Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET
The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events. Click here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.
CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to
secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both
part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with
varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange
for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are
traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction,
while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence.
Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic
objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American
influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both.
Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those
ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.
We
do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.
A Lebanese media outlet published on
May 1 the purported text of the Egyptian-proposed ceasefire agreement
that Hamas is considering.[1] The reported proposal addresses all of
Hamas’ maximalist demands except for a permanent ceasefire.[2] Hamas
would not likely adhere to a permanent ceasefire, however, given that
Hamas has violated previous ceasefires and that Hamas remains committed
to destroying Israel.[3]
The purported
Egyptian-proposed ceasefire agreement contains three phases and meets
Hamas’ demands for a temporary ceasefire, the release of Palestinian
prisoners, the delivery of more humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, and
the reconstruction of the strip.[4]
The first 40-day phase would require Hamas to release at least 33
living Israeli hostages who are elderly, female, or injured in exchange
for a temporary pause in fighting. The first phase also stipulates that
the IDF withdraw eastward away from the populated areas of the Gaza
Strip. The IDF would conduct a phased withdrawal from most of the
Netzarim corridor to allow displaced Gazans to return to the northern
Gaza Strip. Israel would furthermore allow the entry of 500 aid trucks
into the Gaza Strip daily and cease aerial surveillance of the strip for
parts of the day. Israel and Hamas would enter indirect negotiations to
“restore sustainable calm” after the 16th day of the pause in fighting.
Egyptian sources indicated to Western media that the “sustainable calm”
could last up to a year.[5]
The second phase of the proposed ceasefire reportedly stipulates that
Hamas would release the remaining male Israeli civilians and soldiers in
exchange for a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the release
of an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners. The third phase
includes both sides exchanging dead bodies and the implementation of a
five-year rehabilitation plan for the Gaza Strip. Hamas would be barred
from rebuilding its military infrastructure during the five-year period,
according to the Lebanese report.
Hamas has repeatedly refused to accept any ceasefire that does not meet its maximalist demands.[6] Hamas has not changed these demands since December 2023.[7]
Hamas Political Bureau member Osama Hamdan said in an interview with
Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media on May 2 that Hamas’ position on the
ceasefire proposal is “negative” and that Hamas would stop negotiating
if Israel launches a clearing operation into Rafah.[8]
Accepting the ceasefire is inherently contradictory to Hamas’ objective of destroying Israel.[9]
Hamas initiated the current war by breaking a period of relative calm
in its attack into Israel on October 7, 2023. A “permanent” truce would
provide Hamas time to reconstitute itself militarily and reassert its
political authority in the Gaza Strip, which CTP-ISW has previously
assessed Hamas is trying to do.[10]
An Iranian-backed Bahraini militia claimed to have conducted a drone strike on the Israeli port city of Eilat on April 27.[11] Saraya
al Ashtar claimed the strike on May 2 and said that it targeted the
headquarters of Israeli transportation company Trucknet Enterprise in
Eilat.[12]
There is no definitive evidence at this time that the group conducted
an attack, though Saraya al Ashtar published a video of its fighters
launching a drone in an unspecified location.[13]
Saraya al Ashtar suggested that it was part of a larger group called
the Islamic Resistance in Bahrain and vowed that it would continue its
attacks until Israel ends its military operations in the Gaza Strip.[14] This statement marks the first time that Saraya al Ashtar has signaled its participation in the Israel-Hamas war.
The
claimed attack is part of the Iranian-led campaign to impose an
unofficial blockade on Israel. Saraya al Ashtar emphasized the role of
Trucknet Enterprise in facilitating Israeli overland trade.[15]
Trucknet Enterprise signed several agreements with Emirati companies in
December 2023 to organize overland trade to the Persian Gulf and to
mitigate the impact of Houthi attacks on international shipping.[16]
Houthi attacks have reduced commercial operations at the port of Eilat
and thus driven Israel to rely more on land routes through Jordan and
the Gulf states to the Persian Gulf.[17]
Saraya al Ashtar likely claimed the attack, regardless of whether it
occurred, to deter companies and the Gulf states from supporting
overland Israeli trade.
Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” have repeatedly called for an unofficial blockade on Israel in recent months.[18]
Houthi attacks on international shipping are part of this effort. Iran
has also threatened the United Arab Emirates for cooperating with
Israel, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have emphasized the need to
severe the Israeli “land bridge” that passes through Jordan.[19]
Tehran and its allies appear to be operating on the theory that severe
economic disruption would compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza
Strip and that such economic pressure could ultimately collapse the
Israeli state. Iranian leaders have repeatedly said in recent months
that part of their theory on how to destroy Israel revolves around
stoking instability and terror in Israel to catalyze reverse migration
away from Israel.
Saray al Ashtar claiming a drone attack
marks the first time that the group has indicated that it has drone
capabilities. Some observers noted that the drone that Saraya al Ashtar
showed in its video resembles the Houthi Samad-2/3 drones, which have a
range of around 1,500 kilometers.[20] Saraya al Ashtar could threaten numerous US and partner positions throughout the Arabian Peninsula with that capability.
The
Houthi supreme leader emphasized that the Houthis would continue their
attacks against Israel and its interests until the destruction of the
Israeli state. His remarks demonstrate that the Houthis will remain a
serious threat to international shipping even in the event of a
ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik
al Houthi gave a speech on May 2 reaffirming his grand strategic
objective of destroying Israel and describing the key role that he sees
the Houthis having in achieving this goal.[21]
Abdulmalik stated that a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip would only mean
the “completion of this round of escalation” and that the long-term
conflict against Israel would continue. Abdulmalik added that the
Houthis will continue to support the Palestinian militias fighting
Israel until “the end of [Israeli] control over Palestine and the
cleansing” of Israeli people from Israeli territory.[22]
Iran is trying to use its military exports as a vehicle for expanding its influence in Africa. A
French investigative outlet reported on April 30 that Iran and Niger
have been negotiating a deal since late 2023 for Iran to provide
military drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for 300 tons of
uranium yellowcake.[23]
This quantity is especially significant given that Iran announced in
2019 its intent to produce that much yellowcake—300 tons—per year by
2024.[24]
A Nigerien delegation notably traveled to Tehran in January 2024 and
signed unspecified agreements with Iranian officials, including Defense
and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Gharaei
Ashtiani.[25]
Ashtiani is responsible for managing the Iranian defense industry as
well as arms procurement and sales. Niger ended its counterterrorism
partnership with the United States in March 2024 after US officials
accused Niger of secretly exploring a deal to allow Iran access to
Nigerien uranium reserves.[26]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with the
new Iranian ambassador to Niger, Ali Tiztak, the same day that Niger
suspended its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States.[27]
The
Iranian negotiations with Niger come after Tehran similarly tried to
use its defense exports to expand its influence in Sudan. Iran
has supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with drones, such as the
Mohajer-6, to use against the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces.[28]
Western media reported in March 2024 that Iran requested Sudanese
permission to establish a permanent naval base on the Red Sea in return
for a helicopter-carrying warship.[29]
CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Iran would use a naval base in Sudan
to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international
shipping in the Red Sea.[30]
The
Iranian effort to expand its influence in Africa is especially
noteworthy given that Iran recently hosted representatives from over 40
African countries during its second annual Iran-Africa Trade Summit from
April 26-29.[31]
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, among other Iranian officials, met
with the prime minister of Burkina Faso and vice president of Zimbabwe
on the sidelines of the summit.[32]
The Zimbabwean vice president also discussed expanding military
cooperation during a meeting with the Iranian defense minister,
Ashtiani, on April 29.[33]
Key Takeaways:
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance objectives:
The
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force struck Palestinian fighters and
military infrastructure in the central Gaza Strip on May 2. The
IDF 679th Brigade (99th Division) directed an airstrike targeting
Palestinian fighters in an unspecified area in the central Gaza Strip.[34]
The IDF Air Force, in coordination with the 99th Division, separately
struck an “operational shaft” and a mortar launcher in an unspecified
area in the central Gaza Strip.[35]
The
al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades —the self-proclaimed militant wing of
Fatah—and Mujahideen Brigades targeted Israeli forces with mortar and
rocket fire along the Netzarim corridor in separate attacks on May
2.[36] The Netzarim corridor is where Israeli forces have
established forward positions to facilitate future raids into the
northern Gaza Strip.[37] Palestinian militias have claimed near daily attacks targeting Israeli forces near the Netzarim corridor since April 18.[38]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least one location in the West Bank on May 2.[39] The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Jalzone.[40]
Israeli
forces detained three PIJ fighters in January 2024 accused of planning
bombing attacks in the West Bank, according to a Times of Israel report
on May 2.[41] Shin Bet reported that the fighters were
preparing remote-detonated devices for “significant attacks” targeting
Israeli forces. The IDF seized “several” explosive devices ready for use
while arresting the fighters in Yabed. Shin Bet said that the PIJ
headquarters in Lebanon directed the bombing attacks and provided
funding to the fighters through cryptocurrency.
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance objectives:
Iranian-backed
fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least three
attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last
data cutoff on May 1.[42] Hezbollah shelled and fired unspecified munitions targeting Israeli forces in Shtoula and the Zibdin barracks.[43] The IDF reported that four munitions were fired from southern Lebanon targeting Israeli forces surrounding Mount Dov.[44] Unspecified fighters also fired two anti-tank guided munitions damaging two buildings in Shtoula.[45] Israeli forces destroyed Hezbollah infrastructure in Shebaa Farms and targeted Hezbollah fighters in Markaba.[46]
Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
The
Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi
militias—claimed two drone attacks targeting a “vital target” in the
Golan Heights and Eilat, Israel, on May 1.[47] Israeli
officials and media have not commented on the attacks at the time of
this writing. CTP-ISW cannot verify the attack claims.
Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed
strengthening ties with Lebanon in a meeting with Iranian Ambassador to
Lebanon Mojtaba Amani on May 2.[48] Abdollahian stressed importance of Lebanon in the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance and in countering Israel.[49]
Iran is using its recent drone and missile attack on Israel to promote Iranian military exports.
Brig. Gen. Mohammad Shirazi, who is the chief of the Iranian supreme
leader's military office, suggested on May 2 that Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei wants Iranian military officials to more actively promote
Iranian military capabilities to domestic and foreign audiences. Shirazi
highlighted the IRGC Aerospace Exhibition in Tehran as an example of
how other services of the Iranian armed forces should promote their
“achievements.”[50]
A senior IRGC official separately showcased Iranian drones and missiles
used in the April 13 attack on Israel while giving CNN a tour of the
IRGC Aerospace Exhibition on May 2.[51]
Iran has similarly capitalized on the Russian use of Iranian drones in
Ukraine to advertise Iranian drones to potential buyers in Africa and
Latin America.[52]|
An
anti-Iranian regime outlet based in the United Kingdom circulated a
letter claiming to contain hundreds of Iran-Iraq war veterans’
signatures condemning the recent death sentence of prominent Iranian
rapper Toumaj Salehi.[53] An Iranian revolutionary court
sentenced Salehi to death on the charge that he supported the 2022-23
Mahsa Amini protest movement in Iran on April 24.[54]
The letter was purportedly a “warning” signed by 460 Iran-Iraq war
veterans to regime leadership for prosecuting innocent civilians. The
signatories separately condemned the regime for mismanagement and for
committing violence against girls who participated in the Mahsa Amini
movement.[55]
Iran-Iraq war veterans have historically comprised of some of the most
ardent supporters of the regime, making the letter, if authentic,
particularly noteworthy.[56] CTP cannot verify the authenticity of this letter, however.
[1]
https://www.al-akhbar dot
com/Politics/381497/%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3
[2] https://t.me/hamasps/19721; https://t.me/hamasps/19722; https://t.me/hamasps/19723
[3]https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-edition-october-7-2023; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/من-نحن; https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp
[4] https://t.me/hamasps/19722
[5]
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-prepares-to-send-delegation-to-cairo-for-last-chance-gaza-cease-fire-talks-602eb46c?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos4
[6] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/51290; https://t.me/hamasps/19722; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-26-2024
[7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-26-2024
[8] https://t.me/almanarnews/154099; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/11923045?s=tg
[9] https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp
[10] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-4-2024
[11] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/05/bahraini-militia-claims-drone-attack-on-israel.php ; https://x.com/MisgavINS/status/1786027409550021077 ; https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1786082957502841143 ;
[12] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/05/bahraini-militia-claims-drone-attack-on-israel.php
[13] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1786082957502841143
[14] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/05/bahraini-militia-claims-drone-attack-on-israel.php
[15] https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/05/bahraini-militia-claims-drone-attack-on-israel.php
[16]
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2024;
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-02/land-routes-via-uae-saudi-arabia-tested-to-bypass-houthi-menaced-red-sea
[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911 ;
https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/03/07/Red-Sea-Attacks-Disrupt-Global-Trade; https://www.iswresearch.org/2023/12/iran-update-december-23-2023.html;
https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/03/iran-update-march-12-2024.htm
[18] https://www.iswresearch.org/2023/12/iran-update-december-23-2023.html;
https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/03/iran-update-march-12-2024.html
[19] https://almanar.com dot lb/11820481 ;
https://t.me/abualaskary/118; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/21/3066174; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-9-2024
[20] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1786082957502841143; https://faculteitmilitairewetenschappen.nl/file/download/d5785ae8-d95a-458e-beab-c437a5d3d0e3/1608150106flight%20performance%20analysis%20of%20the%20samad%20attack%20drones%20operated%20by%20houthi%20armed%20forces.pdf; https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/Sammad-3_Yemeni_Reconnaissance_and_Loitering_Munition_Drone#:~:text=The%20Sammad%2D1%20is%20the,km%20and%20is%20for%20surveillance.
[21] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3326087.htm
[22] https://saba dot ye/ar/news3326087.htm
[23] https://twitter.com/africa_in_fr/status/1785968816662425650?s=46&t=3jADKce4MtZBKDyf5P9itQ
[24] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/iran-scaling-up-uranium-production-and-mining-atomic-chief-says/
[25] https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c03rd3l3z83o
[26] https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/niger-once-key-u-s-counterterrorism-ally-ends-military-ties-7db66dbe
[27] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/213168/FM-Amir-Abdollahian-stresses-strengthening-ties-with-Niger
[28] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-24/iran-supplies-sudan-army-with-drones-as-civil-war-continues ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-4-2024
[29] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-tried-to-persuade-sudan-to-allow-naval-base-on-its-red-sea-coast-77ca3922
[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-4-2024
[31] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-russia-africa-israel-terror/32917323.html
[32] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-26-2024 ;
https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-29-2024
[33] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/10/3077087
[34] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1785900610358804684
[35] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1785900607066222788
[36] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6334; https://t.me/mojahdeenpal/4480
[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-26-2024
[38] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-may-1-2024
[39] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6337 ; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3127 ; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3128 ; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3129
[40] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6337 ; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3127 ; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3128 ; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3129
[41]
https://www.timesofisrael dot
com/liveblog_entry/shin-bet-captures-islamic-jihad-cell-planning-bombing-attacks-in-west-bank/
; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1785990916823494994
[42] https://t.me/mmirleb/3622 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3624 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1785754981670211811
[43] https://t.me/mmirleb/3622 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3624
[44] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1786015067919560841
[45] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1785754981670211811
[46] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1785999123851727032
[47] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1063 ;
https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1064
[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/02/13/3078744
[49] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/744494
[50] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/664895/
[51] https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/01/middleeast/iranian-missiles-drones-that-hit-israel-mime-intl/index.html
[52] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/are-iranian-drones-turning-tide-sudans-civil-war-2024-04-10/#:~:text=Bloomberg%20and%20Sudanese%20media%20have,many%20the%20army%20had%20received. ;
https://apnews.com/article/iran-argentina-novillo-tehran-drones-570b75c7ca61bb6bbf6ca250ccb75828
[53] https://www.iranintl.com/202405029104 ; https://telegra dot ph/توماج%E2%80%8Cها-را-اعدام-نکنید-به-وضعیت-کشور-رسیدگی-کنید-05-02
[54] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-24-2024
[55]
https://telegra dot
ph/توماج%E2%80%8Cها-را-اعدام-نکنید-به-وضعیت-کشور-رسیدگی-کنید-05-02 ;
https://www.iranintl dot com/202405029104
[56] https://www.aei.org/op-eds/khamenei-warns-veterans-of-declining-revolutionary-fervor/ ; https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/The-Soft-War-Understanding-Irans-Domestic-Ideological-Crisis.pdf?x85095
