Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel
April 2, 2025, 6:15 pm ET
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on April 2. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the April 3 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms. Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that the temporary energy
infrastructure ceasefire is in effect and that Russia is adhering to
the ceasefire.[1]
Peskov claimed that Ukraine has "not joined" the temporary ceasefire
"essentially" and that Russia intends to discuss this with the United
States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 1 that
Russia forwarded a list of Ukraine's alleged ceasefire violations to US
National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio,
the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[2]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 2 that Ukrainian
forces are "systematically" conducting drone and artillery strikes
against Russian energy infrastructure.[3]
The exact contours of the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire
remain unclear, and Ukraine and Russia do not appear to have formally
agreed on the list of objects covered in the ceasefire or the types of
strikes prohibited. ISW previously noted that it is unclear if the
temporary ceasefire prohibits striking energy infrastructure with
shorter-range tube or rocket artillery.[4] It is also unclear how Ukraine could violate a temporary ceasefire that it has "not joined."
US
officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir
Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Two US officials familiar with the matter told Reuters on
April 1 that senior Trump administration officials have discussed the
likelihood that the United States will not be able to secure a long-term
peace agreement in Ukraine in the coming months and are preparing new
plans to pressure Russia and Ukraine into an agreement.[5]
The sources noted that Trump administration officials acknowledged that
Putin is actively resisting US efforts to accomplish a peace agreement
in Ukraine and used a series of meetings and calls over the weekend of
March 29-30 to discuss possible mechanisms to bring Russia to the
negotiating table. A senior US official stated that the Trump
administration is considering levying additional tariffs and sanctions
against Russia. Another source familiar with the discussions similarly
told Fox News on April 1 that US President Donald Trump
believes that Putin is "slow-rolling" negotiations on a general
ceasefire in Ukraine and that the Trump administration is considering
increasing sanctions against Russia in order to force Putin to the
negotiating table.[6]
Trump recently told NBC News that he is considering additional
sanctions against Russian oil and stated during a press conference on
March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for
Russia to agree to a general ceasefire agreement.[7]
ISW previously noted that it is not possible for the United States or
the wider West to exert maximum pressure against Russia with economic
tools alone as Russia's ongoing and forecasted future economic struggles
are closely tied to Russian military losses on the battlefield.[8]
The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a
stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military
aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict
significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
CEO
of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will
reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff
in Washington, D.C. on April 2. Unnamed US officials and other
unspecified sources familiar with Dmitriev's trip told CNN on April 1
that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff later this week in Washington,
D.C., and sources told CNN and CBS that the US government temporarily
lifted sanctions against Dmitriev in order to grant him a visa to visit
the United States.[9] Sources told CBS on
April 2 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff on April 2, but the Trump
administration has not published information about the meeting.[10]
It is unclear if the meeting has occurred as of this publication.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that Dmitriev's
visit to Washington, D.C. is possible, and Dmitriev inconclusively
responded to US reporting on his possible visit with "maybe."[11]
The
Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized
rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that
each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle
divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs' administrative
structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen. Ukrainian
military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 2 that the
Russian military command may be reorganizing the motorized rifle
brigades of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army
Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 3rd CAA (formerly
2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) such that both armies would
have three “motorized” rifle divisions each.[12]
The 51st CAA currently includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper:
the 1st, 5th, 9th, 110th, 114th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades. The
3rd CAA also includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 4th,
6th, 7th, 85th, 88th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades. Mashovets
stated that some unspecified brigades in the 51st and 3rd CAAs are
already staffed at levels significantly higher than a typical brigade,
at least on paper.[13]
Mashovets noted that the brigades are already operating at the front
and have control over a number of other units – usually rifle or
motorized rifle regiments and battalions – attached to the brigade.
Mashovets stated that "it is assumed" that each of the new motorized
rifle divisions in the 51st and 3rd CAAs will consist of two assault
regiments, two "reinforcement" regiments, and an artillery regiment as
well as organic logistics support units at the division-level, but that
the divisions‘ are unlikely to have combat engineer or anti-aircraft
missile units at the regimental level, as is normal for most Russian
motorized rifle divisions. Mashovets stated that the Russian military
command plans to create the 1st, 110th, and 132nd motorized rifle
divisions within the 51st CAA. Mashovets stated that the Russian
military command plans to form the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division on the
basis of the 101st and 109th motor rifle regiments and plans to
consolidate the 269th, 270th and 272nd rifle battalions into the 103rd
Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that the only truly mechanized
"motorized rifle" unit in the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division will be the
1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that it is unclear if
each new division will include a tank regiment and that the situation
with tanks "will be very tense," likely given Russia’s shortage of main
battle tanks. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command may be
making these changes to improve the organizational and staff structure
in the 51st and 3rd CAAs in order to "streamline" their command and
control processes. Mashovets stated that these changes are unlikely to
significantly increase the number of troops in the CAAs or their combat
capabilities beyond that of an army corps.[14] ISW has not observed other reports of the Russian military command restructuring the 51st and 3rd CAAs.
The
Russian military command reorganized the 1st DNR AC and 2nd LNR AC into
the 51st and 3rd CAAs, respectively, in Summer 2024 as part of wider
efforts to integrate irregular forces into the Russian Armed Forces.[15]
Elements of the 51st CAA are currently operating in the Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions, and elements of the 3rd CAA are
currently operating in the Siversk and Chasiv Yar directions and in
Belgorod Oblast.[16]
The Russian military command has especially attempted to leverage
elements of the 51st CAA in offensive operations in the Kurakhove,
Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions in recent months.[17]
Most CAAs in the Russian military include less than three divisions,
with only the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD])
including three divisions.[18]
Mashovets’ report suggests that the Russian military does not seek to
equip the divisions of the 51st and 3rd CAAs to a normal Russian
motorized rifle division’s the full doctrinal end strength, suggesting
that the restructuring is in response to specific command and control of
force structure challenges afflicting the former DNR 1st and LNR 2nd
Army Corps given their hasty reorganization into CAAs.[19]
The
Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in
Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents
prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[20] The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces recorded 767
cases of Russian forces using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers
to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition
containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned under the CWC
in March 2025. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian
forces have used banned chemical agents a total of 7,730 times since
February 2023.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms.
- US
officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir
Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
- CEO
of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will
reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff
in Washington, D.C. on April 2.
- The Russian
military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle
brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each
army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions,
likely in an effort to improve the CAAs' administrative structure,
especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen.
- The
Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in
Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents
prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
- Ukrainian
forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently
advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
- Russian
authorities continued efforts to solidify their control over the
Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian
military's conduct of the war in Ukraine.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Alleged Ceasefire Violations
Ukraine
and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to
ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations
regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy
infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations
remains unclear.
Russian sources continued to claim
on April 2 that Ukrainian forces violated the temporary energy
infrastructure strikes ceasefire. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a substation near Klyukva, Kursk
Oblast and shelled an energy facility in another area of Kursk Oblast on
the morning of April 2.[21]
Luganskgaz, a Russian-controlled energy company operating in occupied
Luhansk Oblast, claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike
against the Svatove gas distribution station in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[22]
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 2 that a Russian
first-person view (FPV) drone struck an electrical substation in Sumy
Oblast and that an artillery strike damaged a power line in Nikopil,
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight from April 1 to 2 leaving almost 4,000
residents of both oblasts without power.[23]
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in
central Zhuravka and near Basivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[24]
Russian
sources claimed that fighting continued northeast of Sumy City near
Basivka and Zhuravka; south of Sudzha near Guyevo and Plekhovo; and
southwest of Suzdha near Oleshnya.[25]
Order
of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian "Arbat" Special Purpose
Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's
Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are
reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[26] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near the Kursk Oblast border.[27]
Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle
Division, 44th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the "Anvar
Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar"
volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in Guyevo.[28]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces
advanced south of Popovka and west of Demidovka (both northwest of
Belgorod City).[29]
Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka.[30]
A Russian milblogger claimed that the area near Popovka is a contested "gray zone."[31]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck the
Korochyanskoye Dam near Popovka to complicate Ukrainian crossings of the
Korocha River.[32]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[33]
Elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment and of the 155th Naval
Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near
Demidovka.[34]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 2 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[35]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi
and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 1 and 2.[36]
The
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk
direction reported on April 2 that Russian forces have been conducting
reconnaissance-in-force missions as part of efforts to resume offensive
operations over the past two weeks.[37]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kupyansk direction on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 1 and 2 that Russian
forces advanced to the northern outskirts of Kindrashivka.[38]
A milblogger claimed that Russian forces consolidated their positions
in northern Kindrashivka after seizing a stronghold near the P79
Kupyansk-Dvorichna road northeast of the settlement.[39]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the
international border near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe, north of Kupyansk
near Kindrashivka and Mala Shapivka, and east of Kupyansk near Pishchane
and Stepova Novoselivka.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Mala Shapkivka and near Stepova Novoselivka.[41]
A
Russian milblogger claimed that ravines and gullies are complicating
Russian efforts to move equipment in the direction of Kindrashivka.[42]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th
Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the "Kontora"
Detachment (375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion, 47th Tank
Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are
reportedly operating north of Stepova Novoselivka.[43]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 2 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near
Novoyehorivka, Zahyrzove, and Nova Krulyakivka and east of Borova near
Novoyehorivka and Novolyubivka.[44]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 1 and 2 that Russian
forces advanced near Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[45]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Katerynivka,
Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novomykhailiva; northeast of Lyman near
Kolodyazi, Myrne, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Dibrova and
Torske on April 1 and 2.[46]
A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces continued
to attack in the direction of Nove (north of Lyman) and Katerynivka
(north of Lyman).[47]
Ukrainian
Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported on
April 2 that Russian forces have increased their assault tempo and
activity in Luhansk Oblast.[48]
The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman
direction stated on April 2 that Russian forces are increasingly using
mass infantry attacks for daily assaults and that Russian force are not
conducting mechanized assaults as frequently as they used to in Fall
2024.[49]
The spokesperson stated that Russian forces recently have been
conducting ground assaults nearly daily, primarily sending penal
recruits into fire to expose Ukrainian firing positions and to enable
trained Russian infantry to better attack Ukrainian positions. The
spokesperson stated that Russian forces conduct artillery, MLRS, air,
and first-person view (FPV) drone strikes to support small group
infantry attacks before assembling into larger groups of 10 to 15
soldiers for subsequent attacks. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade
operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 2 that Russian forces
are trying to seize Lyman by enveloping its flanks in order to
facilitate movement to the Oskil River and establish Lyman as a Russian
logistics node.[50]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd
Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are
reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[51]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 2 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka; northeast of
Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near
Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 1
and 2.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.[53]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar.[54]
Russian
forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near
Novomarkove; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka;
and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechnye and Stupochky on April 1 and
2.[55]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division,
including elements of its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly
operating near Chasiv Yar.[56]
Elements of the "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade
(Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar
direction.[57]
Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined
Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR
AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and drone elements of the 6th
Motorized Rifle Division (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's
Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near
Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[58]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published April 2 shows Russian
forces raising a flag in southwestern Oleksandropil (southwest of
Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[59]
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces
advanced north of Toretsk, near the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk,
northwest of Toretsk, in the southwestern outskirts of Toretsk, and near
the Tsentralna mine in southwestern Toretsk.[60]
Russian
forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne and
Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske; west of Toretsk near Romanivka,
Shcherbynivka, and Leonidivka; and southwest of Toretsk near
Panteleymonivka, Oleksandropil, Valentynivka, and Sukha Balka on April 1
and 2.[61]
Ukraine’s
Southern Operational Command reported on April 1 that Russian forces
are periodically trying to attack in armored columns in the Toretsk
direction.[62]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA,
SMD) and the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (purportedly of the 8th CAA) are
reportedly operating near Oleksandropil and Stara Mykolaivka (southwest
of Toretsk).[63] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[64]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Kotlyne (southwest
of Pokrovsk).[65]
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced in western Lysivka (southeast of
Pokrovsk) and southeast of Bohdanivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced
northeast of Lysivka, northeast of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk),
northwest of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), southwest of Nadiivka, and
near Preobrazhenka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in eastern Zelene (south of Pokrovsk).[68]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself;
northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Berezivka; east of Pokrovsk
near Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Kalynove; southeast of
Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Vidrodzhennya
(formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne,
Kotlyarivka, Uspenivka, Sribne, Novooleksandrivka, Bohdanivka, and
Novoserhiivka on April 1 and 2.[69]
Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 1 that Ukrainian
forces repelled a platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of three
infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and an unspecified number of
motorcycles in the Novopavlivka direction (southwest of Pokrovsk).[70]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking
near Lysivka, Shevchenko, Novooleksandrivka, and Udachne and are
accumulating forces for future counterattacks.[71]
A Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces have started to use tanks and IFVs during assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[72]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka
direction stated that Russian forces are conducting assaults mainly with
motorcycles, quad bikes, and buggies.[73]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk
direction stated that Russian forces are accumulating Soviet-era
equipment for assaults and that Russian losses have tripled in the area
since the start of negotiations (likely referring to mid-February 2025).[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a bridge near Solone.[75]
A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that
Uspenivka is a contested "gray zone" and that Russian forces have not
been able to advance past Shevchenko.[76]
The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have low altitude air
superiority, forcing Russian forces have to conduct rotations on foot
over 10 kilometers and causing problems with Russian supplies of
ammunition, water, and gasoline.
Order of Battle: Air
defense elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA,
Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the
Pokrovsk direction.[77]
Elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 428th Motorized
Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly
operating in Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk), and drone operators
of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th
CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[78]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.|
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[79]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka
and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 1 and
2.[80]
Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Burlatske (northwest
of Velyka Novosilka).[81]
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in
Vesele and Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[82]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near
Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele,
Shevchenko, and Burlatske on April 2.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vilne Pole.[84]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade
(Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly
operating in the Sharkhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[85]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on April 2.
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade
and artillery elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both
of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD])
are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[86]
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates
that Russian forces recently seized Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne) and
advanced east and west of the settlement.[87]
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that elements of the
Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced north of Mali Shcherbaky
(northwest of Robotyne).[88]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near
Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky,
and Kamyanske on April 1 and 2.[89]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on April 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces
advanced on Velikiy Potemkin Island (south of Kherson City) and that
Ukrainian forces are attempting to use boats to cross the Dnipro River
near the Antonivka Road Bridge (east of Kherson City) in order to land
on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[90]
Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Dnipro direction on April 1 and 2.[91]
Order
of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade
(Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west
(right) bank of the Dnipro River.[92]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of April 1 to 2 and a missile strike on April 2. The Ukrainian Air
Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shahed and decoy drones
from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[93]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 41 drones
over northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that 20 drones were
”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.
Ukrainian official sources reported that the drone strikes struck
Kharkiv, Donetsk, Sumy, and Odesa oblasts and that a ballistic missile
struck civilian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
during the day on April 2, killing four civilians.[94]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
authorities continued efforts to solidify their control over the
Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian
military's conduct of the war in Ukraine. Russian state media reported
on April 2 that the Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first
reading on criminal penalties for "discrediting" the Russian military.[95]
The bill proposes that the government confiscate the property of people
who accept payment in exchange for discrediting the Russian military,
for calling for anti-Russia sanctions, or for working in an
international organization of which Russia is not a member. Russian
State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin noted that the bill is aimed
at punishing Russian citizens who fled the country after the start of
the full-scale invasion or who commit treason. The Russian State Duma
also adopted a bill criminalizing failures to report sabotage efforts
against Russian energy and transport infrastructure.[96]
Occupation
governments continue to expand their analogues to the Kremlin's "Time
of Heroes" program. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev
claimed on April 2 that 933 people, including 823 residents of occupied
Sevastopol, Crimea, have applied to join the "Sevastopol — City of
Heroes" program.[97]
Rozvozhaev stated that the program will begin on September 1 and will
accept 30 participants. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration
stated on April 2 that 1,515 people recently submitted applications for
the "Heroes of Kherson Oblast" program.[98]
ISW has previously noted that Russian officials intend to leverage
analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" program in occupied Ukraine as
part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and
militarize society in occupied Ukraine.[99]
Russian
officials may be attempting to address systematic issues of
unprofessionalism and violence in the Russian military three years into
the war. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on April 2
that the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Court stated that it
sentenced two Russian commanders accused of murdering, torturing, and
abusing the bodies of seven fellow Russian servicemembers in Ukraine.[100]
The court sent both commanders to a maximum-security penal colony and
stripped the commanders of their ranks. Russian opposition media and
Ukrainian media outlets previously reported that the commanders were
part of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]).[101]
ISW has consistently observed reports of Russian commanders injuring,
killing, or unjustly imprisoning their subordinates in Ukraine
throughout the full-scale invasion.[102] Russian officials have not undertaken any significant effort to prevent or address systemic violence in the Russian military.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
The People's Front (Narodnyi Front) political coalition told Kremlin newswire TASS on
April 2 that Russian forces have deployed 120 newly developed "Rubin"
modular electronic warfare (EW) systems designed to protect infantry and
vehicles in Ukraine.[103]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW
is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive
Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking
activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates
will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of
annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian
sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to
read the March 31 Russian Occupation Update.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/23574837 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308966
[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/308869; https://t.me/tass_agency/308870 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3825 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/54758
[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/50824
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-officials-eye-longer-road-ukraine-peace-frustration-mounts-2025-04-01/
[6] https://x.com/JacquiHeinrich/status/1907132555293581469
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033125
[8] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Weakness%20Offers%20Leverage%20PDF.pdf
[9] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/01/politics/senior-russian-official-washington-visit/index.html ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steve-witkoff-kirill-dmitriev-russia-white-house-meeting/?ftag=CNM-00-10aab8f&linkId=789427694
[10] https://x.com/saraecook/status/1907418670235619498 ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steve-witkoff-kirill-dmitriev-russia-white-house-meeting/?ftag=CNM-00-10aab8f&linkId=789427694
[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/308968 ; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1907213823502696722
[12] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2664
[13] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2664
[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2665; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2664
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2024
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/October%2012%2C%202023%20Russian%20Orbat_Final.pdf
[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage
[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QBb1y2wz7ZtA1r5BEEupBbPkphmAsjz9EN2eB6jGYXQissKV9cpSW47ZTDLtkdp9l
[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/50824
[22] https://t.me/luganskgaz_lnr/793
[23]
https://suspilne dot
media/985117-zelenskij-pro-obstrili-u-moskvi-znevazaut-diplomaticni-zusilla-partneriv/;
https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/videos/1309292320154958/
[24] https://t.me/rybar/69327
[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26317; https://t.me/wargonzo/25693; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155; https://t.me/rusich_army/22262; https://t.me/rybar/69327; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26338; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89221
[26] https://t.me/milinfolive/145367
[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/50821
[28] https://t.me/rybar/69327; https://t.me/dva_majors/68111; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89210
[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/25693
[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/25693; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155; https://t.me/rybar/69351
[31] https://t.me/rybar/69351
[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89211 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/145380
[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89211; https://t.me/milinfolive/145380
[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89230
[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/308915
[36]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[37] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/navit-iz-siryaka-ne-vyjshly-a-yih-vzhe-rozbyly-bezgluzdi-ataky-rosiyan-poblyzu-vovchanska/
[38] https://t.me/epoddubny/22984; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26311
[39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63264
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWcTfmUIOxyngkNF0eTcgMV5ovkEhT2ueo5gop4wcj51A_8YcO4dBI-ZpFnH6qVOZ78HAY7X4k6nSZ-53N8xXnJJIn6ETfLuou4PDGikVBoA9ypHU1TniJmLUQ20P1vk8NgBXDyf9cloQGLjsz7F9s094UUGoBKEQxlwickn_DKLHiRpUQ77daZ4NGNST71zms&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26311; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63264
[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/68179 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22984
[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89200
[43] https://t.me/dva_majors/68179
[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWcTfmUIOxyngkNF0eTcgMV5ovkEhT2ueo5gop4wcj51A_8YcO4dBI-ZpFnH6qVOZ78HAY7X4k6nSZ-53N8xXnJJIn6ETfLuou4PDGikVBoA9ypHU1TniJmLUQ20P1vk8NgBXDyf9cloQGLjsz7F9s094UUGoBKEQxlwickn_DKLHiRpUQ77daZ4NGNST71zms&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[45] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31203
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWcTfmUIOxyngkNF0eTcgMV5ovkEhT2ueo5gop4wcj51A_8YcO4dBI-ZpFnH6qVOZ78HAY7X4k6nSZ-53N8xXnJJIn6ETfLuou4PDGikVBoA9ypHU1TniJmLUQ20P1vk8NgBXDyf9cloQGLjsz7F9s094UUGoBKEQxlwickn_DKLHiRpUQ77daZ4NGNST71zms&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/68155
[48] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/25667
[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Szeuva9Fl4s ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/vyklykayut-na-sebe-vogon-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-pershymy-v-myasorubku-kydayut-vyazniv/
[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/vpered-vpered-bez-urahuvannya-vtrat-kombryg-rozpoviv-navishho-vorog-atakuye-lyman/
[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159964
[52]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl; https://t.me/tass_agency/308925
[53] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31209
[54] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31209
[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26329
[57] https://t.me/tass_agency/308947
[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13633; https://t.me/tass_agency/308962
[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1907409422927663490; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1907411519396000088; https://tme/partizani68/148
[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26340
[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[62] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/videos/948417157133091/
[63] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13632; https://t.me/KubanArtilery/1205; https://t.me/KubanArtilery/1207; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13633
[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89269
[65] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1907191969358471538; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1907194310300148082; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4518
[66] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8792; https://t.me/BULAVA72b/201; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1907153899993063524; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1907146579103870984; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1907427492471660719; https://t.me/moment_war/385; https://t.me/Stabikus2024/633
[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63270 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274
[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274
[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63262; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63270; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2276
[70] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7229
[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63270; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89258; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26343
[72] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-shturmuyut-z-bronetehnikoyu-ale-bezrezultatno/
[73] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/apokaliptychna-kartyna-lyudozherska-absolyutno-rosijski-motoshturmovyky-mchat-po-tilam-pobratymiv/
[74] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Szeuva9Fl4s ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/pislya-balachok-pro-peremovyny-vtraty-voroga-zrosly-vtrychi-poblyzu-pokrovska-tryvayut-intensyvni-boyi/
[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318
[76] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2276
[77] https://t.me/milinfolive/145308;
[78] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89203; https://t.me/dva_majors/68161 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68177
[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/25693; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26320
[80] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
[81] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26965; https://t.me/sicariofly/15; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1907122739439161456
[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63267; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31212
[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63267; https://t.me/voin_dv/14203
[84] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63267
[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/14188
[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/14204
[87] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8793; https://t.me/rusich_army/22266
[88] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20973
[89] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oBNSADXWHoKMYK4F3N46jFMSdwAcb6GrHSwKL2wphoQDbkhb3tpXrnjxmKdyevVql
[90] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26361
[91] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl
;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oBNSADXWHoKMYK4F3N46jFMSdwAcb6GrHSwKL2wphoQDbkhb3tpXrnjxmKdyevVql
[92] https://t.me/dva_majors/68168
[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/31768
[94] https://t.me/kpszsu/31768; https://t.me/synegubov/13654; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2296; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2297; https://t.me/synegubov/13657;
https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2293 ; https://suspilne dot
media/kharkiv/984867-ponad-14-vibuhiv-prolunali-u-harkovi-rosiani-atakuut-misto-bezpilotnikami/;
https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2305; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/985045-u-holodnogirskomu-rajoni-harkova-usuvaut-naslidki-nicnoi-ataki-bpla/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2307; https://t.me/astrapress/78010; https://t.me/astrapress/77999; https://t.me/astrapress/78049; https://t.me/astrapress/78054;
https://suspilne dot
media/dnipro/985567-armia-rf-atakuvala-balistikou-krivij-rig-so-vidomo;
https://suspilne dot
media/985117-zelenskij-pro-obstrili-u-moskvi-znevazaut-diplomaticni-zusilla-partneriv/;
https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/videos/1309292320154958/
[95] https://ria dot ru/20250402/gosduma-2008869612.html
[96] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/67ed15789a7947dbc713187f
[97] https://t.me/razvozhaev/10903
[98] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/29468
[99] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2025
[100] https://zona dot media/news/2025/04/02/maly-tim
[101]
https://zona dot media/news/2025/04/02/maly-tim; https://meduza dot
io/news/2025/04/02/sud-v-rostove-na-donu-prigovoril-k-20-i-18-godam-dvuh-rossiyskih-komandirov-obvinyaemyh-v-ubiystve-i-pytkah-semeryh-soldat-svoey-divizii;
https://suspilne dot
media/796295-pidirvati-rozstrilati-spaliti-ak-rosijski-vijskovi-vbivaut-svoih-na-linii-frontu-v-ukraini/;
https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/16564
[102] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2023
[103] https://t.me/tass_agency/308937 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23572995
