and southwest of
Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 12 and 13.[70]
Ukrainian
Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on
April 13 that Russian forces have increased the frequency of attacks in
the Pokrovsk direction and are modifying old armored vehicles to
transport infantry in the area.[71]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized
Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District
[SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kalynove.[72]
Elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle
Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly participated in the recent seizure of
Kalynove.[73]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 13 that Russian forces,
including elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military
District [CMD]), seized Troitske (east of Novopavlivka).[74]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near
Novoserhiivka and Uspenivka and toward Novooleksandrivka; east of
Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Preobrazhenka, Sribne, and Troitske; and
southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 12 and 13.[75]
The
commander of Ukrainian company operating in the Novopavlivka direction
reported on April 13 that Russian forces have changed tactics and are no
longer attacking in large groups using tanks or infantry fighting
vehicles (IFVs) in the area.[76]
The company commander stated that Russian forces are instead attacking
in groups of three to four personnel on foot or on motorcycles or
buggies and that these groups are quieter and harder to detect.[77]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 12 and 13 that Russian
forces advanced near Andriivka and toward Bahatyr (both west of
Kurakhove).[78]
Russian
forces attacked west of Kurakhove toward Oleksiivka and near Andriivka,
Kostyantynopil, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on
April 12 and 13.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rozlyv.[80]
Order
of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian
General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near
Bahatyr.[81]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 13 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 13 that Russian forces
advanced near Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka).[82]
Russian
forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and
Vesele; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Pryvilne, and
Shevchenko; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on April 12
and 13.[83]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
(Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas
against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of
Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian
forces conducted limited offensive operations northwest of Robotyne
near Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Stepove on April 12 and 13 but did
not advance.[84]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 12 and 13 but did not advance.[85]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text for information on the Russian ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13.
Russian
forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Ukraine
overnight on April 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched 55 Shahed long range strike drones and decoy
drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Oryol and Kursk
cities.[86]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 43
drones, and that the remaining 12 drones were “lost,” likely due to
Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
ISW
is suspending Russian mobilization and force generation coverage in its
daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW will be introducing a
new product line tracking Russian mobilization and force generation
efforts in the coming days.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine
Russian forces continue efforts to counter Ukrainian drones. A Russian
milblogger claimed that Russian engineers designed a rocket-like weapon
equipped with two first-person view (FPV) drones integrated onto
stabilizers and an optical-electronic guidance system to intercept
Ukrainian drones.[87] The milblogger claimed that the interception weapon has thermal imaging and a homing head.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW
is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking
activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates
will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of
annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian
sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the Russian Occupation Update.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/67fb81259a794798c0cc6be5
[2] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2008794/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/55452
[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125
[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025
[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/310389 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/310391 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3840 ; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2008794/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/55452
[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/51240 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51049; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2025;
https://t.me/mod_russia/50824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025
[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025
[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725
[10] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2008794/
[11] https://jamestown.org/program/osce-in-russias-tight-grip-at-year-end-meeting/ ; https://www.rferl.org/a/32693816.html ;
[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/310389 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/310391 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3840
[13] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2008794/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/55452
[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025
[15] https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4147; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4503 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/41113; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/41118; https://suspilne
dot
media/993711-zelenskij-pro-raketnij-udar-rf-po-sumah-desatki-zagiblih-ta-poranenih-mirnih-ziteliv-tilki-svolota-tak-moze-diati/;
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13853;
[16] https://t.me/ChiefUkrDIU/185; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1XfY5BZ9Tp/; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5701
[17] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9098 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9099
[18] Warning: graphic and disturbing content
https://t.me/istories_media/9362 ; https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1384; https://t.me/bbcrussian/78935;
https://t.me/andriyshTime/35935 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35936 ;
https://t.me/andriyshTime/35937 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35940 ;
https://t.me/andriyshTime/35944 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35946; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1911334974097064312
[19] https://t.me/bbcrussian/78935
[20] https://x.com/generalkellogg/status/1911397989274239450
[21] https://www.facebook.com/usdos.ukraine/posts/1092153402955082?ref=embed_post
[22] https://x.com/Keir_Starmer/status/1911404868595523593; https://x.com/kajakallas/status/1911357795691081838; https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/1911357574512857298; https://x.com/Tsahkna/status/1911358167067341225; https://x.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1911380883489141039; https://x.com/elinavaltonen/status/1911384367940649317; https://x.com/MAERomania/status/1911364685686858170; https://x.com/edgarsrinkevics/status/1911377394557997323; https://x.com/donaldtusk/status/1911403007096332482; https://x.com/eucopresident/status/1911376240142860684; https://suspilne dot media/993777-posol-es-v-ukraini-nazvala-voennim-zlocinom-raketnij-udar-rf-po-sumah/; https://x.com/IrlEmbUkraine/status/1911351814319992938; https://x.com/RLAranda/status/1911355860825022547
[23] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2293
[24] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2294
[25] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2304
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101624
[27] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2304
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040625
[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/51240
[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161140
[31] https://t.me/milinfolive/146021; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/45048
[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63482; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12920; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7547
[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/68982; https://t.me/wargonzo/25888
[34] https://t.me/dva_majors/68982
[35] https://t.me/https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12920/63482
[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161200 ; https://t.me/https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12920/63482
[37] https://x.com/p6060083/status/1911376732214514075; https://t.me/fpv_for_zsu/687
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/otukharkiv/5543
[39] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7890
[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161161; https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7822; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5645
[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076
[42]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/04/12/syly-oborony-na-kupyanskomu-vidtynku-vidbyly-5-shturmiv-z-vykorystannyam-vorogom-bronetehniky-voyin-zsu/
[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7888; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025
[44] https://t.me/oaembr77/743
[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63481; https://tlgrm dot ru/channels/@NotForAir_All/2151
[46] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1911109155680628800; https://www.instagram.com/rota_favorit/reel/DINmq3riWka/
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926
[48] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31313; https://t.me/yurasumy/22400
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31313
[50]
https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/04/13/pragnut-zahopyty-slovyansk-okupanty-aktyvizuvalys-na-lymanskomu-napryamku/
[51]
https://youtu.be/uLfYqmBq8X8 ; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/04/13/zabigty-za-liniyu-frontu-i-pomerty-rosiyany-vdayutsya-do-novoyi-taktyky/
[52] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/banzaj-ataky-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vorog-shturmuye-na-bagi-ta-golfkarah/
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926
[54] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31319
[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/na-toreczkomu-i-kramatorskomu-napryamkah-vorog-ponovyv-shturmy-na-bronetehniczi/
[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8880; https://t.me/Phoenix_ORKOhub/160; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1911156295832305958
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68982
[58] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/za-taktykoyu-vagnera-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-vorog-ne-shkoduye-pihoty/ ; https://suspilne
dot
media/993571-zagibel-pilota-f-16-tramp-prodovziv-sankcii-proti-kremla-se-na-rik-1144-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1744529952&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/na-toreczkomu-i-kramatorskomu-napryamkah-vorog-ponovyv-shturmy-na-bronetehniczi/
[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26881
[61] https://t.me/rybar/69609
[62] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/11/na-toreczkomu-napryamku-vluchnyj-postril-z-granatometa-zupynyv-ataku-vazhkoyi-tehniky/
[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11-2025
[64] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63491; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89862; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161204
[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89862; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161200
[67] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/na-toreczkomu-i-kramatorskomu-napryamkah-vorog-ponovyv-shturmy-na-bronetehniczi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/u-toreczku-vorog-perenis-shturmy-na-flangy-v-otu-lugansk-poyasnyly-prychynu/
[68] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13679; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13680
[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161170; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63483; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63490; https://t.me/wargonzo/25893; https://t.me/mod_russia/51241 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/51242; https://t.me/sashakots/53033
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63483; https://t.me/yurasumy/22384
[71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/ataky-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-posylyuyutsya-vorog-zastosovuye-bronetehniku/
[72] https://t.me/yurasumy/22385
[73] https://t.me/milinfolive/146017
[74] https://t.me/yurasumy/22384
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/16121
[76] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/13/uriznobich-rozchepirenymy-palczyamy-na-novopavlivskomu-vorog-atakuye-malymy-grupamy/
[77] https://t.me/yurasumy/22384
[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/16121; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161110; https://t.me/yurasumy/22383
[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7926; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161110; https://t.me/wargonzo/25888
[80] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161110
[81] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/161153
[82] https://t.me/yurasumy/22383
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/16121
[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048
[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23076; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23063; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23048
[86] https://t.me/kpszsu/32430
[87] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26898
