UA-69458566-1

Saturday, September 2, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2023

Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 2, 2023, 5:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[1] Russian milbloggers who have recently maintained that Russian forces hold positions in the southern part of Robotyne claimed that Russian forces withdrew from the southern outskirts of the settlement to unspecified positions further south.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on September 1 that Ukrainian forces have overcome the Russian “first line of defense” in some areas of the Zaporizhia direction, but that the situation remains difficult due to additional Russian concrete fortifications and dense minefields.[3]

The New York Times reported on September 2 citing Ukrainian military personnel that Russian forces are spreading inflammable agents on mined fields and igniting them with drone-launched grenades while Ukrainian forces clear mines from the areas in an effort to hinder Ukrainian mine clearing efforts that have allowed Ukrainian forces to advance in certain areas.[4] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Commander Colonel Margo Grosberg reported on September 1 that Ukrainian artillery capabilities are “equal or even better” than those of Russian forces and have been able to push Russian artillery units back from the frontline, preventing them from supporting Russian forces.[5] This observation is not universally true across the frontline, as Ukrainian units regularly report coming under heavy Russian artillery fire corrected by Russian drones. Grosberg also stated that Ukrainian forces have been successful at severely damaging Russian artillery radars since July.[6] Russian sources have repeatedly expressed concerns since mid-July over the lack of Russian counterbattery artillery capabilities, particularly in southern Ukraine.[7]

Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Popov has maintained contact with his former subordinates in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and a Russian insider source claimed that these officers turned to Popov for help instead of their new commander.[8] The Russian military command dismissed Popov as the commander of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) in early July after he engaged in clear insubordination by attempting to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about poor counterbattery capabilities, heavy losses, and a lack of rotations directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[9] Russian sources have routinely expressed concern about the issues that Popov highlighted and their detrimental impacts on the Russian defensive effort in southern Ukraine.[10] Popov partially established a precedent for insubordination, and his conduct reportedly prompted the Russian military command to begin removing similarly insubordinate commanders from frontline units, although not all reports of commanders removed were confirmed.[11] Russian sources claimed that Popov encouraged his former subordinates to report the truth about the front to the higher Russian command, possibly encouraging them to replicate his insubordination.[12] Popov’s contact with his former subordinates, if true, suggests that Popov’s replacement has not won the trust of his subordinates either because he is less competent or because he is less forthright with senior Russian leadership about continuing challenges facing the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia.

The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues. Director of the Russian think tank the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Valery Garbuzov, published an article on August 29 criticizing Russian ruling elites who, he argues, have created and perpetuated a series of “utopian myths” about Russian hegemony, the “crisis of capitalism,” and Russia’s claimed leadership of a global anti-Western coalition.[13] Prominent voices within the Russian ultranationalist information space levied largely coherent criticisms against Garbuzov’s article on September 2, criticizing Garbuzov’s argument and the Russian political and informational structures that allowed Garbuzov to hold a prominent position in the Russian political sphere.[14] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Telegram channels have filled an analytical gap in the Russian information space following the onset of the war in Ukraine that think tanks should fill and continue to do so 18 months later.[15]

Prominent Russian milbloggers likely have a monetary incentive to regularly report information about the war in Ukraine that is uncritical of Russian authorities. BBC reported on September 1 that prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that they can make between about 48,000 and 188,000 rubles (about $500 to 1,950) per advertisement on their Telegram channels.[16] BBC reported that an advertising agent working with Wagner-affiliated channels claimed that a prominent Wagner Group-affiliated source made around 31,500 rubles (about $330) per advertisement.[17] The advertising agent told BBC that several employees of RIA FAN, a now-shuttered media outlet affiliated with former Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, received only about 10,500 to 21,800 rubles (about $108 to $226) per advertisement due to their lower subscriber count.[18] BBC noted that Russia’s average monthly salary is about 66,000 rubles (about $685). Prominent milbloggers’ monthly salaries are thus likely much higher than the Russian average. Russian milbloggers are likely economically incentivized to maintain and grow audiences through war reporting that is uncritical of Russian authorities, as criticism of the Russian authorities, resistance to attempted censorship, and potential legal problems could lead to a decrease in advertisements, although milbloggers who present themselves as telling unpleasant truths can also gain large followings. Alexander “Sasha” Kots, a prominent milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin’s Human Rights Council, claimed that milbloggers have a “direct channel to privately communicate information” to the Russian MoD.[19]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2.
  • Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline.
  • The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 2.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along at least one sector of the front on September 2 and advanced near Bakhmut, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) has formed its own Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units, elements of which reportedly operate both on the front line and in far rear areas of occupied Ukraine.
  • Russian and occupation authorities are encouraging residents of occupied Ukraine who are residing in Russia to vote in the occupation regional elections, likely to increase voter turnout and the perception of electoral legitimacy.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on September 2 and recently advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 1 and 2 shows that Russian forces advanced south of Vilshana (14km northeast of Kupyansk) and southeast of Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured several Ukrainian positions north of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), west of Svatove toward the Oskil River, and near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk).[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoyehorivka and Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove).[22] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on September 1 that Russian forces continue unsuccessful attempts to advance in the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna).[23] Footage published on September 2 purportedly shows elements of the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating along the Svatove-Kreminna line, elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People‘s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) operating near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and artillery elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR Army Corps) operating in the Lysychansk direction.[24]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks south of Kreminna near Dibrova (7km southwest) and Hryhorivka (11km south) on September 2.[25]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 2 and advanced. Geolocated footage published on September 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced near Klishchiivka, although these gains are likely not recent.[26] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on September 1 that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes near Kurdyumivka, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka (all 7-13km southwest of Bakhmut), which Malyar characterized as the center of hostilities in the Bakhmut direction.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian assault groups unsuccessfully attacked near Bakhmut.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked along the Klishchiivka-Andriivka-Kurdyumivka line.[29]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 2 and reportedly advanced.  Russian sources claimed on September 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced near Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Kurdyumivka.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 2 that Russian forces counterattacked near Klishchiivka and Kurdyumivka and that elements of the Russian 4th Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps) are operating near Klishchiivka.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kurdyumivka, and Malyar stated on September 1 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked on the northern flank of Bakhmut.[32]

 

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) on September 2.[33]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not advance on September 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Novomykhailivka and Marinka.[35]



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed on September 2 that fighting is ongoing in western Donetsk Oblast amid evidence of further Ukrainian gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains north of Pavlivka (30km southwest of Donetsk City), although these gains are likely not recent.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are ongoing battles near Shevchenko (35km southwest of Donetsk City) and noted that the settlement is an important Russian logistics hub in the area.[37]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited unsuccessful offensive operations along the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 2. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[38] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified the shelling of Russian positions along the Staromayorske-Pryyutne line.[39] The New York Times reported that Ukrainian personnel fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area stated that Russian forces are deploying reinforcements to this sector of the front due to concerns about further Ukrainian advances.[40] The New York Times also reported that Russian forces have established defensive positions along the T0518 (Velyka Novosilka to Nikolske) highway and are constantly surveilling the section of the highway closer to the frontline with drones.[41]

 

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 2 and reportedly advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian assaults near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[43] Russian milbloggers who have previously maintained that Russian forces hold positions in the southern part of Robotyne claimed that Russian forces withdrew from the southern outskirts of the settlement to unspecified positions further south.[44] Another milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in forest areas south of Robotyne.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions east of Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv) and that fighting is ongoing between Novoprokopivka and Verbove.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to attack Russian defensive positions near Verbove and that there is ongoing fighting in fields west of the settlement.[47]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces counterattacked in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 2 but did not specify an outcome.  A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a series of counterattacks southwest and south of Robotyne.[48]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to target Russian rear areas and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and occupied Crimea on September 1 and 2. Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted an unspecified Ukrainian projectile targeting Berdyansk.[49] Ukrainian Berdyansk City Military Administration Head Viktoriia Halistyna stated that residents reported a large explosion in Berdyansk.[50] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that two explosions occurred near a Russian military base in Kyrylivka (50km south of Melitopol) on September 1.[51] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces destroyed three Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea that were allegedly targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge on the night of September 1 to 2.[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast as of September 2. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces hold limited positions between Kozachi Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City) and Pidstepne (13km east of Kherson City).[53] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces fired on Ukrainian groups that tried to replenish a Ukrainian grouping on the left bank near the Antonivsky bridge on September 1.[54]


Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) has formed its own Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units, elements of which reportedly operate both on the front line and in far rear areas of occupied Ukraine. Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported on September 2 that the DNR formed its own branch of Rosgvardia based on the Russian “Vostok” Battalion, a DNR formation that currently operates near Novodonetske and Novomayorske in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[55] RIA Novosti reported that the DNR Rosgvardia’s main strike force is made up of special rapid response (SOBR) forces, currently roughly a motorized rifle platoon, and is training in an unspecified Russian rear area.[56] The formation of a dedicated Rosgvardia branch to assist with security in occupied Ukraine may free up some conventional Russian or DNR units and allow them to deploy to the front line, although not enough to matter at the reported scale. DNR officials may also recruit for Rosgvardia under the premise of operating in deep rear areas and later deploy these units to the frontline anyway.


Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian and occupation authorities are encouraging residents of occupied Ukraine who are residing in Russia to vote in the occupation regional elections, likely to increase voter turnout and the perception of electoral legitimacy. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration published a list of polling stations in over 45 Russian federal subjects for displaced Ukrainians to vote for the occupation regional elections.[57]

Russian authorities continue targeting Ukrainian civilians, including medically fragile civilians, for forcible deportation to Russia. Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova stated on September 2 that she invited disabled young adults in occupied Kherson Oblast to live at an assisted living facility in Penza Oblast.[58] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities have detained over 1,000 Ukrainian civilians in southern Ukraine since the start of 2023 and currently hold these Ukrainians in filtration camps without trial or investigation.[59]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported on September 2 that the first Russian tactical nuclear weapons recently arrived in Belarus. Budanov stated that the risk of Russian forces using nuclear weapons from Belarusian territory is “zero.”[60] Budanov reported that Russian forces transferred an unspecified number of tactical nuclear warheads for Tochka-U missiles as well as for Su-24m aircraft to Belarusian forces.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko relieved Major General Valery Gnilozub from his post as Belarusian Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Combat Control due to his retirement on September 1.[61]

The Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) continued the “Combat Brotherhood 2023” operational-strategic command staff exercises in Belarus on September 2.[62]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[3] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/01/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-garyachi-boyi-na-pivdni-krayiny-ukrayinski-pidrozdily-prosuvayutsya-vpered-ganna-malyar/

[5] https://www.err dot ee/1609085522/grosberg-ukraina-on-pannud-lounarindel-vene-vaed-surve-alla ; https://news.err dot ee/1609085732/intelligence-chief-ukraine-has-put-russian-troops-under-pressure-in-south

[6] https://www.err dot ee/1609085522/grosberg-ukraina-on-pannud-lounarindel-vene-vaed-surve-alla ; https://news.err dot ee/1609085732/intelligence-chief-ukraine-has-put-russian-troops-under-pressure-in-south

[13] https://www.ng dot ru/ideas/2023-08-29/7_8812_illusions.html

[23] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/01/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-garyachi-boyi-na-pivdni-krayiny-ukrayinski-pidrozdily-prosuvayutsya-vpered-ganna-malyar/

[27] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/01/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-garyachi-boyi-na-pivdni-krayiny-ukrayinski-pidrozdily-prosuvayutsya-vpered-ganna-malyar/

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02st4xiFpobCFwmxKEdDhkg3GTvtUdQQ6QC1sQKYh2SdqKoC9zy6GifpYARjhueeSil ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/01/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-garyachi-boyi-na-pivdni-krayiny-ukrayinski-pidrozdily-prosuvayutsya-vpered-ganna-malyar/

[55] https://ria dot ru/20230902/svo-1893650406.html

[56] https://ria dot ru/20230902/svo-1893650406.html

[59] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/vid-pochatku-roku-na-pivdni-zatrymaly-ponad-tysyachu-ukrayintsiv/

[60] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/u-hlobalnii-hri-rosiia-vzhe-ne-hraie-hraiut-neiu-kyrylo-budanov.html ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/02/kyrylo-budanov-u-globalnij-gri-rosiya-vzhe-ne-graye-%e2%80%95-grayut-neyu/ ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/u-hlobalnii-hri-rosiia-vzhe-ne-hraie-hraiut-neiu-kyrylo-budanov.html

[61] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/valeriy-gnilozub-osvobozhden-ot-dolzhnosti-zamnachalnika-genshtaba-vooruzhennyh-sil-po-boevomu-upravleniyu; https://www.belta dot by/president/view/valerij-gnilozub-osvobozhden-ot-dolzhnosti-zamnachalnika-genshtaba-vs-po-boevomu-upravleniju-585814-2023/

Friday, September 1, 2023

Iran Update, September 1, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched an interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

  1. Iran and the Syrian regime are exploiting instability in eastern Syria to pose a greater threat to US forces there.
  2. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) trained Russian forces in Syria to operate Iranian-made drones.
  3. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed anti-Israel operations with leaders from the Axis of Resistance in Beirut.
  4. The Ebrahim Raisi administration is continuing to set conditions to resume nuclear negotiations with the West to achieve a comprehensive deal.

 

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iran and the Syrian regime are exploiting instability in eastern Syria to pose a greater threat to US forces there. Intense fighting between local tribes and the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has erupted and escalated significantly since August 27.[1] Iran and the Syrian regime are using the current security situation to create an increasingly hostile operating environment for US forces, which is consistent with their campaign to expel the United States from Syria.[2]

  • The SDF arrested Ahmed Abu Khawla—the Deir ez Zor Military Council (DMC) commander—on August 27 and began moving reinforcements into Deir ez Zor Province on the same day.[3] The arrest spurred major clashes between the SDF and DMC as well as local tribes. Both sides have suffered dozens of casualties in the fighting, making these clashes deadlier and more significant than the previous SDF-DMC fighting in July 2023.
  • Iranian-backed militias deployed short- and medium-range rockets along the Euphrates River in Mayadin City according to an August 31 report.[4] Rocket launcher experts from Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon deployed to the location of the rocket launchers.[5] Local Syrian opposition media reported that the militias are preparing to attack US forces stationed nearby at the Green Village and Mission Support Site Conoco and blame the attack on tribesmen clashing with the SDF.[6] Iranian-backed forces have previously conducted rocket attacks on US forces in Deir ez Zor Province in 2023.[7]
  • CTP previously reported that pro-Syrian regime forces, including Iranian-backed militants, are deploying to SDF-controlled territory to conduct assassinations and sabotage and fuel tribal tensions. Syrian Air Force intelligence, for instance, deployed to Dhiban in SDF-held territory on August 31.[8] Tribal forces and the SDF have been fighting over Dhiban for several days using drones, mortars, and small arms.[9] The SDF separately arrested Iranian-affiliated forces on August 31 for intimidating locals across the river from Deir ez Zor City.[10]
  • Pro-regime forces, including Iranian-backed elements, are trying to give local tribes medical aid and weapons, which could sustain further fighting. Iranian-backed militias offered medical treatment to injured tribesmen affiliated with the tribal forces fighting the SDF.[11] Syrian regime forces are sending weapons into SDF-held territory through several river crossings as well.[12]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) trained Russian forces in Syria to operate Iranian-made drones on August 31. The Russian forces trained on the Ababil-3 multirole and Qasef-1 combat drones at the Palmyra Military Airport in Central Syria, where Iranian-backed militias and Russian forces are stationed.[13] Local Syrian opposition media reported that the Russian forces have a special site for LH Unit 127—a drone production and intelligence collection unit—to assemble, test, and train forces on drones.[14] The IRGC could have used this opportunity to showcase Iranian drones to Russian officers, as the Kremlin continues to seek Iranian-made drones for use in Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that Russia seeks to retain Iran as a long-term strategic defense partner.[15]

Russian forces could use the drones to offset their force reduction in Syria since the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is periodically engaged in conflict with rebels in northwestern Syria, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the jihadist group that controls the territory.[16]

Russia employs Iranian-made drones, notably the Shahed-131- and 136 drones for striking rear areas in Ukraine.[17] The Qasef-1 has a range of 150 kilometers, and Russian forces could use it to strike areas along the front line, given their frequent use of ZALA Lancet and FPV drones.[18]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed anti-Israel operations with leaders from the Axis of Resistance in Beirut on September 1. Abdollahian met with Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah, and Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri.[19] Abdollahian reiterated common Iranian talking points during the meetings, calling for unity among Palestinian militias and expressing support for militancy in the West Bank. Abdollahian’s visit to Beirut comes amid a spike in inflammatory rhetoric between Israeli and Palestinian militant officials.[20]

Abdollahian’s rhetoric is consistent with the messaging from other Iranian leaders in recent months. Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have regularly called for further arming Palestinian militias in the West Bank since August 2022.[21] Khamenei also called for unity among Palestinian militias and strengthening militancy in the West Bank in meetings with senior Hamas and PIJ officials in Tehran in in June 2023.[22]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

The Ebrahim Raisi administration is continuing to set conditions to resume nuclear negotiations with the West to achieve a comprehensive deal. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian announced on September 1 that Oman will facilitate nuclear negotiations.[23] These remarks follow several Raisi administration officials, including President Raisi, indicating that they will pursue negotiations on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly that begins in New York City on September 5.[24] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei endorsed such negotiations during a meeting with Raisi administration officials on August 30, as CTP previously reported.[25] Future negotiations between Iran and the West would follow Iran and the United States reaching a prisoner-exchange agreement on August 10, as part of a broader understanding between both parties.[26] The United States and Iran previously reached a confidence-building interim agreement in 2013 to facilitate further the negotiations that would yield the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015.[27]



[4] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/09/01/9567

[5] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/09/01/9567

[6] https://eyeofeuphrates (dot) com/ar/news/2023/09/01/9567

[8] https://deirezzor24 dot net/en/the-assad-regime-and-iranian-militias-are-planting-cells-in-the-countryside-of-deir-ezzor

[10] https://sdf-press (dot) com/en/2023/09/operation-security-reinforcement-day-six-participated-forces-tend-to-take-firm-action-against-mercenary-groups/

[12] https://npasyria (dot) com/en/103735

[19] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/10/2950459 ;

https://www.irna dot ir/news/85217349 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/01/2949703

[20] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-756421

[21] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26542 ; https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-dialog?id=50786

[22] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26542 ;

https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26556

[23] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85217435 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/10/2950488

[24] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/06/2948213 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/07/2948809

[25] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26653 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/08/2949415 ;  https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/08/30/2949573 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-30-2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Mason Clark

September 1, 2023, 7:15pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported that the Russian military deployed elements of a newly created “reserve army” (the 25th CAA) to enable units currently on the frontline in Luhansk Oblast to laterally redeploy to defend against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine. Budanov stated on August 31 that the Russian military deployed elements of the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army (reportedly formed under the Eastern Military District) to replace elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) in the Kupyansk direction, and that these elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) began a “slow” redeployment to an unspecified area in southern Ukraine.[1] Elements of the 41st CAA’s 35th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade and 90th Tank Division participated in the failed Russian winter 2023 offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast and have continued limited offensive activity along the Svatove-Kreminna line through now.[2] These units are likely degraded and have been operating without brigade and regiment level rotations like many frontline Russian units throughout the theater. ISW previously assessed that a lack of operational reserves would force the Russian command to conduct further lateral redeployments and make tough decisions about what sectors of the front to prioritize.[3] The Russian military command appears to have deployed elements of the newly formed and likely low quality or understrength 25th CAA to Luhansk Oblast to free up the relatively more effective 41st CAA elements for southern Ukraine. Budanov added that elements of the 25th CAA are already participating in hostilities in Luhansk Oblast.[4]

The 25th Combined Arms Army is unlikely to be combat effective at scale given its rushed deployment, ahead of a previously reported intended deployment date of December 2023. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) formed a “reserve army” at the end of June, likely referencing the 25th CAA, which began recruiting personnel from the Russian Far East in mid-May.[5] The 25th CAA will reportedly consist of 30,000 contract personnel in two motorized rifle divisions as well as an unspecified number of tank and artillery battalions, although it is unclear what elements have actually formed to date.[6] Budanov stated that Russian forces formed the 25th CAA as a ”strategic“ reserve and did not intend for the formation to be combat ready before October or November 2023.[7] A Russian administrator in Dalnegorsk, Primorsky Krai posted a recruitment ad for the 25th CAA on June 5 that claimed that the 25th CAA would train personnel from September 1 to December 1 and then deploy to either Zaporizhia or Kherson Oblast - ISW has not independently observed reporting of the October or November date Budanov cited but has no reason to question this statement.[8] Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department Oleksii Hromov stated on July 5 that the 25th CAA would not be combat ready until at least 2024.[9] Budanov noted that the 25th CAA elements that have arrived in Luhansk Oblast are understaffed and lack training, unsurprising due to their accelerated deployment.[10] ISW cannot yet independently verify that elements of the 25th CAA are operating in Luhansk Oblast, and the scale of the 25th CAA’s commitment is unclear from Budanov’s comments. The current size and capabilities of the elements of the 25th CAA deployed to Ukraine five months prematurely are unclear. The formation is likely either severely understaffed and not near the paper strength of two divisions, or is poorly trained much like initial Russian mobilized units in fall 2022, or both.

The Russian command likely views the deployment of a combat ineffective formation to Luhansk Oblast as a tolerable risk given the relatively lower tempo of operations along much of the Luhansk Oblast frontline. The recent lateral redeployment of elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division from the Kreminna area in Luhansk Oblast to the Robotyne area in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late August further suggests that the Russian military command likely views this sector of the front as relatively safe.[11] Ukrainian forces are conducting limited ground attacks in Luhansk Oblast compared to other areas of the front.

Additional Russian lateral redeployments and the immediate commitment of intended operational reserves suggest that short term reinforcement needs are impeding intended long-term reconstitution efforts. The redeployment of elements of the 41st CAA to southern Ukraine is the third major Russian lateral redeployment since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in June and the second in recent weeks.[12] Russian formations at the division level (and in some areas lower) defending in southern Ukraine have done so without rotation since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, and these forces have committed substantial material, manpower, and effort to hold back Ukrainian advances.[13] The second lateral deployment in the span of a few weeks suggests an increasing Russian concern about the stability of Russian defenses in light of Ukrainian advances around Robotyne. The creation of the 25th CAA is likely a part of Shoigu’s long-term objective previously announced in January 2023 to form several new major ground forces formations, and the deployment of elements of the 25th CAA to avoid creating gaps in the Russian defense suggests that the immediate threat of a Ukrainian breakthrough is serious enough to supersede that effort.[14]

Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky continues to highlight the impact of the lack of Russian counter-battery capabilities on Russian morale in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Khodakovsky claimed on September 1 that Russian forces continue to suffer from a lack of counter-battery capabilities in the Novomayorske-Novodonetske-Kermenchyk area (12km to 18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), where Khodakovsky and the “Vostok” Battalion are reportedly defending.[15] Khodakovsky insinuated that Russian forces are experiencing extreme physical and psychological stress in this area due to constant Ukrainian artillery fire and the Russian inability to return fire.[16] Khodakovsky expressed concerns about whether distressed and exhausted Russian forces will be able to defend against a future Ukrainian offensive in this sector of the front.[17]

Khodakovsky has previously highlighted similar concerns about the Russian defense in this area, although his recent comments are more negative and defeatist in tone.[18] Khodakovsky’s complaints about the lack of counter-battery capabilities in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and concerns about its impacts on Russian morale are not necessarily indicative of a wider phenomenon in the Russian defense. However, Khodakovsky’s comments likely accurately reflect the situation in his limited but important sector of the frontline as well as the situation for often neglected proxy military formations such as Khodakovsky’s Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion. Khodakovsky noted on August 31 that Russian forces cannot lose sight of the daily fight against Ukrainian forces while fantasizing about "burying the enemy in the future.”[19] Khodakovsky may believe that senior Russian commanders have done exactly this by letting the situation deteriorate to the point that Russian forces may be unable to defend against future Ukrainian offensives in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made some advances on September 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut, and geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced northwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success in the Novodanylivka-Novopokropivka direction (5km to 13km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[21] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv), however.[22] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on July 1 that the US has observed notable Ukrainian progress in the “Zaporizhia area” (likely meaning the western Zaporizhia Oblast direction) in the past 72 hours and that Ukrainian forces have achieved some success against the “second line of Russian defenses” in southern Ukraine.[23] Kirby also stated that anonymous US officials’ criticisms of the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive are unhelpful.[24]

Politico confirmed previously-reported numbers of refurbished US Abrams tanks set to arrive in Ukraine by mid-September. Politico confirmed that Ukraine will receive the first 10 of the 31 promised refurbished US Abrams tanks by mid-September following refurbishment in Germany, citing a US Department of Defense official and another source.[25] The US Army Europe and Africa Spokesperson Colonel Martin O’Donnell stated that the US remains committed to delivering the 31 Abrams during an unspecified timeframe in the fall.[26] O’Donnell stated that 200 Ukrainian servicemen recently completed one of the final phases of Abrams training. Ukraine is unlikely to deploy the initial Abrams tanks (two platoons) until the entire brigade set is ready for operations.

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is reportedly visiting multiple African countries as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) continued effort to assume control over the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Yevkurov is conducting a tour of various African countries including Burkina Faso and recently visited Libya and Syria in an attempt to replace “private military companies” (PMCs) with Russian MoD-controlled formations.[27] The milblogger also claimed that the Russian MoD is forming a “volunteer corps” to function as an “expeditionary corps” that will include over 20,000 personnel.[28] The “expeditionary corps” may be a reference to the “Rossiyskiy Ekpeditsionniy Korpus” (Russian Expeditionary Corps) PMC that Russian officials are allegedly creating to conduct operations abroad.[29] Bloomberg reported on August 31 that unnamed sources close to the Russian MoD and an unspecified PMC claimed that a Russian MoD-affiliated PMC is positioned to take control of Wagner’s operations in the Central African Republic.[30] ISW has continually observed claims since the Wagner rebellion on June 24 that the Russian MoD is attempting to consolidate control over Wagner operations in Africa.[31]

A Russian public opinion poll indicates that there is likely little to no societal discontent around the Wagner Group or its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, and the true cause of the plane crash will have little impact on both Russian perceptions and the future of the Wagner Group. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center found that roughly equivalent percentages of Russians believe that either Prigozhin’s death was accidental; Russian authorities intentionally orchestrated Prigozhin’s death; Prigozhin is still alive; or the cause of Prigozhin’s death is difficult to determine.[32] Levada Center polls conducted on June 23 and August 23 found that Russians are almost evenly split between disapproving and approving of Prigozhin’s activities.[33] Public opinion on the death of Prigozhin (very likely a Kremlin-directed assassination) would only impact Kremlin or Ministry of Defense decision making if public opposition reached a far higher threshold, and the Kremlin likely in fact benefits from continued disagreement in Russian society over the circumstances of Prigozhin’s death.

A fringe Russian milblogger arrested on August 31 for allegedly discrediting the Russian military reportedly pled guilty on September 1.[34] Russian state media outlet TASS reported that Andrey Kurshin, administrator of the “Moscow Calling” Telegram channel, pled guilty to charges for knowingly disseminating false information about the Russian military and faces up to 10 years in prison.[35] Russian media outlet Baza claimed that Russian officials charged Kurshin for posts made on September 14 and November 23, 2022 covering Russian shelling of Zaporizhia Oblast and a strike near a dam on the Inhulets River near Kherson City, respectively.[36] Kurshin, via the “Moscow Calling” channel, has actively criticized the Russian military, Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Kremlin throughout the war for poor Russian conduct, and these specific and older posts are unlikely to be the impetus for Kurshin’s arrest. Russian authorities reportedly arrested prominent ultranationalist Igor Girkin based on Telegram posts two months prior to his arrest but reportedly began investigating Girkin on the same day he levied especially harsh critiques against Russian President Vladimir Putin, as ISW has previously reported.[37]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported that the Russian military deployed elements of a newly created “reserve army” (the 25th CAA) to enable units currently on the frontline in Luhansk Oblast to laterally redeploy to defend against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine.
  • The 25th Combined Arms Army is unlikely to be combat effective at scale given its rushed deployment, ahead of a previously reported intended deployment date of December 2023.
  • Additional Russian lateral redeployments and the immediate commitment of intended operational reserves suggest that short term reinforcement needs are impeding intended long-term reconstitution efforts.
  • Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky continues to highlight the impact of the lack of Russian counter-battery capabilities on Russian morale in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
  • Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made some advances on September 1.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains.
  • Russian occupation officials announced on September 1 that voting began for the Russian regional elections held in occupied Ukraine and will continue in various forms through September 10.
  • Russian officials continue efforts to forcibly indoctrinate Ukrainian youth into Russian culture and identity by integrating schools in occupied Ukraine into the Russian educational system.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove) and Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove).[38] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Press Officer Yaroslav Yakimkin claimed on September 1 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction and captured an unspecified Ukrainian stronghold.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces captured several unspecified Ukrainian strongholds and key heights in the Kupyansk direction between August 25 and September 1.[40] Russian sources claimed on September 1 that Russian forces continued to make unspecified gains near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), and Vilshana (14km northeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[41] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that there are only positional battles ongoing in the Kupyansk direction.[42] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an assault near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) but did not specify an outcome.[43]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited unsuccessful ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 1.[44] Yakimkin claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces repelled four Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction.[45] Russian Central Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Alexander Savchuk claimed on September 1 that elements of the Central Grouping of Forces repelled four Ukrainian assaults near Torske (15km west of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area south of Kreminna.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian assaults near Torske and another three assaults near the Serebryanske forest area.[47]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 1 and made marginal advances south of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on September 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances northwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut.[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces repeatedly unsuccessfully attacked near Klishchiivka and Malynivka (24km northwest of Bakhmut) over the last week.[50] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue efforts to capture Klishchiivka.[51] Another Russian milblogger posted footage purportedly showing elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) repelling Ukrainian attacks in the Bakhmut direction.[52]

Russian forces continued counterattacks near Bakhmut on September 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[53] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated on August 31 that Russian forces are counterattacking in the Bakhmut direction in order to stop Ukrainian advances.[54] Several Russian milbloggers claimed on September 1 that Russian forces counterattacked near Kurdyumivka, Ozaryanivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut), and Klishchiivka and recaptured unspecified positions in the area.[55] Other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured some heights west of Klishchiivka.[56] The Russian volunteer ”Hispaniola” Battalion, notably comprised of Russian sports fans, claimed to be operating near Bakhmut.[57]


Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on September 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City), Marinka (directly west of Donetsk City), and Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that Russian and Ukrainian forces skirmished near Nevelske (directly west of Donetsk City) and claimed that Russian forces have entrenched themselves near the Trudovska mine area near Marinka.[59]


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on September 1. Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekov claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack in the direction of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[60] Other Russian sources claimed that small Ukrainian groups attacked in the direction of Staromlynivka (14km south of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky expressed frustration with the inadequacy of Russian counterbattery fire near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and along the Novomayorske-Novodonetske-Kermenchyk line (12-18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), claiming that Russian artillery in the area takes several days to strike Ukrainian positions whereas Ukrainian forces do not suffer such constraints.[62] Khodakovsky claimed that Russian forces defending in the area are under extreme physical and psychological stress and warned that this stress will impact Russian forces’ defensive ability in the area.[63]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on September 1 and reportedly advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) advanced 100-200 meters north of Pryyutne since August 30.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions in the Velyka Novosilka area, likely referring to the broader Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[65]


Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success in the Novodanylivka-Novopokropivka direction (5km to 13km south of Orikhiv).[66] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) overnight on August 31 to September 1 and on September 1, but that Russian forces repelled the attacks.[67] One Russian milblogger characterized the Ukrainian forces that attacked near Verbove as small, 15-person groups without armored vehicle support.[68] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv), and some claimed that Russian forces still maintain positions in southern Robotyne.[69] 

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful operations near Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 1.[70]


Reported Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to censor a subsect of Russian milbloggers who are complaining about the treatment of the Russian Separate 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) in Kherson Oblast are likely impacting discourse about the brigade.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed on September 1 to have obtained information about the conflict within the Russian 205th Brigade from other milbloggers, Russian personnel in the area, and other unspecified sources who cannot publish such information themselves, indicating that some voices are deliberately self-censoring likely out of fear of retribution.[72] Some milbloggers claimed that they refuse to stay silent following reports that unspecified actors within the Russian military command called for the milbloggers’ detentions on August 31, but also largely kept their complaints vague.[73] A milblogger claimed that unspecified “very respected persons” and “political circles” are becoming interested in the situation, indicating that these milbloggers may fear specific reprisals from these individuals.[74]



Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities continue to target migrants with Russian citizenship living in Russia for military service as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on September 1 that Russian authorities detained 21 migrants with Russian citizenship in Krasnoyarsk Krai who did not register with military registration and enlistment offices and issued 18 of them military summonses.[75] Mobilization News also reported that Russian security forces conducted raids on retail outlets in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast from August 21 to 31, issued military summonses to almost 50 migrants who recently received Russian citizenship, and deported 26 migrants.[76]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continue efforts to forcibly indoctrinate Ukrainian youth into Russian culture and identity by integrating schools in occupied Ukraine into the Russian educational system. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the opening of a new school for 1,100 students in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast on September 1, the first day of the Russian school year.[77] Putin claimed that schools in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts now operate under Russian educational standards. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on September 1 that Russian schools, likely including those in occupied Ukraine, will implement a “unified education program” to promote Russian patriotism and societal values.[78] Russian teachers told Verstka that they expect the new program to include propaganda to support and normalize the war in Ukraine.[79]

A Ukrainian official reported that Russian authorities are using children as human shields in occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Operational Command South Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on September 1 that unspecified Russian units are deployed next to a Russian-built boarding school in occupied Kherson Oblast where children are constantly present.[80] Such deployments would violate Article 51 of the Geneva Convention IV which states that, “the presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favor or impede military operations.”[81]

Russian occupation officials announced on September 1 that voting began for the Russian regional elections held in occupied Ukraine and will continue in various forms through September 10. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced that voting has started at 329 extraterritorial sites in 81 Russian regions and will last from September 1 to 4.[82] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian occupation officials began door-to-door visits to collect early votes from settlements near the frontline.[83] Rogov also claimed that early voting will last for eight days and cover over 214,000 voters in 375 settlements in occupied Zaporizhia. Russian occupation officials from Nova Kakhovka, Chaplynka, and Bilozerka in occupied Kherson Oblast called on civilians to vote early between September 2 and 7 and noted that single-day voting will occur from September 8 to 10.[84] ISW continues to assess that Russian occupation authorities are likely conducting early voting and making house calls to collect votes in order to artificially increase voter turnout and achieve desired election results.[85]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

The Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) began the “Combat Brotherhood 2023” operational-strategic command staff exercises in Belarus on September 1.[86] The annual joint military exercise will last through September 6 and include military contingents from Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.[87] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that 2,500 military personnel and 500 units of equipment in total from CSTO members will participate in the exercises.[88] “Combat Brotherhood 2023” has five centerpiece component exercises: “Interaction-2023,” consisting of combined arms combat planning exercises with the CSTO’s joint Collective Rapid Reaction Force; “Search-2023” special reconnaissance exercises; “Echelon-2023” logistics exercises; “Barrier-2023” chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) protection exercises; and “Rock-2023” special exercises involving unspecified Ministry of Emergency Situations elements with CSTO Rapid Reaction Force elements.[89] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces practiced mass fuel and lubricants distribution and logistics organization as part of “Echelon-2023" exercises on September 1.[90]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] https://suspilne dot media/563677-na-kupanskomu-napramku-rf-ne-narosue-sili-a-provodit-rotaciu-budanov/ ; https://amalantra dot ru/25-armiya-rossii/ ; https://vk dot com/wall-203361692_2517

[4] https://suspilne dot media/563677-na-kupanskomu-napramku-rf-ne-narosue-sili-a-provodit-rotaciu-budanov/

[6] https://amalantra dot ru/25-armiya-rossii/

[7] https://suspilne dot media/563677-na-kupanskomu-napramku-rf-ne-narosue-sili-a-provodit-rotaciu-budanov/ 

[10] https://suspilne dot media/563677-na-kupanskomu-napramku-rf-ne-narosue-sili-a-provodit-rotaciu-budanov/

[32] https://www.levada dot ru/2023/09/01/zapomnivshiesya-sobytiya-avgusta-smert-prigozhina/; https://t.me/istories_media/3540

[33] https://www.levada dot ru/2023/09/01/zapomnivshiesya-sobytiya-avgusta-smert-prigozhina/; https://t.me/istories_media/3540

[54] https://suspilne dot media/562909-pid-bahmutom-armia-rf-zibrala-sili-i-namagaetsa-kontratakuvati-evlas/

[77] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/72169; https://t.me/readovkanews/65271

[80] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/01/na-hersonshhyni-okupanty-stvoryly-shkolu-internat-poryad-z-yakoyu-rozgornuly-svoyi-pidrozdily-nataliya-gumenyuk/

[89] https://t.me/modmilby/24949; https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/v-obedinennom-shtabe-odkb-sostoyalis-pervye-shtabnye-peregovory-po-podgotovke-ucheniy-s-kollektivnym/#loaded ; https://t.me/mod_russia/30023