Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 22, 2024, 6:45pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1:40pm ET on January 22. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the January 23 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Russia continues to weaponize
its position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to propagate
several long-standing Russian information operations. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at a UNSC meeting, which Russia
convened, on January 22 and blamed the West for the lack of
negotiations, claiming that Russia has always been “ready for
negotiations.”[1]
Lavrov clarified, however, that Russia is only interested in
negotiations that result in the removal of the current Ukrainian
government from power, confirming that Russia still officially seeks
regime change in Ukraine.[2]
Lavrov continued to deny Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty,
falsely claiming that the Ukrainian people have no interests in the war
against Russia and that the West has pushed Ukraine to continue the war.[3]
Lavrov advised the West to understand that Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky’s ”peace formula” is a “path to nowhere,” claiming
that the “sooner [the West] realizes this, the better it will be for
both Ukraine and the West.”[4] Lavrov also claimed that “if Ukraine stops fighting, hundreds of thousands” of Ukrainian lives would be saved.[5]
Lavrov previously made similar comments, suggesting that the Kremlin
believes that Russia will be able to occupy more territory as the war
continues and that this course of the war will increasingly weaken
Ukraine’s negotiating position.[6]
Lavrov
denied Russia’s responsibility for fears that Russia may attack NATO in
the future, ignoring the recent Kremlin official statements that have
prompted those fears. Lavrov falsely claimed that the West promotes the
idea that Russia will attack the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland in
the future as a way to “extort money” from Western states for aid to
Ukraine.[7]
Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, however,
have sustained consistent threatening rhetoric directed against NATO
member states, and Kremlin-affiliated actors appear to be attempting to
sow instability and set information conditions for possible future
aggressive Russian actions against NATO members and other post-Soviet
states.[8]
Lavrov also blamed Ukrainian forces for conducting strikes on
Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine, which the Kremlin used to support
Russian justifications for its war of conquest in Ukraine.[9]
Lavrov recently claimed that Ukrainian forces are using
Western-supplied weapons to strike civilian targets, including in
alleged strikes against occupied Donetsk City on January 21, for
example.[10] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), made similar claims on January 21.[11] The New York Times reported
on January 21 that it could not independently confirm the actors behind
the strike on Donetsk City, and the press service of the Ukrainian
Tavriisk Group of Forces stated on January 21 that forces under the
control of the Tavriisk Group of Forces did not conduct the strikes.[12]
Lavrov also attempted to downplay the various war crimes and crimes
against humanity that Russian occupation forces and occupation
administrators are conducting in Ukraine, claiming that Ukrainians and
Russians “live in peace and harmony” in occupied Crimea and other
Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.[13]
Lavrov claimed that “Russians and Ukrainians will live exactly like
brothers and good neighbors” after Russia achieves its goals in the war
in Ukraine — which ISW continues to assess are tantamount to full
Ukrainian and Western surrender.[14]
ISW has routinely documented how Russian forces and occupation
administrations have been engaging in large-scale and deliberate ethnic
cleansing campaigns; forcibly and illegally deport Ukrainians, including
children, to Russia; and are systematically working to eliminate the
Ukrainian language, culture, history, and ethnicity in areas that
Russian forces occupy.[15]
ISW
previously assessed that Russia aims to reinforce the primacy of the UN
and to link as many international efforts to the UN as possible in
order to capitalize on Russia’s permanent UNSC seat and veto power.[16]
Russia’s request for the January 22 UNSC meeting to discuss arms
supplies to Ukraine and Lavrov’s use of this meeting to promote various
Kremlin information operations is likely an attempt to legitimize these
Kremlin narratives, promote them on a global stage, and convince
Ukraine’s international partners to stop sending weapons to Ukraine.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Kyiv on January 22 and announced a new Polish defense package for Ukraine.[17] Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Tusk for the new Polish defense
package and noted that he and Tusk discussed possibilities for the
future production of weapons.[18]
Zelensky stated that the package includes a Polish loan for large-scale
Ukrainian weapons purchases, but Tusk and Zelensky did not specify
additional details about security assistance package provisions or the
overall value of the package.[19]
Tusk later stated that Poland joined the Group of Seven (G7)
declaration of support for Ukraine and noted that Poland will appoint a
commissioner to oversee Polish involvement in Ukrainian reconstruction
efforts.[20]
Footage
purportedly showing an altercation between a Russian soldier and
Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok” forces in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast,
reignited criticism of Chechen forces for their lack of contributions
to Russian military operations in Ukraine. Footage widely
circulated on January 22 purportedly shows Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok”
Battalion commander Vakha Khambulatov and other “Akhmat-Vostok”
Battalion personnel threatening to kill a Russian soldier at a
checkpoint in occupied Melitopol after the Russian soldier stated that
Khambulatov had invalid identification documents.[21]
Russian milbloggers criticized the Chechen personnel for having “too
clean uniforms and too clean cars” and complained that these personnel
receive the same state salary and social benefits as frontline Russian
Airborne (VDV) forces despite contributing less to Russian military
operations.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that this is the fifth altercation between Russian and Chechen military personnel in rear areas.[23]
Russian sources have previously criticized Chechen forces for
conducting performative actions in Belgorod Oblast after all-Russian
pro-Ukrainian forces raided the area, for posturing themselves as a
response force during the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023, and for
exaggerating their supposed frontline combat contributions around
Bakhmut in July 2023.[24]
Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov has routinely attempted to curry
favor with the Kremlin and promote his domestic power through
emphasizing Chechnya’s contributions to the war in Ukraine, and
continued criticism against Chechen forces in Ukraine may degrade the
influence Kadyrov has gained through this effort.
An
investigation by a Russian opposition outlet suggests that Russian
elites may have accepted and internalized the domestic consequences of
Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Verstka, citing
unnamed interlocutors amongst Russian elites, reported that Russian
elites are increasingly complaining that vacations in Russia and abroad
in “friendly countries” are becoming more expensive.[25] Verstka’s
interlocutor noted that many Russian elites who work in military and
government affairs want a quick end to the war on the condition that
Ukraine recognizes Russia’s illegal annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk,
Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts, and that elites desire Russia to
”finish off” Ukraine so that Russia can go about planning for a new
future isolated from Europe. Verstka cited Russian political
scientist Ilya Grashchenkov noting that the upcoming March 2024 Russian
presidential election is not galvanizing Russian political elites as the
Presidential Administration had hoped because most Russian elites view
the outcome of the elections as pre-determined, and do not anticipate
much change to their status as a result of Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s re-election. Grashchenkov noted that “new” elites who came into
power as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have realized that
they will be unable to gain more influence and “old” elites understand
they have limited political control. Verstka summarized the
sentiments of Russian elites as “apathetic,” which suggests that many
Russian elites have internalized and accepted the social ramifications
of the war. ISW has previously reported on Russian public opinion polls
that similarly show a substantial degree of domestic internalization of
the war’s consequences and support for the war.[26]
Russian
officials and information space actors are attempting to further
rhetorically justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by misrepresenting a
decree that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed on January 22
concerning discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians in Russia. Zelensky
signed a decree titled “On the Territories of the Russian Federation
Historically Inhabited by Ukrainians,” which accurately stated that
Russia has systematically oppressed and continues to oppress Ukrainians
living in Russia and eroding their national identity, including on lands
historically inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians in modern day Russia’s
Krasnodar Krai and Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov
oblasts.[27]
The decree instructs the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers to develop an
action plan for preserving Ukrainian national identity in Russia,
documenting the history of Russia’s oppression of its Ukrainian
communities, countering disinformation about the history of Ukrainians
in Russia, and disseminating materials about Ukrainian national state
formations in different historical periods. Zelensky’s decree does not establish any territorial demands upon Russia, as select Russian ultranationalists falsely claimed.[28]
Russian
officials purposefully misrepresented the decree to further justify
Russia’s full-scale invasion and made further genocidal appeals to the
destruction of Ukrainian statehood and ethnic identity. Kursk Oblast
Governor Roman Starovoyt called the decree a blatant distortion of
history and argued that it shows that Russian President Vladimir Putin
was correct to invade Ukraine.[29] Starovoyt’s response suggests that Russian officials and actors may continue to misrepresent the decree as an ex post facto casus belli to
falsely assert that Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February
2022 was defensive in nature. Russian Security Council Deputy
Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the decree and reiterated
longstanding Kremlin rhetoric that aims to erase Ukrainian ethnic
identity by asserting that ethnic Ukrainians are ethnically Russian.[30]
Medvedev also stated that “Malorossiya” (Little Russia) is part of
Russia — a pseudo-historical Kremlin talking point that Russian
officials routinely invoke to deny Ukrainian territorial integrity and
sovereignty.[31]
The Kremlin has repeatedly used the concept of “compatriots abroad,”
which includes ethnic Russian and Russian speakers of other ethnicities,
to justify the war in Ukraine and aggression in other neighboring
states, and Russian officials and ultranationalists may be primed to
view legitimate appeals to protecting compatriots abroad as similar
pretexts for aggressive actions.[32]
Russia
has historically had a policy to Russify ethnic minorities living
within Russian territory, and Zelensky’s decree coincides with wider
Russian animus towards non-ethnic Russians within Russia that extends
far beyond ethnic Ukrainian communities.[33]
The Russian ultranationalist community continues to seize on incidents
involving migrants and non-ethnic Russians to express growing hostility
towards diaspora communities and non-ethnic Russian minorities within
Russia.[34]
Russian officials and ultranationalists may attempt to frame states’
legitimate concerns about growing Russian domestic animus towards their
diaspora communities and Russia's history of discriminatory policies as
anti-Russian and inherently escalatory.
Key Takeaways:
- Russia
continues to weaponize its position on the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) to propagate several long-standing Russian information
operations.
- Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited Kyiv on January 22 and announced a new Polish defense package for Ukraine.
- Footage
purportedly showing an altercation between a Russian soldier and
Chechen “Akhmat-Vostok” forces in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast,
reignited criticism of Chechen forces for their lack of contributions
to Russian military operations in Ukraine.
- An
investigation by a Russian opposition outlet suggests that Russian
elites may have accepted and internalized the domestic consequences of
Russia’s war in Ukraine.
- Russian officials and
information space actors are attempting to further rhetorically justify
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by misrepresenting a decree that Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky signed on January 22 concerning
discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians in Russia. Zelensky’s decree
does not establish any territorial demands upon Russia, as select
Russian ultranationalists falsely claimed.
- Russian
forces made confirmed advances south of Avdiivka and west of Donetsk
City amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.
- Kyrgyzstan
issued a statement against Russia’s continued practice of targeting
naturalized migrants as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
- Russian federal subjects continue to establish ties with areas of occupied Ukraine.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces continued intensified offensive operations southeast of Kupyansk
on January 22 and reportedly advanced. Several Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces continued efforts to advance southwest of
Krokhmalne near Berestove (25km southeast of Kupyansk).[35]
A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 21
that Russian forces advanced four kilometers deep along a
1.5-kilometer-wide front towards the Kotlyarivka-Kyslivka line (20km
southeast of Kupyansk and just north of the Krokhmalne area), although
ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of Russian gains towards
Kotlyarivka.[36]
Milbloggers claimed that Russian advances in this area will allow
Russian forces to access the P07 Kupyansk-Svatove road and open a new
front against Kupyansk.[37]
Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that positional engagements
continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka.[38]
Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military
District) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[39]
Russian
forces continued ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on
January 22 and reportedly advanced in some areas. A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 400 meters along a 1.5
kilometer-wide-front from near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and
other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the mill
facility area southeast of Bilohorivka.[40]
ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these Russian gains
near Bilohorivka, however. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that
positional engagements continued northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka and
Novoyehorivka; west of Kreminna near Terny, Torske, and Yampolivka; and
south of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area and near Bilohorivka.[41]
Geolocated footage posted on January 21 shows at least 20 new Russian
vehicles losses following a recent unsuccessful assault on Terny.[42] Elements of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Army Corps continue to operate near Bilohorivka.[43]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces reportedly advanced northwest of Bakhmut amid continued
positional fighting in the area on January 22. Russian milbloggers
claimed on January 21 and 22 that Russian forces advanced within central
Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut) and that Ukrainian forces control
roughly a third of the settlement.[44]
ISW has only observed confirmation of Russian forces holding positions
in the northern outskirts of Bohdanivka. Russian and Ukrainian sources
stated that positional fighting occurred northwest of Bakhmut near
Hryhorivka and Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; and southwest
of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Pivnichne.[45]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on January 22
of elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division participating
in the alleged capture of Vesele (northeast of Bakhmut) on January 18.[46]
Elements of the Russian 98th VDV are reportedly operating northwest of
Bakhmut, elements of the “Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer
Corps) are reportedly operating near Bohdanivka, and elements of the
11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut area.[47]
Russian
forces recently made confirmed gains south of Avdiivka and reportedly
continued to advance in southern Avdiivka on January 22. Geolocated
footage published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently
advanced beyond a section of railway line south of Avdiivka.[48]
Russian milbloggers claimed on January 21 and 22 that Russian forces
further consolidated positions in the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant area
just south of Avdiivka and continued to advance along Sportyvna,
Soborna, and Cherenyshevskoho streets on the southern outskirts of
Avdiivka.[49]
A Russian milblogger claimed on January 22 that Ukrainian forces still
control the area between the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant and the
Avdiivka quarry and Vynohradnyky garden areas in southeastern Avdiivka.[50]
Russian and Ukrainian sources reported positional fighting northwest of
Avdiivka near Ocheretyne, Novokalynove, Novobakhmutivka, and Stepove;
near Avdiivka itself; west of Avdiivka near Sieverne; and southwest of
Avdiivka near Pervomaiske and Nevelske.[51]
Elements of the Donetsk Peoples Republic (DNR) “Pyatnashka”
international volunteer brigade are reportedly operating near Avdiivka,
and elements of the DNR 1487th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st DNR Army
Corps) reportedly participated in the alleged capture of the “Tsarska
Okhota” restaurant area.[52]
Ukrainian
forces recently made marginal advances west of Donetsk City. Geolocated
footage published on January 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces
recently advanced at the Trudovska mine south of Krasnohorivka (west of
Donetsk City).[53]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 300
meters deep along Zhovetna Street and 240 meters deep near the
All-Saints Church in Heorhiivka (west of Donetsk City).[54]
ISW has not observed confirmation of these claimed Russian advances in
Heorhiivka. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional
fighting continued near Heorhiivka and Novomykhailivka (southwest of
Donetsk City).[55]
Elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (Eastern Military District) are
reportedly operating near Novomykhailvika, and elements of the 150th
Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern
Military District), the DNR 5th Motorized Rifle Regiment (DNR 1st Army
Corps), and the 8th CAA’s 238th Artillery Brigade are operating near
Heorhiivka.[56]
Russian
forces recently made a confirmed advance in the Vuhledar area southwest
of Donetsk City. Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates
that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Mykilske
(southeast of Vuhledar).[57]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Positional
engagements continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on
January 22, but there were no confirmed changes to this area of the
frontline. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Ukrainian forces
marginally advanced south of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka),
although ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming this purported
advance.[58]
Russian sources claimed that positional engagements continued near
Novodonetske (southeast of Velyka Novosilka), Staromayorske, and Zavitne
Bazhannya (both south of Velyka Novosilka).[59]
Positional
engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 22, but
there were no confirmed changes to this area of the frontline. Russian
milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces captured several unspecified
positions near Verbove (east of Robotyne), although ISW has not observed
visual evidence confirming this claim.[60]
Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements
continued near Robotyne, Verbove, Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne),
Pyatykhatky (27km northwest of Robotyne), and Kamyanske (35km northwest
of Robotyne).[61]
Russian milbloggers claimed that frequent Ukrainian first-person view
(FPV) drone strikes increase the difficulty of Russian operations in the
Zaporizhia direction.[62]
Ukrainian
forces maintain positions on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of
January 22, but there were no changes to the frontline in this area.
Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that positional engagements
continued near Krynky.[63] Russian forces reportedly continue conducting TOS-1A thermobaric artillery strikes on Ukrainian positions in Krynky.[64]
Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya
Humenyuk stated that Russian forces have reduced tactical aviation
activity over southern Ukraine but have started to intensify the use of
various modified drones to drop explosives on Ukrainian positions and
populated areas.[65]
Humenyuk also reported that Russian forces are attempting to adjust
their combat tactics on the east bank to push Ukrainian forces from the
east bank, so the number of Russian assaults per day has fluctuated
between one and 10 over the past week.[66]
Humenyuk stated that Russian personnel are increasingly refusing to
conduct assaults in the Kherson direction because the Russian command
prohibits Russian forces from using armored vehicle support during the
attacks.[67]
Russian news outlet RIA Novosti
reported on January 22 that a source close to Crimean occupation
authorities claimed that the Russian military will dismantle Ukrainian
ships abandoned in Sevastopol after Russia’s illegal annexation of
Crimea in 2014 instead of transferring them to the Russian Black Sea
Fleet (BSF).[68]
The source claimed that the Russian military has suspended dismantling
the Ukrainian ships in order to prioritize protecting BSF vessels.[69]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Kyrgyzstan
issued a statement against Russia’s continued practice of targeting
naturalized migrants as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
Russian outlet It’s My City reported on January 19 that Russian
security forces from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB),
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), and Rosgvardia conducted a raid at a
construction site in Yekaterinburg on January 17.[70] It’s My City reported
that the Russian security officials inspected the documents of about
150 foreign workers, deported eight workers, and issued military
summonses to four foreign workers who recently obtained Russian
passports but had not registered with Russian military registration and
enlistment offices.[71] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported
on January 22 that there were about 40 Kyrgyz citizens at the
construction site on January 17 and that Kyrgyzstan's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs stated that the Consulate General is taking measures to
investigate the legality of Russian law enforcement’s methods that
“degrade the dignity of [Kyrgyz] citizens engaged in labor activities.”[72]
Kyrgyzstan previously sentenced Kyrgyz citizens to prison on charges of
participating in a military conflict in a foreign country after the
Kyrgyz citizens fought in Ukraine as part of the Wagner Group and a
Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) unit.[73]
Russian
officials continue attempts to censor family members of mobilized
Russian military personnel who demand the return of their family members
back to Russia. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News stated
on January 22 that Russian authorities accused relatives of mobilized
Russian military personnel of violating anti-COVID-19 measures, demanded
an inspection of the group’s documents, and photographed the group’s
signs after the group laid flowers at the Field of Mars in St.
Petersburg on January 20.[74]
Russian
authorities are reportedly struggling to develop a unified electronic
military register for digitizing recruitment processes. Forbes Russia stated
on January 21 that Russia will have to create its electronic military
summonses system from scratch, which may delay the project’s
implementation.[75] Forbes Russia stated
that the Russian government decided on December 22, 2023, to not
develop a military registration system based on its platform for public
services, Gostekh, as this system is not designed to process classified
information. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the creation of a
digital register to send electronic summonses to citizens eligible for
conscription in April 2023, and Russian Deputy Minister of Digital
Development Oleg Kachanov stated in September 2023 that Russia will
launch the digital register in 2025.[76]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 22 that it
delivered an unspecified quantity of modernized T-72B3M tanks to the
Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces operating in the southern Donetsk
direction in Ukraine.[77]
The T-72B3M is a modernized version of the T-72 with an improved fire
control system with a digital ballistic computer, a sight with a laser
rangefinder, an anti-tank missile control system, a modernized digital
communications system, a rearview camera, and more reliable tracks.[78] TASS stated that the T-72B3M is reinforced with side screens, mounted lattice screens, and new protection systems.[79]
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian
objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more
self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
Click here to read ISW’s new analysis on Ukrainian long-term efforts to develop a self-sufficient DIB with US and European support.
Ukraine’s partners continue to prepare military assistance packages and bolster defense production for Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ)
reported on January 21 that the European Union (EU) is developing a new
plan to provide Ukraine with “tens of billions of dollars” of military
assistance and that 22 billion euros ($23.9 billion) of this assistance
will feed back into EU member states.[80] The WSJ also reported that NATO plans to announce a new investment in artillery ammunition production on January 23.[81]
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on January 22 that
Belgium will provide military assistance valued at 611 million euros
($665.1 million) to Ukraine in 2024 and that Belgium has made a
long-term commitment to help modernize the Ukrainian military.[82]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian
federal subjects continue to establish ties with areas of occupied
Ukraine. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated
on January 22 that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov visited occupied
Mariupol to hold administrative meetings with Russian occupation
officials.[83]
Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on
January 22 that the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic continues to establish
patronage networks with occupied Kherson Oblast, including through the
construction of a medical facility and school in occupied Mykhailivka
and Kalanchak and the provision of school supplies to schools in
occupied Skadovsk and Hola Prystan raions.[84]
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Senior
Russian officials continue efforts to falsely portray Ukraine as a pawn
of the West that lacks agency. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
(SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin falsely claimed on January 22 that the
US is trying to make Ukraine into a “vassal state” and that the US is
blackmailing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky into making
cabinet-level personnel changes that allegedly favor the West.[85]
Senior Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin,
routinely attempt to frame Ukraine as an agent of the West to mask
Russia’s expansionist and maximalist war goals of establishing full
Russian control over Ukraine and eliminating Ukrainian sovereignty.[86]
Russian
officials and Kremlin mouthpieces further intensified efforts to
misrepresent French support for Ukraine as escalatory to constrain
ongoing and future French assistance to Ukraine. Russian State Duma
International Affairs Committee Head Leonid Slutsky announced that the
Duma has submitted a draft appeal to the French National Assembly to
begin an investigation into Russian allegations of “French mercenaries”
fighting for Ukraine.[87] Slutsky stated that the State Duma will consider the appeal on January 24.[88] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on Russian state television channel Rossiya-24 that France is violating its own laws by failing to admit that ”French mercenaries” are fighting in Ukraine.[89]
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) previously summoned
French Ambassador to Russia Pierre Levy over these accusations on
January 19.[90]
Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused French Foreign
Minister Stephane Sejourne on January 22 of being “indifferent” and
“unprofessional” in response to the French MFA’s January 18 denial of
“French mercenaries” operating in Ukraine.[91] The French MFA characterized the Russian accusations as “another clumsy Russian manipulation.”[92]
A
pro-Kremlin actor is amplifying information attacks on Armenian Prime
Minister Nikol Pashinyan likely to punish Armenia for recently
distancing itself from Russian influence. A prominent,
Kremlin-affiliated milblogger amplified a claim on January 22 portraying
Pashinyan as purposefully destroying the Armenian military and that
Pashinyan aims to destroy the Armenian state.[93]
The milblogger also claimed that Azerbaijan demanded a list of
minefields along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border and that this demand sets
a precedent for further Azerbaijani demands on the Armenian military.[94]
The milblogger’s seemingly contradictory characterizations of Pashinyan
as both abusing power and as weak in posturing against Azerbaijan
likely aim to portray Pashinyan as an incapable head of state and punish
Pashinyan for his increasingly anti-Russia policies.
Significant Activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko stated on January 22 that he will hold one-on-one
negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the
meeting agenda of the upcoming Union State Supreme Council meeting,
which will likely occur in early 2024.[95]
Neither Russia nor Belarus has announced a date for the
Putin-Lukashenko discussions nor for the Union State Supreme Council
meeting, however. Union State Secretary of State Dmitry Mezentsev
announced on January 22 that Belarus has prepared a draft resolution to
create a unified media holding for the Union State for the Supreme
Council to consider at the meeting.[96]
Mezentsev stated that this media company will coordinate and ensure the
release of print publications, television channels, and internet
resources related to the Union State formation, components, history,
plans, and reactions to pressure. Russian and Belarusian officials have
described the Union State’s united media holding as a single media
company that will unify Belarus’ and Russia’s media resources under one
consolidated “powerful editorial office” to “promote the Union State
agenda” domestically.[97]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/19787349 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/227505 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/227505 ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6442457
[2] https://tass dot ru/politika/19787349
[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/19787275 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/227505
[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/19787375
[5] https://tass dot ru/politika/19787275
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121523
[7] https://tass dot ru/politika/19787241
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723
[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024
[10] https://tass dot ru/politika/19787169
[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2024
;
https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid0CeeYRzYRiD8Mmx7vxsMbg2QmEfEjcjAED7sKHdSYZirJvdFqbriU7GWfu1KY374Kl&id=100087766044760&paipv=0&eav=Afb207dv53y2wu7WJI9vwV7LoQwVzXhjvydXS9N_ezElC39KZRVZPKx3aiz7zrRfpCg&_rdr
[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/19787325
[14] https://rg
dot
ru/2024/01/22/lavrov-rossiia-gotova-k-peregovoram-po-ukraine-no-ne-o-sohranenii-kievskogo-rezhima.html
; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010224 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110523 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2024
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2023
[16]
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf
[17] https://twitter.com/PremierRP/status/1749403397025894659; . https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/9249 ; https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/zelenskyj-povidomyv-pro-novyj-oboronnyj-paket-vid-polshhi/
[18] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-zustrivsya-z-donaldom-tuskom-u-kiyevi-vd-88473; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-zustrivsya-z-donaldom-tuskom-u-kiyevi-vd-88473 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/01/22/volodymyr-zelenskyj-obgovoryv-z-donaldom-tuskom-mozhlyvosti-spilnogo-vyrobnycztva-zbroyi/
[19] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/9249
[20] https://twitter.com/PremierRP/status/1749403397025894659; ttps://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/01/22/polshha-pryyednalasya-do-deklaracziyi-g7-shhodo-garantij-bezpeky-dlya-ukrayiny/
[21] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1749355643683660181?s=20 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/59537 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1749383121387036963?s=20 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60771 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6606 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33150 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6607 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/45330 ; https://t.me/mnogonazi/14551 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/7589
[22] https://t.me/dva_majors/33150 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6607 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6606
[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/33150
[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2023 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48050
[25] https://verstka dot media/kak-sebya-chuvstvuyut-rossiiskie-eliti-nakanune-viborov
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010924
[27] https://www.president.gov dot ua/documents/172024-49513
[28] https://www.president.gov
dot ua/documents/172024-49513 ;
https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/14240
https://t.me/sashakots/44595; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6612
[29] https://t.me/gubernator_46/4602
[30] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/438
[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323
[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar123023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024
[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024
[35] https://t.me/rybar/56220; https://t.me/rybar/56235; https://t.me/dva_majors/33147; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60763; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6600
[36] https://t.me/rybar/56220; https://t.me/rybar/56235
[37] https://t.me/rybar/56235; https://t.me/rybar/56223; https://t.me/rybar/56220; https://t.me/wargonzo/17723
[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038EsnQ8o2SwnnvcDEkwY8xURbanATeK3RyheRwErd6kFj4F4nPPdXGktfGxfV7RnMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X3QvY85Bhoh7NK3RWtnUVJuw1Csgp7E5rspYHgh6t534Qe52ErzHcsEDnuhidQYHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xkZsv7aqpiodEaa7QXxsAijrEQHJv8ptCwUNuBMGKZVTQRgSQ3h3mW9MhAXJQoB8l; https://t.me/mod_russia/34905 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/34907; https://t.me/wargonzo/17723; https://t.me/notes_veterans/15101
[39] https://t.me/sashakots/44593; https://t.me/epoddubny/18884
[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/33147; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60724 https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6600
[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038EsnQ8o2SwnnvcDEkwY8xURbanATeK3RyheRwErd6kFj4F4nPPdXGktfGxfV7RnMl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X3QvY85Bhoh7NK3RWtnUVJuw1Csgp7E5rspYHgh6t534Qe52ErzHcsEDnuhidQYHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xkZsv7aqpiodEaa7QXxsAijrEQHJv8ptCwUNuBMGKZVTQRgSQ3h3mW9MhAXJQoB8l; https://t.me/mod_russia/34905; https://t.me/mod_russia/34904; https://t.me/wargonzo/17723
[42] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1749105243277652257?s=20; https://t.me/BALUhub/7890
[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60724
[44] https://t.me/rybar/56220 ; https://t.me/rybar/56231 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6616 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60763
[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038EsnQ8o2SwnnvcDEkwY8xURbanATeK3RyheRwErd6kFj4F4nPPdXGktfGxfV7RnMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X3QvY85Bhoh7NK3RWtnUVJuw1Csgp7E5rspYHgh6t534Qe52ErzHcsEDnuhidQYHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xkZsv7aqpiodEaa7QXxsAijrEQHJv8ptCwUNuBMGKZVTQRgSQ3h3mW9MhAXJQoB8l
; https://t.me/mod_russia/34905 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/34909 ;
https://t.me/mod_russia/34901 ; https://t.me/rybar/56220 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/33147 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6616 ;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60763 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6600 ;
https://t.me/wargonzo/17723
[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/34902 (Vesele)
[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60731 (Bakhmut) ;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60726 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60737 (Bohdanivka)
[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4134; https://t.me/wargonzo/17733
[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/110405 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/1263 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6600 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/25849 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/25850
; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/14221 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/33147 ; https://t.me/rybar/56220 ;
https://t.me/rybar/56237
[50] https://t.me/multi_XAM/1263
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X3QvY85Bhoh7NK3RWtnUVJuw1Csgp7E5rspYHgh6t534Qe52ErzHcsEDnuhidQYHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xkZsv7aqpiodEaa7QXxsAijrEQHJv8ptCwUNuBMGKZVTQRgSQ3h3mW9MhAXJQoB8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038EsnQ8o2SwnnvcDEkwY8xURbanATeK3RyheRwErd6kFj4F4nPPdXGktfGxfV7RnMl ; https://t.me/rybar/56237 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33147 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60763 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17723 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/15102 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/32538 ; https://t.me/smotri_z/24998
[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/17738 (Avdiivka) ;
https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1749371915444142531 (Tsarska Okhota)
[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4122; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/1158
[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60720 ; https://t.me/rybar/56220 ; https://t.me/rybar/56220
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X3QvY85Bhoh7NK3RWtnUVJuw1Csgp7E5rspYHgh6t534Qe52ErzHcsEDnuhidQYHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xkZsv7aqpiodEaa7QXxsAijrEQHJv8ptCwUNuBMGKZVTQRgSQ3h3mW9MhAXJQoB8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038EsnQ8o2SwnnvcDEkwY8xURbanATeK3RyheRwErd6kFj4F4nPPdXGktfGxfV7RnMl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/34898 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33147 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17723
[56] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60761 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/6969 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11634 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/15107 (Heorhiivka) ;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60763 (Novomykhailivka)
[57]
https://x.com/giK1893/status/1749508186984309075?s=20;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rm0fBjg-i_8;
https://x.com/giK1893/status/1749508363845599315?s=20;
https://x.com/giK1893/status/1749508942479101980?s=20;
https://x.com/giK1893/status/1749509102915457278?s=20
[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/17723 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/4410
[59] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/4410 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17722 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17723
[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/33147 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6600
[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038EsnQ8o2SwnnvcDEkwY8xURbanATeK3RyheRwErd6kFj4F4nPPdXGktfGxfV7RnMl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X3QvY85Bhoh7NK3RWtnUVJuw1Csgp7E5rspYHgh6t534Qe52ErzHcsEDnuhidQYHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xkZsv7aqpiodEaa7QXxsAijrEQHJv8ptCwUNuBMGKZVTQRgSQ3h3mW9MhAXJQoB8l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/33147 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6600 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6625 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/17723 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60763 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/34906 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/34911
[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/33147 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6600 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6600
[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038EsnQ8o2SwnnvcDEkwY8xURbanATeK3RyheRwErd6kFj4F4nPPdXGktfGxfV7RnMl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X3QvY85Bhoh7NK3RWtnUVJuw1Csgp7E5rspYHgh6t534Qe52ErzHcsEDnuhidQYHl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xkZsv7aqpiodEaa7QXxsAijrEQHJv8ptCwUNuBMGKZVTQRgSQ3h3mW9MhAXJQoB8l
; https://t.me/dva_majors/33147 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/60763 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6624 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/6600
[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/110359
[65] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/01/22/na-hersonskomu-napryamku-vorog-zminyuye-taktyku-vedennya-bojovyh-dij/
[66] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/01/22/na-hersonskomu-napryamku-vorog-zminyuye-taktyku-vedennya-bojovyh-dij/
[67]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/01/22/rosijske-komanduvannya-zaboronyaye-vykorystovuvaty-bronetehniku-pid-chas-shturmiv-na-hersonshhyni-nataliya-gumenyuk/
[68] https://ria dot ru/20240122/korabli-1922677523.html
[69] https://ria dot ru/20240122/korabli-1922677523.html
[70] https://itsmycity
dot
ru/2024-01-19/siloviki-snov-proveli-rejd-postrojploshadkam-ekaterinburga-chetverym-migrantam-vruchili-povestki-vvoenkomat
; https://meduza
dot
io/news/2024/01/22/v-ekaterinburge-vo-vremya-reyda-na-stroyploschadke-rabochih-zastavili-hodit-guskom-mid-kyrgyzstana-potreboval-provesti-proverku
[71] https://itsmycity
dot
ru/2024-01-19/siloviki-snov-proveli-rejd-postrojploshadkam-ekaterinburga-chetverym-migrantam-vruchili-povestki-vvoenkomat
; https://meduza
dot
io/news/2024/01/22/v-ekaterinburge-vo-vremya-reyda-na-stroyploschadke-rabochih-zastavili-hodit-guskom-mid-kyrgyzstana-potreboval-provesti-proverku
[72]
https://meduza dot
io/news/2024/01/22/v-ekaterinburge-vo-vremya-reyda-na-stroyploschadke-rabochih-zastavili-hodit-guskom-mid-kyrgyzstana-potreboval-provesti-proverku
[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2023-0
[74] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/17311
[75] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/3844 ; https://t.me/istories_media/4825 ; https://www.forbes dot ru/tekhnologii/504631-vlasti-otkazalis-ot-idei-sozdania-servisa-elektronnyh-povestok-na-platforme-gosteh
[76] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2023
[77] https://t.me/mod_russia/34919
[78] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19780931 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/34919
[79] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/19780931 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/34919
[80] https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/eu-tackles-new-20-billion-plan-to-boost-ukraine-military-aid-79d52b6b
[81] https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/eu-tackles-new-20-billion-plan-to-boost-ukraine-military-aid-79d52b6b
[82]
https://suspilne dot
media/667094-belgia-u-comu-roci-planue-nadati-ukraini-vijskovoi-dopomogi-na-611-mln-evro-umerov/
;
https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02HGkxcnoB7FKNSY3GfX6vdMV5Znt5E52WRCb33srieSW8jRWwnwmy9AVf4m2Lp5a7l?ref=embed_post
[83] https://t.me/andriyshTime/17359
[84] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/1909
[85] https://tass dot ru/politika/19781775 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/227405
[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/lands-ukraine-must-liberate
[87] https://t.me/tass_agency/227426; https://t.me/tass_agency/227414
[88] https://t.me/tass_agency/227426; https://t.me/tass_agency/227414
[89] https://t.me/tass_agency/227414
[90] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-19-2024
[91] https://www.france24 dot com/en/europe/20240118-paris-dismisses-russian-claim-of-french-mercenaries-in-ukraine; https://tass dot com/politics/1735725
[92] https://www.france24 dot com/en/europe/20240118-paris-dismisses-russian-claim-of-french-mercenaries-in-ukraine
[93] https://t.me/rybar/56249
[94] https://t.me/rybar/56248
[95] https://t.me/tass_agency/227415; https://t.me/pul_1/11110; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/232914
[96] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/podgotovlen-proekt-postanovlenija-o-sozdanii-edinoj-mediakompanii-sojuznogo-gosudarstva-610962-2024/
[97] https://ria dot ru/20230216/mediakholding-1852363677.html; https://soyuz
dot
by/novosti-soyuznogo-gosudarstva/ministr-informacii-belarusi-rasskazal-kogda-budet-sozdan-mediaholding-soyuznogo-gosudarstva;
https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/18251579; https://rg dot ru/2023/09/04/gossekretar-sg-mezencev-soobshchil-o-podgotovke-proekta-po-soiuznomu-mediaholdingu.html; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/18251579?ysclid=ljzj44hepi182678384
