By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team
Key
Takeaway: The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) has
made significant progress in its operation to retake Fallujah, but the city is
not fully cleared. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced
the full recapture of Fallujah on June 17, following the recapture of the
government complex. However, the northern neighborhoods of the city remain
controlled by ISIS, and several western neighborhoods are still contested. Even
as the ISF operation is on the verge of military success in Fallujah, it is poised
to be a political failure. The Badr Organization, an Iranian-backed Shi’a proxy
militia, has entered the city limits alongside pro-Iranian ISF elements. The
Badr Organization’s presence, following continued Shi’a abuses against Sunni
residents, will be a sectarian trigger that will undermine the Iraqi
Government’s efforts to reconcile Sunni elements. The Fallujah operation will
be a mission failure – even if the city is physically recaptured – as long as the
Iraqi Government does not address the Sunni political marginalization which made
Fallujah passive towards ISIS’s takeover of the city in December 2013.
The ISF
continue operations to retake neighborhoods in Fallujah, securing Khudra
on June 15 and Hayy al-Shuhada
on June 16, and Nazal
and Sinai,
Fallujah’s industrial center, on June 17. The ISF also secured the mayoral
building and the entire government
complex on June 17. The ISF is still contesting areas in western Fallujah and
have moved into Risala
and Andalus
on June 15 and encircled Fallujah General Hospital
in Dhubat
on June 17. Jubeil likewise remains contested. The ISF and Sunni tribal
fighters continue to consolidate terrain to the southwest of Fallujah,
recapturing Felahat on June 11
and al-Jafah on June 13,
while efforts
are ongoing to secure Halabsa. The ISF secured control over the Fallujah Dam, directly
south of Fallujah, on June 14. Control of the dam will allow forces currently
south of the river to link up with forces on the northern bank.
The Badr Organization, an
Iranian-backed Shi’a proxy militia, has entered the city limits of Fallujah alongside
the Federal Police and Emergency Response Division (ERD). Badr’s entry in the majority
Sunni city follows the expiration of Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri’s
ten-day deadline for Fallujah residents to leave. The deadline expired on June
14. Amiri and the 5th Badr Brigade were present in Hayy al-Shuhada on
June 15 and reached 60th Street, the boundary
between Shuhada and Nazal, on June 16, in coordination with the Federal Police
and ERD. The 5th Badr Brigade was also reported alongside the
Federal Police near the mayoral building on June 17. Elements
of both the Federal Police and ERD are co-opted by the Badr Organization and
are strongly receptive to Iranian direction. These elements have also operated
alongside Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), major
Iranian-backed proxy militias with a history of sectarian violence. It is
possible that Iranian actors, who have been sited previously in Fallujah’s
environs, are also in the city. The Badr Organization is not likely leading the
operations to retake these areas, as they have been pictured in these areas the
day following the ISF announcement of their recapture. Instead, Badr is
shadowing the ISF operations towards the center of the city. The militia
involvement represents a breach of agreement within the ISF that
Shi’a militias would not enter the city, indicating that pro-Iranian ISF
elements will undermine top ISF orders out of affiliation to Iran. This will limit
the ISF’s ability to set the terms of militia involvement. Other militias,
including AAH and KH, may see Badr’s entry into Fallujah as a green light to
enter as well.
Badr’s presence in Fallujah could spoil the anti-ISIS campaign
and setback government efforts of Sunni reconciliation. This setback may
already be triggered.
Iranian proxy militias continue to carry out violations against the Sunni
population fleeing the city. Anbar Governor Suhaib al-Rawi reported on June 13 that Popular Mobilization fighters in
Saqlawiyah had executed 49 Sunni men and disappeared 643 civilians the
week before, following reports of similar actions around Garma. Human Rights
Watch (HRW) released a report on June 9 further detailing
militia abuse against Sunni residents. The Popular Mobilization has denied or downplayed these
allegations. Popular Mobilization activity in Fallujah’s environs has
demonstrated that militias are likely to treat residents in Fallujah as
complicit with ISIS. The U.N. estimated that 40,000 residents had fled the city over
the past three weeks. Many began
to flee the city on June 17 as the ISF entered the inner neighborhoods. The
U.N. had estimated that as many of 90,000 people were in the city when the ground
operation began on May 23. It is unclear how many still remain. Residents have
likely remained in Fallujah until now for a variety of reasons, including
physical obstacles preventing their escape, the difficulty of escape, and
loyalty to the city itself. Residents likely believe that hardships faced by
remaining under ISIS’s control in Fallujah is preferable to living in refugee
camps or anywhere else that may leave them vulnerable to abuse by Shi’a
militias.
A
historic distrust and disdain towards the Iraqi Government among the people of
Fallujah has made them resistant to outside intervention and susceptible to
complicity with radical ideology. The U.S. encountered that anti-government
aggression during efforts to take the city from AQI in 2004 and 2006. Fallujah’s
animosity towards the previous Shi’a-led government reached its height when
former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki arrested several high-profile Sunni
politicians in 2012, leading to year-long anti-government protests across Iraq
and particularly in Fallujah. AQI’s resurgence, and consequent evolution into
ISIS, was incubated among these protests. ISIS seized Fallujah at the end of
December 2013 by capitalizing on that anti-government sentiment amongst a
population that did not fight back.
The
Iraqi Government can salvage the Fallujah operation by changing the composition
of the forces in the city. Continued Shi’a militia involvement in Fallujah will
undermine the military success of the operation and efforts of Sunni
reconciliation. Militias must be withdrawn. The Iraqi Government will also need
to consider the composition of the forces needed to hold Fallujah after its
recapture. Fallujah will not accept a security system maintained explicitly by
the ISF and certainly not one connected to the Popular Mobilization. The
government needs to generate and support a local tribal force that can secure
the city and act as a liaison between Fallujah and Baghdad. The Iraqi
Government also needs to ensure that its Sunni population participates in the
government as a means to achieve demands, rather than seek insurgent or extreme
methods. In the long term, the Iraqi Government needs to develop a framework
that can address the fundamental issue that Sunnis are underrepresented in the
government and a frequent victim of institutional sectarian abuse. Failure to
adequately address Sunni demands of equal representation and political
participation will inevitably lead to the resurgence of either ISIS or a
successor in Fallujah and elsewhere in Iraq.
