September 24, 2020 6:30 PM EDT
By George Barros
Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for the long-term continuous presence of Russian conventional ground forces in Belarus.
Russia’s
military activity in the Western Military District (WMD) is anomalously high
during ongoing Kavkaz-2020 exercises in the Southern Military District. ISW has observed a larger-than-anticipated
number of unscheduled Russian exercises in the vicinity of Belarus and
throughout the WMD.[i]
The Russian Defense Ministry holds annual strategic exercises to test the
readiness of Russia’s four main military districts. Each such annual exercise
occurs in a different military district in a rotating order and usually
precipitates a decrease in military exercises in the other military districts.
This year’s “Kavkaz-2020” exercises began on September 15 in the SMD and should
have coincided with a decrease in Russian military activity in the WMD.
Russian
forces in the WMD are instead exercising on a larger scale than they did during
the last annual exercise in that military district, Zapad-2017. Approximately 7500 Russian military
personnel have conducted exercises in Belarus and the WMD since Slavic
Brotherhood 2020 began on September 15.[ii]
Approximately 7,200 Russian military personnel participated in Zapad-2017
exercises in all.[iii]
Russian
forces likely have greater freedom of movement in Belarus during Slavic
Brotherhood 2020 than they did during Zapad-2017. In 2017 elements of the Pskov-based
76th, Ivanovo-based 98th, and Tula-based 106th Airborne Divisions
conducted exercises in the WMD but never deployed into Belarus for Zapad-2017
exercises.[iv]
Three battalion tactical groups from these divisions deployed to Belarus and
are operating in Brest and Grodno near the Polish and Lithuanian borders this
week.[v]
Belarusian
support units are likely preparing for the next Russian deployment to Belarus
in October. Unspecified
Belarusian signals elements, including elements of Belarus’ 1st
Field Communications Center, began command and control signals exercises in
Belarus on September 21.[vi]
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated these exercises are preparations for upcoming
exercises in October.[vii]
A
regiment-sized force of the of the Pskov-based 76th Guards Air assault Division
is likely preparing for a deployment, likely to Belarus. A regiment-sized force (1,500
personnel) of the 76th began snap exercises in Pskov on September
24.[viii]
The exercises practice transferring subunits in a combined way, the mass
landing of personnel and military equipment from transport aircraft, and
maneuvers into new areas while overcoming water obstacles, and establishing a
lodgment.[ix]
The regiment-sized force is likely preparing to deploy to Belarus under the
rubric of monthly exercises, though that has not been announced.
Russian
military activity in the Western Military District will continue. Brigade-sized elements of a tank
army, presumably the Moscow-based First Tank Army, will conduct exercises at
the Mulino training ground in Nizhny Novgorod from September 28 through October
4.[x]
The
Kremlin may be targeting NATO in the cyber domain. Likely
Russian-backed cyber actors sent emails from an address imitating Lithuanian
officials’ official email addresses to send fake information claiming that
Lithuania and Poland called on the European Union to create European
peacekeeping forces and to deploy it to Belarus on September 24.[xi] Kremlin-backed
hackers may have conducted this disinformation operation to set conditions for
a Russian force deployment to Belarus under the pretext of defending against
Poland and Lithuania. The Kremlin and Lukashenko have repeatedly falsely
accused Poland and Lithuania of planning to partition Belarus.[xii] Kremlin-backed
cyber actors have used similar email imitation techniques in Ukraine before.[xiii]
The
Kremlin flew long-range nuclear-capable supersonic bombers toward NATO airspace
as part of the Slavic Brotherhood exercises for a third consecutive day on
September 24. Two
Russian Tu-160M nuclear-capable supersonic strategic bombers departed from the
Engels-2 airbase in Saratov, Russia, and flew along the Belarusian border with
NATO on September 24.[xiv]
Two Tu-160Ms conducted a similar flight on September 22.[xv]
Six long-range supersonic Tu-22 bombers from the Shaikovka airfield in Tver
flew across Belarus, and struck targets on the Ruzhansky firing range in
Baranovichi, Brest, on September 23.[xvi]
The Kremlin will likely continue to conduct similar flights as Russia’s
military presence in Belarus persists or increases.
Forecast:
Russian airborne troops currently in Belarus will likely return to
Russia as scheduled on September 25, but fresh troops—likely airborne but
possibly including motorized rifle forces from the WMD—will likely return to
Belarus in October for the next round of now-monthly exercises. Putin likely
intends to desensitize NATO to the nearly-continuous presence of Russian troops
in Belarus under the pretext of exercises, shifting to a continuous presence
within a few months.
[i] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian.html
[ii] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315043@egNews; http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-russia-deploys-third-battalion-tactical-group-belarus; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315028@egNews; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian.html; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/the-kremlin-deploys-brigade-sized-force.html
[iii] http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142199@egNews
[iv] Unknown
elements of the Moscow-based 1st Tank Army deployed to an unknown training
range in Belarus for Zapad-2017, however. https://www.ng(.)ru/politics/2017-08-11/2_7049_vdv.html;
https://regnum(.)ru/news/polit/2321907.html; http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142236@egNews
[v] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-russia-deploys-third-battalion-tactical-group-belarus
[vi] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[vii] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[viii]
https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315956@egNews; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-russia-deploys.html
[ix] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315956@egNews
[x] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316020@egNews
[xi] https://twitter.com/LT_MFA_Stratcom/status/1308779237147541505
[xii] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-russian-force.html
[xiii]
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/viral-disinformation-kremlin%E2%80%99s-coronavirus-information-operation-ukraine
[xiv] https://www.rbc(.)ru/rbcfreenews/5f6ca5439a794783bafb9ff4;
https://www.mk(.)ru/politics/2020/09/24/rossiyskie-samolety-tu160-proleteli-vdol-zapadnykh-granic-belorussii.html;
https://tsargrad(.)tv/news/dvojka-russkih-tu-160-podoshla-k-granicam-nato-ih-prikryvali-belorusskie-istrebiteli_283581
[xv] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/putin-remains-dissatisfied-with.html
[xvi] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315812@egNews
