Turkish Elections Empower Erdogan to Continue Support for Syrian Rebels

By Christopher Kozak and Katie Menoche 

Key Take-away: Turkish President Recep Erdogan reinforced his hold on political power with a key victory in early parliamentary elections held on November 1. The AKP’s dramatic victory likely reflects the Turkish electorate’s desire to return to political stability following several months of uncertainty and violence. The election of a stable AKP-led government will allow Erdogan to maintain and possibly intensify Turkey’s financial and military support to Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan reinforced his hold on political power with a key victory in early parliamentary elections held on November 1. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 316 out of 550 seats in the Turkish National Assembly and comfortably regained a majority after suffering significant losses in the June 2015 Turkish elections. The AKP’s gains came at the direct expense of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Both parties lost seats previously gained in the June elections. The HDP barely surpassed the 10% electoral threshold required to win seats in the Turkish Parliament. The AKP did not win the 330 seats required to call a constitutional referendum to expand President Erdogan’s executive powers. Nevertheless, the AKP now holds a solid mandate to form a single-party government. This leeway will enable Erdogan to pursue his own foreign, domestic, and military agenda with minimal opposition.

The AKP’s dramatic victory likely reflects the Turkish electorate’s desire to return to political stability following several months of uncertainty and violence. The AKP lost its thirteen-year-long parliamentary majority in June. Subsequent negotiations to form a coalition government failed amidst political deadlock. Turkey also faced mounting domestic threats between June and November 2015. ISIS-linked militants conducted suicide attacks against pro-Kurdish rallies in the southern town of Suruc on July 20 and the Turkish capital of Ankara on October 10. ISIS also released a Turkish-language statement warning of a “penalty” for Turkish democracy immediately prior to the elections. Meanwhile, tensions between the Turkish government and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) escalated into open conflict during July and August. The resumption of hostilities ended a two-year-long ceasefire and froze ongoing peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the PKK. The violence stemmed in part from allegations that Erdogan had allowed ISIS and other Salafi-jihadist groups to operate in Turkey in order to counteract Kurdish expansionism.

Erdogan leveraged – and by some accounts, exacerbated – these security threats in order to persuade Turkish voters that the AKP presented the only option for national stability. The AKP adopted an aggressive posture against both ISIS and the PKK in the aftermath of the bombing in Suruc. Turkey began an air campaign against PKK positions in northern Iraq on July 24. Turkey later opened the strategic Incirlik Airbase to the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition on July 29. Turkish security forces also detained hundreds of suspected ISIS and PKK affiliates in raids throughout the country between July and October. Erdogan and other senior AKP officials later intensified their rhetoric against the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as the YPG gained ground against ISIS in northern Syria. Turkish warplanes most recently conducted at least two airstrikes against suspected YPG positions on October 24-25. Erdogan’s harsh stance against the PKK and other Kurdish militant groups attracted nationalist MHP voters towards the AKP. Renewed conflict with the PKK simultaneously undercut popular support for the pro-Kurdish HDP.

The election of a stable AKP-led government will allow Erdogan to maintain his current policies in support of Syrian rebels fighting the Assad regime. Several Turkish opposition parties had advocated for political talks with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The prospect of a coalition government thus opened space for a policy reversal that might have included cooperation with Russia on the terms of a political transition in Syria. The AKP’s decisive victory precludes this realignment and may allow Erdogan to increase support to select Syrian rebel factions in order to counteract Russia and Iran’s deepening intervention in Syria. Several prominent Syrian opposition groups congratulated the AKP on its success in a joint statement, highlighting the importance of Erdogan’s policies to the Syrian opposition.

The continuity of the Turkish government also ensures the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition’s continued access to important military bases in southern Turkey. Deepening cooperation between the U.S. and Syrian Kurds as the primary ground partner in the anti-ISIS campaign will likely spur increased tension between the U.S. and Turkey. Erdogan may nonetheless seek to demonstrate progress on his election promises of security and stability by pursuing de-escalation with the Kurds. Turkey remains likely to enforce its pre-existing ‘red lines’ on YPG expansion in Syria while pressuring the U.S. to intensify its support for the Syrian opposition rather than the Kurds.