By: Nataliya
Bugayova
Key Takeaway: Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a new phase in his campaign to retain power after 2024 when his current term expires. Putin offered Russians a revised social contract. Putin is reconfiguring the balance of power within the Russian government as he seeks to carve out an optimal spot for himself. Putin is in uncharted territory, trying to create a new transition model for Russia. He is running an information operation targeting the Russian population and the West as he seeks to mitigate the risks associated with his transition. His approach is working so far, with the Kremlin’s opposition disarmed and the public unclear on the net implications of the changes.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin has begun a new phase in his campaign to retain power when his current
presidential term expires in 2024. Putin announced a major set of political changes
inside Russia in January 2020. He reorganized Russia’s government, proposed major changes to the Russian
constitution, and pledged significant social spending.[1] Putin’s decision to put forward these changes was not a surprise. Putin
and his associates have primed the information space with the idea of
constitutional change, and set conditions for a 2024 transition more broadly, over
the past several years.[2]
The significance of the new announcements lies in the process,
substance, and the context in which Putin made his power move.
Putin’s
proposed changes offered Russia’s population a revised social contract. He
promised increased social spending and announced
measures that further strengthen the Kremlin’s centralized powers. This premise
is not fundamentally new, but the adjustment is nevertheless key for Putin given that his popular
support—bolstered by his illegal occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and
other interventions beyond Russia’s borders—has been waning over the past few
years.[3]
- The ‘Benefits’ – Putin pledged increased government support for programs to improve education and increased population growth. He focused most of his January 15 annual speech addressing the Russian population’s demands for improved quality of life. Putin also likely intended to shift the blame for failed economic reforms of recent years to former Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev by reshuffling the cabinet.[4] Putin appointed Mikhail Mishustin, formerly head of Russia’s federal tax service, as Russia’s new prime minister in part to signal his commitment to putting fresh energy behind his agenda.[5]
- The Cost – Putin combined these pledges with policies and constitutional amendments that will further limit civil liberties in Russia as well as isolate Russia from the international community. Putin intends to formalize the primacy of the Russian constitution over international law. Putin likely seeks to provide the Kremlin with the freedom to disregard decisions by international organizations, such the European Court of Human Rights. Putin is also likely trying to further limit the potential for credible political opposition to his rule, which is nearly nonexistent today. For example, the state will disqualify individuals who have lived outside Russia in the past 25 years or have obtained foreign residency from running for president. Further, one of Mishustin’s first moves as prime minister was to introduce bonuses for members of the security services, such as the Russian National Guard, who work to “keep order” at protests and other public events. This measure indicates that the security services will remain a core pillar of Putin’s regime.[6] Putin’s changes also extend the federal government’s power further down into the regional level. Regional legislatures will now largely lose their authority to influence appointments of regional prosecutors.
Most of Putin’s constitutional amendments are aimed at changing
the relative power of the branches of Russia’s government as Putin carves out a
place for himself post-2024. Putin’s
proposed amendments will nominally increase the Russian parliament’s powers,
though the actual realignment depends on the final amendments and other
supplemental federal laws.[7]
The presidency remains strong, though Putin limited future presidents to two
terms total, ensuring there will not be another Putin (who is serving his fourth
term).[8]
One of the most significant changes is Putin’s proposal to give the State
Council—currently an advisory body of regional leaders—the constitutional
authority to govern. This change introduces a new variable into Russia’s
political equation.
Putin may be creating a specific role
for himself, such as the head of an
empowered State Council, or seeking a combination of roles. The key issue,
however, will be the overall new political configuration, not the technical nature of Putin’s specific role. This
configuration will greatly depend on the final content of Putin’s changes which
are currently unknown – likely by design.
Putin is in uncharted
territory with a set of conflicting objectives. Putin chose not to remove term limits on the
presidency, which would have been a damaging but not impossible political move
allowing him to remain as president beyond 2024. Putin is thus faced with the task of inventing a new succession model.
Putin seeks to balance
a set of objectives. He likely seeks to
preserve power post-2024, as it is essential to his security and his legacy.
Putin is also trying to preserve, at least notionally, a strong Russian head of
state. Putin’s view that Russia can only survive with a centralized government has
remained consistent for the last two decades. Putin wrote in 2000 that “strong
government is not an anomaly for Russians, but a guarantor of order.” [9] Putin stated in January
2020 that Russia requires a strong presidential republic and that creating any
institute above the head of the state would mean “dual power” and will be “absolutely
harmful for a country like Russia.”[10]
Putin’s campaign thus
has a number of vulnerabilities. Putin will be testing the limits of informal
power structures in Russia if he tries to preserve power outside of the
presidency. The key question will be whether Putin can over the long run, maintain
a positive public perception of his legitimacy and power. Another core question
is whether Putin can find a way to control indirectly Russia’s security services
– currently a key pillar of his regime – when Putin is no longer president.
Putin is using a carefully crafted approach, which is effectively an information operation, to roll out his plan. Putin is revealing the
substance of the government changes in a controlled manner. He shared the contours
of his changes, but the final details will be determined gradually through
further refinements and additional laws. The exact powers of the State Council
are still undetermined, for example. The exact process by which the Russian
people will express their degree of support for these changes is also unclear.
Putin is moving rapidly to implement the changes.
Putin announced and received approval from the State Duma (the lower
house of the Russian parliament) for his changes within
two weeks, providing little room for a genuine discussion of the changes.
Putin is thus showing the public at home and
abroad what he wants at the pace he wants. Putin is both trying to disarm any
potential opposition to this process while protecting himself against the vulnerabilities
inherent in a power play. He also seeks to keep his options open and preserve
the ability to shift course as he gauges the initial reaction to his move.
Putin has also launched
this phase four years before his current term expires. He is likely choosing to push through the changes while his
ratings are relatively high so that he can secure public approval for his plan.
He also chose a moment just months after he brutally, and effectively, suppressed
an emerging wave of protests against the Kremlin’s efforts to prevent
anti-Kremlin candidates from running in Russia’s local elections.[11]
He also likely expects to boost his public approval by increased social spending.
Putin’s tactics are working so far.
His power
structures are rapidly advancing Putin’s changes. He is also successfully disarming the opposition. Putin made some of his proposed changes seem democratic on the
surface – which is not a given because of the simple fact that the final
content and configuration is not yet public. The protests against Putin’s
changes were weak.[12]
Finally, Putin’s pledge to increase social spending paired with a cabinet
reshuffle taps into widespread calls for change and increased quality of living
– helping both obfuscate Putin’s intentions of staying in power and disincentivizing
protests.
KEY QUESTIONS AHEAD
The Duma approved
Putin’s proposed amendments on January 23 – just a week after Putin’s
announcement.[13] A governmental commission
is currently considering proposals for additional amendments to the
constitution.[14] Russia’s parliament will
likely vote on the revised draft on February 11.[15]
Putin is also framing these changes as a societal choice, pledging that the
constitutional changes will be subject to a popular referendum. The Kremlin has
not yet revealed a process for such a referendum.
- Immediate: What will the final changes entail? What do these changes do to the absolute and relative power of each government body? How will the changes be passed? What will the new status and role of the State Council be?
- Long Term: What will be the design of the overall power structures? What are the sources of power that Putin needs to maintain as the situation evolves? What is the most optimal position(s) for him to land? How will Putin’s base – his voters and his power structures – react as he further unfolds his plan? How will Putin address the inherent vulnerabilities of his transition, such as the risk of a growing perception that he is losing power or control over security?
[1]
[“Message from the President to the Federal Assembly,”] Kremlin, January 15,
2020, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/62582; [“Decrees on the Appointment of
Ministers of the Government of the Russian Federation were Signed,”] Kremlin,
January 21, 2020, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/62625; [“Decrees on
the First Deputy and Deputy Prime Ministers were Signed,”] Kremlin, January 21,
2020, http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/62623.
[2]
Vyacheslav
Volodin, speaker of the Duma, advocated expanding the Duma’s authority through
a constitutional change in July 2019
[“ Volodin Proposed to Change the Constitution Again to Include the Duma in the
Formation of the Government,”] Novaya Gazeta, July 17, 2019, https://www.novayagazeta(.)ru/news/2019/07/17/153399-volodin-predlozhil-zafiksirovat-v-konstitutsii-uchastie-gosdumy-v-formirovanii-pravitelstva; Putin called the Russian constitution a “living organism” in 2018. [“Putin: The Constitution of the Russian Federation is
a living, developing organism that is the Foundation of the Legal System,”]
TASS, December 12, 2018, https(:)//tass.ru/politika/5905516.
[3] “Trust in Russia’s Putin falls to 13-year low: state
pollster,” Reuters, January 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-poll/trust-in-russias-putin-falls-to-13-year-low-state-pollster-idUSKCN1PF1TL.
[4]
Leonid Bershidsky, “Why Russia Is Struggling to Build Putin’s Grand Dream,”
Bloomberg, November 15, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-11-15/russia-is-struggling-to-build-putin-s-grand-dream;
Putin transferred Medvedev into a newly created role of a deputy head of
Russia’s National Security Council. Medvedev’s dismissal likely serves a dual
purpose: shifting blame from Putin with regard to the failed economic reforms,
while also indicating Putin’s potential intent to strengthen Russia’s National
Security Council. Putin also made Mishustin a permanent member of Russia’s
National Security Council.
[5]
[“Mishustin Presented His Prime Minister Agenda to the State Duma. The Main
Thing,”] RBK, January 16, 2020, https://www(.)rbc.ru/politics/16/01/2020/5e2046379a794749e1cceb81
; [“Mishustin Outlined the Main Tasks and Priorities in the Work of the New
Cabinet,”] Sputnik, January 21, 2020, https:\sputnik(.)by\politics\20200121\1043748961\Mishustin-oboznachil-osnovnye-zadachi-i-prioritety-raboty-novogo-kabmina.html.
[6]
[“Monthly Salary Increases were Established for the Complexity of the Tasks
Performed by Employees of Internal Affairs Organs, Military personnel and
Employees of the Russian Guard,”] Russian Cabinet of Ministers, January 24,
2020, http://government(.)ru/docs/38839/;
“[Mishustin Introduced Bonuses for Employees of the Russian National Guard
working at Protests],” Vedomosti, January 24, 2020, https://www.vedomosti(.)ru/politics/news/2020/01/24/821435-mishustin-vvel-nadbavku;
“Russian Prime Minister Orders Special Category of Security Officers to be
Eligible for up to Double Pay for ‘Complex’ Work,” Meduza, January 24, 2020,
https://meduza(.)io/en/news/2020/01/24/russian-prime-minister-orders-special-category-of-security-officers-to-be-eligible-for-up-to-double-pay-for-complex-work.
[7]
The Duma (lower
house) will have authority to approve the prime
minister. Currently the president appoints the prime minster while the parliament
can advise. The president will have no authority to refuse parliament's
nomination of the prime minister. The president would also have to consult with
the Federation Council (upper house of parliament) to appoint the heads
of Russia's security services and regional prosecutors.
[8] Putin said that it is essential
that Russia remains a strong presidential state. The president might have less
authority over the cabinet of
ministers, though the final text of the amendment is to be determined. At the
same time,
the president gets additional powers, including the ability to request
the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of
the bill before resident’s signs the bill.
[9]
Vladimir Putin, [“Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,”] Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
December 30, 1999, http://www.ng(.)ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium. html.
[10]
[“The President Met with Students and Faculty of Leading Universities at the
Sirius Center,”] Pervy Kanal, January 22, 2020,
https://www.1tv(.)ru/news/2020-01-22/379270-prezident_v_tsentre_sirius_vstretilsya_so_studentami_veduschih_vuzov_i_prepodavatelyami.
[11]
Nataliya Bugayova, Darina Regio, Mason Clark, and Michaela Walker with
Alexandra McClintock, “Russia in Review: Domestic Discontent and Foreign
Policy,” Institute for the Study of War, August 6, 2019, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/08/russia-in-review-domestic-dissent-and.html.
[12] Matthew Luxmore, “WHY SO FEW PROTESTS AGAINST Putin’s
Constitutional Shake up,” RFERL, January 28, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/why-so-few-protests-against-putin-s-constitutional-shake-up-/30402490.html
[13]
Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Russian Parliament Gives Early Approval to Putin’s
Constitutional Amendments Ahead of Referendum,” The Telegraph, January 23,
2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/23/russian-parliament-gives-early-approval-putins-constitutional/; [“The Law of the Russian Federation on the Amendment to
the Constitution of the Russian Federation ‘On Improving the Regulation of
Certain Issues of Public Authority Organization,’”] Russian Duma’s Legislative
Support System, Accessed on January 30, 2020,
https://sozd.duma.gov(.)ru/bill/885214-7.
[14]
Tom Balmforth and Andrew Osborn, “”Supreme Ruler Putin? Kremlin Non-Committal
on Proposed New Job Description,” Reuters, January 29, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin/supreme-ruler-putin-kremlin-non-committal-on-proposed-new-job-description-idUSKBN1ZS1Z7.
[15]
“Russia's Duma Unanimously Approves Putin's Constitution Shake-Up,” Al Jazeera,
January 23, 2020, https://www.aljazeera(.)com/news/2020/01/russia-duma-unanimously-approves-putin-constitution-shake-200123120220504.html.
