Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Special Edition
By Nicole Wolkov and Mason Clark
ISW
is publishing this special edition update on Ukraine’s strike campaign
against Crimea in addition to its regular daily update for October 8.
Key Takeaway: Ukrainian
forces have conducted a campaign of strikes against Russian military
infrastructure, headquarters, and logistics routes in Crimea since June
2023 in order to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as
a staging and rear area for Russian defensive operations in southern
Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes on logistics routes are disrupting Russian
supplies to Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblast. Strikes on Black Sea Fleet
assets are degrading its role as a combined arms headquarters but have
not defeated it as a naval force. Ukrainian strikes generate outsized
morale shocks among Russian commanders and in the Russian information
space. Western provision of long-range missiles to Ukraine would amplify
this ongoing, essential, and timely campaign to weaken Russia’s ability
to defend southern Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces
began a successful and ongoing campaign of strikes on Russian military
infrastructure in Crimea in summer 2023, intended to degrade Russia’s
ability to use Crimea as a key staging and rear area for Russian
operations in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces conducted a
series of strikes on Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in
Crimea – including the Chonhar and Henichesk Bridges, and likely the
Kerch Strait Bridge – during the first phases of Ukraine’s
counteroffensive in June 2023 to disrupt Russia’s ability to provide
personnel and material to defensive operations in southern Ukraine.[1]
Ukrainian forces have since then consistently targeted Russian
airfields, air defense systems, command posts, and supply depots in
Crimea and along the Crimea-Melitopol-Rostov-on-Don route.[2] Ukrainian
military officials including Commander-in-Chief General Valerii
Zaluzhnyi have stated that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign has
successfully degraded Russian logistics and defensive systems, and
Ukraine has increasingly expanded its strike campaign to target Russian
naval assets.[3]
The Russian military used
Crimea as a springboard for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022 and continues to use it as a key staging area.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely considers Crimea a
“platsdarm” – а Russian military term roughly translated as
“bridgehead,” but defined more broadly as an area that a military can
use to concentrate forces and use as a starting point for military
operations.[4] Russian forces, primarily from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF)
and other Southern Military District (SMD) formations, began
concentrating personnel and equipment in Crimea and conducting exercises
in 2021 in the buildup to the February 2022 invasion.[5] The Russian
axis of advance north from Crimea achieved greater successes than
Russia’s multiple other axes during the first weeks of the full-scale
invasion, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces advancing out
of Crimea (including elements of the SMD, 7th Airborne (VDV) Division,
and Black Sea Fleet) had higher readiness and performed more effectively
than Russian forces in northern and eastern Ukraine.[6]
The
Russian military continues to use Crimea as the primary rear area for
Russian forces defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations
in southern Ukraine and would use Crimea to support any future offensive
operations in this region. The Russian military continues to
use rail lines and roads in Crimea to transit military personnel,
equipment, fuel, and lubricants intended for Russian frontline
operations in southern Ukraine, supporting the longer supply route from
Rostov Oblast, Russia, across occupied southern Ukraine.[7] Russian
forces have also consistently used major Crimean cities including
Sevastopol, Armyansk, and Dzhankoi as military logistics hubs.[8] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Radio Svoboda
reported in April 2023 that the Russian military operated multiple
military hospitals in Sevastopol, Simferopol, and Fedosia with a total
of 1,250 beds and that Russian officials closed these hospitals to
civilian patients about three months prior to the Russian full-scale
invasion of Ukraine, and Russia has leveraged these hospitals to treat
wounded Russian personnel throughout the war.[9]
Ukrainian
forces are conducting precision strikes on Black Sea Fleet (BSF)
elements in addition to strikes on Russian logistics routes and hubs,
likely disrupting its role as a combined arms – not strictly naval –
headquarters coordinating Russian ground operations in southern Ukraine.
Despite its name, the BSF is a major combined arms formation, roughly
equivalent in stature to Russia’s land Combined Arms Armies. In addition
to naval surface and submarine warfare elements, the BSF formally
controls several surface-to-surface missile batteries and air defense
batteries which have been deployed to occupied southern Ukraine; the
22nd Army Corps; and Naval Infantry elements.[10] Russian fleet and army
headquarters are additionally designed to flexibly take control of
attached units, and the BSF is likely responsible for commanding some
portion of Russian volunteer formations and other irregular units in
southern Ukraine. The BSF is also likely responsible for maintaining
Russian logistics between Krasnodar Krai and Crimea to the Russian
southern grouping of forces, as the BSF is the only formal Russian
military structure with a long-term presence in occupied Ukraine.[11]
Satellite imagery published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian
forces conducted a precise strike on the BSF headquarters despite
Russian air defenses and electronic warfare capabilities.[12] Ukrainian
military officials reported that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on
the BSF Command headquarters occurred during a meeting of senior BSF
officials and reportedly wounded 105 Russian personnel including the
commander of the Russian grouping of forces in the Zaporizhia direction,
Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, and killed 34 BSF officers.[13]
Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated
that the loss of unspecified BSF leadership will likely cause
significant challenges to command and control because junior commanders
lack the initiative to make individual decisions.[14] Pletenchuk also
reported that some unspecified mechanisms of the BSF have become
inoperable due to the BSF’s centralization of command.[15]
Ukrainian
strikes against BSF naval assets and repair facilities in Crimea may be
preventing BSF naval elements from fully conducting their desired
missions, though BSF elements remain capable of conducting most wartime
operations, and assertions Ukraine has driven away or defeated the BSF
are premature. A Ukrainian missile strike on Sevastopol damaged
a Russian landing ship, Kilo-class submarine, and the state-owned ship
repair facility Sevmorzavod on September 13.[16] Satellite imagery
published on October 1 and 3 shows that Russian forces transferred at
least 10 vessels from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, likely
to protect them from continued Ukrainian strikes.[17] Further satellite
imagery taken on October 6 confirms that at least thirteen vessels,
including at least one Kalibr missile-equipped warship, remain in
Sevastopol, and it is premature to state Ukraine has defeated or driven
away the BSF.[18] The threat of Ukrainian strikes on BSF vessels may be
prompting Russian command to withdraw some vessels away from the shore
of occupied southern Ukraine. Russian withdrawals from the coast may
partially impede Russia’s ability to conduct regular patrols and close
support of defensive operations in southern Ukraine but do not remove
Russia’s seaborne strike capabilities entirely. Russian vessels could
continue to strike Ukraine with Kalibr cruise missiles and other systems
even if the Russian military chooses to move vessels from Sevastopol to
Novorossiysk, and Russian forces have conducted multiple sea-based
Kalibr cruise missile strikes since Ukrainian military officials
officially acknowledged the interdiction campaign.[19]
However,
Ukrainian strikes on Russian vessels and Russia’s decision to withdraw
vessels from the western Black Sea likely have limited the ability of
BSF vessels to threaten Ukraine’s “grain corridor” in the Black Sea.
Russia likely intended to impose a blockade following Russia’s departure
from the Black Sea grain deal without having to formally commit
warships and legally declare a blockade, but at least six commercial
vessels have successfully traveled to Ukraine through the unofficial
corridor since July 2023.[20] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported
on September 26 that Ukrainian strikes have diminished the BSF’s ability
to conduct wide security patrols, conduct routine maintenance, and
enforce blockades of Ukrainian ports despite continuing to execute its
core capabilities.[21]
Ukrainian strikes are successfully degrading Russian air defenses, possibly enabling future strikes on key Russian assets. Suspilne Crimea
reported on September 21 that Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources
stated that the SBU and the Ukrainian Navy enabled a successful Neptune
missile strike on a Russian airfield near Saky, Crimea by first
launching drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems.[22] The SBU
sources reportedly stated that the missile strike inflicted unspecified
serious damage to the airfield.[23] Ukrainian forces struck a Russian
air defense system (likely a S-400 system near Yevpatoria, Crimea) in
September and likely struck another S-400 system near Olenivka, Crimea
in August.[24] Russian sources expressed concerns over Ukraine’s ability
to operate drones over Crimea during these strikes.[25] Successive
Ukrainian strikes on Russian air defense infrastructure may be
indicative of wider systemic issues with Russian air defenses in
Crimea.
Ukrainian strikes on Russian military
assets in Crimea often generate Russian panic disproportionate to their
kinetic effect and negatively impact Russian morale. Ukrainian
strikes on Russian rear areas consistently cause panic in the Russian
information space and generate frustration and criticism about the
Russian military command.[26] Ukrainian strikes on Crimea have also
caused some Russian milbloggers to panic and erroneously perceive any
Ukrainian actions targeting Crimea as conditions setting for imminent
Ukrainian operations to liberate the peninsula.[27] Russian milbloggers
notably expressed concern that Ukrainian forces were able to operate a
drone and record footage of a strike on a Russian S-400 air defense
system in Crimea about 120km behind the current frontline.[28] The
Russian withdrawal of aviation elements and other military equipment
from the Chornobaivka base from May to September 2022 following the
Western provision of HIMARS to Ukraine and the more recent withdrawal of
some BSF surface elements from Crimea suggest that preemptive fears of
Ukrainian strikes can compel Russian forces to withdraw military assets
further into the rear.[29] Several Russian milbloggers accused other
milbloggers of spreading panic by publishing images purportedly showing
the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes in Crimea in late July 2023.[30]
Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on August 14 that
Crimean occupation officials will propose amendments at a federal level
to increase the liability for the spread of photos and videos showing
the location and operation of Russian air defense systems, other
systems, and military and strategic assets, indicating increased concern
over Ukrainian strike capabilities.[31]
A
sustained and expanded Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian
military targets in Crimea would likely degrade Russian efforts to
defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern
Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes against Russian military
infrastructure in occupied southern Ukraine often cause Russian
occupation officials to temporarily suspend transit, disrupting key
Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) connecting Crimea to
occupied Kherson Oblast for periods from a few hours to a few
months.[32] Disruptions to Russia’s southern GLOCs have created severe
logistics delays and bottlenecks, as the only routes to or from Crimea
to occupied Kherson Oblast or Russia are a limited set of bridges.
Suppressing or destroying Russian air defense capabilities in southern
Ukraine would increase the vulnerability of these GLOCs to Russian
ground operations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. Sustained missile
strikes on Russian offensive air capabilities would likely strain
Russian aviation attempting to conduct strikes on Ukraine by increasing
their flight time, thereby decreasing the loitering time for Russian
aviation to conduct strikes on Ukraine.
Sustained
long-range strikes against Russian military targets in Crimea could
additionally force the Russian military to move military assets and
command centers farther away from the frontline, disrupting command and
control. Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Western-provided HIMARS
forced the Russian military to establish and execute a withdrawal plan
from the Russian military base at the Kherson International Airport
Chornobaivka (1km northwest of Kherson City) that concluded in September
2022.[33] ISW has also observed reports that Russian forces have moved
command headquarters out of range of some Ukrainian platforms in an
attempt to protect command centers from HIMARS and other long-range
missile strikes after summer 2022.[34] A sustained and successful
Ukrainian strike campaign against Crimea could likely achieve similar
effects.
Western provision of long-range missiles
to Ukraine would amplify this ongoing, essential, and timely campaign to
weaken Russia’s ability to defend southern Ukraine. No single
Western-provided system will provide Ukraine with a decisive advantage
or directly enable Ukrainian victory, and this report does not assert
that ATACMS or other systems would provide Ukraine with a silver
bullet.[35] However, Ukraine is demonstrably degrading Russian forces
and logistics in Crimea, and the Western provision of long-range
missiles would enable further strikes on the Russian rear. Four unnamed
US government officials told NBC News in an article published
on September 22 that US President Joe Biden told Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky that the US would provide Ukraine with “a small
number of long-range missiles.”[36] Several unnamed people familiar with
ongoing deliberations on ATACMS told the Washington Post that
the Biden administration plans to provide Ukraine with a version of
ATACMS armed with cluster munitions rather than a single (unitary)
warhead.[37] Ukraine’s use of precision fires enables ongoing
counteroffensive operations against occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia
oblasts and is not focused solely on a hypothetical future ground attack
into Crimea itself - and Ukraine’s need for ATACMS and similar systems
is therefore a timely requirement to support ongoing Ukrainian
operations.
[4] https://encyclopedia.mil dot ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=8938@morfDictionary
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Ukraine%20Indicators%20Update.pdf
[9] https://www.svoboda dot org/a/ranenyh-mnogo-privozyat-postoyanno-kak-voyna-povliyala-na-krym/32360573.html; https://suspilne dot media/575537-v-okupovanomu-krimu-likarni-dedali-bilse-pereorientovuut-na-likuvanna-vijskovih-rf/
[10]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2023
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2023
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2023;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar082523 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2023
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4
[12]
https://x.com/bradyafr/status/1705324205170971010?s=20 ;
https://t.me/Crimeanwind/43142 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/26042 ;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrhmqwHpxBU ;
https://t.me/grey_zone/20690 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2023
[14]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2023/09/25/u-chornomu-mori-perebuvaye-pyat-korabliv-rf-sered-nyh-raketonosij-ale-vin-porozhnij-dmytro-pletenchuk/
[15]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2023/09/25/u-chornomu-mori-perebuvaye-pyat-korabliv-rf-sered-nyh-raketonosij-ale-vin-porozhnij-dmytro-pletenchuk/
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13-2023
[18] https://x.com/MT_Anderson/status/1710479196513063386?s=20 ; https://x.com/The_Lookout_N/status/1710616079020482891?s=20
[21] ttps://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1706545023913701480?s=20
[23]
https://suspilne dot
media/577137-v-sbu-pidtverdili-udar-po-vijskovomu-aerodromu-saki-v-okupovanomu-krimu/
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2023
[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2023
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082323
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29
[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2023
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29
[36] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-ukraine-war-atacms-biden-zelenskyy-long-range-missile-rcna116876