Friday, December 6, 2019

Russia in Review: The Kremlin Reverses Setbacks in Moldova

Russia in Review is a weekly intelligence summary (INTSUM) produced by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). This ISW INTSUM series sheds light on key trends and developments related to the Russian government’s objectives and its efforts to secure them. Receive future Russia in Review INTSUM products via-email by signing up for the ISW mailing list.

Authors: Nataliya Bugayova with Mason Clark and Andre Briere

Key Takeaway: The Kremlin is reversing setbacks it experienced in Moldova in recent years. Moldova paused key bilateral cooperation mechanisms with Russia over the last three years and expelled numerous Russian officials. Moldova’s Constitutional Court suspended the powers of the Kremlin-backed Moldovan President Igor Dodon five times in 2018.[1] The Kremlin has managed in the past six months to restart all key bilateral mechanisms with Moldova, sign several new deals, and host the Moldovan prime minister in Moscow after a seven-year hiatus. President Dodon secured control of the cabinet of ministers, Moldova’s security services, and the capital in November. The Kremlin achieved this progress by sidelining two competitors to its interests in Moldova – oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc in June 2019 and pro-European Prime Minister Maia Sandu in November 2019 – in a phased campaign. The Kremlin has not yet solidified its gains; it will require significant resources to maintain its position. Russia is nevertheless making progress in forcing Moldova back into Russia’s orbit. A successful Russian effort in Moldova, which shares borders with Romania and Ukraine, would expand pressure on NATO. Russia would leverage its dominance in Moldova to build on its campaign to assert influence in Ukraine. Russia also seeks to legitimize its military intervention in Moldova’s Transnistria region and set a precedent for the legitimization of its interventions elsewhere.

Moldovan President Igor Dodon forced Prime Minister Maia Sandu to resign on November 12. Kremlin-backed Dodon successfully facilitated a no-confidence vote against Sandu’s government and ended the coalition between his Socialist Party (PSRM) and Sandu’s pro-European ACUM party.[2] Dodon called for the vote after Sandu attempted to alter the procedure for appointing the general prosecutor. Sandu was likely trying to limit Dodon’s influence over the process.[3]

Dodon formed a minority government two days after the no-confidence vote. Ion Chicu, a former Dodon advisor, became the new prime minister.[4] Dodon secured 27 votes from the Democratic Party (PDM), led by exiled oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. PDM conditioned its support for Dodon’s plan on “a state program we consider acceptable” and support for PDM’s desired domestically focused projects.[5] Dodon likely agreed to these conditions and may have given PDM members additional assurances to secure their votes. For example, Dodon could have promised not to push for prosecution cases against PDM members. Dodon’s PSRM nominated former PDM deputy Alexander Stoyanoglo as the prosecutor general on December 2, a move that may have been intended to help secure PDM support.[6]

Dodon has successfully expanded control over power structures. Dodon controlled the presidency prior to November 12, while his associate Zinaida Greceanii became the speaker of the parliament in June. Dodon now controls the cabinet given that his former aides occupy most cabinet positions.[7] Pavel Voicu, a former personal advisor to Dodon, replaced Sandu’s associate Andrei Nastase as minister of internal affairs, expanding Dodon’s control over the Moldovan security services. Victor Gaiciuc, another Dodon advisor, became minister of defense. Gaiciuc has said publicly that he admired the “courage” of Kremlin-controlled forces in Eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2016.[8] Several other new cabinet members are former Dodon appointees.[9] Dodon has secured influence over Moldova’s capital, Chisinau, as the city’s voters on November 4 elected PSRM candidate Ion Ceban to serve as mayor.[10] PSRM also won several seats in local elections on November 3.[11]

The newly formed government is a second victory for the Kremlin in Moldova this year and likely a planned phase in Russia’s campaign to regain influence there. Russia faced major setbacks in Moldova in recent years. The Kremlin managed to start turning the tide in June 2019 by facilitating a Moldovan parliamentary coalition between the ACUM and PSRM parties.[12] A nominal alignment with the West likely helped Russia legitimize its political client, Dodon. This brokering allowed Russia to achieve two goals: eliminate a key competitor to its interests, the formerly exiled oligarch Plahotniuc, and preserve Dodon’s power.

The Kremlin then likely shifted to sideline Dodon’s rival Sandu. Russia and Dodon likely assessed an opportunity to weaken Sandu and form a new cabinet expanding Dodon’s power. That perceived opening was the primary trigger for the no-confidence vote targeting Sandu. Control over the prosecutor general’s office, the ostensible basis for the vote, was important to Dodon but likely a secondary motivation. Dodon likely had an agreement with his eventual coalition government partner PDM even before the no-confidence vote given the speed with which PDM – formerly a rival to Dodon’s party – embraced Dodon’s agenda. 

Graphic: The Kremlin's Adaptations in Moldova [13]

The Kremlin is moving rapidly to secure its gains in Moldova. The Kremlin launched an outreach campaign targeting Moldovan officials following the new government’s formation.
  • Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev hosted newly appointed Prime Minister Chicu in Moscow on November 20 – the first visit by a Moldovan prime minister to Russia in seven years. Medvedev expressed hopes to recover the opportunities “lost between Moldova and Russia over the last few years.”[14]
  • Moldova and Russia signed several deals during Chicu’s visit. The Kremlin plans to lend Moldova $500 million to finance transportation infrastructure projects.[15] Russian Deputy Prime Minster Dmitry Kozak, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s key executive officer on Moldova, said that Moldova will buy Russian gas at $173 per thousand cubic meters starting January 1 2020 – a 26% decrease compared to the current price.[16] Russia plans to expand the list of duty-free goods exported from Moldova, and issue thousands of permits to Moldavan exporters to deliver goods to Russia.[17] Chicu also said that Moldova might “pause” its cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) if the IMF is not flexible with its terms.[18] The Kremlin would welcome such a break, given that Moldova’s cooperation with the IMF helps integrate the country into the West. Diminished funding from the IMF could increase Moldova’s dependency on Russia.
  • Russian Ambassador to Moldova Oleg Vasnetsov initiated a meeting with Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban on November 13 – just days after Ceban was elected.[19] Ceban met with Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin in Russia on November 28.[20] Ceban asked Sobyanin for support with municipal and investment projects to help develop Chisinau. Russian Deputy PM Kozak also met with Ceban to discuss Chisinau’s cooperation with other Russian cities.[21]
  • Another Dodon ally and Speaker of Moldova’s Parliament Zinaida Greceanii attended the Council of Independent States (CIS) Interparliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg on November 20-22 after a two-year gap in Moldovan participation.[22] CIS is a largely Russia-led intergovernmental organization focused on cooperation between several former Soviet states. Greceanii expressed Moldova’s interest in more active work within CIS and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union.[23] Dodon also stated that Moldova is considering joining the Russia-led Eurasian Development Bank on November 29.[24]
  • Dodon praised Russia’s proposal to destroy its ammunition depot in the separatist region of Transnistria as a step in the right direction towards settlement of the frozen conflict.[25] Dodon stated on November 22 that Gazprom should annul Transnistria’s $6.2 billion gas debt to Russia if the conflict is resolved.[26] Dodon is likely setting conditions in the information space to legitimize the acceptance of a permanent Russian military presence in Transnistria and a potential special status for the region.
  • Russian Security Council Chief Nikolai Patrushev signed a cooperation plan on November 21 with the national security councils of several former Soviet states, including Moldova.[27] This agreement is a component of Russia’s effort to regain control over Moldova’s security structures.
Russia’s recent outreach builds on the previous phase of the Kremlin’s campaign to regain influence in Moldova. The Kremlin moved equally fast to secure political influence during the previous window of opportunity in June 2019 when it facilitated a coalition between PRSM and ACUM. Russian officials announced that relations between Russia and Moldova were “unfrozen” on June 24.[28] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu put a three-year military cooperation plan between Russia and Moldova on the table in August – a development that was hard to imagine even a year ago.[29] Moldova lifted a ban on Moldovan officials traveling to Russia in June.[30] Several bilateral cooperation mechanisms between Russia and Moldova resumed work after a three-year pause. Moldovan Speaker of the Parliament Greceanii chose Russia as the destination of her first foreign visit in June.[31] Moldovan companies signed several agreements with Russian businesses in September.[32] Dodon and Greceanii discussed in July the need to abolish the existing ban on Russian broadcasting in Moldova.[33]


Russia will attempt to advance its campaign aggressively while Dodon, its preferred political actor, retains expanded powers and faces fewer obstacles. The Kremlin will tailor its investments toward integrating Moldova into Russia’s formal and informal structures, and helping Dodon deepen his influence. The Kremlin will likely prioritize strengthening control over Moldova’s security services and national security establishment now that Dodon controls the ministries of defense and interior. Moldova is still considering the military cooperation plan with Russia proposed by Shoigu. Both the newly appointed minister of interior and minister of defense met senior Russian officials, including Shoigu and Patrushev, in recent months.[34] The Kremlin will leverage its new cooperation plan between the Moldovan and Russian national security councils to advance its security influence.

The Kremlin will attempt to legitimize its military intervention in Moldova and reintegrate Transnitria as a permanent lever of control. Dodon attempted to assure the West and Moldova that he does not plan to federalize Moldova but is considering a special status for Transnistria.[35] Russia likely aims to integrate Transnistria back into Moldova to expand the voting base for its interests without giving up its control and its force presence. Russia will regain dominant influence over Moldova’s decision-making if it succeeds in this effort. Russia’s success would also establish the principle that it can invade another sovereign state, manipulate the political environment to its advantage, and force the country to accept its version of peace. This would set an international precedent that the Kremlin will leverage in its efforts to solidify special status for the Kremlin-controlled, self-proclaimed “republics” in Ukraine.

The Kremlin will push Moldova to expand cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and CIS. Russia granted Moldova observer status with the EEU in 2017 to keep Moldova engaged. Yet Moldova has not actively participated in the EEU’s activities since then as the previous government prioritized cooperation with the EU.[36] Russia’s long-term goal is Moldovan membership in the EEU, which Dodon expressed support for in the past. The rapid shift towards the EEU is likely politically unattainable for Dodon, however, especially in advance of the 2020 presidential race, as more Moldovans prefer joining the EU than the EEU.[37] Dodon has previously stated his intent to cancel Moldova’s existing association agreement with the EU, but later softened his rhetoric and expressed commitment to the EU association agreement. Moldova’s Prime Minister Chicu also that stated Moldova will honor its international agreements.[38] Russia will thus likely push for a free trade agreement (FTA) between Moldova and the EEU. An FTA falls short of full membership in the EEU. The Kremlin is using the FTA vehicle to expand the EEU globally as Russia’s initial push to engage countries through formal membership failed. Russia will continue to signal nominal alignment with the West but use it as a cover to gradually integrate Moldova without triggering a major political backlash. Russia will leverage institutions like the Eurasian Development Bank in this effort. It will also double down on its interparliamentary cooperation with Moldova and try to push through various “legislative harmonization” initiatives through this framework.[39]

The Kremlin will invest further to support Dodon, who has expanded but not yet solidified his grip on power. Russia is prioritizing investments in areas that will help Dodon secure broader support, such as in energy, infrastructure, and trade. Dodon is already championing Russian infrastructure loans as a means of creating employment opportunities for Moldovans.[40]

Russia will also double down on its information campaign to discredit Sandu. Dodon is already framing Sandu as incompetent during her five months as prime minister. Dodon blamed Sandu for deliberately provoking a crisis to distract from her “erroneous and ineffective” policies.[41] Russia has focused on a similar campaign in Ukraine, where the Kremlin sought to discredit Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko ahead of the 2019 Presidential Election in Ukraine.[42] Russia will increase its efforts to regain a media presence in Moldova as Dodon prepares for presidential elections scheduled to take place in 2020. The Kremlin will likely attempt to pressure Moldova to lift the existing ban on Russian broadcasting.

Russia’s campaign in Moldova has vulnerabilities, however. Dodon does not have full support in the parliament and is dependent on a former rival party, PDM. Sandu’s ACUM openly opposes Dodon. PDM’s support for Dodon against ACUM was a transactional rather than a principled alignment with Dodon. There is no guarantee that PDM will vote for policies that do not directly benefit its interests or if the West is able to change PDM’s calculus. Russia will thus likely have difficulties passing major legislation in the short term. Russia will therefore focus on the aforementioned operational goals while it works to rebuild its influence networks and Dodon’s power.

Dodon will need to deliver for multiple constituencies to maintain political support. There is no guarantee that Dodon and his cabinet will be effective. Dodon raised the bar for his own performance by framing Sandu as an incompetent leader. Dodon and Chicu also made a number of ambitious promises, including a goal to increase social spending, raise pensions and salaries, complete justice system reform, attract investment, and fix roads throughout the country. Russia will need to increase its financial investment to help Dodon’s fulfill these promises to his constituencies and to generate concrete results from Dodon’s government work. Russia also needs to rebuild its influence over the information space – which Russia might not be able to do at the required speed – to provide political cover for Dodon’s potential failures.

Sandu could potentially come back as a strong opponent in the 2020 presidential race. Sandu may be temporarily weakened, but she can leverage the narrative of being the only non-corrupt candidate who did not attempt to cling to power and did not back down on judicial reform efforts. There is also a possibility in the future of an alliance between PDM and ACUM that could significantly change the balance of power.

Finally, Moldova’s political landscape is more nuanced than a simple “pro-Russia” and “pro-West” bifurcation. Dodon has a domestic political agenda and seeks to balance relationships with Russia and the West. Dodon has recently reinforced his commitment to the EU association agreement. Moldova also benefits from Western aid and trade, while a larger portion of the population – constituencies that Dodon cannot ignore – prefers the EU over the EEU.

Russia will likely expand its military posture in Moldova if the Kremlin succeeds in solidifying its gains in Moldova. This outcome would put additional pressure on NATO and Ukraine. ISW assessed previously that the Kremlin is working to expand and potentially link its military influence across states in its closest orbit – within and among Belarus, Moldova, and the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.[43] A special status in Transnistria will de facto legitimize Russia’s principle of illegal military intervention in a sovereign state, which would set an international precedent. Success in Moldova will accelerate Putin’s efforts to regain dominant influence in Belarus and Ukraine. The Kremlin is using Moldova as a test case of its ability to legitimize its clients via nominal alignment with the West. It is also testing a blueprint it could use in other places, most immediately in Ukraine.

[1] “Moldovan Constitutional Court Suspends President For Fifth Time,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 18, 2018,
[2] Dodon’s PSRM party and the PDM party previously led by Plahotniuc supported the no-confidence motion, while ACUM boycotted the vote and the minority Sor party abstained, passing the motion with 66 of 101 votes. Alexander Tanas, “Moldova’s Fledgling Government Brought Down by No Confidence Vote,” Reuters, November 12, 2019,; [“Moldovan Parliament Passes Vote of No Confidence in Sandu Government,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 12, 2019, https://sputnik((.))by/politics/20191112/1043216670/Parlament-Moldovy-vynes-votum-nedoveriya-pravitelstvu-Sandu.html.
[3] The Moldovan Cabinet of Ministers, led by PM Sandu, announced a planned amendment authorizing the PM to nominate candidates for the Prosecutor General position to the High Council of Prosecutors before approval by the president on November 6. Sandu and Justice Minister Olesea Stamate claimed PSRM members on the selection panel would “rig” the appointment of a new Prosecutor General in order to ensure a political appointee, necessitating an amendment changing the process. Sandu likely viewed the elimination of PSRM control of the Moldovan prosecution system as a necessary condition for further anti-corruption efforts. [“Maia Sandu’s Government Fell: 63 Deputies Vote of No Confidence,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 13, 2019, https://ru.sputnik((.))md/infographics/20191112/28178068/pravitelstvo-maia-sandu-palo-63-deputata-vyrazili-votum-nedoveriya.html; Madalin Necsutu, “Moldovan Socialists Topple Govt in No-Confidence Vote,” Balkan Insight, November 12, 2019,; [“Sandu Went to the World – That She Suggested that the Coalition Not Break Up,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 11, 2019, https://ru.sputnik((.))md/politics/20191111/28160602/sandu-poshla-na-mirovuyu-chto-ona-predlozhila-chtoby-koalitsiya-ne-raspalas.html; “Moldova’s Fledgling Government Brought Down by No Confidence Vote,” Reuters, November 12, 2019,
[4] [“The New Government of Moldova,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 14, 2019, https://ru((.))
[5] [“Will Democrats Support Chicu’s Candidacy as Moldovan Prime Minister,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 14, 2019, https://ru((.))
[6] Julia Semenova, [“A New Prosecutor General Appeared in Moldova,”] Deutsche Welle, November 29, 2019 https://www(.)
[7] Corneliu Popovich, a former advisor to Dodon, was named Minister of Education. Fadey Nagachevsky, a former party lawyer for PSRM, was appointed Minister of Justice. Aureliu Ciocoi, Dodon’s former Ambassador to Germany and former adviser for foreign policy, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs & EU Integration. Viorica Dumbraveanu, the new Minister of Health, Labor and Social Protection, was formerly Dodon’s advisor on the same issues. Ion Perju, Dodon’s former advisor on agro-industrial and public administration issues, was named Minister of Agriculture. Sergey Pushcuta, the new Vice Premier, Minister of Finance, was a financial advisor to Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin (Communist Party) in 2009. Fadey Nagachevsky, the new Minister of Justice, was a PSRM lawyer and former advisor to Speaker of the Parliament Zinaida Greceanii (PSRM). Of the ten new key ministers seven are former presidential advisors, two are former Dodon appointees, and the last one was a PSRM lawyer and adviser to Zinaida Greceanii. [“Everything About the Ministers of Ion Chicu’s Government,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 27, 2019, https://ru(.)
[8] [“Moldovan Defense Minister Gaiciuc: Militants in the Donbass are Heroes, and the APU Will Never Defeat Them,”] Dialogue UA, November 19, 2019, https://www((.))
[9] Anatol Usatii, the new Minister of Economy and Infrastructure, was appointed by Dodon for his former position as Deputy Minister for Regional Development. Alexandru Flenchea, the new Deputy Minister for Reintegration, was previously appointed to be the head of the Bureau for Reintegration Policy. [“Everything About the Ministers of Ion Chicu’s Government,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 27, 2019, https://ru(.)
[10] “Socialist Ceban Elected New Mayor of Chisinau in Runoff,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 4, 2019,
[11] PSRM won the most regional centers out of all of Moldova’s political parties. PSRM won eight regional centers, primarily on the northern and eastern borders. PSRM took control in Briceni, Ocnita, Soroca, Floresti, Criuleni, Chisinau, Anenii Noi, and Gagauzia. “Socialist Ceban Elected New Mayor of Chisinau in Runoff,” RFERL, November 4, 2019,; [“Most Municipalities and District Centers, Won by PSRM, PN, and Independent Candidates,”] Unimedia, November 4, 2019, https://unimedia((.))info/ro/news/4aff2a7f6f32c831/infografic-cele-mai-multe-municipii-si-centre-raionale-castigate-de-psrm-pn-si-candidatii-independenti.html.
[12] Plahotniuc’s PDM party, which opposed the Kremlin largely to protect its own business interests, lost its parliamentary majority in February 2019. Russian Deputy PM Dmitry Kozak directly urged PSRM to enter coalition with the pro-EU ACUM. Plahotniuc fled Moldova under Russian and Western pressure in June 2019 after failing to use his influence to force Moldova’s courts to declare the new coalition government unconstitutional. Darina Regio and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: Opportunity in Moldova,” Institute for the Study of War, June 24, 2019,
[13] This is the sourcing for the Moldova graphic.
  1. “Moldova Official: Russia Meddling in Presidential Race,” VOA News, October 4, 2016,
  2. Matthias Williams, “Moldova Bars Officials from Visiting Russia Citing "Abuse" Campaign,” Reuters, March 9, 2017,
  3. “Moldova Declares Russian Deputy PM Rogozin Persona Non Grata,” RFE/RL, August 2, 2017,
  4. Matthias Williams, “Exclusive: Russian Diplomats Expelled from Moldova Recruited Fighters – Sources,” Reuters, June 13, 2017,; “Moscow Threat as Moldova Expels Five Russian Diplomats,” BBC, May 30, 2017,
  5. Madalin Necsutu, “Moldova Extends Entry Ban on Russian Journalists,” Balkan Insight, November 29, 2017, https((:))//; “Two Russian TV Film Crews Refused Entry To Moldova,” Tass, February 19, 2019, https((:))//
  6. Liliana Barbarosie and Robert Coalson, “Banning Russian TV, Moldova Is Latest Hot Spot Fighting Kremlin Disinformation,” RFE/RL, February 1, 2018,
  7. “Prime Minister Of Moldova Calls For Withdrawal Of Russian Troops From Transnistria,” Tass, February 17, 2018, https((:))// 
  8. “General Assembly Adopts Texts Urging Troop Withdraw from Republic of Moldova, Strengthening Cooperation in Central Asia,” United Nations Press Office, June 22, 2018,
  9.  “Moldova Mulls New Gas Contract with Romania, Not Russia,” AP News, August 21, 2018,
  10. “Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia to Create Platform for Studying Russia’s Influence on Population in Occupied Territories,” Ukrinform, November 14, 2018, https://www((.)) 
  11. [“Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Open Dialog Case Published,”] MoldPres, December 17, 2018, https((:))//
  12. “Moldovan Court Suspends President in Political Standoff,” U.S. News, September 24, 2018,; “Moldovan Constitutional Court Suspends President for Fifth Time,” RFE/RL, December 18, 2018,
  13. Darina Regio and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: Opportunity in Moldova,” Institute for the Study of War, June 24, 2019,
  14. [“Medvedev and Dodon had a Constructive Conversation,”] Sputnik Moldova, June 21, 2019, https(:)//
  15. [“Dodon met with Kozak, Patrushev, and Karasin,”] Igor Dodon Facebook, June 24, 2019,
  16. [“Zinaida Greceanii Spoke at a Meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation,”] Arguments Facts, June 27, 2019,
  17. [“Dodon Promised to Appoint Co-Chair of the Intergovernmental Commission of Russia and Moldova,”] NOI Moldova, June 21, 2019, https((:))// 
  18. [“Sergei Shoigu's Visit to Moldova Proved That An Unofficial Tripartite Contract Is Valid,”] Vedomosti Moldova, August 29, 2019, http://www((.))
  19. Мikhail Kosov, [“Moldova-Russia: Reloading Relations,”] Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 24, 2019. https(:)//
  20. [“Meeting with President of Moldova Igor Dodon,”] Kremlin, September 7, 2019, http(:)//
  21. [“Russia and Moldova signed eight agreements under the MREF,”] Izvestiya, September 22, 2019, https((:))//; [“What Ended the Second Russia-Moldova Economic Forum,”] Sputnik Moldova, September 22, 2019, https://ru((.)); [“Partnership Without Borders: Results of the Second Moldovan-Russian Economic Forum,”], September 22, 2019, https(:)//
  22. [“Moldovan Parliament Voted To Resign Sandu Government,”] Tass, November 12, 2019, https((:))//
  23. [“Moldovan Government Swore Oath: What the New Prime Minister Said,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 14, 2019, https(:)//
  24. [“Moldovan Prime Minister Pays First Visit to Moscow: Agenda and Plans,”]Sputnik Moldova, November 11, 2019, https(:)//
  25. [“Gazprom Cuts Gas Price for Moldova by 26%,”] NV Ukraine, November 21, 2019, https://nv((.))ua/biz/markets/cena-gaza-rossiya-snizila-cenu-na-gaz-dlya-moldovy-novosti-mira-50054804.html; “Moldova’s New Cabinet Sets Course for Mending Strategic Relations with Russia — President,” Tass, November 20, 2019, https://tass(.)com/politics/1091311.
  26. [“Zinaida Greceanii Met in St. Petersburg with Valentina Matvienko,”] Accent TV, November 21, 2019, http(:)//
  27. [“Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Nikolai Patrushev Holds Bilateral Meetings With Secretaries Of Security Councils Of Several CIS Countries,”] Security Council of the Russian Federation, November 20, 2019, http(:)//
  28. “Moldovan President Invites Putin to Visit Chisinau,” Tass, November 21, 2019, https(:)//
  29. “Moldova, Eyeing Russia Loan, May 'Pause' Cooperation with IMF: PM,” Reuters, November 26, 2019,      
[14] [“Medvedev at a Meeting With Chicu: ‘I Hope That Moldova and Russia Will Be Able To Catch Up All The Same Opportunities’,”] Komsomolskaya Pravda, November 20, 2019, https://www((.)); [“Sputnik Exclusive: Prime Minister Ion Chicu On How Negotiations Were Held In Russia,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 20, 2019, https://ru((.))
[15] [“Chicu: Moldova Will Soon Turn Into A Large Construction Site,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 20, 2019, https://ru((.))
[16] [“Kozak: The Price Of Russian Gas For Moldova From 2020 Will Drop To $173 Per Thousand Cubic Meters,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 20, 2019, https://ru((.))
[17] [“Dodon Said That The Russian Federation Is Ready To Expand The List Of Non-Taxable Goods From Moldova,”] Tass, November 20, 2019, https://tass((.))ru/ekonomika/7166513; “Moldova’s New Cabinet Sets Course For Mending Strategic Relations With Russia — President,” Tass, November 20, 2019, https://tass((.))com/politics/1091311; [“Moldovan Prime Minister Summarizes The Visit To Moscow,”] Gagauziya Radio Televizionu, November 21, 2019, https://grt((.))md/news/2019/11/21/%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%B2%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BC%D1%8C%D0%B5%D1%80-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BB-%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B8-%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B8/.
[18] Alexander Tanas and Pavel Polityuk, “Moldova, Eyeing Russia Loan, May 'Pause' Cooperation With IMF: PM,” Reuters, November 26, 2019,
[19] Alexander Isaev, [“ Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban Meets With Russian Ambassador to Moldova,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 11, 2019, https(:)//; [“Ceban Met With Russian Ambassador To Moldova,”] Ion Ceban, November 13, 2019, https(:)//
[20] Oxana Serban, [“Ion Ceban and Sergei Sobyanin Agree to Renew Cooperation Agreement Between Chisinau and Moscow,”] TV 8 Moldova, November 29, 2019, http(:)//; [“We Will Adopt Many Projects: Ceban Told Sputnik About His Visit to Moscow,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 29, 2019, https(:)//
[21] Andrey Petrik, [“How Moscow Will Help Chisinau: Ceban and Sobyanin Meet in Russia,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 28, 2019, https((:))//
[22] [“Moldova Is Ready For Active Work Within The CIS and EAEU,”] Rhythm of Eurasia, November 22, 2019, https://www((.)); Alexander Isaev, [“Zinaida Greceanii Met With Valentina Matvienko At The IPA CIS Session,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 21, 2019, https://ru((.))
[23] [“Moldova Is Ready For Active Work Within The CIS and EAEU,”] Rhythm of Eurasia, November 22, 2019, https://www((.))
[24] The Eurasian Development Bank is a regional development bank established by the Kremlin in 2006. Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are the member states. [“Dodon: Moldova Will Discuss The Possibility Of Joining The Eurasian Development Bank,”] Eurasian Development Bank, November 29, 2019, https(:)//
[25] “Moldovan President Says Russia Has Made 'First Step' Toward Troop Withdrawal,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 2, 2019,
[26] [“Moldovan President Proposes To Annul Transnistria's Gas Debt Of $6.2 Billion,”] Interfax Ukraine, November 22, 2019, https://interfax((.))
[27] [“Secretary Of The Security Council Of The Russian Federation Signed A Cooperation Plan With Colleagues From The CIS,”] Rhythm of Eurasia, November 21, 2019, https://www((.))
[28] [“Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation: From Today, Bilateral Relations are Unfrozen,”] Sputnik Moldova, June 24, 2019, https((:))//
[29] [“Dodon: Russian Ministry of Defense is Preparing a Plan of Cooperation with the Defense Department of Moldova,”] Publika, August 27, 2019, https://ru((.))
[30] [“Moldova Lifts Ban On Russia Trips For Deputies And Officials,”] Radio Sputnik, Sputnik Moldova, July 29, 2019. https(:)//
[31] Zinaida Greceanîi, [“Zinaida Greceanîi Addressed Deputies of the Russian State Duma.”] Sputnik Moldova, June 27, 2019. https(:)//
[32] [“MREF-2019: The First Agreements Between The Regions of Russia and Moldova Are Signed.”] Sputnik Moldova, September 20, 2019, https(:)//; [“Partnership Without Borders: Results of the Second Moldovan-Russian Economic Forum,”], September 21, 2019, https(:)//
[33] [“Dodon Will Seek to Restore the Broadcasting of Russian Television Channels,”] Ren, July 31, 2019, http://ren(.)tv/novosti/2019-07-31/dodon-budet-dobivatsya-vosstanovleniya-veshchaniya-rossiyskih-telekanalov.
[34] [“Sergei Shoigu Handed Over To Pavel Voicu The Combat Banners Of The Soldiers Who Liberated Moldova,”] Sputnik Moldova, August 24, 2019, https://ru((.)); [“Secretary Of The Security Council Of The Russian Federation Signed A Cooperation Plan With Colleagues From The CIS,”] Rhythm of Eurasia, November 21, 2019, https://www((.))
[35] Madalin Necsutu, “Romania Opposes Federal Solution to Moldova’s Transnistria Problem,” Balkan Insight, September 26, 2019, https://balkaninsight((.))com/2019/09/26/romania-opposes-federal-solution-to-moldovas-transnistria-problem/.
[36] “Moldova Granted Observer Status In Eurasian Union,” Euractiv, April 19, 2017, https://www((.))
[38] [“First Statements By Prime Minister Ion Chicu - What Will The Government Do,”] Sputnik Moldova, November 14, 2019, https://ru(.)
[39] Nataliya Bugayova and Darina Regio, “Russia in Review: Diversifying Foreign Policy Tools”, Institute for the Study of War, October 1, 2019,
[40] [“Russia will provide Moldova a loan for infrastructure projects,”] Novosti, November 21, 2019, https(:)//; [“Russia Will Provide Moldova With $ 500 Million For Infrastructure Development,”] Eurasian Choice of Moldova and Transnistria, November 21, 2019, https(:)//
[41] Dmitry Olishevsky, [“Dodon Spoke to the Press Regarding the Resignation of the Sandu Government,”] Parliamentary News, November 12, 2019, https://www.pnp((.))ru/in-world/dodon-obratilsya-k-presse-v-svyazi-s-otstavkoy-pravitelstva-sandu.html.
[42] Nataliya Bugayova and Darina Regio, “Russia’s Long View on Ukraine’s Elections,” Institute for the Study of War, April 3, 2019,
[43] Nataliya Bugayova and Mason Clark, “Russia in Review, Military Exercises as Geopolitical Tools,” Institute for the Study of War, September 4, 2019,