Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 5, 2024, 8:30 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 5. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the September 6 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Russian forces have recently
intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad
Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to
and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway. Apparently
coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the
Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around
Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending
in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in
Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian
forces have recently significantly intensified their offensive
operations near Vuhledar as of September 1 (southwest of Donetsk City)
and have so far made marginal tactical gains in the area.[1]
Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian
forces recently advanced into central Prechystivka (west of Vuhledar)
during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault.[2]
Additional geolocated footage published on September 5 shows reported
elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet,
Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising a Russian flag in northwestern
Prechystivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely seized the
settlement.[3]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from
Zolota Nyva (immediately west of Prechystivka) and that Russian forces
are continuing to advance in the area.[4]
Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian
forces recently advanced immediately east of Vuhledar near the
Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 1.[5]
A Ukrainian open-source account published additional footage showing
Russian forces conducting several platoon-sized mechanized assaults near
Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka and west of Vuhledar) and
Prechystivka in recent days.[6]
The Ukrainian account stated that elements of the Russian 60th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD), 394th
Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD),
and 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD)
attacked near Makarivka and that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry
Brigade, 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(36th CAA, EMD), and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized
unit) are attacking near Prechystivka.[7]
Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the intensified Russian
offensive operations in the area during a speech at the Eastern Economic
Forum in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai on September 5, claiming that the
Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (responsible for the front roughly
from Vuhledar to Hulyaipole) seized "a triangle" of territory five to
seven kilometers deep on September 3.[8]
Russian
forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations
elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of
Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage
decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in
the near-term. A Ukrainian airborne brigade operating
southwest of Donetsk City published footage on September 4 of Ukrainian
forces repelling a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault
comprised of four tanks and 17 armored combat vehicles near
Kostyantynivka.[9]
Russian forces intensified both the regularity and size of mechanized
assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City in late July 2024 and have
since routinely conducted relatively large mechanized assaults in the
area — although these assaults have only resulted in marginal tactical
gains.[10]
Russian forces appeared to initially intensify offensive operations
southwest of Donetsk City in late July in order to achieve their
longstanding tactical objective of cutting the 0-0532
(Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar) highway, but have since continued large
mechanized assaults in the area after achieving this objective.[11]
Intensified Russian efforts to exploit gains in the Pokrovsk direction
and Russian redeployments in response to the Ukrainian incursion into
Kursk Oblast have yet to disrupt the Russian offensive tempo west and
southwest of Donetsk City, however. Continued large and costly Russian
mechanized assaults suggest that the Russian military command has tasked
elements of both the Eastern and Southern Grouping of Forces in the
area with a wider operational objective.
Russian
forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after
starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting
that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive
operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction,
immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near
Vuhledar. Russian forces began an immediate tactical effort in
late August 2024 along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of
Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction
and eliminating the salient's vulnerabilities to Ukrainian
counterattacks.[12]
Russian forces have already succeeded in partially widening the
southern section of the Pokrovsk salient and are continuing efforts to
tactically envelop limited Ukrainian positions in rural areas east of
Hirnyk and north of Krasnohorivka. Russian forces have reportedly
advanced to the outskirts of Ukrainsk and are approaching the outskirts
of Hirnyk, and the seizure of these towns would allow Russian forces to
assault Kurakhove — a significant Ukrainian defensive node for the front
west and southwest of Donetsk City — from the north as well as from the
east from Krasnohorivka and Maksymilyanivka. Russia's intensification
near Vuhledar likely aims to pressure the western flank of the Ukrainian
defense in the area west and southwest of Donetsk as Russian forces
approach Kurakhove on the eastern flank. Russian offensive operations
along the O-0532 highway between Kostyantynivka and Vuhledar offer
Russian forces avenues for advance that would support both an effort to
seize Kurkahove to the north and Russian efforts to envelop and seize
Vuhledar to the west. Russian forces conducted a failed offensive effort
in western Donetsk Oblast in Winter 2022–2023 characterized by mass
frontal mechanized assaults against Vuhledar itself, but Russian forces
now appear to be pursuing gradual advances along multiple mutually
supporting lines of advance — a Russian campaign design that has become
more common as the Russian military has abandoned attempts at
operationally significant break throughs through mechanized maneuver.[13]
The
Russian military command likely aims for the intended seizure of
Kurakhove and Vuhledar to allow Russian forces to make more rapid
tactical gains up to and along the H-15 highway, although Russian forces
will likely face challenges in leveraging the envisioned seizure of
these settlements to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient in western
Donetsk Oblast. The envisioned Russian seizure of Vuhledar
would remove a Ukrainian strongpoint that Ukrainian forces have
successfully leveraged to prevent Russian efforts to advance to the H-15
highway from the south, although seizing Vuhledar will not be the
decisive factor for whether Russian forces can reach the highway.
Vuhledar is 23 kilometers south of the H-15 highway, and the area
between Vuhledar and the highway is mainly comprised of open fields that
would require Russian forces to conduct successful mechanized assaults
to make more rapid tactical gains. Intensified Russian mechanized
assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City since late July have so far
facilitated only a couple of kilometers of advance, and Russian forces
have historically proven inept at conducting effective operational-level
mechanized maneuver.[14]
The intended Russian seizure of Kurakhove would take another
significant defensive point away from Ukrainian forces, but the
settlements west of Kurakhove along the H-15 highway also provide
opportunities for defense and there is no reason to assess that Russian
forces would be able to advance more rapidly west of Kurakhove if
Ukrainian forces decide to defend in these settlements. The Russian
Eastern and Southern groupings of forces have generally proven
ineffective at conducting successful offensive operations, and more
combat effective elements of the Central Grouping of Forces that are
driving on Kurakhove's northern flank may improve Russian prospects for
seizing Kurakhove.[15]
It is unlikely that the Russian military command will commit Central
Grouping of Forces elements to a prolonged effort to advance further
along the H-15 highway and away from the Central Grouping of Force's
priority effort to seize Pokrovsk, however.[16]
The
Russian military command continues to prioritize the offensive effort
on Pokrovsk and will likely treat the intensified effort in western
Donetsk Oblast as a secondary effort. The Russian military command
likely intends for this secondary effort, regardless of its success, to
fix Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast and prevent Ukrainian
redeployments to reinforce the defense of Pokrovsk. The Russian
military command has shown a pronounced desire to insulate its
offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction from the operational
pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast and is likely
holding back its remaining operational reserves for the effort to seize
the city of Pokrovsk itself.[17]
This level of prioritization will likely remain regardless of the
success of the intensified Russian offensive effort in western Donetsk
Oblast. Russian forces began efforts to widen the Pokrovsk salient along
the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line as a preparatory step for the
upcoming attempt to seize Pokrovsk itself, and any participation by
elements of the Central Grouping of Forces in the offensive effort in
western Donetsk Oblast will likely be further conditions-setting for the
Pokrovsk effort.[18]
The Russian military command has pursued a theater wide campaign design
aimed at stretching Ukrainian forces through consistent offensive
pressure and appears to be replicating this theater-wide effort in a
more intensified way along the frontline in Donetsk Oblast.[19] Russian
forces will not be able to retain the initiative throughout eastern
Ukraine indefinitely, and multiple intensified offensive efforts in
Donetsk Oblast, in addition to the persisting operational pressures
caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast, will likely cause
Russian offensive operations to culminate sooner than the Russian
military command intends.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin continues to downplay the theater-wide
operational impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and
continues efforts to convince the Russian people that the Kremlin's
delayed and disorganized response to the Kursk incursion is an
acceptable price to pay for further Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast. Putin
claimed during his speech at the Eastern Economic Forum on September 5
that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has failed to force
Russia to redeploy forces from frontline areas in Ukraine to Kursk
Oblast or stop Russia's offensive operations in "key directions" of
eastern Ukraine.[20]
Putin claimed that the incursion has not impacted Russia's "primary
goal" of seizing the remainder of Donbas. Putin claimed that Ukraine
also intended for the incursion to divide Russian society, but that
instead the incursion has further unified Russia and there has been a
sharp increase in the number of people interested in signing military
service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Putin
claimed that Russian forces have "stabilized" the situation in Kursk
Oblast and are beginning to push Ukrainian forces from Russian
territory. Putin claimed that Russian forces are making significant
territorial advances in Ukraine and have accelerated their offensive
operations. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian forces are suffering
"heavy" manpower and equipment losses, but did not provide specific
numbers for these losses. Putin's claims about the Kursk incursion
having no operational impacts are demonstrably false, however, as ISW
has reported.[21]
The
Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has had theater-wide impacts and
these impacts will likely continue to affect Russian offensive and
defensive capabilities beyond the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated
during an interview with CNN published on September 5 that the Ukrainian
incursion spoiled a planned Russian attack into Sumy Oblast and
"reduced the threat" of Russian incursions into northern Ukraine.[22]
Syrskyi stated that Ukraine's key objectives for the incursion were to
stop Russian forces from using Kursk Oblast as a sanctuary to prepare
offensive operations into Ukraine, divert Russian forces from other
unspecified areas in Ukraine, create a "security zone," take Russian
prisoners of war (POWs), and boost Ukrainian morale. Syrskyi stated that
Russian forces have moved "tens of thousands" of troops previously
intended to reinforce Russian offensive operations in Ukraine to Kursk
Oblast, including small elements of several elite Russian Airborne (VDV)
units. Russian forces have reportedly redeployed elements of the 56th
Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the 11th and 83rd VDV
brigades to Kursk Oblast.[23]
The Russian military command has largely relied on conscripts and
regular and irregular forces redeployed from lower priority sectors of
Ukraine, such as northern Kharkiv Oblast, to conduct defensive
operations in Kursk Oblast.[24]
These forces are extremely unlikely to be sufficient to expel Ukrainian
forces from Kursk if the Ukrainians choose to defend. The Russian
military command may have also redeployed at least a company of the 15th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military
District [CMD]) from the Pokrovsk direction in mid-August 2024.[25]
The redeployment of elements of the CMD — which is reportedly tasked
with completing the seizure of Pokrovsk — suggests that the Russian
military command has not be able to fully insulate its priority
offensive operations from the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion,
despite Putin's claims.
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk
Oblast has also allowed Ukraine to challenge Russia's control of the
theater-wide initiative in Ukraine. Russia has possessed the
theater-wide initiative in Ukraine since at least November 2023, which
has allowed the Russian military command to determine the location,
time, scale, and requirements of fighting in Ukraine at will and has
forced Ukraine to expend manpower and materiel in reactive defensive
operations.[26]
Syrskyi recently stated that Russia has redeployed roughly 30,000
troops from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast to respond to the Ukrainian
incursion.[27]
A significant additional redeployment of Russian troops from the
frontline in Ukraine would very likely be necessary to let Russia regain
control of its territory in Kursk, as US intelligence officials have
reportedly assessed, and would significantly impact Russia's offensive
operations and Russia's ability to prepare for future operations.[28]
Putin's
informational efforts are likely intended to convince the Russian
public that an ongoing Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is tolerable
in exchange for the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk. The Kremlin is
reportedly trying to condition Russian society to accept that the
limited Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is a "new normal," possibly
in order to afford itself time and space to respond to the incursion
after seizing Pokrovsk.[29]
Putin delayed declaring a "counterterrorism operation" for several days
following the incursion and has largely avoided redeploying the large
numbers of experienced and combat effective forces that Russia will
likely need to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[30]
ISW continues to assess that Putin is likely prioritizing Russian
offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over pushing Ukrainian
forces from Kursk Oblast, and Putin's rhetorical efforts further support
this assessment.[31]
Putin also attempted to marginally rehabilitate the Russian MoD's
public image during his speech by claiming that the MoD is "objective"
and by presenting battlefield reports from the MoD as accurate.[32]
Putin may also intend to influence select Western audiences with his
comments about the Ukrainian incursion. Putin may assess that he can
encourage Western decision-makers to pressure Ukraine into withdrawing
its forces from Kursk Oblast, which would allow Putin to continue his
offensive operations in Ukraine without having to redeploy additional
forces to Kursk Oblast. Putin's ostensible comfort with allowing
Ukrainian forces to hold Russian territory for a protracted time is a
stunning reversal of longstanding Russian rhetoric and doctrine about
the inviolability of Russia's borders and calls into question the
significance of Russia's supposed "red lines."[33]
Russian
offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast do not portend the imminent
collapse of the frontline throughout Ukraine, despite Putin's efforts to
portray the advances in Donetsk Oblast as dramatic. Russian
forces have advanced at most roughly 40 kilometers from the 2022
frontline in Pokrovsk Raion since the beginning of the Russian offensive
effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and appear to have suffered
significant manpower and armored vehicle losses in exchange for these
territorial gains.[34]
A Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would almost certainly complicate
Ukrainian logistics, and further Russian advances west and southwest of
Donetsk City will challenge Ukraine's defensive positions in the area to
be sure. The loss of Pokrovsk, and the loss and occupation of any
Ukrainian territory and people, would be a significant blow to Ukrainian
morale. The Russian seizure of Pokrovsk is by no means inevitable,
however. Russian forces have failed to seize Chasiv Yar and threaten
Ukraine's fortress belt from Slovyansk to Kostyantynivka after months of
assaults, and Ukrainian forces have proven their ability to limit
Russian advances elsewhere in the theater, particularly when
well-staffed and equipped. It remains too soon to forecast the
outcome of the current Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast,
and far too soon to assess the effects of the Ukrainian incursion into
Kursk that were intended to go far beyond affecting the immediate
situation around Pokrovsk.
The US,
Ukraine's other supporters, and Ukraine itself maintain the ability to
make decisions that can impact the battlefield situation — including by
addressing Ukraine's manpower and training restraints and adequately
arming and equipping Ukraine so that the Ukrainian military command can
properly prepare for future defensive and counteroffensive operations.
Russia
continued its efforts to bolster economic relations with non-Western
countries on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in
Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai. Russian President Vladimir Putin
shared the stage during his speech with officials from Malaysia and the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) on September 5 to discuss bilateral
cooperation and multilateral projects.[35]
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim told Putin during a plenary
session that Malaysia is interested in joining BRICS and claimed that
Russian-Malaysian collaboration on what Ibrahim called “Islamic finance”
would help Russia attract more investment from majority Muslim
countries.[36]
Indian Ambassador to Russia Vinay Kumar stated that India expects to
increase imports of Russian oil until 2030 and that India and Russia are
developing a new interbank exchange system.[37]
Kumar also expressed hope that Russia will increase its exports of
fertilizer to India. Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom CEO
Alexei Likhachev highlighted Rosatom’s ongoing work with India and
Vietnam to develop the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic, a shipping
route between western Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region.[38]
Putin also discussed joint PRC-Russian efforts to address and mitigate
external challenges to bilateral cooperation between the two countries
with PRC Vice President Han Zheng.[39]
This conversation occurred against the backdrop of a statement by the
CEO of Russian metals and renewables company En+, Vladimir Kolmogorov,
at the EEF, who claimed that a large joint Russia-PRC coal project in
Siberia is facing financial difficulties due to concern among PRC
companies about Western secondary sanctions.[40]
ISW previously noted that Russian efforts at the EEF are largely
centered around diplomatic efforts with non-Western countries to evade
Western sanctions.[41]
Ukrainian officials announced a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 5. Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rada Deputy Yaroslav Zheleznyak reported on September 5 that
that the Verkhovna Rada voted to appoint First Deputy Foreign Minister
Andrii Sybiha as Foreign Minister; Head of Ukraine's state-owned defense
enterprise Ukroboronprom, Herman Smetanin, as Strategic Industries
Minister; former Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Olha
Stefanishyna as Justice Minister; Presidential Office Deputy Head
Oleksiy Kuleba as Development of Communities, Territories and
Infrastructure Minister; and Deputy Defense Minister Nataliya Kalmykova
as Veterans Affairs Minister.[42]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian
forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to
eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk
City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia
City) highway.
- Apparently coordinated Russian
offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction
to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim
to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk
Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized
offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction.
- Russian
forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations
elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of
Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage
decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in
the near-term.
- Russian forces intensified
offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the
southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces
intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the
southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk
City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar.
- The
Russian military command likely aims for the intended seizure of
Kurakhove and Vuhledar to allow Russian forces to make more rapid
tactical gains up to and along the H-15 highway, although Russian forces
will likely face challenges in leveraging the envisioned seizure of
these settlements to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient in western
Donetsk Oblast.
- The Russian military command
continues to prioritize the offensive effort on Pokrovsk and will likely
treat the intensified effort in western Donetsk Oblast as a secondary
effort. The Russian military command likely intends for this secondary
effort, regardless of its success, to fix Ukrainian forces in western
Donetsk Oblast and prevent Ukrainian redeployments to reinforce the
defense of Pokrovsk.
- Russian President Vladimir
Putin continues to downplay the theater-wide operational impacts of the
Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continues efforts to convince
the Russian people that the Kremlin's delayed and disorganized response
to the Kursk incursion is an acceptable price to pay for further
Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.
- The
Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has had theater-wide impacts and
these impacts will likely continue to affect Russian offensive and
defensive capabilities beyond the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive.
- Putin's
informational efforts are likely intended to convince the Russian
public that an ongoing Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is tolerable
in exchange for the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk.
- Russian
offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast do not portend the imminent
collapse of the frontline throughout Ukraine, despite Putin's efforts to
portray the advances in Donetsk Oblast as dramatic.
- Russian
forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kupyansk, and in
the Kherson direction and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions
north of Kharkiv City.
- Russian forces continue
to forcibly redeploy mobilized Russian military personnel from occupied
Ukraine to frontline positions to bolster Russia's crypto-mobilization
efforts.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in the southeastern area of the Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently regained limited
positions in the northern part of the salient. Geolocated footage
published on August 31 showing Ukrainian forces operating south of
Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha) indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced
in the area, although likely not within the past several days.[43]
Additional geolocated footage published on September 1 showing Russian
forces operating north of Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha) indicates that
Russian forces marginally advanced in the area.[44]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed
on September 5 that Ukrainian forces continued attacking near Korenevo;
east of Korenevo near Olgovka; north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya,
Kamyshevka, Maryevka, and Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; and southeast of
Sudzha near Borki.[45]
Elements of the Russian 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion of the 810th
Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating
near Spalnoye.[46]
Russian
authorities continue to involve new volunteer territorial defense units
in the response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The
Russian MoD and the Belgorod Oblast administration formally announced on
September 5 the creation of the "BARS-Belgorod" volunteer detachment
that will protect infrastructure facilities, conduct anti-drone
measures, detect Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups, evacuate
civilians, and "secure the counterterrorism regime" in Belgorod Oblast.[47]
The MoD stated that "BARS-Belgorod" personnel are currently undergoing
training. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov publicly announced
on August 29 the creation of the "BARS-Kursk" volunteer detachment that
will "ensure security" in Kursk Oblast during Ukraine's incursion.[48]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev
previously noted that Russian authorities are forming a "BARS-Bryansk"
volunteer detachment to defend in Bryansk Oblast as well.[49]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian forces recently regained
positions north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive
operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on
September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost
positions northeast of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[50]
Russian forces continued attacking north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke
and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on September 5.[51]
Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces reported that personnel in the
Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad
Military District [LMD]) operating near Lukyantsi (north of Kharkiv
City) are suffering from a shortage of potable water and refuse to
conduct some unspecified operations.[52]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid
continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line
on September 5. Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates
that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Pishchane
(southeast of Kupyansk).[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk
near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Tabaivka, Hlushkivka,
Kruhlyakivka, Berestove, Andriivka, and Myasozharivka and towards
Lozova; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka, Cherneshchyna,
Hrekivka, Makiivka, Nevske, and Novosadove; and west of Kreminna near
Torske on September 4 and 5.[54]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian
forces reportedly advanced in the Siversk direction on September 5 but
did not make any confirmed gains in the area. Russian milbloggers
claimed that there are reports that Russian forces seized Pereizne
(south of Siversk), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this
claim.[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near
Verkhnokamyanske and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Spirne
on September 4 and 5.[56]
Russian
forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar and continued offensive
operations in the area on September 5. Geolocated footage published on
September 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of
Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) along the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas
Canal.[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, north of
Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, southeast
of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, and south of Chasiv Yar in the
direction of Predtechyne and Ivanopillia on September 4 and 5.[58]
Russian
forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on
September 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 600
meters in Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk), although ISW has not observed
confirmation of this claim.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk and south of
Toretsk near Nelipivka and Niu York on September 4 and 5.[60]
Russian
forces did not make any confirmed gains in the Pokrovsk direction on
September 5. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian
forces seized Zavitne (southeast of Pokrovsk), although ISW observed
confirmation that Russian forces seized the settlement as of August 18.[61]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the eastern
outskirts of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk), although ISW has not
observed confirmation of this claim or any evidence to corroborate
persistent Russian claims that Russian forces are operating within
Selydove.[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near
Vozdvyzhenka, Zelene Pole, and Hrodivka and southeast of Pokrovsk near
Ukrainsk, Lisivka, Myrolyubivka, Mykhailivka, Selydove, Mykolaivka, and
Novohrodivka on September 4 and 5.[63]
A Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian forces are
significantly intensifying glide bomb strikes against Pokrovsk, and a
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces damaged a bridge along
the E-50 (Donetsk City-Pokrovsk) highway in western Pokrovsk on
September 5.[64]
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited on September 4
elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army
[formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps], Southern Military
District [SMD]) with the May 2024 seizure of Netaylove (southeast of
Pokrovsk) and likely recent Russian seizure of Novohrodivka.[65]
See topline text for details on Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City.
Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 5.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian
forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne
and Verbove (east of Robotyne) and north of Robotyne in the direction of
Novoandriivka on September 4 and 5, but there were no confirmed changes
to the frontline.[66]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kherson direction amid continued Russian assaults in the area on September 4 and 5.[67]
Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Russian
forces recently seized positions on the eastern part of Kozulyskyi
Island (southwest of Kherson City) in the Dnipro River Delta.[68]
Ukrainian
Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on
September 5 that Russian forces are accumulating an unspecified number
of air defense systems in occupied Crimea to defend the Kerch Strait
Bridge against Ukrainian drone and missile strikes and that Russian
forces are pulling these systems from unspecified areas in Russia or
possibly occupied Ukraine.[69]
Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces may have to rely on the bridge to
transport materiel into occupied Crimea following the recent Ukrainian
strikes against Russian transport ferries in the port of Kavkaz,
Krasnodar Krai.[70]
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 5 that Russian
forces destroyed two Ukrainian naval drones in the northeastern Black
Sea on the night of September 4 to 5, although ISW has not observed
visual confirmation of this claim.[71]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
on the night of September 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied
Crimea and 78 Shahed-136/131 drones from Yeysk and Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai and Kursk Oblast.[72]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 60
Shahed drones over Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Kharkiv,
Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Poltava, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia and
Kherson oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 15 Shahed drones
did not reach their targets, two drones flew into Russian airspace, and
one drone flew into Belarusian airspace.
The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted an
Iskander-M ballistic missile strike against Ukrainian forces near
Rudnivka, Sumy Oblast, although ISW has not observed independent
confirmation of this claim.[73]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian
forces continue to forcibly redeploy mobilized Russian military
personnel from occupied Ukraine to frontline positions to bolster
Russia's crypto-mobilization efforts. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head
Artem Lysohor reported on September 5 that Russian forces are forcing
Ukrainians mobilized in 2022 from occupied Luhansk Oblast to return to
the front.[74]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian
sources claimed on September 3 that Russian company Nova Labs is
reportedly testing a new first-person view (FPV) interceptor drone.[75]
The anti-drone system is reportedly equipped with machine vision
allowing the system to recognize and disable enemy FPV drones by ramming
them midair.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
ISW is suspending publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts until further notice.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
US
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
announced on September 4 that the US sanctioned 10 individuals and two
entities, including RT Editor-in-Chief and Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan, for malign influence operations against the US.[76] OFAC reported that executives at the Russian state media outlet RT began
attempts to covertly recruit "unwitting" US citizens at the start of
2024 to support Russian malign influence operations in the US.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin reiterated a boilerplate Russian information
operation on September 5 at the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) alleging
that Western officials coerced Ukraine into rejecting an agreement
favorable to Russia during the March 2022 negotiations between Ukraine
and Russia in Istanbul.[77]
This Kremlin narrative frames the West as the only meaningful
negotiating party in Ukraine as part of its effort to gain Western
acceptance of its premise that Ukraine has no independent agency and to
secure preemptive concessions from the West on Ukraine’s behalf that
undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Belarus reportedly
intercepted several Russian drones that flew into Belarusian airspace
from Ukraine on the night of September 4 to 5. The Belarusian Ministry
of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 5 that Belarusian forces shot down
an unspecified number of drones that violated Belarusian airspace.[78]
Independent Belarusian monitoring group the Hajun Project reported on
September 4 that Belarusian forces downed an unspecified number and type
of Russian Shahed drones over Gomel Oblast near the Belarus-Ukraine
border.[79]
Several Belarusian and Russian sources claimed that the wreckage from
the downed drones caused a fire and damaged nearby storage buildings.[80]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2024
[2] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6663; https://t.me/morpex_V/2698
[3] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6665; https://t.me/zov_kam/12348
[4] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27984 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136268 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136257
[5] https://t.me/ombr72/10256; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9878
[6] https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1831696217216065601 ; https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1831700027044987112
[7] https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1831696217216065601 ; https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1831700027044987112
[8] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75029
[9] https://t.me/odshbr79/344
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524
[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2024
[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021123
[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024
[15]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2024
; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072624 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024
[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072624 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/assessing-significance-current-russian-and-ukrainian-operations-course-war ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082924
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082924
[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
[20] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75029
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar090324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081424
[22] https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/05/europe/ukraine-army-chief-kursk-incursion-exclusive-intl/index.html
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar090124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224
[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081324
[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124
[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081124
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2024;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2024;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18-2024;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar051124
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082724
[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082424
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0
[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081024
[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2024
[32] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75029
[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424
[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041324
[35] http://en dot kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75029
[36] https://t.me/basurin_e/13953 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/13952 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/13950; http://en dot kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75029
[37] https://t.me/tass_agency/270599; https://t.mess_agency/270629; https://t.me/tass_agency/270632 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/270637
[38] https://t.me/tass_agency/270595; https://t.me/tass_agency/270603
[39] http://en dot kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75029
[40] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/09/05/russian-chinese-coal-project-hits-financing-hurdle-due-to-secondary-sanctions-a86278; https://www.rbc dot ru/business/05/09/2024/66d970939a7947e94c3629f7;
[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2024
[42] https://suspilne dot media/829537-verhovna-rada-zvilnila-ocilnika-fondu-derzmajna-ta-dvoh-ministriv-devatoh-priznacila-na-novi-posadi/ ; https://t.me/yzheleznyak/9855 ; https://t.me/yzheleznyak/9857 ; https://t.me/yzheleznyak/9858 ; https://t.me/yzheleznyak/9864
[43] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1831424101690544229; https://t.me/tactical_13/5928
[44] https://t.me/gnilayachereha/17568; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/19637
[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/43009 ; https://t.me/rybar/63293 ; https://t.me/rybar/63274
[46] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1831424101690544229 ; https://t.me/tactical_13/5928
[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/42990
[48] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082924
[49] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082924
[50] https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1831627383855534236; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1831639066950918385
[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02igTWTnuyzQkQf7iwHCvTJPaW8aKA7pfq4ZVRKLpZh6Ncq147TR3WsU5YmJ9aLgM9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022LQvYTr9esmfXoMuCYWDFveeX8hCrijgprnUR9ZG71vtkGDaZMBEnirGwHQFke6Al; https://t.me/wargonzo/21925
[52] https://t.me/otukharkiv/1114
[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6670; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/19609
[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02igTWTnuyzQkQf7iwHCvTJPaW8aKA7pfq4ZVRKLpZh6Ncq147TR3WsU5YmJ9aLgM9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022LQvYTr9esmfXoMuCYWDFveeX8hCrijgprnUR9ZG71vtkGDaZMBEnirGwHQFke6Al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036TahyrBKWpMVjMTuHbYHZVzrKfijzbQbpE8piCrtDj6SRUfFacazumdU9BN47uHNl\ ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11331
[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136257 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/19322
[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02igTWTnuyzQkQf7iwHCvTJPaW8aKA7pfq4ZVRKLpZh6Ncq147TR3WsU5YmJ9aLgM9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022LQvYTr9esmfXoMuCYWDFveeX8hCrijgprnUR9ZG71vtkGDaZMBEnirGwHQFke6Al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036TahyrBKWpMVjMTuHbYHZVzrKfijzbQbpE8piCrtDj6SRUfFacazumdU9BN47uHNl
[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6661; https://t.me/ptashkaDoDo/692
[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02igTWTnuyzQkQf7iwHCvTJPaW8aKA7pfq4ZVRKLpZh6Ncq147TR3WsU5YmJ9aLgM9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022LQvYTr9esmfXoMuCYWDFveeX8hCrijgprnUR9ZG71vtkGDaZMBEnirGwHQFke6Al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036TahyrBKWpMVjMTuHbYHZVzrKfijzbQbpE8piCrtDj6SRUfFacazumdU9BN47uHNl
[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14992 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/76379
[60]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02igTWTnuyzQkQf7iwHCvTJPaW8aKA7pfq4ZVRKLpZh6Ncq147TR3WsU5YmJ9aLgM9l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022LQvYTr9esmfXoMuCYWDFveeX8hCrijgprnUR9ZG71vtkGDaZMBEnirGwHQFke6Al
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036TahyrBKWpMVjMTuHbYHZVzrKfijzbQbpE8piCrtDj6SRUfFacazumdU9BN47uHNl
[61] https://t.me/mod_russia/43005 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2024
[62] https://t.me/rybar/63277 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21925
[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02igTWTnuyzQkQf7iwHCvTJPaW8aKA7pfq4ZVRKLpZh6Ncq147TR3WsU5YmJ9aLgM9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022LQvYTr9esmfXoMuCYWDFveeX8hCrijgprnUR9ZG71vtkGDaZMBEnirGwHQFke6Al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036TahyrBKWpMVjMTuHbYHZVzrKfijzbQbpE8piCrtDj6SRUfFacazumdU9BN47uHNl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/14997 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/51616 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/136257
[64] https://t.me/don_partizan/5085 ; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1831710071140610234
[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/42989
[66] https://t.me/rusich_army/16982 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02igTWTnuyzQkQf7iwHCvTJPaW8aKA7pfq4ZVRKLpZh6Ncq147TR3WsU5YmJ9aLgM9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022LQvYTr9esmfXoMuCYWDFveeX8hCrijgprnUR9ZG71vtkGDaZMBEnirGwHQFke6Al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036TahyrBKWpMVjMTuHbYHZVzrKfijzbQbpE8piCrtDj6SRUfFacazumdU9BN47uHNl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21925 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11241
[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid036TahyrBKWpMVjMTuHbYHZVzrKfijzbQbpE8piCrtDj6SRUfFacazumdU9BN47uHNl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022LQvYTr9esmfXoMuCYWDFveeX8hCrijgprnUR9ZG71vtkGDaZMBEnirGwHQFke6Al ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02igTWTnuyzQkQf7iwHCvTJPaW8aKA7pfq4ZVRKLpZh6Ncq147TR3WsU5YmJ9aLgM9l
[68] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/19640; https://t.me/jahznebes/99
[69] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/09/05/tyagnut-zvidusil-u-vms-zsu-rozpovily-chomu-rosiya-zvozyt-systemy-ppo-v-krym/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k
[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2024
[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/42992
[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/18851
[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/42998
[74] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/21160; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/21161
[75] https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/09/03/v-rossii-ispytali-dron-perehvatchik-s-mashinnym-zreniem/; https://x.com/alpha_defense/status/1831262374671864161; https://t.me/basurin_e/13951; https://t.me/UAVDEV/7193
[76] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2559
[77] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75029
[78] https://t.me/modmilby/41578
[79]https://x.com/Hajun_BY/status/1831467521985409258; https://x.com/Hajun_BY/status/1831472563320713369
[80]https://x.com/Hajun_BY/status/1831472563320713369; https://t.me/rusich_army/16965; https://t.me/dva_majors/51634; https://t.me/vrogov/17387 ; https://x.com/Hajun_BY/status/1831631461063028863
