Authors: George Barros, Nataliya Bugayova with
Mason Clark
Key Takeaway: The Kremlin increased military and
international pressure on Ukraine in May 2020 after efforts to establish direct
talks between Ukraine and Kremlin-controlled proxies stalled. Kremlin
information operations are framing Ukraine as having two options: legitimize
the Kremlin’s proxies through negotiations or admit Ukraine is impeding the
peace process. Both options in this Kremlin-contrived dichotomy advance the
Kremlin’s objectives and absolve the Kremlin of responsibility as a belligerent
in the war in Donbas. The Kremlin is continuing to consolidate
control over its proxies in occupied Donbas while posturing internationally as
a neutral arbiter aiming for peace. The Kremlin will
likely intensify its pressure on Ukraine to conduct local elections in occupied
Donbas in October 2020.
The Kremlin
is ramping up pressure on the Ukrainian government after Moscow’s recent failure
to force direct talks between Ukraine and Kremlin proxies. The Kremlin is trying to force Ukraine to
formalize the Advisory Council – a Kremlin-favorable initiative to facilitate
direct talks between Ukraine and the Kremlin’s proxies. The Ukrainian government initially agreed to the Advisory
Council in March but later paused the initiative, largely due to backlash from Ukrainian civil
society and logistical complications from the COVID-19 pandemic.[i]
The Kremlin is exploiting the trap it set with
Ukraine-proxy talks to pressure Ukraine into a contrived lose-lose scenario.
- The Kremlin is presenting Ukraine with
a false dichotomy of either legitimizing the Kremlin’s proxies through direct
negotiations or publicly undermining Ukraine’s commitment to the ongoing peace
process. The Kremlin-controlled self-proclaimed Donetsk
People’s Republic (DNR) issued an ultimatum to Ukraine on May 16 stating
Ukraine must either begin a direct dialogue with the DNR or admit Ukraine is
not committed to the Minsk agreements – the core of the ongoing peace process.[ii]
Both options would advance the Kremlin’s objectives. Direct Ukrainian negotiations
with the Kremlin’s proxies legitimize these proxies and,
by extension, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. The appearance of Ukraine
abandoning the Minsk agreements would reinforce Kremlin narratives that Ukraine
is spoiling the peace process and could present a justification for the Kremlin
to escalate the war. The
Kremlin’s framing that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky must either
legitimize the Kremlin’s intervention in Ukraine or admit Ukraine is an
obstacle to peace, distorts reality, and absolves the Kremlin of responsibility
for starting the war.
The Kremlin
backed its proxies’ ultimatum with additional military pressure. The DNR and
Luhansk People’s Republics (LNR) mobilized their forces to full combat
readiness on May 19.[iii]
The DNR called for dialogue with Ukraine but stated it cannot remain peaceful
without Ukraine’s reciprocation, while the LNR threatened offensive action to
move the front line.[iv]
Ukraine’s Defense Ministry reported Kremlin proxy forces again attacked the
Zolote disengagement point on May 27.[v]
- The Kremlin has intensified its
efforts to leverage European states against Ukraine, while framing Ukraine as a
spoiler in peace talks. Dmitry Kozak, the Kremlin’s policy
head on Ukraine, met an aide of German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on
May 13 to restart Ukrainian peace talks.[vi]
No Ukrainian representatives were present at the meeting. In a May 19 call with
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called on
Germany to demand Ukraine implement agreements reached during the December 2019
peace talks, despite Russia’s failure to implement its side of the agreements.[vii]
French and German
readouts from the April 30 Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) meeting, like those
of the Kremlin, did not mention any Russian responsibility for the stalled peace
process.[viii]
European acceptance of Kremlin narratives and pressure on Ukraine
to meet Russian demands will limit Ukrainian freedom of action.
The Kremlin also continues to frame
Zelensky as spoiling the peace process – a campaign that began in September
2019 and that ISW has tracked in detail.[ix]
Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs again accused Zelensky of failing to
deliver on peace promises on May 20.[x]
Lavrov accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations and denied ceasefire violations from
the Kremlin’s proxies on April 30.[xi]
The Kremlin’s efforts to establish Ukrainian
talks with the proxies are slowly progressing.
Public backlash likely compelled Zelensky to take a stronger stance; Zelensky refused
to allow Russian citizens to represent occupied Donbas in the Advisory Council.[xii]
Zelensky also reiterated that local elections in Donbas will only take place if
Ukraine regains control over its border with Russia.
Zelensky,
however, continues to defend the idea of the Advisory Council as a part of his
plan to end the war.[xiii]
His administration is proposing various ways to accommodate occupied Donbas’ participation
in peace talks. Zelensky’s chief of staff said on May 4 that Ukraine is ready
to talk to members of Donbas’ “civil society” who exclusively hold Ukrainian
citizenship, never participated in military operations against Ukraine, and
have clean criminal records.[xiv]
Ukraine’s delegation head to the TCG, Oleksiy Reznikov, said on May 18 that “legitimate”
representatives from Donbas could theoretically include city and regional
officials from Donbas elected in 2010, the last local elections to occur in
Donbas before Russian occupation.[xv]
These criteria, however, still leave room for the Kremlin to insert its agents
under the umbrella of “civil society representatives.”
The Kremlin will likely continue facing
setbacks in its effort to establish legitimacy-granting negotiations between
its proxies and the Ukrainian government. Several thousand Ukrainian protesters
gathered in Kyiv to protest Zelensky’s concessions to the Kremlin on May 24.[xvi]
The most-recent TCG calls on May 14 and May 27 did not produce
Kremlin-favorable results.[xvii]
The Kremlin likely deliberately arrived late to the May 27 TCG meeting and said
the DNR and LNR will not decrease their full combat readiness until Ukraine
deescalates, reinforcing the Kremlin’s false claims about Ukraine stalling the
process.[xviii]
The Kremlin continues to integrate and consolidate
external control over its proxies in Donbas while pressuring Ukraine to
negotiate with them as independent actors and shaping conditions to integrate
them back into Ukraine.
-
The Kremlin continues to issue Donbas
residents Russian citizenship while setting conditions for them to remain in
Ukraine. The Russian State Duma passed a bill in the
first reading to allow applicants for Russian citizenship to preserve their
foreign citizenship on April 14.[xix]
The Duma passed a bill in the first reading exempting DNR and LNR residents
from paying a fee when receiving expedited Russian citizenship on April 17.[xx]
The Kremlin will likely pass these bills into law in the near future. The
Kremlin is increasing the number of Russian citizens in Donbas to ensure the
Kremlin’s long-term influence in Donbas, especially as the Kremlin sets
conditions for local elections in Donbas.
-
The Kremlin is consolidating
management of critical infrastructure in Donbas.
The DNR and LNR announced their intent to create a unified electrical grid
called "Donbas Energy” on May 4.[xxi]
The unified grid will use powerplants in the DNR powered by LNR coal.[xxii]
The Kremlin consolidated control over the LNR and DNR’s railway systems in
2019.[xxiii]
The Kremlin will continue to consolidate management of the proxies’
infrastructure, linking the proxies to each other and to Russian structures,
even as it attempts to falsely frame the proxies as independent entities in an
“intra-Ukrainian” conflict.
-
The Kremlin continues to reinforce its
proxies’ military capabilities while posturing for peace.
Ukraine’s Defense Ministry reported the Kremlin used preparations for May 9 Victory
Day celebrations as cover to provide additional Russian command staff, combat-readiness
training, and heavy weapons to the DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR).[xxiv]
Forecasting
and implications. The
Kremlin will likely intensify its shaping operations to pressure Ukraine to
compel direct Ukrainian talks and hold local elections in occupied Donbas
during Ukraine’s upcoming October 2020 local elections.[xxv] Zelensky
is unlikely to hold elections in occupied Donbas in October 2020 despite intensified
Kremlin pressure to do so. The Kremlin will likely amplify information
operations portraying Zelensky as an obstacle to peace in Donbas when he refuses
to grant the Kremlin’s proxies local elections. The Kremlin will likely similarly
malign Zelensky if he continues to refuse direct Ukrainian talks with the
Kremlin’s proxies. Holding elections in Donbas on the Kremlin’s terms - without
granting Ukraine control of its border - would allow Putin to gain a permanent lever of influence over Ukraine’s
politics. The Kremlin
will likely continue to use similar false dichotomy traps against world leaders
in several international conflicts. The West should not allow the Kremlin to
manipulate Ukraine into a Kremlin-brokered peace agreement that amounts to a
Ukrainian surrender and removes restraints on Putin’s ambitions globally.
[i] Nataliya
Bugayova, Mason Clark, and George Barros, “Russia in Review: Putin Accelerates
Ukraine Campaign Amid Converging Crises,” Institute for the Study of War, March
24, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putin-accelerates-ukraine-campaign-amid-converging-crises ; George Barros, Nataliya Bugayova,
Mason Clark, “Russia in Review: Kremlin Misdirection Continues Amid COVID and
Peace Processes,” Institute for the Study of War, April 29, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlin-misdirection-continues-amid-covid-and-peace-processes.
[ii] [“The DNR Gave Kyiv
an Ultimatum,”] Lenta, May 16, 2020, https((:)//lenta.ru/news/2020/05/16/dnr/.
[iii] [“Russian Hybrid Forces
Threaten "Combat Readiness" in Donbas: What is Happening?”] Radio
Svoboda, May 29, 2020, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30622502.html ; Roman Zakharov,
[“In the DNR there is Increased Combat Readiness Because of the Deterioration
of the Situation in Donbas,”] TV Zvezda, May 20, 2020, https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/20205201221-wmSg0.html ; Alexander Gusarov
[“LNR Brought Armed Forces to Full Combat Readiness,”] Rossiskaya Gazeta, May
20, 2020, https://rg(.)ru/2020/05/20/lnr-privela-vooruzhennye-sily-v-polnuiu-boegotovnost.html.
[iv]
Ibid.
[v]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Operation post, May 27, 2020, [“Evening Report on the Situation
in the Area of the Joint Forces Operation as of 1700 on May 27, 2020,”] https://www.facebook.com/pressjfo.news/photos/a.364697644022858/864027044089913/?type=3&theater
; George Barros with Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin's Fake
De-escalation in Donbas,” Institute for the Study of War, February 24, 2020,
https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/02/russia-in-review-kremlins-fake-de.html.
[vi] “Ukraine Was Aware
of Kozak's Visit to Berlin in Advance, Will Know How It Passed – Kuleba,”
Interfax Ukraine, May 14, 2020, https://en.interfax.com(.)ua/news/general/662173.html ; “Kozak Told the
Details of the Talks in Berlin,” RIA Novosti, May 13, 2020, https://ria(.)ru/20200513/1571398488.html.
[vii]
[“On a Telephone Conversation between Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sergey Lavrov and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany H. Maas,”]
Russian Foreign Ministry, May 19, 2020, https://www.mid(.)ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4133311.
[viii] “‘The Guns Must Fall
Silent’ – Foreign Ministers Hold Virtual Normandy-Format Meeting on Ukraine,”
German Federal Foreign Office, April 30, 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-amt(.)de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/ukraine-node/supportukraine/normandy-format-meeting-ukraine/2338380 ; “Ukraine –
Statement by Jean-Yves le Drian – Video conference of Foreign Ministers in the
Normandy Format (30 Apr. 2020),” French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs,
April 30, 2020, https://www.diplomatie.gouv(.)fr/en/country-files/ukraine/news/article/statement-by-jean-yves-le-drian-video-conference-of-foreign-ministers-in-the.
[ix] Nataliya Bugayova, Mason Clark, and
George Barros, “Russia in Review: Putin Accelerates Ukraine Campaign Amid
Converging Crises,” Institute for the Study of War, March 24, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putin-accelerates-ukraine-campaign-amid-converging-crises.
[x] [“Russian MFA
Information and Press Department Commentary Regarding the Anniversary of the
Inauguration of the President of Ukraine V.A. Zelensky,”] Russian Foreign
Ministry, May 20, 2020, https://www.mid(.)ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4133577.
[xi] George Barros with
Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: The Kremlin's Fake De-escalation in
Donbas,” Institute for the Study of War, February 24, 2020,
https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/02/russia-in-review-kremlins-fake-de.html; [“Speech
and Answers to Media Questions by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation Sergey Lavrov During a Press Conference Following the Video Conference
of the Normandy Format Foreign Ministers, Moscow, April 30, 2020,”] Russian
Foreign Ministry, April 30, 2020, https://www.mid(.)ru/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/4109746.
[xii]
[“Zelensky On People from Donbas in the Advisory Council: Only citizens of
Ukraine,”] Liga News, May 20, 2020, https://news.liga(.)net/politics/news/zelenskiy-o-sostave-konsultativnogo-soveta-v-minske-tolko-grajdane-ukrainy.
[xiii] [“Petition to the
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelensky with a Demand to Immediately
Revoke the Signatures of the Representative of Ukraine and the Approval of the
Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine under the Minutes of the
Tripartite Contact Group Meeting Held in Minsk on March 11, 2020,”] President
of Ukraine, March 16, 2020, https://petition.president(.)gov.ua/petition/88960 ; Olga Rudenko, “Highlights
from Zelensky’s Press Conference on His First Year in Office,” Kyiv Post, May
20, 2020, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/highlights-from-zelenskys-press-conference-on-his-first-year-in-office.html?cn-reloaded=1.
[xiv]
Atlantic Council, “Pandemic, reform, war, and peace: The view from Ukraine’s
White House,” YouTube, May 4, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gn-rCRcKcWQ.
[xv]
[“Kyiv Selected for the Contract Group Meeting its Own Donbas ‘Representatives,’”]
TASS, May 26, 2020, https://tass(.)ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/8571823
; [“Reznikov: Representatives of Donbas in the TCG Should Have Public Legitimacy,”]
RBK Ukraine, May 18, 2020, https://www.rbc(.)ua/rus/news/reznikov-predstaviteli-donbassa-tkg-dolzhny-1589792191.html.
[xvi]
Volodymyr Petrov, “Demonstrators in Kyiv Protest Zelensky, Resist ‘Capitulation’
to Russia,” Kyiv Post, May 24, 2020, https://www.kyivpost.com/multimedia/photo/demonstrators-in-kyiv-protest-zelensky-resist-capitulation-to-russia-photos;
[“Protest Rally on Maidan Because of Zelensky’s Policy,”] Ukrainska Pravda, May
24, 2020, https://www.pravda.com(.)ua/rus/news/2020/05/24/7252956/.
[xvii]
[“Kyiv’s Delegation Refused to Discuss Ceasefire in Donbas,”] RIA Novosti, May
27, 2020, https://ria(.)ru/20200527/1572088156.html.
[xviii]
[“Kyiv’s Delegation Refused to Discuss Ceasefire in Donbas,”] RIA Novosti, May
27, 2020, https://ria(.)ru/20200527/1572088156.html ; [“Russia is Delaying the Start of the TCG Meeting-
media”] Espreso, May 27, 2020, https://espreso(.)tv/news/2020/05/27/rosiya_galmuye_pochatok_zasidannya_v_tkg_zmi.
[xix] [“The State Duma Introduces
the Ability to Maintain Foreign Citizenship Upon Receiving Russian
Citizenship,”] TASS, April 14, 2020, https://tass(.)ru/politika/8240117.
[xx] [“The State Duma Exempted
Residents of the DNR and LNR from Fee Upon Receiving Russian Citizenship,”]
TASS, April 17, 2020, https://tass(.)ru/obschestvo/8268559.
[xxi] [“The LNR and DNR Will
Create an Energy Concern ‘Donbas Energy,’”] Komsomolskaya Pravda, May 5, 2020, https://www.donetsk.kp(.)ru/online/news/3860737
[xxii] Ibid.
[xxiii]
The singular administrator operates to optimize rail transportation between the
LNR and the DNR and has monthly working meetings. Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in
Review: Putin Advances in Ukraine and Its Neighboring States,” The Institute
for the Study of War, October 15, 2019,
http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2019/10/russia-in-review-putin-advances-in.html
; [“Fighters from 'DNR' and 'LNR' Created a New Cross Border Concern,”] Lenta,
August 8, 2019,
https://lenta((.))ua/boeviki-iz-dnr-i-lnr-sozdali-novyy-transgranichnyy-kontsern-20873/;
[“‘DNR’ and ‘LNR’ Combined the Railways in the Concern ‘Railways of Donbass,’”]
Antikor, August 19, 2019, https://antikor(.)com.ua/articles/320311-dnr_i_lnr_objedinili_heleznye_dorogi_v_kontsern_heleznye_dorogi_donbassa.
[xxiv] The Kremlin
reportedly send the LNR and DNR more than 10 tanks, eight armored fighting
vehicles, up to 30 vehicles loaded with small arms ammunition and grenade
launchers, and heavy artillery ammunition. [“Daily Summary of the Press Service
of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on the Situation in the Area of the
Joint Forces Operation,”] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, May 12, 2020, https://www.mil.gov(.)ua/news/2020/05/12/shhodenne-zvedennya-pressluzhbi-minoboroni-ukraini-shhodo-obstanovki-v-rajoni-provedennya/ ; [“Daily Summary
of the Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on the Situation in
the Area of the Joint Forces Operation,”] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, May
19, 2020 https://www.mil.gov(.)ua/news/2020/05/19/shhodenne-zvedennya-pressluzhbi-minoboroni-ukraini-shhodo-obstanovki-v-rajoni-provedennya-operaczii-obednanih-sil/
[xxv]
[“Lavrov Declared the Unwillingness of Ukraine to discuss the Donbas Special Status,”]
RIA Novosti, May April 25, 2020, https://ria(.)ru/20200425/1570566688.html.