Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Carolyn Moorman, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter
Information Cutoff: 5:00 PM ET
The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are publishing multiple updates daily to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The morning update will focus on the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel. The evening update will be more comprehensive, covering events over the past 24-hour period and refining items discussed in the morning update.
Please note that ISW-CTP will only be emailing the evening edition of our daily Iran Update Special Reports. You can find this morning's edition here on our website.
Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has begun implementing emergency succession measures in response to escalating Israeli strikes and the potential for US military involvement.[1] Unspecified Iranian sources told the New York Times on June 21 that Khamenei has relocated to a secure bunker, suspended digital communications, and now communicates with senior commanders only through a trusted aide.[2] Sources added that Khamenei named three senior clerics as candidates to replace him if he is killed.[3] Khamanei also reportedly named replacements for top military commanders and ordered senior officials to work from underground offices and avoid using cellphones.[4] These steps mark the first reported instance of Khamenei directly selecting potential successors outside the formal process of the Assembly of Experts. Khamenei likely took these steps amid heightened assassination fears, as some Israeli officials, including Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, have openly threatened Khamenei’s life.[5] Two unspecified US officials told Reuters on June 15 that the US President Donald Trump vetoed an Israeli plan to kill Khamenei, however.[6] Trump separately stated on June 17 that the United States knows “exactly where the so-called ‘Supreme Leader’ is hiding” but would not “take him out, at least not for now.”[7]
Khamenei’s previous actions indicate that the three possible replacements are almost certainly equally as ideological as he is. Khamenei previously met with the Assembly of Experts members in November 2024 and emphasized that the next Supreme Leader must “embody the revolution” and implement Islam in Iranian society.[8] Khamenei did not name a successor at the meeting, however. Esfahan interim Friday Prayer Leader and Assembly of Experts member Abdolhasan Mahdavi confirmed a week after Khamenei’s meeting in November 2024 that the assembly had confidentially identified and prioritized three candidates for succession and framed it as “a routine responsibility.”[9] The Assembly of Experts is an 88-member elected clerical body tasked with appointing, supervising, and—at least in theory—removing the Supreme Leader, though in practice it has never challenged the position and plays a limited role in day-to-day politics.[10] The only previous leadership transition in Iran occurred in 1989 under different political conditions. The current assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[11]
It remains unclear who Khamenei selected as his potential successor. Unspecified sources added that Mojtaba Khamenei, Khamenei’s son and frequently rumored successor, is not among the designated candidates, however.[12] Former President Ebrahim Raisi, another widely speculated figure, died in a helicopter crash in May 2024 and is no longer in consideration.[13] Khamenei’s decision reflects his concerns about external threats and potential instability after his death, as the regime expects opposition groups and anti-regime actors to exploit any leadership vacuum.[14] Opposition groups and anti-regime actors are more likely to try to exploit such a vacuum during a war.
Israeli officials assess that airstrikes on Iranian ballistic missile capabilities since June 12 have degraded Iran’s ability to launch ballistic missile attacks on Israel, which is consistent with the launch rates that CTP-ISW has observed.[15] Israeli Hatzerim Airbase Commander Brigadier General “Ayin” said that the IAF has conducted over 1,000 sorties with fighter jets dropping ”hundreds” of munitions on Iranian ballistic missiles and storage sites in the past eight days.[16] IDF Spokesperson Effie Defrin said that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities “have been heavily degraded.”[17] Brigadier General ”Ayin” stated that these airstrikes have also disrupted Iran’s ability to launch retaliatory attacks from western Iran and have forced Iranian forces to relocate eastward and southward.[18] This southward movement of Iranian forces may account for the intensifying Israeli airstrikes in southern Iran that CTP-ISW observed on June 20. The IDF stated on June 17 that Iran had attempted to launch a missile targeting Israel from Esfahan, central Iran, after withdrawing forces from western Iran.[19] Iran would not be able to use three medium-range ballistic missiles that it has previously used to attack Israel if it fires them from Esfahan. Haj Qassem (1,400-kilometer range), Fattah (1,400-kilometer range), and Kheibar Shekan (1,450-kilometer range) ballistic missiles cannot reach Israel from Esfahan due to their shorter ranges.[20] Iran would almost certainly need to rely on Emad, Ghadr, and Sejjil-1 ballistic missiles because these missiles are capable of reaching Israel from Esfahan.[21] Iran could hypothetically modify the shorter-range missiles to carry smaller payloads (thus extending the range), but doing so rapidly would be difficult. Emad and Ghadr liquid-fuel ballistic missiles are extremely volatile and challenging to transport, however.[22] Iran did not launch any ballistic missile attacks on Israel on June 21. The IDF intercepted approximately 40 Iranian drones targeting Israel overnight on June 20 and 21.[23] This is a slight increase in the number of drones that Iran has launched compared to 16 drones on June 20 and 4 drones on June 19.[24]
Key Takeaways
- The Iranian supreme leader named three unspecified senior clerics as possible successors in an effort to secure the future of the Islamic Republic in the event of his death. The limited open-source reporting about possible successors and the supreme leader’s view of his possible successors suggests that the three unspecified clerics are almost certainly equally as ideological as the current supreme leader.
- Israeli officials continue to assess that their air campaign has degraded Iranian ballistic missile capabilities, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's observations.
- The Iranian foreign affairs minister again rejected US demands for zero uranium enrichment during a June 20 meeting with European diplomats.
- The United States continued to deploy military assets to the Middle East.
- Israel has continued to conduct strikes targeting Iranian internal security and social control institutions, which could destabilize the regime over time.
Political Developments
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi again rejected zero uranium enrichment demands during his June 20 meeting with French, German, British, and European Union diplomats.[25] European partners demanded during the meeting that Iran accept zero uranium enrichment levels, restrict its ballistic missile program, and end its support for its proxy forces.[26] Araghchi suggested that Iran would be willing to return to a 3.67 uranium enrichment level stipulated under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[27] Iranian officials have expressed their interest in negotiating a nuclear deal with the United States, but have not moderated their negotiating position from before the conflict.[28] An unspecified senior Iranian official cited by Reuters on June 21 argued that European demands were “unrealistic.”[29] Iran remains committed to preserving its stated “right” to enrich uranium.[30] The United States and Israel have rejected Iranian demands and maintained that Iran will not be permitted to enrich uranium on Iranian soil.[31] Araghchi noted that Iran would not engage in direct negotiations with the United States until Israel suspends its air campaign on Iran.[32]
Military Developments
The United States has continued to deploy military assets to the Middle East to support potential defensive or offensive operations in the region. Satellite imagery posted by open-source social media accounts on June 21 appeared to show approximately 27 KC-135 air-to-air refuelers, 12 C-130 transport aircraft, and 52 fighter aircraft at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.[33] This does not include aircraft under shelters. A large number of US aircraft have similarly traveled into the Middle East in recent days.[34] Open-source flight trackers reported two B-2 long-range stealth bombers deployed from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, on June 21 and are en route to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.[35] Two air-to-air refuelers were also deployed to provide fuel to the B-2s.[36]
Israel wants to act against the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant prior to US President Donald Trump’s two-week deadline, according to unspecified sources familiar with the issue cited by Reuters on June 21.[37] US White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on June 19 that Trump will decide whether or not to strike Iran “within the next two weeks.”[38] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Israel Katz, and Chief of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff Eyal Zamir argued that there is a limited window of opportunity to conduct an operation against the nuclear facility during a phone call with Trump on June 19.[39]
The IDF continued its campaign to destroy Iranian ballistic missile and drone capabilities. This line of effort is essential to preempt Iranian attacks and limit the threat that Iranian ballistic missiles and drones pose to Israeli civilians. IDF Spokesperson Effie Defrin said that the IDF has struck approximately 950 explosive drones during its airstrikes in Iran before they could be launched.[40] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) struck a twin-launch rail drone launcher in Esfahan, Esfahan Province, that was ready for immediate launch towards Israel.[41] The IDF also struck drone depots and another unspecified weapons depot in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.[42] The IDF struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 64th al Hadid Missile and Artillery Group base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[43] The 64th al Hadid Missile and Artillery Group is responsible for directing and coordinating Iranian aerial assets and weaponry, including drones, missiles, and artillery fire.[44] The IDF also reportedly struck the IRGC Shahroud Missile Facility in Semnan Province.[45] The IRGC reportedly used the facility to develop, test, and launch solid-propellant missiles.[46] The IDF previously struck the facility during its October 2024 airstrikes on Iran.[47] Israeli Hatzerim Airbase Commander Brigadier General “Ayin” said on June 21 that the IDF is carrying out new strikes against launch sites in western Iran to prevent Iranian forces from returning there.[48]
The IDF continued to strike other Iranian military sites and infrastructure on June 21. Israel struck the IRGC Ground Forces Karbala base in Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province.[49] Iranian media reported that Israel struck an Artesh 4th tactical airbase in Dezful, Khuzestan Province.[50] Israel also struck three Iranian F-14 fighter jets on an Artesh Ground Forces base in Esfahan, Esfahan Province.[51] CTP-ISW is also monitoring reports that Israel struck Iranian forces at the port of Bandar Abbas. We will cover any developments related to Bandar Abbas in the June 22 Update morning edition, given the conflicting information available at this time.
Israel struck the Iranian Cyber Police (FATA) headquarters in Tehran as part of Israel’s stated objective to destabilize the Iranian regime. Geolocated imagery posted on X (Twitter) on June 21 shows the heavily damaged headquarters.[52] The FATA is responsible for domestic surveillance and cyber operations.[53] The Iranian regime has previously used FATA to thwart dissent on online platforms, including during the crackdowns that followed the Masha Amini protests in 2022.[54] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on June 20 that he instructed the IDF to “intensify” strikes on Iranian regime symbols and sites connected to domestic repression in Tehran to “destabilize” the regime.[55] Katz previously stated on June 19 that he and Prime Minister Netanyahu directed the IDF to increase the intensity of strikes on Iranian government targets to “undermine” the regime.[56] A sustained campaign that targets Iran’s internal security institutions and social control institutions, combined with economic downturn and mass population displacement that triggers protests, could destabilize the regime.[57] Israel reportedly struck Mahshahr Port in Khuzestan Province on June 21, which is a key hub for Iranian oil.[58] Popular frustration over the economic downturn could trigger internal unrest.
International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi reported that renewed Israeli strikes targeting the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) on June 21 caused additional damage to the facility.[59] The IDF previously struck the ENTC on June 13, which damaged the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion facility, a reactor fuel manufacturing plant, and an enriched uranium metal processing facility. Grossi stated that the renewed Israeli strikes on June 21 damaged six other buildings at the ENTC. Grossi stated that the Israeli airstrikes damaged a natural and depleted uranium metal production facility that was not operational at the time of Israel’s June 21 airstrike. Grossi noted that the Israeli airstrikes on June 21 also damaged a fuel rod production facility, a building with low-enriched uranium pellet production, a laboratory and nuclear material storage, another laboratory building, a workshop handling contaminated equipment, and an office building with no nuclear material. Grossi noted that the targeted facilities either contained no nuclear material or small quantities of natural or low-enrichment uranium. Grossi assessed that there is no risk of off-site contamination.
The Houthis threatened on June 21 that any US involvement in the Iran-Israel war would trigger Houthi attacks on US ships and naval ships in the Red Sea, almost certainly to deter US participation.[60] The Houthis are very likely observing and reacting to ongoing discussions in Western media about the risks of a protracted war in the Middle East and seek to exploit these concerns by threatening to expand the conflict.[61] This threat follows similar statements by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatening the United States to avoid participating in the war.[62] The spokesperson of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened on June 19 that US participation in the war would trigger attacks on US bases in the region, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, and the closure of ports in the Red Sea.[63]
An Israeli airstrike along the Iran-Iraq border killed a senior member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and a personal aide to former Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.[64] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada released a statement on June 21, mourning the death of “security unit” head Haider al Musawi.[65] An informed source told Iraqi media on June 21 that Musawi managed Syrian affairs for Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada.[66] The strike also killed Nasrallah’s former aide Abu Ali al Khalil and his son, Mahdi al Khalil.[67]
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4
[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4
[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4
[5] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/ratcheting-up-threats-defense-minister-says-irans-khamenei-cannot-continue-to-exist
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-vetoed-an-israeli-plan-kill-irans-supreme-leader-us-officials-say-2025-06-15
[7] https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/06/17/trump-iran-supreme-leader/84243930007/
[8] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27777 ;
https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58256
[9] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/832835 ;
https://www.iranintl dot com/fa/202411176393 ;
https://farsi.alarabiya dot net/iran/2024/11/15/%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%DB%8C%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF
[10] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/everything-you-need-to-know-about-irans-assembly-of-experts-election/ ;
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/understanding-irans-assembly-experts-vote#:~:text=Patrick%20Schmidt%20is%20a%20U.S.,onboard%20the%20USS%20Ronald%20Reagan.&text=The%20victors%2C%20winnowed%20from%20an,approved%20by%20the%20Guardian%20Council
[11] https://apnews.com/article/iran-parliamentary-election-protests-mahsa-amini-64c628103ff5d193da974c25a13fbb12 ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-1-2024#_ednf8771f050e6e6afa4ff71fb427f8cd151
[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4
[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/21/world/middleeast/iran-ayatollah-israel-war.html?searchResultPosition=4
[14] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-takes-to-end-it.pdf?x85095
[15] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432
[16] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432
[17] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936487673536909462
[18] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432
[19] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1935035545521930590
[20] https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/iran/ ; https://presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/06/18/749984/explainer-what-makes-fattah-missile-used-op-true-promise-lethal ; https://presstv dot ir/Detail/2025/06/18/749984/explainer-what-makes-fattah-missile-used-op-true-promise-lethal
[21] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/17/iran-israel-attack-drones-missiles/
[22] https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1935257174537588816
[23] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936383068841124283
[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936152624220327970 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936164798267269431 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935809822454153369 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935851441039503824 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1935859724672434403
[25] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/20/iran-israel-meeting-geneva-trump-diplomacy
[26] https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1936021611708113400
[27] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/restoring-jcpoas-nuclear-limits ; https://www.axios.com/2025/06/20/iran-israel-meeting-geneva-trump-diplomacy
[28] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/a-battered-iran-signals-it-wants-to-de-escalate-hostilities-with-israel-and-negotiate-9feab4ae?mod=hp_lead_pos1
[29] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/senior-iranian-official-european-proposals-geneva-unrealistic-2025-06-21/
[30] https://x.com/Osint613/status/1936031144329531655 ; https://x.com/SaeedAzimi1772/status/1936458300746256836
[31] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-iran-hold-nuclear-talks-amid-clashing-red-lines-2025-05-23/
[32] https://www.axios.com/2025/06/20/iran-israel-meeting-geneva-trump-diplomacy
[33] https://x.com/GeoPoliticJosh/status/1936279666912006387 ; https://x.com/MenchOsint/status/1936191314720120870
[34] https://x.com/JenGriffinFNC/status/1934634030994980959 ; https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1934425218929336644 ; https://x.com/vcdgf555/status/1934427191544336737 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/21-46086 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/21-46094 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/17-46035 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/flights/CHAOS82/2472998587 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/16-46016 ; https://www.airnavradar.com/data/registration/16-46012
[35] https://theaviationist.com/2025/06/21/b-2-guam-amid-iran-conflict/
[36] https://theaviationist.com/2025/06/21/b-2-guam-amid-iran-conflict/
[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-seeks-swift-action-iran-sources-say-with-split-us-administration-2025-06-21/
[38] https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1935753412856967261
[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-seeks-swift-action-iran-sources-say-with-split-us-administration-2025-06-21/
[40] https://t.me/moriahdoron/23435
[41] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1936379080422690952
[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1936499518507503734
[43] https://x.com/BabakTaghvaee1/status/1936400201301872890
[44] https://snn dot ir/fa/news/1229501/%D9%88%D8%B8%DB%8C%D9%81%D9%87-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%BE%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%DB%B6%DB%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%BE%D8%B4%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B4-%D9%BE%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B8%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%81%DB%8C%D9%84%D9%85
[45] https://x.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1936526320877338789 ; https://x.com/Osinteurope/status/1936535858443665800
[46] https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/shahroud-missile-test-site/ ; https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/nuclear/ncri-report-irans-covert-nuclear-warhead-program-and-missile-sites-exposed/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-shahroud-space-center.html
[47] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-strikes-iran-shahroud-space-center.html ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-29-2024
[48] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1936394722731229432
[49] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936419095554977991
[50] https://x.com/IranIntlbrk/status/1936427040661541002 ; https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936473251846267140
[51] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936489005719118209
[52] https://x.com/andynovy/status/1936411428807676176 ; https://x.com/MohamadAhwaze/status/1936402381916278847
[53] https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/sanctioned-person/iranian-cyber-police
[54] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0994
[55] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1935993942798930397 ; https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1936009764791542142
[56] https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/1935588198505173249 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-19-2025-evening-edition
[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-evening-edition
[58] https://x.com/Againstmullahs/status/1936472188565037137
[59] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-on-developments-in-iran-3
[60] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1936438990594322841
[61] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/19/politics/trump-us-strikes-iran-israel-analysis ; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/last-chance-middle-east-peace ; https://www.msn.com/en-us/politics/government/trump-will-make-iran-strike-decision-within-two-weeks-as-us-fears-full-scale-war-in-middle-east/ar-AA1H32zr?ocid=BingNewsVerp
[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-20-2025-evening-edition
[63] https://t.me/abualaskary/134
[64] https://t.me/Smedia1/1129 ; https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iran/210620253 ; https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1936441408677924997
[65] https://t.me/Smedia1/1129
[66] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%BA%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86
[67] https://t.me/Smedia1/1129