Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2025

 

Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Nate Trotter, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros

July 25, 2025, 7:30 pm ET
 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on July 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials continue to delay high-level negotiations between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin amid US calls for a meeting. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 25 that a meeting between Zelensky and Putin remains highly unlikely and stated that Russia and Ukraine must first develop agreements "through expert work.”[1] US President Donald Trump told reporters on July 25 that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky is “going to happen” and that the meeting should have “happened three months ago.”[2] Russian officials have repeatedly postponed high-level meetings between Ukrainian and Russian leaders and refused to engage in constructive negotiations that seek concrete steps to end the war.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia is feigning interest in negotiations in order to buy time to make gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West — in stark contrast to Ukraine’s continued willingness to engage in negotiations to end the war.[4]

Russian forces likely seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and appear to be conducting limited sabotage and reconnaissance missions into Pokrovsk amid ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Novoekonomichne and likely seized the settlement.[5] One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Kapitalna Mine just west of Novoekonomichne and just south of the mine.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced further northeast of Pokrovsk near Nykanorivka, Boikivka, and Zatyshok and south of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Novoukrainka.[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) recently participated in the seizure of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[8] Additional Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian infantry units and sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced into and throughout Pokrovsk and into the outskirts of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), and one Russian milblogger claimed that several Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups temporarily advanced into central Pokrovsk.[9] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that reports that Russian units are in Pokrovsk are premature, however, and ISW has not observed any indication that Russian forces maintain enduring positions in Pokrovsk.[10] Ukrainian forces are conducting limited counterattacks in the area, and additional geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook positions west of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[11]

 

The Russian military command appears to be leveraging elements of the 51st CAA to advance northeast of Pokrovsk and pressure Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the seizure of Novoekonomichne.[12] A Ukrainian reserve officer noted that elements of the 51st CAA appear to be the main force attacking northeast and east of Pokrovsk and that these forces maintain sufficient combat capabilities.[13] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and other elements of the 51st CAA played a significant role in the seizure of Kurakhove in December 2024 and wider Russian advances in western Donetsk in Fall 2024 before redeploying to the area east of Pokrovsk in January and February 2025.[14] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade renewed frontline assaults in May 2025, likely after several months of rest and reconstitution, and have participated in several Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk in recent months.[15] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 21 that the Russian military command also redeployed elements of the 51st CAA's 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades to the area north and northeast of Pokrovsk.[16]

Russian forces recently advanced into and northwest of Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Holubivka (northeast of Kupyansk), likely seized the settlement, and advanced into northern Kupyansk.[17] Additional geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Kindrashivka and southwest of Tyshchnkivka (both northwest of Kupyansk).[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within Kupyansk, southeast of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk), and northeast of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Holubivka and that additional elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division are operating in Myrne (just northwest of Kupyansk).[20]

Russian forces will likely leverage advances northwest of Kupyansk to support the future envelopment of Kupyansk and complicate Ukraine's ability to supply positions in the town and defend west of the town in the future. Recent Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction cohere with the Russian military command’s long-standing operational objective of enveloping and eventually seizing Kupyansk.[21] The Russian military command may intend for Russian forces to interdict the H-26 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics and Ukrainian egress routes from Kupyansk. The Russian military command may assess that further advances west of the Velyka Shapkivka-Palamarivka-Hechvolodivka line could complicate Ukraine's ability to fall back to defensive positions west of the town along the Kupyanka River in the future.

The Russian military command could pursue at least three courses of action (COAs) following a future seizure of Kupyansk. A possible future seizure of Kupyansk, which is unlikely in the short-term, would present the Russian military command with a decision point. Russian forces could either continue pushing west from Kupyansk, reprioritize Russian advances in the Borova and Lyman direction, or redeploy elements of the Moscow Military District (MMD) and LMD from the Kupyansk direction to higher priority directions, such as the Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Novopavlivka directions. Any of these three COAs would likely require months' worth of personnel and material to accomplish, although the exact timeline of Russia's ability to achieve the various objectives associated with these COAs is dependent on the level of US and Western military assistance Ukraine continues to receive. ISW continues to assess that US military assistance is arriving to a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and Russia's long-standing objectives of seizing and subjugating Ukraine via military means.[22]

• COA 1: Russian forces could continue to push west of Kupyansk toward Shevchenkove or northwest of Kupyansk toward Velykyi Burluk in order to support Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance toward Kharkiv City. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are likely attempting to connect operations near Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk, and Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.[23] Russian forces currently attacking Kupyansk from the north and east may reorient their attacks west, should Russian forces seize the town. Russian forces may attempt to advance along the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway toward Shevchenkove or push northwest along the T-2114 Dvorichna-Velykyi Burluk highway toward Velykyi Burluk as part of a long-term effort to establish and fortify a buffer zone along the northeast border of Ukraine. Russian advances toward Shevchenkove could complicate Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Kharkiv City and Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and threaten the rear areas of Ukrainian forces defending near Velyki Burluk and on the west bank of the Oskil River southwest of Kupyansk.
  
  

• COA 2: The Russian military command may reprioritize seizing the remainder of the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions. The seizure of Kupyansk could allow the Russian military command the opportunity to redeploy some elements of the Moscow Military District (MMD) and LMD from the Kupyansk direction to the Borova and/or Lyman directions. Russian units currently attacking north and east of Kupyansk could refocus their attention southward and push toward Borova along the P-79 Kupyansk-Borova highway. Russian forces are currently advancing toward the Oskil River north of Lyman and have formed a salient and geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces are roughly 12 kilometers from the Oskil River and roughly 22 kilometers from Oskil City in this area. The Russian military command may intend to converge these efforts in this area, assuming that Russian forces could advance roughly 35 kilometers south of their current positions near Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).  Russian forces could then leverage their positions along the east bank of the Oskil River to push toward Lyman and Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions — from the north. A Russian offensive against Ukraine’s fortress belt from the north would require Russian forces to cross the Siverskyi Donets River – a challenging task that Russian forces may not be able to achieve, however.
  
  

• COA 3: The Russian military command may redeploy manpower from the Kupyansk direction to higher priority areas such as the Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Novopavlivka directions to facilitate Russia's long-standing objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military command could redeploy Russian forces involved in the seizure of Kupyansk to reinforce degraded Russian units attempting to envelop Pokrovsk, which has been the Russian military command's priority sector since October 2023.[24] The Russian command could reinforce Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction, who are attempting to create a possible salient to either envelop Ukraine's fortress belt or facilitate attacks against the fortress belt from the south.[25] The Russian military command could also redeploy forces from Kupyansk to the Novopavlivka direction, as ISW has noted that Russian forces could leverage advances into southwestern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to support seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.[26] It is unclear if the Russian military command will redeploy elements from the MMD or LMD to western Donetsk Oblast, however as the Russian military has reportedly concentrated over 100,000 Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction and elements of the Southern Military District (SMD), Eastern Military District (EMD), and Central Military District (CMD) are currently operating in western Donetsk Oblast.[27] The Russian military command may opt to redeploy additional forces to western Donetsk Oblast, however, given that seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast remains one of Russia's primary battlefield priorities.[28]
  
  

The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the second time in two months, likely in an attempt to increase capital available to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Central Bank announced on July 25 that it had lowered its key interest rate from 20 to 18 percent.[29] The Central Bank lowered its annual average key rate forecast to between 18.8 and 19.6 percent in 2025 and between 12 and 13 percent in 2026. The Central Bank also lowered its target annual inflation rate to between 6 and 7 percent for 2025 and four percent for 2026. Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated on July 25 that the Central Bank chose to lower the key interest rate due to a faster than expected decrease in current inflationary pressures, including a deceleration of inflation, demand, and annual lending growth.[30] Nabiullina also stated that Russia is on its way back to the four percent target inflation rate and that the Central Bank’s ongoing monetary policy efforts are already producing favorable results in the Russian inflation rate.[31] Russian opposition outlet The Bell assessed on July 21 that the Russian Central Bank may choose to lower the key interest rate due to an observed slowing growth rate of the Russian economy, prices, wages, and corporate lending.[32] Growth in these factors would typically exacerbate inflation. The Central Bank may choose to further lower the key interest rate later in 2025. The Central Bank may have lowered its key interest rate as part of the Russian government’s efforts to make more capital available for the Russian DIB and lower the price of borrowing money for DIB producers. The Central Bank has largely leveraged monetary policy to cope with the economic consequences of Russia’s wartime economy and expanded the Russian money supply through military payouts, social projects, and investment in the DIB. Money supply expansion typically exacerbates inflation, and the Central Bank previously introduced a record key interest rate of 21 percent in October 2024 in an attempt to counter inflation due to wartime spending and a weakening ruble.[33] The reduction in the Russian inflation rate may be the result of these efforts, though it remains unclear whether Russian inflation will stabilize.

The Kremlin dismissed First Deputy Director-General of the Kremlin newswire TASS, Mikhail Gusman, likely in a continued effort to increase control over domestic media sources affecting Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin relieved Gusman on July 24 without any further explanation.[34] Reuters reported on July 25 that Gusman recently praised Azerbaijan for maintaining relations with different countries at an event hosted by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.[35] Russian authorities recently raided the offices of Baza, a Russian outlet reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement, and have been cracking down on media outlets that present stories that challenge the Kremlin's ideal narratives of the war in Ukraine.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to delay high-level negotiations between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin amid US calls for a meeting.
• Russian forces likely seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and appear to be conducting limited sabotage and reconnaissance missions into Pokrovsk amid ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town.
• Russian forces recently advanced into and northwest of Kupyansk.
• The Russian military command could pursue at least three courses of action (COAs) following a future seizure of Kupyansk.
• The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the second time in two months, likely in an attempt to increase capital available to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Kremlin dismissed First Deputy Director-General of the Kremlin newswire TASS Mikhail Gusman, likely in a continued effort to increase control over domestic media sources affecting Russian-Azerbaijani relations.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus
  
  

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces conducted limited attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 24 and 25.[37]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck nitrogen and gunpowder plants in Stavropol Krain and Tambov Oblast, respectively, on the night of July 24 and 25. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on July 25 that Ukrainian drones struck the Nevinnomyssk Nitrogen Plant in Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai and the gunpowder factory in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast on the night of July 24 to July 25.[38] Kovalenko stated that the Nevinnomyssk Nitrogen Plant produces chemicals for explosives, such as nitric acid and ammonium nitrate, and that it is a key input supplier for ammunition production such as artillery, bombs, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). Kovalenko stated the factory produces gunpowder for small arms, artillery, MLRS, aviation, and missile systems and noted that the factory is integral for the operation of Russian Grad and Smerch MLRS systems.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 25 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Yunakivka on July 24 and 25.[39] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne, Sadky, and Yunakivka.[40]

Order of Battle: A reconnaissance company of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), reconnaissance elements of the 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division), elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[41]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Hlyboke, and Zelene on July 24 and 25.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove (southeast of Vovchansk).[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 25 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[44]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Ambarne.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ambarne.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

See topline text for reports of Russian advances and unconfirmed claims in the Kupyansk direction.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrne and toward Velyka Shapkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, Petro-Ivanivka, and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on July 24 and 25.[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Pishchane.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna on July 24 and 25.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on July 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) and southeast of Torske (east of Lyman).[50]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Lyman toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on July 24 and 25.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 25 that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[52]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on July 24 and 25.[53]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces build defensive positions at night to avoid being struck by Ukrainian drones but still sustain heavy casualties because of effective Ukrainian drone strikes.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th and the 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk.[55] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 25 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Chasiv Yar.[57]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, west of Chasiv Yar near Mykolaivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne on July 24 and 25.[58]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on July 25 that Russian fixed-wing drones, such as the Molniya drone, is complicating logistics in the Ukrainian rear.[59] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are fighting house-by-house along the remaining streets in Chasiv Yar.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 24 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[60]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and seized Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk).[61] A milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) participated in the seizure of Oleksandro-Kalynove.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka and toward Pleshchiivka, Katerynivka, and Stepanivka on July 24 and 25.[63]

See topline text for reports of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River near Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and are advancing toward Filiya (north of Yalta).[64]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia and Yalta; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Piddubne, Zelenyi Hai, Tovste, Novokhatske, and Voskresenka and toward Oleksandrohrad on July 24 and 25.[65]

Order of Battle: Assault groups of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) alongside Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly operating near Zelenyi Hai.[66] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are reportedly operating near Sichneve (southwest of Novopavlivka, formerly Yanvarske).[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Kamyshuvakha (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Temyrivka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[68] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[69]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Maliivka and west of Velyka Novosilka toward Temyrivka, Zaporizhia Oblast on July 24 and 25.[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on July 25.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 25 but did not make any confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on July 24 and 25 that Russian forces advanced east of Plavni, south of Stepnohirsk, and north of Kamyanske (all west of Orikhiv).[71]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Plavni on July 24 and 25.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 25 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kamyanske.[73]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group, which attempted to seize positions in Stepnohirsk for the first time since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022.[74] Voloshyn also stated that Russian forces are attempting to advance along the Kakhovka Reservoir and the M-18 Simferopol-Kharkiv highway in order to break through the Ukrainian defensive line in Plavni.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv, Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), and Novoandriivka (southwest of Orikhiv); and drone operators of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[75]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on July 25 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kherson City toward Sadove and Prydniprovske and southwest of Kherson City toward Dniprovske on July 24 and 25.[76]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kherson City and drone operators and other elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[77]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russia conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and 61 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed and suppressed 54 Shahed-type and decoy drones in northern and eastern Ukraine. Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on July 25 that three Russian Shahed drones damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast and that a Russian guided glide bomb damaged a medical facility in Kharkiv City.[79]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, on July 25, met with representatives of a Ukrainian company producing drones designed to intercept Russian Shahed drones and requested that the company produce one thousand interceptors per day.[80]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

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[1] https://tass dot com/politics/1994253

[2] https://vimeo.com/1104519956?fl=pl&fe=sh; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/25/russia-ukraine-putin-zelensky-meeting/

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2025

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051925; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2025

[5] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1948633960919011544; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1948632019694756327; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9656; https://t.me/btr80/29588; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9654; https://t.me/jaguar1bop/568 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1948609589697794496 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1948605168314188105 ; https://t.me/zvezdanews/161138 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1948620522004299921

 

[6] https://t.me/rybar/72400

[7] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32117; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32124

[8] https://t.me/sashakots/55125 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55108 ; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31571 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39548 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39549

[9] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96521 ; https://t.me/condottieros/12218 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39576 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24378; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24380 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39545 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32121

 

[10] https://t.me/rybar/72400

[11] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1948621479051948159; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/343; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1948622247637516671

[12] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32120 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14101 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54969 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66180; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96516 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55124 ; https://t.me/rybar/72400 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/54986 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32117

[13] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1948629865458270510

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625

[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225

[17] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9655 ; https://www.facebook.com/114TerritorialDefenceBrigade/videos/1245858349970558/; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1948417225754313222

[18] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9659

[19] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39521; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39543; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96468; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39554

[20] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39521 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39522 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39526 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39543

[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425

[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2025

[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625

[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2025

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060625

[29] https://www.cbr dot ru/eng/press/pr/?file=25072025_133000key_e.htm

[30] https://www.cbr dot ru/eng/press/event/?id=26809

[31]

[32] https://t.me/thebell_io/33623

[33] https://www.cbr dot ru/eng/press/pr/?file=25102024_133000Key_eng.htm

[34] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/24604499 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/83391; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202507240031

[35] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/russia-fires-tass-news-agency-executive-after-azerbaijan-visit-2025-07-25/

[36] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2023

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970

[38] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9568

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970; https://t.me/wargonzo/28053

[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/76022; https://t.me/severnnyi/4651

[41] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/9791; https://t.me/dva_majors/76005; https://t.me/dva_majors/76007; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96469

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14411; https://t.me/severnnyi/4651

[43] https://t.me/severnnyi/4651

[44] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13676

[45] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13676; https://t.me/severnnyi/4651; https://t.me/wargonzo/28053

[46] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13676

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14411

[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39554

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14411

[50] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32127

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14411

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39562

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14411 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39562 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972

[54] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/07/25/lyudej-bagato-vony-yih-ne-duzhe-shkoduyut-poblyzu-siverska-vorozhi-soldaty-pomyrayut-z-lopatamy-v-rukah/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BHKG1nDKK0I

[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39563

[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/39460 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/39524

[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173553

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14411 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28053

[59] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1075497-vtrati-armii-rf-velicezni-ale-ataki-ne-pripinautsa-trivaut-boi-u-casovomu-aru/

[60] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1948528084816109752; https://t.me/fakhivtsi/381

[61] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173686 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28053

 

[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/76050

[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14411 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28053

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/28053

[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14411 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/173676 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/76022

[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/16155

[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/16159 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16162

 

[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/76022

[69] https://t.me/tass_agency/327299 

[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/14411

[71] https:// t.me/RVvoenkor/96471; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96521; https://t.me/dva_majors/76040; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96521; https://t.me/sashakots/55126

[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02ece6irSV9dmJCcRuZmNZ7ypnwFWEU3KuL7CYM68q5sdoZEQqojgNqWwaN9c3r3cl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970; https://t.me/wargonzo/28053; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96471; https://t.me/dva_majors/76022;

[73] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/31675

[74] https://suspilne dot media/1075047-ssa-nadadut-ukraini-obladnanna-dla-ppo-na-180-mln-zelenskij-zminiv-sklad-stavki-golovnokomanduvaca-1248-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1753454217&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/96473; https://t.me/dva_majors/75999

[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03671n3Qdf29RK7cC8oSrxngm5uazorN34tpuPsUsiEyFisX1pv76P4hbxpD8NmLuZl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26972 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02ece6irSV9dmJCcRuZmNZ7ypnwFWEU3KuL7CYM68q5sdoZEQqojgNqWwaN9c3r3cl;  https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/26970

[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/76005; https://t.me/dva_majors/76033; https://t.me/dva_majors/75998

[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/39203

[79] https://t.me/synegubov/16002; https://t.me/synegubov/16021 ; https://t.me/synegubov/16011 ; https://t.me/synegubov/16006 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1075329-rosia-vdarila-kabami-po-industrialnomu-rajonu-harkova-e-postrazdalij/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/16032 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/25/u-harkovi-vnaslidok-udaru-rosijskogo-kaba-17-postrazhdalyh/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/87648

[80] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15292 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/07/25/nash-zapyt-1000-perehoplyuvachiv-na-dobu-prezydent-zustrivsya-z-vyrobnykamy-droniv-perehoplyuvachiv/