August 24, 2020, 6:30 pm EDT
By George Barros
The Lukashenko regime began a new phase in its crackdown by starting to disperse and arrest protesters and conduct targeted arrests against opposition leaders in Minsk for the first time since August 19. Belarusian authorities detained Minsk Tractor Works (MTZ) strike leader Sergei Dvlevsky and opposition leader Olga Kovalkova – both members of opposition leader Svitlana Tikanouskaya’s Coordination Council – on August 24.[1] Belarusian security forces also detained Alexander Lavrinovich – the strike leader at the state-owned Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) – and Anatoly Bokun – the strike leader at the Belaruskali potash fertilizer plant – on August 24.[2] Authorities released Bokun after fining him 675 rubles on August 24.[3] Authorities had previously arrested a key Belaruskali strike organizer on August 20, but he reportedly managed to escape his detention facility.[4] Lavrinovich’s status is unknown as of this update.[5] Authorities brought Kovalkova to the Akrestin St. detention facility – a location the opposition associates with the physical abuse of detainees.[6] The opposition had marched on the Akrestin St. detention facility in a poorly organized effort directed by the NEXTA Telegram channel on August 18.[7] The Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) has not attempted to disperse any protests in Minsk or detain protesters since August 19.[8] Belarusian authorities ended the last round of mass detentions on August 14 when they released a large number of detainees. The renewed dispersions and arrests are likely intended to intimidate protesters. The Lukashenko regime will likely increase the scope of targeted arrests against opposition leaders and use force against protesters in the coming week.
President
Alexander Lukashenko likely took advantage of the small scale of protests today
to demonstrate his renewed willingness to use force to disperse them and to
arrest demonstrators. There were no large-scale protests in
Belarus on August 24. A few hundred protesters came to Independence Square in
Minsk around 7:00 pm Minsk time but riot police detained some and dispersed the
rest.[9] Localized small-scale protests continue to occur in Belarus but
security forces are consistently dispersing them.[10]
NEXTA
issued directions for new protest activity for August 25 that will likely lead
to direct confrontation between protesters and Belarusian authorities given
Lukashenko’s actions. A NEXTA post at 10:29 pm Minsk
time on August 24 directed Belarusians to gather at the Belarusian
Investigative Committee in Minsk at 10:00 am local time and then gather at
Independence Square at 6:00 pm.[11] The Investigative Committee of Belarus
summoned Pavel Latushko, a Coordinating Council member, to appear at its
premises for questioning about alleged “calls for actions aimed at causing harm
to national security” on August 25 at 10:00 Minsk time.[12] NEXTA is
likely trying to direct protesters to the Investigative Committee building to
disrupt Latushko’s scheduled questioning. NEXTA also instructed residents in
other cities to hold their own demonstrations at 6:00 pm Minsk time on August
25. NEXTA stated that a ”detailed strategy” on how to ”return power to
the people” and an ”important appeal from Svitlana Tikanouskaya” would be
presented sometime this week.[13] Belarusian security forces will likely
confront protesters at the Investigative Committee building. It is unclear
if they will attempt to disrupt or otherwise interfere with protests at
Independence Square, which they have not done over the past 10 days.
The
opposition may be setting conditions for a grassroots leadership structure to
emerge inside Belarus. Opposition leader Olga Kolesnikova
urged Belarusians to initiate legal petitions to recall their MPs and regional
officials in a Coordination Council briefing on August 24. Lukashenko will
likely not allow this effort to remove any officials. The process of Belarusian
opposition activists collecting signatures, however, may facilitate the
emergence of a better organized indigenous opposition network necessary for
sustained and more organized protest activity. The Belarusian opposition
movement currently lacks a clear leadership structure inside Belarus and is
dependent on announcements from Tikanouskaya in Lithuania or NEXTA in Poland to
organize large-scale protests.[14] This initiative may also be an effort
by the Vilnius-based Tikanouskaya to develop her own abilities to control
protest events in Belarus and thereby reduce her reliance on the Warsaw-based
NEXTA, which has repeatedly appeared to disrupt her plans.[15]
The
US is engaging the Belarusian opposition in a high-profile manner despite
Kremlin warnings not to meet with opposition figures. US Deputy
Secretary of State Stephen Biegun met with Tikanouskaya in Vilnius, Lithuania
on August 24.[16] Biegun urged Lukashenko at a press conference on the
same day to facilitate dialogue and engage all stakeholders.[17] Biegun
also stated the US has no “indication beyond some of the public remarks that
we’ve heard” that the Kremlin is preparing a possible military intervention
into Belarus.[18] Biegun’s statement contradicts elements of ISW’s previous
assessments. The Kremlin and Lukashenko previously accused the US of “foreign
interference” in Belarus.[19] "Foreign interference" is a legal
ground for a military assistance according to Russia and Belarus’ Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) agreements. The Kremlin previously stated
it observed “foreign interference” in Belarus but has not military intervened
because Lukashenko has not asked for assistance.[20] The Kremlin has
stated repeatedly it would intervene military in Belarus at Lukashenko’s first
request.[21]
The
Kremlin is likely extracting concessions from Lukashenko in return for
supporting his continued rule. Concessions likely include the deployment
of Russian military hardware in Belarus. Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Lukashenko had their fourth phone call since protests began
on August 24.[22] Lukashenko informed Putin about his measures to restore
order in Belarus. The Belarusian Defense Ministry reportedly signed a deal with
the Kremlin-owned Almaz-Antey defense company on August 24 at the Army 2020
annual international military-technical forum in Moscow. The Belarusian defense
minister reportedly signed a contract for cooperation on air defense systems
until 2025.[23] Almaz-Antey is the holding company for the manufacturers
of the S-300, S-400, and S-500 Russian air-defense systems.[24] Lukashenko
may have agreed to this deal as a condition for Kremlin support in Belarus.
The Kremlin likely seeks to deploy anti-access/area denial
weapon systems in Belarus to contest NATO and Eastern European airspace more
than it already does with systems deployed in Kaliningrad. Lukashenko
previously declined the Kremlin’s multiple requests to expand strategic Russian
airbases in Belarus since at least 2015.[25] ISW assessed on August 21
that Lukashenko likely made concessions to Putin under duress while Lukashenko
was losing control over Belarus before the Kremlin’s intervention.[26]
ISW is monitoring the situation
and will provide further updates.
[1] https://www.intellinews(.)com/leading-members-of-belarus-coordinating-council-and-strike-movements-have-been-arrested-as-belarus-lukashenko-starts-crackdown-190296/
[3] https://news.tut(.)by/economics/697923.html
[4] https://www.rbc(.)ru/politics/21/08/2020/5f3fcf9a9a794700f5463764
[5] https://news.tut(.)by/economics/697923.html
[6] https://www.facebook.com/KavalkovaVolya/posts/1669394853218051 ; https://www.dw(.)com/ru/%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BA-%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%BB-%D0%B6%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8-%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2-%D0%B2-%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B8-18082020/av-54614818 ;
[7] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-telegram-channel-nexta-provo... ; https://www.kommersant(.)ru/doc/4459118 ;
[8] https://meduza(.)io/news/2020/08/19/omon-razognal-miting-u-minskogo-traktornogo-zavoda-do-etogo-sluchaya-aktsiyam-protesta-v-gorode-ne-prepyatstvovali-nedelyu
[9] https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1297930631939346432; https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1297941342891450376; https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1297950771883933696
[10] https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9435
[11] https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9454
[12] https://naviny(.)by/new/20200824/1598274073-latushko-vyzvali-v-sledstvennyy-komitet-na-25-avgusta
[13] https://t(.)me/nexta_live/9454
[14] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-lukashenko-and-nexta-apparen... ; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-nexta-telegram-channel-divid... ; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-violent-confrontation-betwee... ;
[19] https://rus.ozodi.org/a/30793138.html; https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/experts-on-belarus/5552916.html
[20] https://www.belta(.)by/politics/view/lavrov-vmeshatelstvo-v-belarus-izvne-proishodit-s-tseljju-navjazat-svoi-porjadki-403367-2020
[22] http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/63938
[23] https://www.rbc(.)ru/politics/24/08/2020/5f43c9f29a7947ddefc83127
[24] https://defence-blog.com/news/army/russian-army-awards-contract-to-almaz... ; https://www.defenseworld.net/news/25691/Almaz_Antey_Delivers_New_Set_of_... ; https://www.dw(.)com/en/s-400-missile-system-what-is-it-and-why-does-turkey-want-it/a-49571650
[25] https://www.rbc(.)ru/politics/06/10/2015/5613ebe59a794769839c9e3f ; https://www.vesti(.)ru/article/1501418; https://www.gazeta(.)ru/army/2019/11/14/12811502.shtml