Brian Carter, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kathryn Tyson, Kelly Campa, and Annika Ganzeveld
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events. Click here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.
CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We do not
report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered
in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we
are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws
of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against
humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
The
Israeli defense minister publicly called on Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu to define a political end state in the Gaza Strip. Israeli
Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on May 15 that “governance by
non-Hamas Palestinian entities, accompanied by international actors, is
in Israel’s interest.”[1]
Gallant added that he rejected Israeli civil or military governance in
the Strip. Gallant said that his statement was necessary because “the
gains of the war are being eroded and Israel’s long-term security is at
stake.”[2]
Gallant was responding to an earlier statement by Netanyahu in which
Netanyahu argued that it would be irrelevant to discuss the post-war
plans until Hamas is destroyed.[3]
This
public disagreement between Netanyahu and Gallant comes after IDF Chief
of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi privately demanded a post-war plan from
Netanyahu and called current Israeli re-clearing operations a “Sisyphean
task.”[4] Halevi made these comments during a cabinet meeting sometime between May 10 and 12.[5] The Washington Post reported that Halevi’s private comments reflected the opinions of “many Israeli security officials.”[6]
Other senior IDF officials also demanded ”political leaders...make
decisions and formulate a strategy,” according to Israeli media.[7]
Israeli media also reported that Israeli cabinet officials told the
prime minister that his failure to make decisions was ”risking lives.”[8]
These disagreements come as the IDF reentered Zaytoun, a neighborhood
in southern Gaza City, for the third time since February 2024 and other
IDF units began a major, division-sized operation in Jabalia.[9] The IDF previously fought in Jabalia in December 2023 before withdrawing.[10]
Military
action should be designed and executed with a defined political end
state to guide military operations and avoid actions that will undermine
the successful achievement of the political end state. This is
particularly important when the requirement for a military operation’s
success is the development and stability of a new government in the area
of operations. The political echelon should define a political end
state to enable military commanders to design military operations to
successfully meet the political end. Military commanders planning
operations that lack a political end state will be unable to plan and
execute effective operations because the commanders will not understand
how their mission fits into the political objective of eliminating
Hamas’ government. Destroying Hamas is a military task, but it is not
necessarily a political end state without a vision for the post-war Gaza
Strip. Some actions that could destroy Hamas’ military capabilities may
fail to support the establishment of a new government. Other actions
could ultimately undermine Israel’s ability to replace Hamas with a new
governing authority in the Gaza Strip. The articulation of a political
end state is important to avoid the risks of such outcome.
CTP-ISW
continues to assess that there is no sustainable end to this conflict
if Hamas remains a political and military entity in the Gaza Strip. Hamas
aims to destroy Israel and replace it with an Islamist Palestinian
state controlling all Israeli territory. Hamas has said publicly that it
can “accept the interim liberation of parts of Palestine” and an
“interim truce” but that these interim steps only “serve as a warrior’s
rest stop.”[11]
”Parts of Palestine“ in this context refers to the Gaza Strip. A
ceasefire that leaves Hamas in power would serve Hamas’ purposes by
allowing the group to prepare for the next round of fighting. Hamas
started the current war by breaking a period of relative calm between
itself and Israel on October 6, and there is no reason to believe Hamas
will honor a future “truce.”
Reuters reported on
May 15 that Jordanian security services thwarted an attempt by
Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons to a Jordanian
Muslim Brotherhood cell in Jordan in late March 2024.[12] Jordanian
security services arrested an unspecified number of Jordanians of
Palestinian descent who were “members of the Brotherhood cell” and
seized a cache of unspecified smuggled weapons, according to two
anonymous Jordanian sources. The Brotherhood cell members intended to
use the weapons to conduct “acts of sabotage” to destabilize Jordan,
according to the sources. The unspecified Jordanian sources also claimed
that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood cell is linked to Hamas’ military
wing. An anonymous senior Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood representative
claimed that senior Hamas leader Saleh al Arouri—who the Israelis killed
in January 2024—recruited the arrested cell members.[13] Hamas denied on May 15 that it planned to stoke instability in Jordan.[14]
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood acknowledged that Jordanian security
forces arrested some of its members and that these members possessed
smuggled weapons but claimed that Brotherhood leadership did not approve
the smuggling of weapons to Jordan.[15]
It is nonetheless notable that Iranian-backed militias and a senior
Hamas leader were able to recruit and then smuggle weapons to a cell in
Jordan.
The Iranian-backed attempt to arm a Muslim
Brotherhood cell in Jordan supports CTP-ISW's previous assessments that
Iran is adopting a more confrontational approach towards Jordan in its
regional strategy.[16]
Jordan has thwarted numerous attempts in recent months by Iran and its
partners to smuggle weapons—including Claymore mines, C4 and Semtex
explosives, Kalashnikov rifles, and 107mm Katyusha rockets—to the West
Bank and Jordan.[17]
Bloomberg
reported on May 15 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s
understanding of Iranian "nuclear ambitions" has deteriorated, citing
the IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report.[18]. The
IAEA released the report to diplomats who will attend the IAEA Board of
Governors meeting in Vienna on June 3. The report stated that the
IAEA's understanding of Iran’s production and inventory of centrifuges,
rotors and bellows, heavy water, and uranium ore concentration has
decreased despite an eight percent increase in the number of IAEA
inspections in Iran in 2023. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated
in the report that there has been little progress in resolving
outstanding safeguards issues. Grossi added that the IAEA cannot provide
”assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
program” unless Iran resolves the outstanding safeguards issues. Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium increased by 145 kilograms in the last quarter.
Grossi
separately stated on May 15 that Iranian officials “must stop”
normalizing discussions about procuring a nuclear weapon. Some Iranian
officials have warned in recent weeks that Iran could change its nuclear
doctrine, as CTP-ISW has repeatedly noted.[19]
Grossi stated that Iran must "meaningfully engage” with the IAEA so
that the IAEA can guarantee that the Iranian nuclear program is
exclusively peaceful in nature.
Key Takeaways:
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in the center of Jabalia camp on May 15. Israeli forces engaged “dozens” of Palestinian fighters while operating in Jabalia.[20]
Palestinian militias have claimed 34 attacks targeting Israeli forces
operating near Jabalia camp since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 14.[21]
Palestinian militias have claimed 120 attacks (averaging 30 attacks per
day) targeting Israeli forces since the IDF advanced into eastern
Jabalia on May 11.[22] This marks the highest rate of claimed attacks per day in Jabalia since the war began.
Israeli forces continued a re-clearing operation in Zaytoun on May 15. The Nahal Brigade killed Palestinian fighters and seized small arms, explosives, and Hamas intelligence documents.[23] Hamas fighters targeted Israeli forces in Zaytoun with rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire.[24] Israeli forces also located a rocket manufacturing facility near a school in Zaytoun.[25] The Nahal Brigade withdrew from Zaytoun on May 15 and began preparing for future ”offensive operations.”[26] The 2nd Reservist Infantry Brigade will remain in Zaytoun and continue clearing operations.
The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations east of Rafah city on May 15.[27] Palestinian
militias, including Hamas, targeted Israeli forces east of Rafah city
with RPGs, sniper rifles, and improvised explosive devices.[28] Three Palestinian militias also mortared Israeli forces near Rafah crossing and in eastern Rafah.[29] Israeli forces destroyed militia infrastructure.[30]
The Givati Brigade (162nd Division) raided a Hamas training facility in Rafah.[31]
The training facility contained models of Israeli Merkava tanks and
armored personnel carriers. Israeli forces killed Palestinian fighters,
seized weapons and intelligence material, and destroyed buildings.
The
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) posted footage on May 14 showing
unspecified armed Palestinian fighters near an UNRWA logistics facility
in eastern Rafah.[32]
The Palestinian fighters were loitering near UN vehicles and moving
outside the building. The footage also appears to show the Palestinian
fighters threatening unspecified individuals at the facility. The IDF
also reported that the Palestinian fighters fired small arms.[33] The IDF called on the United Nations to conduct an investigation into the incident.[34]
The IDF issued evacuation orders on May 15 for civilians in Menasheya and Sheikh Zayed in the northern Gaza Strip.[35]
Israeli forces will conduct operations in the evacuation zones
”immediately” to target Palestinian fighters operating in and launching
rockets from the area. The IDF ordered civilians to evacuate to shelters
in western Gaza City.
The IDF released documents describing the activities of Hamas’ General Security Service in the Gaza Strip.[36]
The IDF obtained documents detailing the names of operatives working
for Hamas’ General Security Service, their handlers, and the reports
that the operatives and handlers submitted to the service. The IDF
explained that the head of Hamas in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar and a
Hamas Political Bureau member, Rawhi Mushtaha, helped established the
General Security Service to secure Hamas’ control over the Gaza Strip.
The IDF said that Hamas recruited informants in Gazan mosques and
elsewhere in communities to report activities that challenge Hamas The
IDF added that Hamas also planted “agents” within other Palestinian
militias, including PIJ, to interfere in their internal affairs. The IDF
reported that the General Security Service has also threatened
journalists and human rights activists who speak out against Hamas.
Palestinian
fighters conducted at least five rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip
into southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on May 14.[37]
The IDF Air Force attacked Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters who
launched a rocket attack from the northern Gaza Strip targeting Sderot
on May 14[38]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The
al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated an improvised
explosive device targeting Israeli forces during Israeli operations in
Nablus on May 15.[39]
The
Palestinian Authority claimed that Israeli forces shot and killed a
student during a march for Nakba Day in al Bireh, near Ramallah, on May
15.[40] Palestinian media reported that West Bank residents held a funeral service for the student.[41] The IDF has not commented on the incident at the time of this writing.
Israeli forces detained ten wanted individuals and confiscated military equipment during raids across the West Bank on May 15.[42]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Iranian-backed
militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least six
attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on May 14.[43]
The IDF killed a senior Hezbollah field commander in a drone strike in Tyre, southern Lebanon, on May 14.[44]
The IDF said that Hussein Ibrahim al Makki helped plan and execute
attacks targeting Israel. The IDF added that Makki previously served as
the commander of Hezbollah’s “coastal sector.”[45] Hezbollah mourned the death of Makki on May 14.[46]
Israeli sources reported that Makki served as a coordinator and liaison
between Hezbollah and the IRGC Quds Force in Syria and had a ”special
relationship” with senior IRGC officer Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi.[47]
Zahedi, who died in the Israeli airstrike in Damascus, Syria, on April
1, commanded the IRGC Quds Force unit responsible for overseeing
operations in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinian Territories.[48]
Israeli media said that Makki was responsible for ”arming and equipping
[Hezbollah] and the supply line from Iran,” citing unspecified media
sources.[49] Israeli media added that Makki was a ”strong arm” in Syria for Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[50]
Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah hosted a Hamas delegation in Beirut on May 15.[51] Deputy Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip Khalil al Hayya led the delegation.[52]
Hamas Political Bureau member Mohammed Nasr and Hamas' senior
representative to Lebanon Osama Hamdan also attended the meeting.
Nasrallah and the Hamas officials discussed recent developments in the
Gaza Strip, the “various support fronts,” and the status of recent
negotiations between Israel and Hamas.[53]
The
Metulla Council head said on May 15 that communities in northern Israel
will permanently relocate if schools remain closed for another year.[54] The council head’s comments follow demonstrations on May 14 against the Israeli government's inability to return displaced Israeli civilians to northern Israel.[55]
Residents began planning protests after Israeli media reported on May
10 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had dismissed concerns
that residents may not be able to return to northern Israel before the
school year begins in early September.[56]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Iranian
officials are unapologetically defending the type of violent behavior
against Iranian women that triggered the Mahsa Amini protest movement in
September 2022. Social media users circulated a video on May
14 of the Iranian morality patrol forcing a woman who defied the
mandatory veiling law into a van in Iran.[57]
The video shows the morality patrol covering the woman’s head with a
blanket. Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi claimed on May 15 that
the morality patrol acted ”according to regulations” by covering the
woman’s head with a blanket. This incident follows a sharp increase in
violent arrests of unveiled women by the Iranian Law Enforcement Command
(LEC) following the resumption of enforced mandatory veiling in Iran in
mid-April 2024.[58] The LEC separately fired an officer for assaulting an unveiled woman on May 14.[59] The LEC fired this officer after footage of the LEC acting inappropriately surfaced on social media.
Iranian
Law Enforcement Commander Brig. Gen. Ahmad Reza Radan and Vietnamese
Public Security Minister To Lam signed a memorandum of understanding in
Hanoi, Vietnam, on May 14 to increase law enforcement cooperation.[60]
The agreement includes provisions for Iran and Vietnam to increase
information sharing and cooperation to combat organized crime,
terrorism, cybercrime, drug smuggling, arms trafficking, and illegal
immigration. Radan traveled to Hanoi on May 13 for a four-day visit.
Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh called for increasing
economic, commercial, law enforcement, and educational cooperation
during a meeting with Radan on May 13. Radan previously traveled to
Russia in June 2023 and to China in January 2024.[61]
Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brig. Gen.
Esmail Ghaani reiterated the Iranian regime’s claim that Iran's April 13
drone and missile attack targeting Israel was a success.[62] Ghaani
emphasized Iran's military during a speech on May 15 commemorating
former IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hadi Haj
Rahimi. Rahimi died in the Israeli airstrike in Damascus, Syria, on
April 1. Ghaani claimed that Israel, the United States, and the West are
“too small” to face Iran and its Axis of Resistance. Ghaani stated that
Israel and the United States knew when Iran would launch its
retaliatory attack against Israel. This statement is consistent with
IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brig. Gen. Eraj Masjedi’s statement
on May 14. Masjedi noted that it is difficult for Iran to maintain the
element of surprise when attacking Israel directly due to the distance
between the two countries.[63]
Ghaani threatened that the full effects of both the April 13 attack and
Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel have not yet been fully seen.[64]
Ghaani claimed the success of the April 13 attack is not due to the
volume of missiles Iran launched but due to "many secrets" hidden in
this operation. Ghaani claimed that the United States defends Israel
more than any other country.
The Islamic
Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has
claimed three attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off
on May 14. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified “military target” in Eilat on May 14.[65]
The group also claimed two “Arqab” cruise missile attacks targeting
unspecified “vital targets” in the Jericho Valley and the Nevatim
airbase near Beer Sheva on May 15.[66]
The IDF reported that its fighter jets intercepted two drones that
entered Israeli airspace from the east on the night of May 14 to 15.[67]
Russian
state-owned energy company Gazprom announced on May 15 that its CEO,
Alexei Miller, met with Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber
and Oil Minister Javad Owji in Tehran.[68]
Gazprom did not specify what these officials discussed, and Iranian
media has not reported on Miller’s visit to Iran at the time of this
writing. Owji met with representatives from Gazprom on the sidelines of
the Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Algiers, Algeria, in early March
2024.[69]
The National Iranian Oil Company and Gazprom signed a memorandum of
understanding in July 2022 that includes provisions for Gazprom to help
Iran develop the Kish and North Pars gas fields and to increase gas
pressure at the South Pars gas field.[70]
The Houthis claimed on May 15 that they launched an anti-ship ballistic missile targeting the USS Mason in the Red Sea on an unspecified date.[71] CENTCOM reported that the USS Mason intercepted a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile on May 13.[72] The Houthis also claimed on May 15 that they fired unspecified weapons targeting a vessel identified as the Destiny in the Red Sea.[73] The Houthis claimed that the Destiny concealed its destination while transiting via the Red Sea en route to Eilat in April 2024 to avoid a Houthi attack. [74]
[1] https://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-to-pm-reject-israeli-military-civil-rule-of-gaza-after-hamas-i-wont-allow-it/
[2] https://www.timesofisrael.com/gallant-to-pm-reject-israeli-military-civil-rule-of-gaza-after-hamas-i-wont-allow-it/
[3] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/gallant-to-pm-reject-israeli-military-civil-rule-of-gaza-after-hamas-i-wont-allow-it/
[4] https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-chief-said-to-unbraid-netanyahu-for-failing-to-lay-out-post-war-plan-for-gaza/
[5] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-chief-said-to-unbraid-netanyahu-for-failing-to-lay-out-post-war-plan-for-gaza/
[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/05/15/gaza-day-after-post-war-future-netanyahu/
[7] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-chief-said-to-unbraid-netanyahu-for-failing-to-lay-out-post-war-plan-for-gaza/
[8] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-chief-said-to-unbraid-netanyahu-for-failing-to-lay-out-post-war-plan-for-gaza/
[9]
[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-23-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-11-2024
[11] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86
[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-arms-plot-kingdom-caught-iran-israel-shadow-war-2024-05-15/
[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-arms-plot-kingdom-caught-iran-israel-shadow-war-2024-05-15/
[14] https://twitter.com/ShehabAgency/status/1790723031142195299
[15] https://ikhwanjo dot net/الناطق-الإعلامي-للإخوان-ينفي-ما-أوردت;
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-arms-plot-kingdom-caught-iran-israel-shadow-war-2024-05-15
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-29-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-2-2024
[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-arms-plot-kingdom-caught-iran-israel-shadow-war-2024-05-15/
[18]
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-15/increase-in-un-nuclear-inspections-in-iran-can-t-solve-deepening-mistrust?sref=RR1m1tD8
[19]
https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/14/talk-in-iran-about-change-in-nuclear-weapons-policy-must-stop-un-expert-says?CMP=twt_b-gdnnews
[20] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790646709455851946
[21] See author for sources
[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2024
[23] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790678836297785469
[24] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2125 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2154
[25] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790678845164515598
[26] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790678854035485000
[27] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790646717378904196
[28] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2149 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2145 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2139 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4242
[29] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4243 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17839 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17838 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6428
[30] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790646717378904196
[31] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1790653547119366501 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790646728254783926
[32] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790444433357320354
[33] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790444442450546706
[34] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790444445671756263
[35] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1790711897941049590
[36] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1790732988784713792 ; https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1790735941579026758
[37] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6417 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2134 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17824 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2151 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17843
[38] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790646717378904196 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/17805
[39] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6422
[40] https://www.wafa dot ps/Pages/Details/95594;
https://www.timesofisrael
dot
com/liveblog_entry/palestinians-claim-man-killed-by-israel-troops-after-west-bank-march-marking-nakba
[41] https://t.me/newpress1/75569; https://t.me/newpress1/75584
[42] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790709786650034330; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790709789950910789
[43] https://t.me/mmirleb/3889; https://t.me/mmirleb/3891; https://t.me/mmirleb/3893; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/2146; https://t.me/mmirleb/3895; https://t.me/mmirleb/3897
[44] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790594270925123703; https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1790596780255527379
[45] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790594274196602949
[46] https://t.me/mmirleb/3887
[47] https://www.i24news
dot
tv/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84/artc-ca946c02;
https://twitter.com/IntelliTimes/status/1790497959487885362
[48]
https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-794796#google_vignette;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-1-2024
[49] https://www.i24news
dot
tv/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84/artc-ca946c02
[50] https://www.i24news
dot
tv/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84/artc-ca946c02
[51] https://t.me/mmirleb/3888; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-801221
[52] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/05/15/hezbollah-launches-60-rockets-at-israel/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-25-2024
[53] https://t.me/mmirleb/3888
[54] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1790643973205180703
[55] https://twitter.com/kann_news/status/1790288362324038039;
https://twitter.com/InbarBezek/status/1790293918476566569;
https://www.timesofisrael dot com/northern-residents-plan-to-disengage-from-israel-in-independence-day-protest/;
https://www.jpost dot com/israel-hamas-war/article-800692
[56]
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/northern-residents-plan-to-disengage-from-israel-in-independence-day-protest/;
https://www.jpost dot com/israel-hamas-war/article-800692
[57] https://twitter.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1790455188219646306 ;
https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1790749150717305098
[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-15-2024
[59] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202405140093
[60] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/215155/Iran-Vietnam-ink-MoU-on-Law-Enforcement-cooperation
[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-27-2023 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2024
[62] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/26/3086640/
[63] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/25/3085555
[64] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/667523/
[65] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1117
[66] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1120
[67] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1790737606247862348
[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/gazprom-ceo-miller-is-iran-putin-prepares-visit-china-2024-05-15/
[69] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85405729
[70] https://en.shana dot ir/news/459590/NIOC-Gazprom-strike-40b-MoU ;
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-russias-gazprom-sign-primary-deal-energy-cooperation-2022-07-19/#:~:text=Iran%20and%20Russia's%20Gazprom%20sign%20primary%20deal%20for%20energy%20cooperation,-By%20Reuters&text=LONDON%2C%20July%2019%20(Reuters),ministry's%20news%20agency%20SHANA%20said. ;
https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/has-iran-given-up-on-energy-deals-with-russia
[71] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1790716849044201703
[72] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3773882/may-13-red-sea-update/
[73] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1790716849044201703
[74] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1790716849044201703
