By Genevieve Casagrande
Key Takeaway: The
cessation of hostilities agreement in Syria has collapsed and violence has once
again ramped up across Syria. The nationwide ceasefire brokered by Russia and
the U.S. on September 9 stipulated that after at least seven days of reduced
violence and uninterrupted humanitarian access across Syria, the U.S. and
Russia would establish a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) to coordinate
strikes against ISIS and al Qaeda. The ceasefire, although short-lived, was
ultimately a success for the Syrian regime and Russia. Both parties utilized
the cessation in order to consolidate recent gains in Aleppo City and to
redeploy military assets to other critical frontlines in likely preparation for
upcoming offensives. Russian and regime airstrikes escalated against opposition
forces in Aleppo and Idlib Provinces in the 48-hours prior to the cessation of
hostilities going into effect on September 12. Russia subsequently pivoted its
strikes towards ISIS-held terrain in Eastern Syria throughout the tenuous
ceasefire with the opposition, but began to break the terms of the ceasefire and
intensify strikes against opposition targets in Homs Province on September 16 –
17. Reported Russian airstrikes targeting a UN humanitarian aid convoy on
September 19 marked a dangerous phase line in the willingness of Russia and the
Syrian regime to violate international law and deny besieged opposition-held
areas humanitarian aid. Hardline elements of the Syrian opposition meanwhile
continued to use the failed ceasefire to increase their own influence among
mainstream opposition factions, undermining efforts by the U.S. to compel
independent opposition groups to distance themselves from al Qaeda and ISIS in
Syria. Both Russia and the Syrian regime will continue to use subsequent
ceasefires to solidify gains against the Syrian opposition in Aleppo City and
to employ siege-and-starve tactics to force the defeat of the opposition in
critical terrain. Russia will continue to exert pressure on the U.S. and the
international community by escalating levels of violence in order to extract
concessions in negotiations over the Syrian Civil War.
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The preceding graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
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Introduction
The General Command of the Syrian
Arab Army declared
an end to the seven-day ceasefire on September 19 as violence by all
parties escalated in Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs Provinces. Russian airstrikes
on a UN humanitarian aid convoy only hours after the Syrian regime’s
declaration of the end of the cessation represented a dangerous escalatory step
in the pro-regime willingness to violate international law and deny aid to
besieged opposition-held areas in Syria. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has
nonetheless continued to reiterate that the “ceasefire
is not dead,” despite its near-constant
violations and the Syrian regime’s denial of humanitarian aid to besieged
populations throughout the country. Members of the International Syria Support
Group (ISSG) similarly agreed on September 20 to “pursue” a ceasefire
based upon the terms of the U.S.-Russia deal announced on September 9.
Pro-regime airstrikes have meanwhile escalated across the country, resulting in
over 38 deaths in Aleppo Province
on September 18 - 19 alone.
The U.S. and Russia announced the
resumption of a nationwide ‘cessation of hostilities’ in Syria on September
9. The agreement stipulated that after at least seven consecutive days of
“reduced violence” and unimpeded humanitarian aid deliveries beginning on
September 12, the U.S. would establish a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) in
order to coordinate U.S. and Russian airstrikes against al Qaeda and ISIS in
Syria. The deal required Russia to ensure the regime’s adherence to its terms
to include the prevention of regime warplanes from conducting air operations in
areas where “the legitimate opposition” or “[Jabhat] al Nusra” is present as
designated by maps drawn up during technical meetings between Russia and the
United States. The full terms of the agreement were not publically disclosed, but
the U.S. reportedly shared the text of
the deal to designated “partners” after considerable pressure from France
and Russia. The deal nonetheless lacked the necessary enforcement mechanisms or
consequences to ceasefire violations to prevent pro-regime forces and Salafi-Jihadist
groups from spoiling the cessation of hostilities.
Russian and the Regime
Violations
Russian and the Syrian regime amplified their air campaigns against the
Syrian opposition in the 48-hours prior to the ceasefire deal going into affect
on September 12. The Russian air campaign subsequently pivoted to primarily
target ISIS in eastern Syria after the onset of the cessation of hostilities. Pro-regime
forces meanwhile continued operations against remaining opposition-held pockets
in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus and the northern Homs countryside;
Russian airstrikes notably began to escalate against opposition-held areas in
northern Homs from September 16 - 17 in violation of the agreement. Pro-regime
forces will likely try to consolidate control over the central corridor to
include the collapsed opposition-held pockets near the regime strongholds of
Damascus and Homs cities over the coming months.
Pro-regime airstrikes on a UN
humanitarian convoy in western Aleppo Province just hours after the regime’s
declared end to the ceasefire marked a dramatic escalation in efforts to deny
humanitarian aid deliveries in opposition-held terrain. The targeted strike
violated both international law and the terms of the ceasefire brokered by the
U.S. and Russia. It killed
an estimated 20 civilians and at least one aid
worker while destroying 18 trucks destined for opposition-held areas of
western Aleppo Province. The UN subsequently announced the suspension of all
humanitarian aid convoys into Syria. Deputy National Security Adviser Ben
Rhodes stated on September 20 that the U.S.
holds “the Russian government accountable” for the airstrikes against the
aid convoy. Rhodes did not specify if the strike was carried out by the Syrian
regime or Russia, but unidentified U.S. officials reported that preliminary
analysis of the strike indicated two
Russian aircraft carried out the attack. Russia likely seeks
to use the escalating levels of violence to constrain the U.S. and the international
community into increasing the threshold for acceptable levels of violence in
Syria in order to allow the Syrian regime to pursue victory over the Syrian
opposition in northwestern Syria.
Russia had already exerted its
own control over the flow of humanitarian aid into Aleppo at the time of the
strike, however. The UN ultimately remained unable to deliver humanitarian aid
to the estimated 300,000 civilians in Eastern Aleppo City throughout the
cessation, despite the deal’s requirement for unhindered humanitarian aid
deliveries to Aleppo. Russian forces deployed a “mobile
observation post” at the entrance to Aleppo City along the Castello Road on
September 13, which was the primary supply route into opposition-held areas of eastern
Aleppo City before pro-regime forces severed it in late July 2016. Pro-regime
forces temporarily withdrew from their positions along the road to transfer
control of the critical supply route to Russian forces on September 15, but
ultimately returned to their positions along Castello after opposition forces
refused to withdraw. There was little indication, however, that the Russian
forces withdrew from the supply route. The movement of Russian personnel to Castello
Road allowed Russia and the regime to block humanitarian aid deliveries to
Aleppo City in support of the Assad regime’s siege-and-starve tactics to force
the surrender of the opposition in Aleppo under a crippling siege. Russia
agreed to the cessation of hostilities deal only after pro-regime forces with
considerable Russian air support were able to
reestablish the siege on Aleppo City on September 4, essentially freezing
frontlines with the opposition in the city. The ceasefire allowed the regime
and Russia to reset operations in Aleppo in order to consolidate these recent
gains, while the Syrian opposition remains constrained by the ceasefire and
unable to launch a counteroffensive.
Operational Reset
The Syrian regime and Russia used
the cessation of hostilities to shift military assets to frontlines with ISIS. Russia allegedly deployed
four Mi-28 ‘Havoc’ attack helicopters, a transport helicopter, and a contingent
of fifty special operations forces to the Shayrat Airbase near Homs City on
September 18, according to local activists. Russia has used prior ceasefire
agreements to redeploy additional military assets to key frontlines within Syria,
including a deployment of attack helicopters to the Shayrat Airbase in the wake
of the original ‘cessation of hostilities’ brokered in February 2016. Pro-regime
forces exploited the dynamic rotary
wing strikes to retake
the city of Palmyra from ISIS in central Homs in March 2016 during the previous
nationwide ceasefire. Russia and the Syrian regime likely sought to similarly
use this period of cessation to divert resources away from previously active
frontlines with the opposition to clear remaining ISIS-held terrain threatening
the regime-held city of Palmyra and the remaining regime-held areas of Deir ez
Zour City.
Russian airstrikes during the
cessation of hostilities primarily concentrated against ISIS-held areas in Deir
ez Zour Province amidst a pro-regime offensive in the area. However, these
operations were disrupted by reported U.S.-led coalition airstrikes on
pro-regime forces in Deir ez Zour on September 17 that accidentally killed at
least sixty-two pro-regime fighters. U.S. CENTCOM released a statement
confirming that coalition aircraft may have “mistakenly struck” pro-regime
forces while conducting operations against ISIS near Deir ez-Zour City,
stressing that the coalition would not “intentionally strike” a known regime
position. The Russian Ministry of Defense blamed the incident on the “stubborn
refusal” of the U.S. to coordinate its air operations with Russia in Syria,
exerting additional pressure on the U.S. to partner with Russia amidst escalating
hostilities with opposition forces in western Syria.
Syrian Opposition and the Ceasefire
The failed attempt at a ceasefire
ultimately risks driving the remaining “legitimate” members of the opposition
towards hardline groups and fueling anti-U.S. sentiment. Twenty-one
"FSA-affiliated" opposition factions and prominent Salafi-Jihadist
group Ahrar al Sham released joint
statements on September 12 agreeing to allow humanitarian aid into besieged
areas in Syria. The groups also expressed considerable reservations about the
lack of enforcement mechanisms to prevent indiscriminate pro-regime aerial bombardment
and rejected the “targeting of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham or any other faction that
fights against the regime.” The joint statement represented tentative support
for a general ceasefire in Syria, but a sharp condemnation of the current terms
of the nationwide ‘cessation of hostilities’ brokered by the U.S. and Russia. Hardline
elements of the opposition such as Jabhat Fatah Al Sham (JFS) – successor of al
Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra -- have used the failed ceasefire to
increase their own influence within opposition ranks in Syria. JFS Emir Abu
Mohammad al-Joulani condemned the U.S.- and Russian-brokered nationwide
ceasefire on September 17. He stressed that the deal between the two countries
aims to impose a “political solution that would result in the complete surrender.
Continued failures of the United States to bring about a functioning ceasefire
to Syria will ultimately drive the long term staying power of hardline groups
like JFS in Syria as anti-U.S. sentiment grows. The U.S. risks driving these
“legitimate” groups closer to al Qaeda in Syria, rather than forcing these
groups to distance themselves from hardline, Salafi-Jihadist groups.
Conclusion
The U.S. cannot accept a
partnership with Russia in Syria so long as it continues to function as a
belligerent actor in the conflict. Russia will continue to pursue its vital
interests in Syria to include the preservation of the Assad regime and will
continue to prioritize the defeat of the Syrian opposition, which remains the
Syrian regime’s primary adversary. Russia and the regime will therefore pursue
a strategy to remove mainstream opposition forces from the battlefield either
through their submission, destruction, or the transformation of these groups into
radical elements that can be rightfully targeted as terrorists. Russia is
purposefully driving this radicalization through its deliberate targeting of
civilian and humanitarian infrastructure. Russia will pursue an escalatory path
in Syria that will constrain the U.S. and the international community into
accepting certain levels of violence in exchange for a U.S.-Russia deal that
will discourage Russia from escalating further. The U.S. must develop
appropriate enforcement mechanisms to ensure both pro-regime forces and opposition
groups adhere to the terms of any potential ceasefire in Syria and cannot rely
upon Russia to ensure compliance with international law, let alone ceasefires.