By Jonathan Mautner
Russia leveraged the asymmetric advantage
of its air power in Syria in order to facilitate major pro-regime gains in eastern
Aleppo City from November 26 – December 7, bringing the regime close to
securing the city’s ultimate surrender. Russia conducted targeted airstrikes against a
contiguous swathe of five opposition districts in northeastern Aleppo City from
November 25 – 26, enabling pro-regime forces to recapture
four neighborhoods in the area. At the same time, opposition forces withdrew from five additional
neighborhoods in the vicinity of the Kurdish-held Sheikh Maqsud District in
northern Aleppo City, ceding control of the districts to the predominantly
Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. Most recently, pro-regime forces seized
the Sha’er District on December 6 and advanced
into the dense urban terrain of Aleppo’s Old City on December 7 after the
withdrawal of opposition fighters, establishing control of more than three-fourths
of the opposition’s urban pocket. The withdrawal of those fighters to more open
areas of the city will render them increasingly vulnerable to Russian
airstrikes and place them under greater pressure to accede to regime surrender
and evacuation proposals.
Russia also intensified its air
operations against schools, markets, and other civilian infrastructure in the suburbs
north
and west of Aleppo City and
in neighboring Idlib
Province from November 25 – 28 and December 3 – 6, respectively, aiming to
extract a high cost for the opposition’s continued resistance in Aleppo City.
Russia will continue to wage its air operations in northwestern Syria for both
military and punitive effect, at least until the regime’s siege-and-starve
campaign coerces Aleppo City’s remaining opposition districts to surrender. As
Russia acts deliberately to reinforce that campaign, opposition-held eastern
Aleppo City and its bastion of acceptable opposition factions will likely
surrender before the incoming U.S. administration takes office. This
eventuality would not only bolster the regime and its allies, but also threaten
the national security objectives of the U.S. in Syria. Lacking alternatives,
the remnants of those once acceptable opposition forces will likely withdraw to
core opposition terrain in Idlib Province and cooperate more closely with
Salafi-jihadist groups in order to continue their insurgency against the Syrian
regime. Although committed to overthrowing the government of Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad, Salafi-jihadist groups such as ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham are
also invested in attacking the U.S. and its allies. If the regime achieves
victory in Aleppo City, the U.S. will face both a continuing civil war and an increasingly
durable Salafi-jihadist safe haven in northern Syria from which groups can plan
and potentially execute external attacks.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
