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Monday, May 1, 2023

Iran Update, May 1, 2023

Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna More, Amin Soltani and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick

May 1, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.  

Iranian leadership dismissed several economic officials and emphasized fighting corruption between April 27 and May 1 to improve Iran’s economy, which is very unlikely to precipitate the meaningful economic change necessary to curb inflation and stabilize the Iranian rial. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on parliament and the Raisi administration to fight economic corruption during a meeting with workers, labor organization members, and Raisi administration officials on April 29.[1] President Ebrahim Raisi has engaged in numerous symbolic economic engagements in recent days. Raisi dismissed 15 unspecified managers in Khuzestan Province to demonstrate his administration’s “intolerance” of corruption during a two-day trip to this province on April 27-28.[2] Raisi additionally ordered the formation of a working group on April 30 to “follow up on the issues” raised by Khamenei in his April 29 meeting with workers without providing further details.[3] Raisi called on his administration to address the needs of contract workers and retirees—who have organized widespread strikes and protests in recent weeks—during a MAPNA Company event for International Workers’ Day on May 1.[4]

Parliament separately impeached Industry, Mines, and Trade Minister Reza Fatemi Amin on April 30.[5] Several parliamentarians accused Amin of mismanaging the automobile industry and of involvement in a corruption scandal.[6] Parliament previously attempted but failed to impeach Amin in November 2022.[7] President Ebrahim Raisi appointed Mehdi Niazi—who previously served as Industry, Mines, and Trade Deputy Minister—to replace Amin.[8] Amin’s impeachment follows the dismissal of numerous Raisi administration economic officials--including Program and Budgeting Organization Chief Massoud Mir Kazemi, Agricultural Jihad Minister Javad Sadati Nejad, state-affiliated Innovation and Prosperity Fund President Ali Vahdat, and Central Bank of Iran Chief Ali Salehabadi--in recent months.[9] Reformist politicians suggested that Fatemi Amin’s impeachment would not improve Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions without meaningful changes to Iran’s economic ecosystem.[10] Former Rouhani administration Spokesperson Ali Rabie wrote an op-ed in reformist-aligned Etemad Online stressing that Iran must address economic corruption through structural reforms and programs on April 30. Parliamentarian Jalil Rahimi Jahan Abadi similarly stated that fundamental issues with Iran’s economic policies had created “victims” of presidential administrations. Former Industry, Mines, and Trade Minister under then-President Ali Khamenei and reformist politician Mostafa Hashemi Taba separately criticized parliament and the Raisi administration of tackling “superficial” problem sets instead of furthering Iran’s strategic priorities.

Increasingly dire economic conditions in Iran require fundamental economic reform, not symbolic and superficial solutions. The Iranian rial depreciated to 556,500 rials to one US dollar on May 1, marking a nearly 10-percent reduction in the value of the rial in the past month.[11] The Financial Times separately reported on May 1 that the Statistical Center of Iran has withheld publishing national inflation data for two months, possibly to conceal evidence of increasing prices. The Financial Times added that Iran’s inflation rate may have surpassed 49 percent, the highest ever recorded inflation rate in Iran, within the past two months. Raisi’s visit to MAPNA—an industrial conglomerate with links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)—on May 1 indicates Raisi’s reticence towards such reform. Improving Iran’s economy would require limiting the disproportional and disruptive influence that companies like MAPNA have on Iran’s economy rather than supporting and encouraging these companies’ activities.

The regime’s failure to address workers’ demands will likely fuel further economically motivated strikes and protests, which may in turn exacerbate Iran’s economic situation by disrupting production and economic transactions. Regime officials and employers have responded to workers’ demands for better living conditions with repression instead of empathy. Managers of the Chavar Petrochemical Company in Ilam Province prevented 200 workers who recently participated in economic protests from entering the company’s petrochemical complex on May 1.[12] Pars Special Economic Energy Zone CEO Sakhavat Asadi separately threatened to dismiss workers who participate in strikes on April 28, as CTP previously reported.[13] The Free Union of Iranian Workers announced that Iranian authorities had summoned at least 50 labor activists in Tehran, Kurdistan, and Gilan Provinces ahead of International Workers’ Day.[14]

IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami appointed Brigadier General Abdol Reza Abed as Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters Commander on May 1, possibly signaling the IRGC’s efforts to strengthen its role in the Iranian economy.[15] The Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters is the IRGC’s engineering and development firm. The company oversees large-scale civil-military construction projects. The regime also uses the Headquarters to circumvent international economic sanctions.[16] Salami reported during Abed’s introduction ceremony that the Raisi administration had granted 30 major economic projects to the headquarters within the past year and agreed to provide further contracts on a weekly basis.[17] Iranian state-media highlighted Abed’s success as the Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters commander from 2005 to 2008 and his ability to combat economic sanctions.[18] Abed also has experience as an executive in the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries.

Salami likely considers Abed to be an appropriate leader for the Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters amid recent intra-regime discussions about privatization, as CTP previously reported.[19] Some regime officials have suggested that parastatal organizations, including the IRGC, should reduce their role in the Iranian economy in favor of privately owned firms.[20] Abed’s appointment and Salami’s statements indicates the IRGC aims to preserve its involvement in the economy.

Key Takeaways

  • Iranian leadership emphasized fighting corruption and dismissed several economic officials between April 27 and May 1 in a purported effort to improve Iran’s economy, although these actions will not likely precipitate meaningful economic change.
  • IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami appointed Brigadier General Abdol Reza Abed as Khatam al Anbiya Construction Headquarters Commander on May 1, possibly signaling the IRGC’s efforts to strengthen its role in the Iranian economy.
  • At least one protest occurred on April 29, at least 11 protests occurred in 10 cities across nine provinces on April 30, and at least 12 protests occurred in 12 cities across nine provinces on May 1.
  • CTP recorded poisoning incidents in two provinces on April 29, one province on April 30, and three provinces on May 1.
  • The New York Times reported that Former Deputy Defense Minister Alireza Akbari, whom Iranian authorities executed for espionage on January 11, 2023, provided the UK with intelligence on Iranian nuclear and military programs for over a decade.
  • An unidentified assailant stabbed an unspecified cleric in Qom City, Qom Province on April 29.
  • Unidentified assailants shot and killed Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province Law Enforcement Command Criminal Investigation Chief Alireza Shahraki.
  • Iranian authorities installed barriers to further segregate men and women in Tehran metros carts on April 30.
  • Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval discussed Indian-Iranian economic cooperation with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on May 1.
  • Saudi Arabia evacuated Iranian citizens fleeing Sudan on May 1.
  • Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike on suspected Iranian-affiliated targets in Homs Province on April 28.
  • Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran on April 29.
  • Iranian-backed Iraqi proxy Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba released a series of statements echoing rhetoric from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
  • Coordination Framework leadership held a meeting on May 1 with Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani and Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohamed al Halbousi.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least one protest occurred on April 29. CTP assesses with low confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Tehran City, Tehran Province[21]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Foreign teachers

 

At least 11 protests occurred in 10 cities across nine provinces on April 30. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[22]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Social security retirees

Rasht, Gilan Province[23]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Social security retirees

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[24]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Social security retirees

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[25]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Social security retirees

Haft Tappeh, Khuzestan Province[26]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Haft Tappeh factory workers
  • Notes: Strike and protest

Arak, Markazi Province[27]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Social security retirees

Tehran City, Tehran Province[28]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Air traffic control employees
  • Notes: Strike and protest

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Shiraz, Fars Province[29]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Nurses

Torbat-e Jam, Khorasan Razavi Province[30]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Individuals protesting welfare

Babol, Mazandaran Province[31]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

Tehran City, Tehran Province[32]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Social security retirees

 

At least 12 protests occurred in 12 cities across nine provinces on May 1. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Rasht, Gilan Province[33]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

Gheshm Island, Hormozgan Province[34]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Petrochemical workers

Kerman City, Kerman Province[35]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[36]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[37]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

Shoush, Khuzestan Province[38]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Marivan, Kurdistan Province[39]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Association of laborers and construction workers

Sari, Mazandaran Province[40]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

Shahriar, Tehran Province[41]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Retirees

Tehran, Tehran Province

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Anti-regime protesters

Ghazvin City, Ghazvin Province[42]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Nurses

Kamyaran, Kurdistan Province[43]

  • Size: Small
  • Demographic: Construction Workers

 

CTP recorded poisoning incidents in two provinces on April 29, one province on April 30, and three provinces on May 1.

 

 

 

 

 

The New York Times reported that Former Deputy Defense Minister Alireza Akbari, whom Iranian authorities executed for espionage on January 11, 2023, provided the UK with intelligence on Iranian nuclear and military programs for over a decade.[44] The Times wrote that Akbari forged close relationships with Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani and Chief Nuclear Scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, whom Israel assassinated in 2020. Akbari reportedly provided initial intelligence on the existence of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Qom Province.

An unidentified assailant stabbed an unspecified cleric in Qom City, Qom Province on April 29. An unidentified man shot and killed Shia cleric and Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani in a bank in Babolsar, Mazandaran Province on April 26, as CTP previously reported.[45] Social media users separately circulated footage of an unidentified driver purportedly running over a cleric in Tehran City, Tehran Province on April 27.

Unidentified assailants shot and killed Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province Law Enforcement Command Criminal Investigation Chief Alireza Shahraki.[46] The assailants also injured Shahraki’s wife.

Iranian authorities installed barriers to further segregate men and women in Tehran metros cars on April 30.[47] Metro and Suburban Operation Company CEO Masoud Dorosti defended criticisms of the barriers’ design—which featured flowers—and stated that the barriers aimed to reinforce gender segregation in the Tehran metro by discouraging men from entering women’s carts. Iranian social media users separately circulated footage of Iranian men and unveiled women on motorcycles--flouting segregation and mandatory veiling laws--in Tehran on April 29.[48]

Economic Affairs

See topline text.

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval discussed Indian-Iranian economic cooperation with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on May 1.[49] Doval discussed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and India’s investment in the Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province port with Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani. Shamkhani stressed the need to create a “Rial-Rupee” trading mechanism. Doval separately met with Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian to discuss bilateral relations on the same date.

Saudi Arabia evacuated Iranian citizens fleeing Sudan on May 1. The Saudi navy carried 65 Iranian citizens from Port Sudan to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[50]

External Security and Military Affairs

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted an airstrike on Iranian-affiliated targets in Homs Province on April 28.[51] Syrian and Israeli media outlets claimed the IDF air strike targeted convoy of fuel trucks at a fuel station on the M5 highway reportedly transporting Iranian arms into Syria according to Israeli social media accounts.[52]  CTP cannot independently verify these claims. UK-based news outlet Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that the IDF also targeted a LH weapons depot at Dabaa Military Airport.[53] The IDF last targeted Iranian-backed positions in Homs Province on April 1.[54]

 

Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran on April 29.[55] Khamenei emphasized expanding ties between Iran and Iraq.[56] He claimed that Iraq‘s ties to Iran have prevented the country from sliding back to conditions seen under Saddam Hussein. Khamenei also called for the Iraqi government to expel all Americans from Iraq claiming that the US is not an ally of Iraq.[57] Rashid and Raisi held a joint press conference and discussed removing the US from Iraq.[58] Raisi also called for the Iraqi government to fully implement the security memorandum of understanding the countries signed on March 19 outlining additional security measures in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Iranian-backed Iraqi proxy Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba released a series of statements echoing rhetoric from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Akram Kaabi claimed that the Popular Mobilization Forces -- a group of loosely aligned militias ostensibly reporting to the Popular Mobilization Commission -- had successfully blocked Coalition forces from southern Iraq and were capable of targeting US forces in northern Iraq. He argued that despite the US presence, Iraqis in northern Iraq were immune to the soft war that the US is waging. “Soft war” is an Iranian doctrinal term used to describe nonmilitary means that the West uses to erode legitimacy of the Iranian regime and foment domestic opposition while spreading Western values.[59]

Coordination Framework leadership held a meeting on May 1 with Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani and Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohamed al Halbousi.[60] Leadership agreed to conclude negotiations on the 2023-2025 budget by May 10, to move forward with planned ministerial changes, and to hold local elections by the end of 2023.


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[2] https://president dot ir/fa/143555

[3] https://president dot ir/fa/143629

[4] https://president dot ir/fa/143643

[5] https://t dot co/Z8ULyriuad

[6] https://t dot co/IyYslwSFrr ;

https://t dot co/ohY3JpGquU ;

https://t dot co/5NJwRKZBOE ;

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[7] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/478221

[8] https://president dot ir/fa/143630

[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-11-2023 ;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-december-29

[10] https://www.etemadonline dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-9/610122-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%BE%D8%B1%D9%88%DA%98%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C ; https://www.rouydad24 dot ir/fa/news/336361/ ; https://t dot co/pQTZcmQcGc

[11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-4-2023

[12] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1653053357257367552

[13] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1651930331350532097

[14] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202305016275

[15] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/02/11/2887769 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/586284 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/586210

[16] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/khatam-al-anbiya-construction-headquarters-kaa

[17]https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/02/11/2887859 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/586237 ; https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-65444910

[18] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/586284 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/586210/

[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-updates-february-2023 ;

[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-23-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-27-2023

[21] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652328341179973632

[22] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652707811883614212 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1652659612674392064 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652662184185405441 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652615121179496452

[23] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652643550897504256 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652670021166874625 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1652659612674392064 ; https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652707811883614212

[24] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652707811883614212 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652612564386185218 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1652659612674392064 ; https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652707811883614212

[25] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652657837540093954 ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652670588895240194 ;

https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652705654694637574

[26] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652641842800873474 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652650750583898112 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652715445445689344

[27] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652705654694637574 ;

https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1652659612674392064 ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652665252687822850 ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652652866996166657

[28] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652743792079020032 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652599573859139586 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652593955815432192

[29] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652688913411248129 ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652660976691429377

[30] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652707567146086400 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652630150729670656 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652608689667178496

[31] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652710075796955139

[32] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652655405787496450 ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652670588895240194 ;

https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652630684006232065

[33] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1653031175462461443 ; https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1653031175462461443 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1653031561615351808 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1653005242097709058

[34] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652637023813992448 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1653065865770815491 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1653065865770815491

[35] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652964175826546696 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652957945582288898 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652965137186275328

[36] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1653014695689740289 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652987399528431618 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652958627378995202

[37] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652957585035632640 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652943033724223489 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652950861998333954 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652995679030071296

[38] https://twitter.com/bbcpersian/status/1652976329040461825 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1652971039196958720 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1652964384421953537 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652952952238227457

[39] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1653010687952666629 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1653052534309769218

[40] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1652998808488366085

[41] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1653059280315056130 ; ﷟HYPERLINK "https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1653010825383141376"https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1653010825383141376

[42]https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1653114599955128339?s=20

[43] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1653104176895778829?s=20

[44] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/01/world/middleeast/british-spy-execution-iran.html

[45] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-26-2023

[46] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85096735/

[47] https://t dot co/gAkrIdoAiy

[48] https://twitter.com/arminarefi/status/1652349701868462082?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/ICHRI/status/1652445677903921155?s=20

[49] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85098564/ ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85098314/ ; https://nournews dot ir/Fa/News/139315/

[50] https://www.reuters.com/world/saudi-iran-rapprochement-visible-sudan-evacuation-effort-2023-05-01/

[51] https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=564218142521743&set=a.535390988737792 ;

https://timesofisrael.com/israeli-airstrikes-hit-targets-near-homs-syrian-state-media-says/

[52] https://twitter.com/IsraelRadar_com/status/1652250799722962945 ;

https://twitter.com/kaisos1987/status/1652367303068065803 ;

https://t.me/SAM_Syria0/4145

[53] https://www.syriahr dot com/%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%80-%D9%80%D8%AF/604478/ ;

https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-741580

[54] https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-israel-targeted-hezbollah-drone-site-in-syria-strike-this-week/

[55] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B1-%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9 ;

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9 ;

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[56] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26457/

[57] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A6%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%BA%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82 ;

[58] https://president dot ir/fa/143577

[59] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-february-3-2023

[60] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%B6%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%883-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87 ;

https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1050476 ;

https://www.ina dot iq/184090--.html

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