Iran Update, May 16, 2025

Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Ria Reddy, Alexis Thomas, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A variety of Syrian armed groups, including those associated with the new transitional government, the Assad regime, and hardline Islamic groups, have committed a series of extrajudicial killings since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. CTP-ISW absolutely condemns these extrajudicial killings.

 

Israel targeted Houthi-controlled al Salif and Hudaydah ports on May 16 as part of an Israeli campaign to disrupt the Houthi ability to enable attacks targeting Israel.[1] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated after the airstrikes on May 16 that Israel will continue to strike Houthi targets “including [Houthi] leadership and all infrastructure that enables [the Houthis] to attack [Israel].”[2] The Houthis have repeatedly targeted Israel’s main airport, Ben Gurion Airport, to support Hamas in the Gaza Strip by imposing an “economic blockade” on Israel.[3] The Houthis have launched four ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport since May 12.[4] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepts many of these missiles with its ballistic missile defenses, but some missiles have penetrated Israeli defenses.[5]

The IDF targeted Salif and Hudaydah ports likely because the Houthis use these ports to generate revenue and smuggle weapons that they use to launch drone and missile attacks targeting Israel.[6] The United Nations, through the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism, inspects vessels in Djibouti before the vessels offload cargo at Yemeni ports.[7] UN ambassadors have previously warned that there has been a surge in Iranian ships bypassing international inspections and offloading uninspected cargo at Hudaydah Port since 2023.[8] The solid fuel missiles, which Iran smuggles to the Houthis and the Houthis use to target Israel, cannot be disassembled for transit and then reassembled. The challenges inherent in transporting these missiles mean that Iran needs to move solid fuel missiles on larger vessels that presumably require more robust port facilities than smaller dhows commonly used to smuggle weapons to the Houthis.[9] The Palestine-2 and Zulfiqar solid fuel ballistic missiles that the Houthis use to strike Israel are 10 meters long, for example, which makes them more difficult to transport on small dhows.[10] The IDF previously targeted Hudaydah Port on May 5, which decreased the port's capacity by 50 percent, according to the Basha Report.[11] The Basha Report estimated that the May 16 airstrikes reduced the port's capacity by an additional 10 to 20 percent.[12]

The Houthis probably forced cargo vessels to stay at Hudaydah Port after the Israeli evacuation notices on May 14 to discourage Israeli airstrikes on certain areas of Hudaydah Port. The IDF also published evacuation orders for the Hudaydah, Salif, and Ras Issa ports on May 11 and May 14.[13] The IDF struck near berth three and seven on May 16, according to the Basha Report.[14] Two Panamanian-flagged, Emirati-owned vessels and one Panamanian-flagged and -owned vessel were docked at berths two, four, and six, according to Starboard Maritime Intelligence and Basha Report.[15] A Comoros-flagged vessel was also at Hudaydah Port, north of berth seven.[16] The Houthis were reportedly not allowing the vessel at berth four to leave the port, which is consistent with Starboard Maritime Intelligence data.[17] Starboard‘s data indicates that the vessel at berth four arrived on May 15 and did not leave before the time of the strike.[18] The Houthis have previously employed a similar strategy and held vessels hostage at Houthi-controlled ports as leverage with international actors.[19] All four vessels in and around Hudaydah Port at the time of the strike previously stopped at Djibouti Port, suggesting that the vessels complied with the UNVIM inspections regime described above.[20]

US airstrikes targeting Sanaa City in March 2025 reportedly killed Houthi drone and missile chief Zakaria Abdullah Yahya Ahmed Hajar, who reportedly previously trained in Iran, Lebanon, and Syria.[21] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force reportedly trained Hajar in drone warfare and worked closely with him.[22] Saudi Arabia added Hajar to their designated terrorist list in August 2022 for his involvement in Iranian weapons smuggling to the Houthis, Houthi attacks on international shipping, and Houthi ballistic missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia.[23] The United States killed several Houthi drone and missile experts during its airstrike campaign against the Houthis between March and May 2025.[24]

The Islamic State is attempting to use discontent with the Syrian transitional government among Salafi-jihadi hardliners to undermine the government and expand recruitment. Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara’s ruling coalition consists of a wide variety of Sunni Arab groups that were opposed to the Assad regime, some of which are hardline Salafi-jihadists.[25] These Salafi-jihadists remained allied with Shara as he disavowed the Islamic State in 2013 and then al Qaeda in 2016.[26] Other hardliners broke with Shara both times, remaining with the Islamic State in 2013 and al Qaeda in 2016.[27] The Islamic State is again attempting to divide Shara’s following by appealing to hardline and foreign Salafi-jihadists in Ahmed al Shara’s coalition.[28] The Islamic State criticized Shara for cooperating with the United States after his meeting with Trump on May 14 and Shara’s previous efforts to eliminate the influence of “non-state actors and non-Syrian armed groups,” which is a key US demand. The Islamic State encouraged those fighters to join the Islamic State instead.[29]

The Islamic State likely hopes to exploit discontent with the transitional government’s ideological moderation and cooperation with the United States. Salafi-jihadi factions linked to Shara’s original coalition that helped overthrow Assad are at ideological odds with the transitional government’s stated approach to respect and preserve the rights of Syrian minorities, though Shara subordinated these factions to himself in the late 2010s and early 2020s and has taken steps to ensure their loyalty.[30] Some individuals within these factions have repeatedly expressed discontent with the direction of the government.[31] Both al Qaeda-linked ideologues and the Islamic State have made similar arguments criticizing Shara’s Western ties in the past.[32]

This Islamic State recruitment drive is likely an attempt to further infiltrate transitional government-controlled areas of Syria.[33] The Islamic State noted its growing presence in the “countryside and [city] outskirts” in Syria.[34] The group has had a presence in western Syria under both the Assad regime and the transitional government. It attacked a major Shia shrine south of Damascus in summer 2023, and the Syrian transitional government thwarted an Islamic State plot to target the same shrine in January 2025.[35] Islamic State cells have not successfully conducted attacks in western Syria since the fall of Assad, but Salafi-jihadi groups ideologically aligned with the Islamic State and explicitly opposed to the new government, like Saraya Ansar al Sunnah, have claimed tens of attacks targeting religious minorities across western Syria.[36] ISIS-aligned groups like Saraya Ansar al Sunnah have taken advantage of the porous security situation in western Syria after the fall of the Assad regime, which ISIS could similarly exploit to further infiltrate from eastern Syria.[37]

The Iraqi political debate over the Iraqi prime minister’s decision to invite Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara to the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17 illustrates the continued divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians, including Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali and State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, repeatedly criticized Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s invitation to Shara to attend the summit due to Shara’s former membership in al Qaeda in Iraq.[38] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri notably defended Sudani’s invitation to Shara, however.[39] Maliki and Khazali will reportedly run on separate lists against Sudani’s coalition, which will include Ameri.[40] Shara announced on May 13 that Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani would attend the summit in his place due to internal Iraqi opposition to his participation.[41] Sudani met with Khazali and Ameri on May 13, suggesting that Sudani may have caved to Khazali and Maliki’s pressure and discussed the pressure with Ameri before ensuring Shara declined the invitation to the summit. Shara announced he would not attend the summit on May 13 without specifying reasons for his absence.[42]

The IRGC Quds Force commander probably traveled to Iraq to ensure alignment among Iranian-backed Iraqi parties ahead of the Arab summit, particularly over engagement with Syria and the invitation to Shara. A State of Law parliamentarian criticized unspecified Iraqi political parties for portraying Iraq as weak in order to attack the Iraqi federal government in an interview on May 14.[43] The parliamentarian added that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani traveled to Baghdad on May 14 to “secure the Arab Summit,” implying that Ghaani sought to create unity among the Iranian-backed parties. Ghaani arrived one day after Sudani met with Khazali and Ameri, and would presumably need to forge unity after the political sparring over the invite to Shara. Many Iranian-backed factions, including Khazali’s Asaib Ahl al Haq, threatened the summit if Shara attended, while Ameri defended Shara’s invite. Iran is especially concerned about tensions between the Shia Coordination Framework ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections.[44] Iranian-backed Iraqi parties lost a significant number of seats in the 2021 elections due to inter-party competition that advantaged a more unified opposition.[45]

Iranian efforts to secure Syrian debt reimbursement through Iraqi mediation probably do not represent a change in Iranian hostility towards Damascus, though it does illustrate Iran’s economic fragility and need for funds. An informed source told Iraqi media on May 15 that Ghaani emphasized to several Shia Coordination Framework leaders, including Maliki and Ameri, that the Iraqi federal government should help recover Syrian debt to Iran.[46] Iranian parliamentarians and former diplomats calculate that Iran spent about 30 billion US dollars to bolster the Assad regime. CTP-ISW cannot verify this number.[47] Ghaani’s effort to secure Syrian debt to Iran follows US President Donald Trump’s announcement on May 13 that he intends to lift “all” sanctions on Syria, despite several legal obstacles to doing so.[48] Ghaani may have discussed this with Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians due to Shaibani’s planned attendance at the Arab Summit in Baghdad, where Iraqi leaders could engage Shaibani.[49] Ghaani reportedly discussed other Iranian “desires” regarding sanctions relief and the US-Iran nuclear negotiations for the Iraqi federal government to raise at the summit with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji on May 14.[50] It is not clear what Iraq could offer Syria to entice the new Syrian government to repay Assad’s debts to Iran. The money and other support that Tehran gave Assad would have been used to attack the Syrians who currently control Syria.

Iran and the Iranian-backed Iraqi actors that Ghaani approached to mediate Syria’s debt repayment continue to oppose Iraq-Syria normalization. Unidentified political sources told Iraqi media in late February 2025 that Iraq has not normalized relations with the Syrian government due to Iranian opposition, demonstrating the reality that Iran is still hostile towards Syria.[51] Iran also views Turkey’s influence in Syria as a threat to its long-standing strategic objectives. Iranian officials have also expressed concern that the fall of Assad created a vacuum for ISIS to exploit and spread instability to Iran.[52] Maliki and Ameri, like some Iranian officials, view Hayat Tahrir al Sham and Shara as “terrorists.”[53] It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians would be able to compel the Syrian government to repay its debt to Iran. The Syrian government would also almost certainly prioritize reconstructing Syria over repaying Iran because Iranian money made serious contributions to Syria’s destruction.

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely begin the first phase of a pressure campaign to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq. Ghaani reportedly discussed applying political and diplomatic pressure on Turkey to withdraw from Iraq during meetings with Shia Coordination Framework leaders on May 15.[54] Turkey maintains at least 136 permanent military bases across northern Iraq and has built 121 of these bases since 2018 to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), according to BBC analysis.[55] The PKK announced on May 9 that it would dissolve itself and “end its armed struggle” after forty years of militant activity.[56]

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders may use force to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq if the diplomatic and political efforts fail. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi figures appear to believe that political and diplomatic pressure will be sufficient to ensure a Turkish withdrawal upon PKK disarmament, but Turkey has not expressed willingness to withdraw at this time. Turkey exerts major influence within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and has previously worked with Iraqi Sunni parties to increase its influence in Iraq, often at Iran’s expense.[57] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have previously struck a Turkish base in Ninewa Province and other Turkish positions in northern Iraq to impose a cost on Turkey for its regional activities.[58]

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Strikes on Houthi-Controlled Ports: The Houthis probably forced cargo vessels to stay at Hudaydah Port after the Israeli evacuation notices on May 14 to discourage Israeli airstrikes on certain areas of Hudaydah Port. Israel targeted Houthi-controlled al Salif and Hudaydah ports on May 16 as part of an Israeli campaign to disrupt the Houthi ability to enable attacks targeting Israel. The IDF targeted Salif and Hudaydah ports likely because the Houthis use these ports to generate revenue and smuggle weapons that they use to launch drone and missile attacks targeting Israel.
• ISIS Recruitment Efforts in Syria: The Islamic State is attempting to use discontent with the Syrian transitional government among Salafi-jihadi hardliners to undermine the government and expand recruitment. The Islamic State likely hopes to exploit discontent with the transitional government’s ideological moderation and cooperation with the United States. This Islamic State recruitment drive is likely an attempt to further infiltrate transitional government-controlled areas of Syria.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Parties Remain Divided: The IRGC Quds Force commander probably traveled to Iraq to ensure alignment among Iranian-backed Iraqi parties ahead of the Arab summit, particularly over engagement with Syria and the invitation to Shara. The Iraqi political debate over the Iraqi prime minister’s decision to invite Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al Shara to the Arab Summit in Baghdad on May 17 illustrates the continued divisions within the Shia Coordination Framework.
• Iran Seeks Debt Reimbursement from Syria: Iranian efforts to secure Syrian debt reimbursement through Iraqi mediation probably does not represent a change in Iranian hostility towards Damascus, though it does illustrate Iran’s economic fragility and need for funds. It is unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians would be able to compel the Syrian government to repay its debt to Iran. The Syrian government would also almost certainly prioritize reconstructing Syria over repaying Iran because Iranian money made serious contributions to Syria’s destruction.
• Iran and Turkey in Iraq: Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors will likely begin the first phase of a pressure campaign to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq. The IRGC Quds Force commander reportedly discussed applying political and diplomatic pressure on Turkey to withdraw from Iraq during meetings with key pro-Iran political leaders. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders may use force to compel Turkey to withdraw from northern Iraq if the diplomatic and political efforts fail.
• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) met in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and snapback sanctions. This is the first meeting between Iran and the E3 since the start of US-Iran nuclear talks.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) met in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 16 to discuss the US-Iran nuclear negotiations and snapback sanctions.[59] This marks the first Iran-E3 meeting since the start of US-Iran nuclear talks on April 12. Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi led the Iranian delegation.[60] UK Foreign Office Political Director Christian Turner stated that Iran and the E3 “shared [a] commitment to dialogue” and “agreed to meet again,” citing the “urgency” of the moment. This urgency likely refers to US President Donald Trump's 60-day nuclear deal deadline, which ends in June 2025.[61] The meeting also comes after E3 diplomats recently threatened to trigger snapback sanctions on Iran by August if no substantial deal is reached.[62]

Senior Iranian military officials are continuing to prepare for potential US or Israeli strikes on Iran. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected the Southeastern Air Defense Zone in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on May 16.[63] The inspection follows Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri‘s order to deploy military assets to the Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf.[64] The new inspection by Mousavi reflects continued Iranian efforts to enhance Iran’s air defense capabilities and reinforce key military infrastructure in southern Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh previously inspected the Southeastern Air Defense Zone on April 4.[65]

Iran continues to deepen its economic ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. The Iran-EEU free trade agreement, signed in December 2023, entered into force on May 15.[66] The EEU is comprised of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. The deal aims to facilitate trade between the parties in various sectors, including agriculture, textiles, and industrial goods.[67] The deal reportedly cuts Iranian tariffs on Russian imports from 16.6 percent to 5.2 percent.[68] Iranian media reported that the deal could raise Iran-EEU trade to 12 billion dollars.[69] Iran and Russia have continued to expand ties since they signed the January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.[70] Iran recently approved the opening of the first Russian bank branch in Iran, likely to bypass the US dollar-based SWIFT system and bolster Iran's economy.[71] The deal is part of a broader Iranian effort to reduce dependence on Western markets and mitigate the effect of sanctions on Iran's deteriorating economy.

The United States continues to target Iranian oil exports by increasing pressure on foreign buyers. A US Treasury delegation warned banks in Hong Kong in April 2025 against facilitating Iranian oil shipments to China.[72] The Treasury delegation asked banks to identify individuals facilitating illicit Iranian oil trade and scrutinize "suspicious" non-US dollar transactions on May 16.[73] China remains the largest importer of Iranian oil, purchasing approximately 90 percent of Iran’s total oil exports.[74] Approximately 6 million tons of Iranian crude oil were delivered to independent Chinese refineries in April.[75] The US warning comes amid US President Donald Trump’s renewed maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports. Part of this campaign has included an increase in sanctions targeting PRC-based entities involved in illicit Iranian oil trade.[76]

The Iranian rial appreciated from 830,000 rials to one US dollar on May 15 to 829,000 rials to one US dollar on May 16.[77]

Syria

Unknown fighters mortared the Druze town of al Thala along the Suwayda-Daraa border on May 15.[78] Prominent Druze militia Mudafat al Karama called the attackers “outlaw mercenaries” and warned that attacks between provinces and confessional groups seek to weaken Syria.[79] Shelling also targeted other towns near the provincial border.[80] This marks some of the first cross-province violence targeting Druze communities in Suwayda since Druze notables and Damascus agreed to a security framework in early May.[81]

The Syrian General Security Service (GSS) seized weapons and military equipment in two separate operations near Qardaha, Syria, on May 15 and 16.[82] GSS forces raided a warehouse in Bahmra, west of Qardaha, on May 15, containing approximately 1,000 improvised explosive devices that appeared to have been manufactured at scale.[83] GSS forces also seized various quantities of ammunition, a MILAN anti-tank guided missile launcher, and a Konkurs anti-tank guided missile in Qardaha, Latakia Province, on May 16.[84] Qardaha is former Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s hometown.[85] The GSS has seized numerous weapons linked to Assadist insurgent cells in Qardaha since January 2025, which suggests that it has served as a likely insurgent support zone.[86] It is unclear if insurgents have continued to use it as a support zone, given the lack of insurgent attacks in western Syria.

GSS forces also seized small arms, grenades, communication devices, and other military equipment in Beit Tema, Rif Dimashq Province, on May 16.[87]

The United States will offer Syria initial economic and sanctions relief via a sanctions waiver before removing all US sanctions. US President Donald Trump announced on May 13 that he will order the cessation of “all” US sanctions on Syria.[88] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on May 15 that the Trump administration will initially seek a 180-day waiver on sanctions imposed on Syria by the US Congress.[89] Rubio said that Trump intends to use the waiver authority granted to him by the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which penalizes those who do business with the Syrian government.[90] Rubio added that the Trump administration will attempt to repeal the act entirely if the Syrian transitional government “makes enough progress.”[91] The Trump administration will need Congressional approval to remove the Caesar Act. The US Treasury Department issued a six-month general license in January 2025 that authorized certain transactions with the new Syrian government after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.[92] Rubio met with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Turkey on May 15 to discuss US-Syria relations and a roadmap for lifting sanctions.[93]

Iraq

See topline section.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

See topline section.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. 

 

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

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[1] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1923400705714352639; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1923386330408521805 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1923385561449910337; https://t.me/moriahdoron/21748

[2] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/4gvsmejgd#

[3] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3481853.htm

[4] https://t.me/army21ye/2981;

https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthi-missile-likely-aimed-at-israel-falls-short/;

https://t.me/army21ye/2964?single;

https://t.me/army21ye/2972

[5] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1923078353784868867;

https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1923359347482005723; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-working-intercepting-missile-launched-yemen-2025-05-04/

[6] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1923400705714352639

[7] https://vimye.org/

[8] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/stop-israeli-attacks-yemen-enforce-sanctions-iran-houthi-link

[9] https://www.edrmagazine.eu/edr-analysis-houthi-maritime-strike-capabilities#:~:text=It%20is%20not%20clear%20whether,target%2C%E2%80%9D%20Dr%20Kaushal%20said.&text=It%20is%20a%20solid%20fuel,will%20not%20find%20a%20target.; https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-missile-arsenal-iran-israel-hamas-ed74174915e301d30c50493f2c629a1a; https://headedforspace.com/why-solid-rocket-boosters-are-dangerous/#:~:text=2)%20A%20Solid%20Rocket%20Booster,explode%20in%20the%20following%20article.)

[10] https://armyrecognition.com/military-products/army/missiles/hypersonic-missiles/palestine-2-hypersonic-missile#spec; https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/zolfaghar/

[11] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments

[12] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments

[13] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1921625616861810785 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1922542231837118527

[14] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments

[15] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments; Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"

[16] Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"

[17] https://bashareport.substack.com/p/initial-on-the-ground-assessments; Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"

[18] Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-1-2025

[20] Docked Cargo Ship data available by subscription from Starboard Maritime Intelligence"

[21] https://www.defenseliney dot net/posts/260

[22] https://www.defenseliney dot net/posts/260

[23] https://www.defenseliney dot net/posts/260

[24] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4167047/uscentcom-forces-continue-to-target-houthi-terrorists

[25] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate033125

[26] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/78961-al-nusra-commits-to-al-qaida-deny-iraq-branch-merger/ ; https://www.brookings.edu/research/profiling-jabhat-al-nusra/

[27] https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/twenty-years-after-9-11-the-fight-for-supremacy-in-northwest-syria-and-the-implications-for-global-jihad/ ; https://academic.oup.com/book/57951 pg 93 and 127

[28] SITE Intelligence Group, ” IS Condemns Julani Sacrificing Religion and Sovereignty at Trump's "Doorstep," Mocks Search for Dead Americans in Dabiq” May 15, 2025. Available by subscription. ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate051425

[29] SITE Intelligence Group, ” IS Condemns Julani Sacrificing Religion and Sovereignty at Trump's "Doorstep," Mocks Search for Dead Americans in Dabiq” May 15, 2025. Available by subscription.

[30] https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-24-2024 ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/jihadi-counterterrorism-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-versus-the-islamic-state/

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-24-2024

[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-24-2024

[33] SITE Intelligence Group, ” IS Condemns Julani Sacrificing Religion and Sovereignty at Trump's "Doorstep," Mocks Search for Dead Americans in Dabiq” May 15, 2025. Available by subscription.

[34] SITE Intelligence Group, ” IS Condemns Julani Sacrificing Religion and Sovereignty at Trump's "Doorstep," Mocks Search for Dead Americans in Dabiq” May 15, 2025. Available by subscription.

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-august-2-2023 ; https://apnews.com/article/syria-islamic-state-sayyida-zeinab-shiite-shrine-attack-b4b98ffc8890b30703db16ad770c2fb4

[36] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate042325

[37] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate042325

[38] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sudanis-invitation-ahmed-al-sharaa-triggers-militia-backlash ; https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/839633

[39] https://www.facebook.com/onenewsiq/posts/%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%87%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%83%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8F%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9-/1037277591852958/

[40] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%B4-%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA

[41] https://apnews.com/article/syria-iraq-arab-summit-ahamd-alsharaa-will-not-attend-b196f2fff1f2df07da139633bff1b5ca ; https://al-ain dot com/article/baghdad-arab-summit-sharaa-s-absence

[42] https://apnews.com/article/syria-iraq-arab-summit-ahamd-alsharaa-will-not-attend-b196f2fff1f2df07da139633bff1b5ca

[43] https://x.com/AliAfarhahan/status/1922757942799200272

[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-30-2025

[45] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly

[46] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9

[47] https://amwaj.media/en/article/deep-dive-syria-s-foreign-debt-to-iran ; https://www.sharghdaily dot com/بخش-سیاست-6/954877-میزان-بدهی-سوریه-به-ایران-فاش-شد ; https://www.etemadonline dot com/بخش-سیاسی-9/692966-سوریه-بدهی-ایران

[48] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-will-remove-us-sanctions-syria-2025-05-13 ; https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1922328009853264070 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025

[49] https://apnews.com/article/syria-iraq-arab-summit-ahamd-alsharaa-will-not-attend-b196f2fff1f2df07da139633bff1b5ca

[50] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5--%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%B1%D8%BA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9

[51] https://almadapaper dot net/397476/

[52] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/10/16/3232253

[53] https://almadapaper dot net/397476/

[54] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9

[55] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c985lw7lywlo

[56] https://firatnews dot com/kurdIstan/pkk-12-kongresi-basariyla-yapildi-212451

[57] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/turkeys-foray-fertile-crescent ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20A%20Forecast.pdf

[58] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muqawamas-duel-turkey

[59] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-three-european-powers-met-istanbul-discuss-nuclear-talks-iranian-official-2025-05-16/

[60] https://x.com/Gharibabadi/status/1923322323446243466

[61] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202505168369

[62] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-europeans-hold-nuclear-talks-friday-diplomatic-sources-say-2025-05-13/

[63] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/746896

[64] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/745973/ ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/23/3311610

[65] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/15/3285079

[66] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russian-backed-union-free-trade-deal-with-iran-goes-into-effect-2025-05-15/

[67] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russian-backed-union-free-trade-deal-with-iran-goes-into-effect-2025-05-15/

[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russian-backed-union-free-trade-deal-with-iran-goes-into-effect-2025-05-15/

[69] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/02/26/3313950/

[70] https://president dot ir/fa/156864 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-send-russia-launchers-short-range-missiles-sources-say-2025-05-09/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-missile-experts-flew-iran-amid-clashes-with-israel-2025-03-04/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-russia-iran-coalition-deepens

[71] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/224132

[72] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-16/us-treasury-warns-hong-kong-banks-over-funding-iran-oil-trades

[73] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-16/us-treasury-warns-hong-kong-banks-over-funding-iran-oil-trades

[74] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-march-iranian-oil-imports-surge-us-sanctions-fears-2025-04-10

[75] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-16/us-treasury-warns-hong-kong-banks-over-funding-iran-oil-trades

[76] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctions-china-refiners-over-iran-oil-disrupt-operations-sources-say-2025-05-08/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/us-imposes-sanctions-network-sending-iranian-oil-china-2025-05-13/ ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0090

[77] Bon-bast.com

[78] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1923175841971704130 ; https://x.com/omar_alharir/status/1923106562073112727 ; https://www.facebook.com/althalaa10/posts/pfbid034AAHaR9CmuH89Kf2u7sqBfJpR7dKzC8wkHruswpLopPYVvnPjiCphCsiDPRYggChl?__cft__[0]=AZUrV1lNlubvvgs_X9rXDsSyqSUqMJoeOOFWcrASyCyC9SterrBirjtINw4Vut45trSELRRGqru242TlvBrPcribYg0MXPIOMaPecn-WLFKuxcOMTKQtqx8QwZYvOsXtqK7Rcz6dBE4wPS2enPdAIGIKF_URorDJ_gsntIinwPqbKT3AehjfJFMNXSrpGxcFXMg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1923123054130971042

[79] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02GSYF5eBFxopAGxdCcSstD9CkmVNrB8h6EPNQgqXJZiZyvFf6EWAcVDGsyhJ2YjFGl&id=100064919851077&__cft__[0]=AZXOkWYSftrJ1nZjiQcekkp7t0NgTVVeSLN827gZmpuVmBQmXxushQcffH242pOKQ8wRofRXA5gFm5K1kG8cjqECQJUegDoGExFkVTeTYr92UUWrsqlFfcKVEzGsx2fEeqGkQlspVzVcAOxtFwkySLNAtzzhzSMgbmYbzGiGbzAMPg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[80] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02xhqcjHmMixkJQu9SS9iHN3prBckqsAjJ7JbhV8EcZVKfsow2oGqEExrfGAqpjDRl&id=100088574370045&__cft__[0]=AZWHWafhVu7W-gsdNrcBT--dlXwWAy7CzT3R-IyGSsmLjSiScMq0AUVxdAkASMZOPetFHpKGD3boBrfMWa6KiRfszlIz2TeIp8DelQ89xCdoVaKYarXt84mndg-ySHg6o45hKgDKhmq3OSK47He4A-k5TXLN0uK78An4HeDH-L7Sz05sxXptCF3Z7fkVUQQwsQ0&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1923175841971704130 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1923337382713086438 ; https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1923132929137431034

[81] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate050525

[82] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1923340880682852521 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/24242

[83] https://x.com/OALD24/status/1923370569627521404 ; https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1923109607003566437

[84] https://t.me/LatakiaGov1/4584 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1923437816173781025

[85] https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-assads-domination-of-qardaha/

[86] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1913254810716975472 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-18-2025 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883134566367715559

[87] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1923340880682852521

[88] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-13-2025

[89] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-15/trump-will-seek-180-day-waiver-to-congress-sanctions-on-syria?taid=682630d1f8868200012edcfe&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter

[90] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-15/trump-will-seek-180-day-waiver-to-congress-sanctions-on-syria?taid=682630d1f8868200012edcfe&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter

[91] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-15/trump-will-seek-180-day-waiver-to-congress-sanctions-on-syria?taid=682630d1f8868200012edcfe&utm_campaign=trueanthem&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&embedded-checkout=true

[92] https://apnews.com/article/treasury-bashar-assad-sanctions-syria-biden-4df4fb793579c7aa820bcf5392286bd5

[93] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/834