By Jennifer Cafarella
Key Takeaway:
Turkey’s President Erdogan is trying to coerce President Trump into shifting
American support from Kurdish forces toward Turkey’s proxies in Syria, which
include al Qaeda-linked elements. Erdogan may launch a new ground operation
into Syria in order to create ground realities that could force the U.S. to
reconsider his demands.
Erdogan may open a new front line in
his campaign against America’s primary anti-ISIS partner in Syria, the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), in coming days. Erdogan seeks to coerce President
Trump into accepting Turkey and Turkish-backed opposition groups as alternative
ground partners to the SDF in the fight against ISIS. The YPG dominates the SDF
and is the Syrian branch of the Turkish Kurdistan
Worker’s Party (PKK), which is waging an active
insurgency against the Turkish state. Erdogan views the YPG’s ascendancy in
northern Syria as his primary national security threat. Erdogan has signaled
that he will launch a cross-border operation to seize the Syrian border town of
Tel Abyad, north of Raqqa City. Turkish forces are shelling the town and local
sources indicate that Turkish warplanes are flying
sorties above it, although without dropping
munitions thus far. Unconfirmed reports also indicate Turkish-backed opposition
groups may be amassing for an offensive. Erdogan may launch the operation
before his upcoming meeting with President Trump in Washington on May 16-17.
Erdogan’s plan is to siphon Syrian
Arab support away from the SDF, which would block America’s planned Raqqa
operation. Tel Abyad is an Arab-majority town currently under military control
by the Syrian Kurdish (YPG). An operation against Tel Abyad, if it occurs,
would open a fissure between Arabs and the YPG in northern Syria that could be
sufficient to neutralize the SDF as a reliable American partner force for the
Raqqa operation. Turkey likely also intends to undermine Arab support for the
SDF’s larger governance project in northeastern Syria by providing an option
for independent Arab governance outside YPG control.
Erdogan has been threatening an
operation in Tel Abyad for some time. Erdogan had proposed an alternative approach
to the US plan to seize Raqqa City in interviews
and in meetings
with U.S. officials in February and March 2017. Erdogan offered to use Turkish
troops and allied opposition fighters to create a 12-mile wide corridor from Tel
Abyad to Raqqa City. The US was reportedly unsatisfied with the proposal, which
offered to commit
only 3,000 Turkish soldiers. The Turks reportedly claimed to be able to field 10,000
Turkish-trained opposition forces, but those numbers have not materialized. The
U.S. rejection did not change Erdogan’s commitment to block the Raqqa
operation, however. Erdogan warned on April 3, 2017 that he intended to launch
“new surprises” targeting ISIS, the PKK, and the YPG. Turkey recently tested
America’s resolve to defend the YPG in eastern Syria. Turkey launched
airstrikes against YPG headquarters in eastern Syria and YPG proxy fighters in
northern Iraq on April 25, 2017. The U.S. condemned the strike but did not take
action in response.
Erdogan may use an operation against
Tel Abyad to demonstrate his ability to rally Arab tribal support in order to
force the U.S. to reconsider. Turkey convened 50 Sunni Arab tribal leaders from
eastern Syria in the Turkish town of Sanliurfa, north of Tel Abyad, in mid-March
to discuss resistance against the YPG. Turkey formed a new Syrian Arab military
force named the “Eastern
Shield Army” on April 19, likely drawing from
the tribes represented at the summit in Sanliurfa. The group includes members
from the al-Nai’m
tribe, which operates near Tel Abyad, in addition to rebel
fighters linked to al Qaeda that operated in eastern Syria before the rise of
ISIS in late 2014. The group’s influence reportedly
extends through Raqqa and into Deir ez Zour Province, although the size of its
fighting force remains unclear. Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik stated
on April 21 that continued cooperation between the U.S. and
the Syrian Kurdish YPG threatens
to create “long-term instability” between Arabs and Kurds,
signaling Turkey’s intent to exploit Arab discontent with YPG domination in
northern Syria.
An operation against Tel Abyad would
mark the start of a second phase in Turkey’s military intervention in Syria and
its first major ground operation directly against the YPG. Turkey began its
intervention in August 2016. It first seized
the Syrian border town of Jarablus, west of Tel Abyad, from the Islamic State
of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) on August 26, 2016 using a similar partnered rebel
force. Turkey then cleared the remainder of the ISIS-held Syrian-Turkish border
and pushed south to recapture
the ISIS-held town of al Bab on February 23. Turkey had only limited success
gaining U.S. support for its operations and has not managed to weaken America’s
commitment to the SDF. The U.S. provided intermittent support to Turkey’s
operations against ISIS but blocked Turkey’s move to attack the SDF near al
Bab. Erdogan’s resolve to prevent the SDF from taking Raqqa City has not
diminished. President Trump congratulated
Erdogan for his victory in the Turkish referendum earlier
this month, which may have emboldened Erdogan to start a new phase of his
Syrian campaign. Erdogan reciprocated
on April 28, stating “I believe that we will open a fresh
page with Trump” in a conference in Istanbul.
Turkey’s
alternative plan for Raqqa is unacceptable even if Turkey secures large-scale
Arab buy in. The Syrian opposition forces that Turkey is using to support its
operations include elements linked to al Qaeda, such as Ahrar al Sharqiya.
Turkey will likely also use the Salafi jihadi group – and al Qaeda ally – Ahrar
al Sham, which has messaged its willingness
to participate alongside Turkey in operations to
seize Raqqa. Turkey previously used
Ahrar al Sham as a logistical backbone for the first phase
of the Euphrates Shield operations in northern Aleppo. The form of governance
that Turkey is emplacing in its de facto safe zone is meanwhile antithetical to
U.S. objectives. Turkey is allowing groups like Ahrar al Sham to implement
social control, for example imprisoning members
of a local governing council.
The US cannot allow groups like Ahrar al Sham to dominate governance in a
post-ISIS Raqqa because it would create a permissive environment for al Qaeda
in the long term. The U.S. must contain the escalating Turkish-YPG war, and
should accept delays in the timeframe for the Raqqa operation in order to do
so. Defeating ISIS must remain a priority, but the U.S. risks producing more
dangerous futures by rushing into clearing operations in Raqqa under current
conditions. The possible dangerous outcomes of a Raqqa operation on current
trajectory include a failure to recapture the city due to a war between Turkey
and allied Arabs and the YPG or an al-Qaeda rise to power in Raqqa after its
recapture from ISIS.