UA-69458566-1

Sunday, June 4, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4, 2023

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros,
and Fredrick W. Kagan

June 4, 2023, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted another limited raid into Belgorod Oblast on June 4 and are reportedly continuing to operate in a Russian border settlement. Geolocated footage published on June 4 shows LSR and RDK personnel advancing towards Novaya Tavolzhanka (3.5km from the Ukrainian border).[1] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov confirmed that there was fighting within Novaya Tavolzhanka, although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Western Military District and the Russian Border Guard Service struck a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near the settlement, forcing them to withdraw.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that a sabotage and reconnaissance group of 20 personnel entered Novaya Tavolzhanka without armored vehicles.[3] Wall Street Journal Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Yarsoslav Trofimov reported that the pro-Ukrainian Russian fighters remain in Novaya Tavolzhanka as of 1700 (Moscow Standard Time).[4]

Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov responded to a RDK and LSR demand to negotiate for the exchange of captured Russian prisoners of war (POWs). The LSR and RDK addressed a video to Gladkov purporting to show RDK and LSR fighters with two Russian POWs whom they said they captured near Novaya Tavolzhanka. The RDK and LSR demanded that Gladkov arrive at the temple in Novaya Tavolzhanka by 1700 (Moscow Standard Time) to negotiate for the release of the POWs.[5] Gladkov stated that he was ready to meet with the RDK and LSR fighters at the Shebekino checkpoint to negotiate the exchange of the POWs.[6] Gladkov later reportedly refused to meet with the RDK and LSR fighters because he believed that the Russian POWs were already dead.[7] The RDK and LSR released a subsequent video showing themselves with 12 Russian POWs, criticizing Gladkov for lacking courage, and stating that they would send the POWs to Ukraine.[8]

The dissonant Russian responses to and reporting about the limited raid in Belgorod Oblast continue to suggest that the Russian leadership has not yet decided how to react to these limited cross-border raids. The contradictory reporting from official Russian sources about the situation in Belgorod Oblast and Gladkov’s apparent personal decision to respond to the RDK and LSR suggests that the MoD and Gladkov are not coordinating their responses to the raids. ISW has previously reported that Russian officials have disproportionately responded to the limited raids into Russian territory in an effort to assuage growing Russian anxiety about the war in Ukraine while also supporting ongoing information operations that aim to present the war as existential to Russia.[9] Russian responses have primarily centered on informational effects, and there is no indication that the Russian leadership has set a wider policy for preventing further limited raids into Russian border oblasts. It is also not clear if Russian authorities are orchestrating the evacuation response to this activity. An RDK fighter claimed on June 4 that Belgorod Oblast authorities have not organized the announced evacuation measures in the Shebekino area and that Russian citizens have largely fled of their own accord, leaving many settlements in a semi-abandoned state.[10] Gladkov claimed that 4,000 residents from the area are currently staying at temporary accommodation centers in connection with evacuation efforts, however.[11] Ukrainian Advisor to the Internal Affairs Minister Anton Herashchenko stated on June 4 that the RDK and LSR activity has prompted Russian leaders to divert significant forces to stop border incursions, although ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have done so.

The limited raids and border shelling in Belgorod Oblast are increasingly becoming the current focal point for criticism against the Russian military leadership. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast to criticize the MoD on June 3 and 4, specifically calling out the lack of response from Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Colonel General Alexander Lapin, and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valeriy Gerasimov.[12] Prigozhin offered to negotiate the release of POWs held by the RDK and LSR if Russian authorities failed to do so, and responded to criticism of his offer by sarcastically stating that Russia has a problem with people who have “balls.”[13] Other ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the latest raid by criticizing Gladkov for being willing to negotiate with the RDK and LSR, and Russian authorities for failing to consistently inform the public about the situation in Belgorod Oblast.[14] A prominent milblogger used the raid in Belgorod Oblast to criticize the MoD for not funding Belgorod territorial defense volunteer formations and for not considering the volunteers as actual combatants.[15] Former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin argued that the Kremlin cannot do anything about the situation in Belgorod Oblast without engaging in a costly diversion of resources that would likely end in an attritional operation reminiscent of Bakhmut.[16]

Russian forces again targeted Ukraine with Iranian-made drones and cruise missiles on June 4, marking the fourth consecutive day of strikes across Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched five Shahed-136/131 drones from Bryansk Oblast and six Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from six strategic Tu-95 bombers in the Caspian Sea in the early morning of June 4.[17] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down three Shahed drones and four cruise missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that two Russian missiles struck an active Ukrainian airfield near Kropyvnytskyi in Kirovohrad Oblast.[18] Ihnat added that two Shahed drones struck unspecified infrastructure in Sumy Oblast.[19] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all drones and missiles that targeted Kyiv.[20]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces may have regained positions in southwestern Bakhmut, supporting repeated Ukrainian reports that the Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the southwestern outskirts of the city. Prigozhin claimed that some unspecified reports suggest that Ukrainian forces established observation posts in the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut.[21] Prigozhin recommended that the Russian forces in Bakhmut take action if these reports are true. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar and other Ukrainian officials have continuously reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut since May 20, when Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces seized the entirety of the city.[22]

Key Takeaways

  • Elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducted another limited raid into Belgorod Oblast on June 4 and are reportedly continuing to operate in a Russian border settlement.
  • Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov responded to a RDK and LSR demand to negotiate for the exchange of captured Russian prisoners of war (POWs).
  • The dissonant Russian responses to and reporting about the limited raid in Belgorod Oblast continue to suggest that the Russian leadership has not yet decided how to react to these limited cross-border raids.
  • The limited raids and border shelling in Belgorod Oblast are increasingly becoming the current focal point for criticism against the Russian military leadership.
  • Russian forces again targeted Ukraine with Iranian-made drones and cruise missiles on June 4 making it the fourth consecutive day of strikes across Ukraine.
  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces may have regained positions in southwestern Bakhmut, supporting repeated Ukrainian reports that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the southwestern outskirts of the city.
  • Ukrainian and Russian forces both claimed to have made limited territorial gains on the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and Marinka.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted local ground attacks and reportedly made limited tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a draft government decree that will no longer require an individual’s presence at an enlistment office for military registration.
  • Russian officials continue to use rest and rehabilitation schemes to deport Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force northeast of Kharkiv City on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group conducted an unsuccessful attempt to penetrate through Ukrainian defenses near Zelene (34km northeast of Kharkiv City.[23]

Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces are attempting to regain the initiative on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and are reinforcing their troops along the Luhansk-Kharkiv frontline.[24] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces are attempting to restart their offensive operations near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), Novoselivske and Kuzemivka (16km northwest of Svatove), Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (27km south of Kreminna).[25] Syrskyi added that Russian forces are reinforcing their positions with “Storm Z” assault units that are staffed with convicts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces deployed a group of 500 convicts to reinforce an unspecified element operating in Kharkiv Oblast, and that the Ukrainian forces injured almost 100 of these convicts with artillery fire.[26]

Ukrainian and Russian forces both claimed to have made limited territorial gains on the Kupyansk-Svatove line on June 4. Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces successfully advanced 400 meters in an unspecified area in the Svatove direction and liberated a significant area of the Ivanivskyi forest.[27] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces crossed the Oskil River and seized Novomlynsk (21km northeast of Kupyansk) but noted the absence of photo or video evidence for this claimed advance.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Novoselivske, while the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove), Andriivka (14km west of Svatove), and Novoselivske.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Kreminna on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Bilohorivka and Spirne.[30] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in combat along the R-66 highway near Kreminna.[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Ivanivske and Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Ivanivske direction and that Ukrainian forces conducted assault operations near Zaliznyanske (9km northwest of Bakhmut).[33] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Wagner forces continue to withdraw from Bakhmut and that regular Russian airborne (VDV) forces are replacing them.[34] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov reported that the loss ratios of losses of Russian forces to Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut was 7.5 : 1.[35]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Avdiivka on June 4. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Opytne (3km southwest of Avdiivka) and Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[36] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Vodyane, while some Russian milbloggers refuted this claim.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations near Avdiivka.[38]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Marinka on June 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian ground attacks near Marinka.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Chechen “Akhmat” Special Forces (Spetsnaz) continue offensive operations in the Marinka direction.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Akhmat units and elements of the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Army Corps) with artillery support from the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) conducted assault operations in Marinka while Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack in Marinka.[41]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in southern Donetsk Oblast on June 4. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Pavlivka (2km southwest of Vuhledar) and Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[42] Another milblogger characterized the Ukrainian attacks near Pavlivka and Mykilske as unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force operations.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted local ground attacks and reportedly made limited tactical gains in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4.[44] Geolocated footage posted on June 4 shows that mechanized Ukrainian forces made limited advances northeast of Rivnopil.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the direction of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Makariivka (within 4km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and captured Novodarivka (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Neskuchne (2km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[46] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through the first line of Russian defenses and advanced 500 meters to three kilometers in this area.[47] There is no visual evidence for these reports as of this writing. The language of these reports suggests that Russian forces also lost their positions in Levadne (18km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), although it is unclear if this is a recent development or occurred on an earlier date. Footage posted on June 2 shows artillery elements of a Ukrainian artillery brigade conducting fire missions against Russian positions near Staromaiorske, about 7km south and 7km southeast of Neskuchne and Rivnopil, respectively.[48] Some milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted limited counterattacks near Mala Tokmachka (28km southeast of Hulyaipole), and that Russian forces conducted airstrikes against attacking Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipole.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian “Vostok” volunteer battalion and elements of the 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) successfully defended against further Ukrainian advances.[50] Russian sources largely claimed that the Ukrainian localized counterattacks were reconnaissance-in-force operations.[51]

Ukrainian forces continued to target frontline and rear areas in southern Ukraine. Russian sources claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted Ukrainian missiles targeting Berdyansk and Melitopol on June 3.[52] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck additional areas in Zaporizhia Oblast on June 4: near Melitopol, northeast of Melitopol near Chernihivka, and near the frontline near Verbove and Polohy.[53] Crimean Occupation Head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare systems destroyed or disabled nine Ukrainian UAVs targeting Dzhankoi, Crimea on June 3.[54]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian MoD submitted a draft government decree that will no longer require an individual’s presence at an enlistment office for military registration. The draft decree states that Russian officials will be able to register citizens for military service “without the personal appearance of citizens in the military [recruitment office] on the basis of information contained in the state information resource, other state information systems and information resources.”[55] Russian citizens will reportedly receive notifications of registration and deregistration in their personal accounts on the Russian State Services Portal.[56] The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on Aprill 11 approving the creation of a digital unified register of Russian citizens eligible for military service.[57] ISW assessed that the Kremlin advocated for the digital register in order to use tools of digital authoritarianism to improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and crack down on Russian draft dodgers, and this new draft government decree is likely a part of this effort.[58]

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian servicemembers continue to desert their positions in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 4 that roughly 40 Russian servicemembers near Svatove, Luhansk Oblast left their combat positions and deserted.[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces dispatched two helicopters and a Rosgvardia unit to look for the deserters.[60]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continue to use rest and rehabilitation schemes to deport Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Russia. Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official Rodion Miroshnik stated on June 4 that the “Helping Ours” volunteer organization has sent 103 people, 67 children and 36 mothers, from occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts to the Klyazma sanatorium in Moscow Oblast.[61] Miroshnik stated that “Helping Ours” reached a new agreement with the Russian Federal Medical and Biological Agency to send another 162 people, primarily children ages five to 13, to the Klyazma sanatorium by the end of 2023.[62] A Russian news aggregator reported on June 3 that children’s health camps in Bryansk Oblast will receive 750 children from Bryanka, Luhansk Oblast and that 90 children from the settlement will arrive in Bryansk Oblast in June.[63]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[18] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2023/06/4/7405228/

[24] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/04/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-pvk-vagner-zaminyuyut-povitryano-desantni-pidrozdily-rosarmiyi-sergij-cherevatyj/

[25] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/06/04/na-okremyh-dilyankah-frontu-ye-prosuvannya-syl-oborony-ukrayiny-oleksandr-syrskyj/

[27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/06/04/na-okremyh-dilyankah-frontu-ye-prosuvannya-syl-oborony-ukrayiny-oleksandr-syrskyj/

[34] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/06/04/na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-pvk-vagner-zaminyuyut-povitryano-desantni-pidrozdily-rosarmiyi-sergij-cherevatyj/

[35] https://www.corriere dot it/esteri/23_giugno_04/oleksiy-danilov-trattare-putin-mai-429ae186-0246-11ee-9687-f6cb889dd928.shtml

[46] https://t.me/rybar/47992; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87854; https://t.me/rybar/47992; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87874; https://eadaily dot com/ru/news/2023/06/04/nashi-byut-tanki-vsu-poshli-v-nastuplenie-v-rayone-vremevskogo-vystupa; https://t.me/milinfolive/101620; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87892 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7769; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46590 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46595; https://t.me/rybar/48009; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/6379; https://t.me/sashakots/40099; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48163; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48164; https://t.me/rybar/47992; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87854; https://t.me/rybar/47992; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87874; https://t.me/wargonzo/12958; https://t.me/milinfolive/101620; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46590 https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46603

 

[55] https://regulation.gov dot ru/Regulation/Npa/PublicView?npaID=138886 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/04/glava-belgorodskoy-oblasti-otvetil-na-obraschenie-negodyaev-ubiyts-i-fashistov-iz-rdk-on-predlozhil-vstretitsya-i-zabrat-plennyh-v-drugom-meste ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/47309 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12508

[56] https://t.me/bbcrussian/47309; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/12508; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/04/glava-belgorodskoy-oblasti-otvetil-na-obraschenie-negodyaev-ubiyts-i-fashistov-iz-rdk-on-predlozhil-vstretitsya-i-zabrat-plennyh-v-drugom-meste

Posted by at
Labels: ,

Saturday, June 3, 2023

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3, 2023

 Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Fredrick W. Kagan

June 3, 2023, 4:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1 pm ET on June 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukrainian forces are prepared to start counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in a June 3 interview with the Wall Street Journal that Ukraine is ready to launch a counteroffensive.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukraine “would like to have certain things, but … can’t wait for months” to start counteroffensive operations.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 3 that “military plans love silence” and that she will “discuss something else” in the meantime, likely acknowledging that Ukrainian officials have started to more strictly enforce a regime of informational silence about operations in preparation for upcoming counteroffensives.[3] Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated on June 3 that Ukraine has formed all nine brigades of the “Offensive Guard” and that these formations are ready to take part in hostilities at Zelensky’s and Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi’s orders.[4]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin escalated his feud with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely hoping to draw criticism back to the Russian military leadership and downplay his ongoing conflict with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. Prigozhin alleged on June 2 that representatives of the MoD placed anti-tank mines and other explosive devices along routes that Wagner forces were using to withdraw from Bakhmut.[5] Prigozhin asserted that these charges were placed in rear areas with no Ukrainian activity and that the MoD likely meant for Wagner forces to detonate the explosives in order to give Wagner a “public flogging.”[6] Prigozhin also further responded to a concerted attack that Chechen commanders launched against him on June 1 and stated on June 3 that he and Kadyrov settled the conflict.[7] Prigozhin claimed that he called Kadyrov on June 1 and the two agreed to let the “whole story” about the conflict dissipate.[8] Prigozhin suggested that a group in the Kremlin may have started the conflict between Kadyrov’s forces and Wagner and insinuated that the Kremlin often plays ”dangerous games” that could destabilize interethnic relations within Russia.[9] Kadyrov has yet to publicly address the conflict between Chechen forces and Wagner.

Prigozhin has not yet responded to Kadyrov or the Chechen commanders who started the attack in an antagonistic manner typical of his usual approach to responding to critiques.[10] The claimed private phone call between Prigozhin and Kadyrov would suggest that Prigozhin is concerned that this typical public response might further antagonize Kadyrov and Chechen commanders and that Prigozhin is concerned about having another prominent silovik figure like Kadyrov aligned against him. Prigozhin likely accused the MoD of trying to kill Wagner forces and the Kremlin of creating the conflict with the Chechen commanders to quickly reorient Russian discussion back to his usual targets of ire, the Russian military and political leadership. Prigozhin is also likely aiming to rally pro-war ultranationalist groups, specifically Kadyrov and Chechen commanders, to join him in criticizing those targets as he has done before.

Prigozhin’s flamboyant allegations are also likely an attempt to retain his heightened initiative within the Russian information space following the capture of Bakhmut. Prigozhin has consistently shaped discussions within the Russian information space leading up to the capture of Bakhmut and following the end of Wagner’s effort in the city by engaging in a near-daily series of public outbursts and demonstrative actions.[11] Prigozhin has used his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites and bolster his attempt to solidify himself as the central figure of the Russian ultranationalist community.[12] The concerted attack from Chechen commanders represents the first instance since the capture of Bakhmut that Prigozhin has not been the one to initiate larger conversations about himself and the Wagner Group within the Russian information space. Prigozhin’s desire to retain Kadyrov as a potential ally has likely constrained Prigozhin’s regular approach to shaping the Russian information space. Prigozhin has routinely used Wagner’s claimed responsibility for tactical gains to legitimize his pursuit of influence and his criticism of others, and he is likely also concerned that he may soon lose his current ability to dominate discussions about himself and Wagner as Wagner Group forces withdraw to rear areas to replenish and reconstitute.[13] Prigozhin’s dramatic accusation against the MoD aims to remove any constraints resulting from his conflict with Kadyrov, shift the conversation back to criticizing his opponents in the MoD, and allow Prigozhin to continue determining how he and Wagner are portrayed.

Prigozhin seized on general Russian discontent with security on the Belgorod Oblast border to threaten that Wagner Group forces may operate in Russian territory without approval from the Russian military command.[14] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner will not wait for an invitation or permission from the MoD to defend Belgorod Oblast if the MoD does not curb security threats to the region. Prigozhin justified his threat of insubordination by claiming that Wagner aims to protect the Russian people, implying that Wagner will assume the role of border defender that the MoD should already occupy. Prigozhin's threats capitalize on complaints from other prominent information space voices that Russian authorities have not done enough to protect border areas from the impacts of the war and reflect Prigozhin‘s current loss of informational initiative.[15]

Prigozhin’s threats also indicate that he may aim for Wagner forces to assume primary or sole responsibility for an axis in the Ukrainian theater now that Wagner forces have withdrawn from that role in the Bakhmut area. Prigozhin may see the Belgorod-Ukraine border as an easy enough front line to defend as the raids into Russia have thus far occurred on an extremely limited scale. Deploying Wagner forces to the Belgorod border would allow Prigozhin to maintain his position as a commander of frontline forces without the grueling demands of conducting human wave-style frontal assaults against a heavily fortified Ukrainian city. Prigozhin’s apparent threat to undertake military operations, even defensive ones, on Russian territory without the permission of the Russian MoD is astonishing if it is anything other than flamboyant rhetoric. It implies that Prigozhin regards himself as able to use large military forces loyal to him at his own discretion and beyond the control of the actual Russian military. Russian President Vladimir Putin would have to have tremendous confidence in Prigozhin’s personal loyalty to himself to be at all comfortable with such a situation.

A Russian Duma Deputy stated during a public forum on June 1 that Russia has failed to accomplish any of its articulated goals for the “special military operation” in Ukraine. First Duma Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Affairs Konstantin Zatulin emphasized that of Russia’s officially declared goals at the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine — “denazification, demilitarization, the neutrality of Ukraine, and the protection of the inhabitants of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics”—none have actually been met.[16] Zatulin further noted that as the war has worn on, these goals have ceased to hold actual meaning and suggested that Russian forces should have been more aggressive in efforts to push Ukrainian forces back from the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Zatulin’s critical observations are noteworthy considering that he is a contributor to the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club, which famously upholds views complementary to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the official Kremlin propaganda line.[17] Zatulin’s apparent views of the war represent an absolute minority within the Russian domestic political environment, as self-censorship and general information space repressions are commonplace. However, such statements coming from a relatively mainstream and well-platformed official suggest that a small subset of the predominant pro-war Russian political faction may feel somewhat empowered to voice discontent and advocate for escalated goals as the war continues.

Key Takeaways

  • Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukrainian forces are prepared to start counteroffensive operations.
  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin escalated his feud with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely hoping to draw criticism back to the Russian military leadership and downplay his ongoing conflict with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. Prigozhin’s flamboyant allegations are also likely an attempt to retain his heightened initiative within the Russian information space following the capture of Bakhmut.
  • Prigozhin seized on general Russian discontent with security on the Belgorod Oblast border to threaten that Wagner Group forces may operate in Russian territory without approval from the Russian military command.
  • A Russian Duma Deputy stated during a public forum on June 1 that Russia has failed to accomplish any of its articulated goals for the “special military operation” in Ukraine.
  • Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and northwest and south of Kreminna.
  • Regular Russian forces have likely largely relieved Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut amid a low offensive tempo in the area as of June 3.
  • Russian forces focused offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line near Marinka.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued efforts to establish defensive positions in Kherson Oblast.
  • The Russian military leadership is attempting to create and staff new military formations.
  • Likely Ukrainian partisans assassinated a Russian collaborator in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on June 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoselivske, Luhansk Oblast (16km northwest of Svatove).[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian reinforcements arrived during Russian ground attacks near Novoselivske and forced Russian forces to retreat towards Kuzemivka (15km northwest of Svatove).[19] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked towards Kuzemivka but that Russian forces repelled the assaults.[20] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Dvorichna (16km northeast of Kupyansk), Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), and Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk).[21]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northwest and south of Kreminna on June 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting in the Makiivka area is ongoing near the R-66 (Kreminna to Svatove) highway and that Russian forces advanced in forests west of Kreminna.[23]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to read ISW’s retrospective analysis of the Battle for Bakhmut.

Regular Russian forces have likely largely relieved Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut amid a low offensive tempo in the area as of June 3. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 2 that 99 percent of Wagner units have left Bakhmut.[24] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that degraded Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) elements, including those of the 76th VDV Division, 106th VDV Division, and two unspecified brigades have deployed to the Bakhmut area and are increasing their role in the area.[25] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Russian forces lost 100,000 personnel killed and wounded in the 10-month Bakhmut effort.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions 6km west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are conducting positional engagements on the northern and southern flanks of Bakhmut.[28] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are strengthening defensive lines in this area because Russian forces aim to restart their offensive effort on June 5, the claimed completion date of the Wagner withdrawal from Bakhmut.[29]

Russian forces on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line continued to focus their offensive efforts on Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) on June 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 14 Russian ground attacks in Marinka and near Oleksandrivka (immediately south of Donetsk City).[30] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces did not conduct ground attacks near Avdiivka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces gained some territory in northwestern Marinka and that Russian forces will likely attempt to encircle the settlement in June.[31] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces made limited gains north of Avdiivka and complained that Ukrainian forces successfully constrained Russian offensive efforts west of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka.[32]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on June 3. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to seize the initiative in the Vuhledar direction but there are currently no reports that Ukrainian troops have broken through Russian lines.[33] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are probing Russian defenses for future attacks near Pavlivka (2km southwest of Vuhledar) and Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[34] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian positions near Russian-controlled Pavlivka, which is consistent with other Russian claims of activity in the area.[35]  None of these claims are particularly anomalous or unusual, and ISW has no independent confirmation of any of them.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces continued to target rear Russian positions throughout southern Ukraine on June 3. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian aviation units struck Russian concentration areas in Skadovsk Raion, Kherson Oblast.[36] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched missile strikes against Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, and that Russian air defenses intercepted six unspecified Ukrainian missiles.[37] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov also claimed that Russian air defenses were active near Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, and that residents heard several explosions in the area.[38]

Russian forces continue to expand fortifications in rear areas of Kherson Oblast as of June 3. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows newly erected dragon’s teeth defensive structures northeast of Stavky (87km southeast of Kherson City).[39] The fortifications are located on the north side of the E97 highway, a key ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting occupied Crimea to Skadovsk (60km south of Kherson City) and Oleshky (8km southwest of Kherson City). These new structures are consistent with an ongoing pattern in limited Russian fortifications in southern Ukraine that prioritize the defense of main GLOCs.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian military leadership is attempting to create and staff new military formations. Russian state media outlet TASS began reporting in mid-May that authorities of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic are offering to pay 20,000 rubles (approximately $247) to residents who join the newly formed 40th Army Corps.[40] Rostov Oblast news agency DON24 similarly reported on May 12 that Rostov Oblast governor Vasily Golubev instructed military enlistment offices to pay bonuses to volunteers who sign up for contract service with the Rostov St. George Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 40th Army Corps of the Southern Military District.[41] Russian media noted that these are the first instances of the 40th Army Corps in the public press, and ISW has not observed mentions of this formation pre-dating reports from mid-May.[42] ISW previously reported on the ad hoc formation of the volunteer-based 3rd Army Corps, which formed over the summer of 2022 and reportedly had an end-strength of around 20,000 personnel.[43] It is unclear how Russian military authorities intend to staff an army corps-level formation considering pervasive and continued issues with force generation.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Likely Ukrainian partisans assassinated at least one Russian collaborator in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on June 2. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian actors blew up the car of local businessman Sergey Didovodyuk in Myhailivka with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), killing Didovodyuk and injuring two others.[44] Rogov claimed that Didovodyuk was active in the occupation political sphere and participated in preliminary voting for the ruling “United Russia” party. Ukrainian sources reported that Didovodyuk is the deputy chairperson of the “We are Together with Russia” collaborator movement, of which Rogov is the chair.[45] Ukrainian sources also reported that the attack killed Didovodyuk’s daughter, Mykhailivka occupation Civil-Military Administration Deputy Head Yana Didovodyuk, and injured the Mykhailivka occupation Civil-Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Bidnyak.

Russian authorities established a system to simplify the adoption of Ukrainian children to Russian families and prevent returning Ukrainian children to Ukraine. Russian independent investigative outlet Vazhne Istorii reported that the Russian government established a state information bank on Ukrainian orphans and other children without parental care and advertises their profiles to Russian families for guardianship and adoption.[46] Vazhne Istorii reported that the Russian system aims to keep Ukrainian children from returning to Russia and that there are 4,400 Ukrainian orphans left without any care or adult supervision in Russia as of March 2023. Vazhne Istorii found that the number of Ukrainian children in Russia significantly increased in 2022, including 573 Ukrainian children in the Rostov Oblast database, 460 in the Moscow Oblast database, and 388 in the Nizhny Novgorod database.

Russia established a permanent occupation government in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik signed a decree on June 2 that established the Government of the LNR, consisting of 18 ministers and headed by a prime minister.[47] Pasechnik announced that Sergey Kozlov serves as the Chairperson of the LNR Government and that the new government strengthens integration with Russian state bodies.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www.wsj.com/video/series/in-depth-features/wsj-exclusive-an-interview-with-ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky/DF7422A2-778B-403B-83ED-3F9490192C1A?mod=e2tw

[2] https://www.wsj.com/video/series/in-depth-features/wsj-exclusive-an-interview-with-ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky/DF7422A2-778B-403B-83ED-3F9490192C1A?mod=e2tw

[3] https://t.me/annamaliar/808  

[4] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/03/gvardiya-nastupu-sformovana-ta-gotova-do-nakaziv-igor-klymenko/

[5] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3564

[6] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3564

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060123 ; https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3571;

[8] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3571;

[9] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3571

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060123

[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20April%2013%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20April%2024%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20April%2025%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20April%2022%2C%202023.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2017%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20April%2016.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/May%2022%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052423

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052423 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar01192023

[14] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3571; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/58925;  https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/03/osnovatel-chvk-vagnera-evgeniy-prigozhin-zayavil-chto-ureguliroval-konflikt-s

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2023

[16] https://zatulin dot ru/vystuplenie-konstantina-zatulina-na-forsajt-forume-kakaya-ukraina-nam-nuzhna/

[17] https://valdaiclub dot com/about/experts/522/

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R2MYRrZRBdC4rSxUU35ANfLUHn9Wmdvxf2aE5U1AZnLdJi5vCHqQ94zbgQoL7FDml  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xo5FZQwsmDe3DXRXUpcraqc5Vxxj2YVTL5xCZYSiDqCcsVZRtRq2yaPjVy5NFirdl

[19] https://t.me/rybar/47947

[20] https://t.me/rybar/47947

[21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87761; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48132 ;  https://t.me/wargonzo/12931

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R2MYRrZRBdC4rSxUU35ANfLUHn9Wmdvxf2aE5U1AZnLdJi5vCHqQ94zbgQoL7FDml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xo5FZQwsmDe3DXRXUpcraqc5Vxxj2YVTL5xCZYSiDqCcsVZRtRq2yaPjVy5NFirdl

[23] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87761; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48132

[24] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3564

[25] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1664861262629556228?s=20

[26] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/03/bahmut-dlya-voroga-zalyshayetsya-bilsh-priorytetnym-nizh-byelgorodshhyna-sergij-cherevatyj/

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xo5FZQwsmDe3DXRXUpcraqc5Vxxj2YVTL5xCZYSiDqCcsVZRtRq2yaPjVy5NFirdl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R2MYRrZRBdC4rSxUU35ANfLUHn9Wmdvxf2aE5U1AZnLdJi5vCHqQ94zbgQoL7FDml

[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87761; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48132

[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87761; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48132

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02R2MYRrZRBdC4rSxUU35ANfLUHn9Wmdvxf2aE5U1AZnLdJi5vCHqQ94zbgQoL7FDml; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Xo5FZQwsmDe3DXRXUpcraqc5Vxxj2YVTL5xCZYSiDqCcsVZRtRq2yaPjVy5NFirdl

[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87761; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48132; https://t.me/wargonzo/12931

[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87761; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48132;

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/12931

[34] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/87761; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48132

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/27063

[36] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0fh6tWdCpmuUmFqDKfBng2SDfbLG3a2QWGye7kYv7LCaWYtRUatTC2zxLfYTeXKsZl

[37] https://t.me/vrogov/10009 ; https://t.me/astrapress/28641

[38] https://t.me/vrogov/10007 ; https://t.me/vrogov/10008

[39] https://twitter.com/CrimeaUA1/status/1664981721719222274?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1664982615345045505?s=20  

[40] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/17772407

[41] https://don24 dot ru/rubric/obschestvo/dobrovolcam-rostovskogo-motostrelkovogo-batalona-vyplatyat-premii-po-rasporyazheniyu-gubernatora.html

[42] https://don24 dot ru/rubric/obschestvo/dobrovolcam-rostovskogo-motostrelkovogo-batalona-vyplatyat-premii-po-rasporyazheniyu-gubernatora.html

[43] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/09/15/the-russians-spent-months-forming-a-new-army-corps-it-lasted-days-in-ukraine/?sh=4a997ae856e6; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept18; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust27

[44] https://t.me/vrogov/9982 ; https://t.me/vrogov/9983; https://t.me/rybar/47935; https://t.me/rybar/47928 

[45] https://censor dot net/ua/news/3422464/sbu_likviduvala_na_okupovaniyi_terytoriyi_zradnykiv_batka_yi_donku_didovodyukiv_djerelo_foto ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1664983003737587718?s=20 ; https://tsn dot ua/ukrayina/na-zaporizhzhi-vibuhnuv-avtomobil-kolaboranta-yakiy-u-svoyemu-kafe-goduvav-okupantiv-foto-2342380.html ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2144 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2143

[46] https://storage.googleapis.com/istories/stories/2023/05/31/dopolnitelnie-grazhdane-rossii/index.html?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=mainpage

[47] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/1236

Posted by at
Labels: ,

Friday, June 2, 2023

Iran Update, June 2, 2023

Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick

 

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Key Takeaways

1). Iran is training its militias in Syria to use a range of improvised and advanced weapons to attack US personnel in Syria. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq may conduct attacks against US forces in Syria.

2). Iran likely calculates that it has achieved strategic depth and using militias in Iraq and Syria to attack US forces will keep conflict confined to Syria.

3). Iranian media circulated reports of an IRGC-conducted a drone strike targeting Kurdish Iranian separatist groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan region on June 2.

4). The Iranian regime is pursuing increased gas swaps with Turkmenistan, likely to preempt electricity shortages in the summer that could fuel internal unrest.

 

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iran is training its militias in Syria to use a range of improvised and advanced weapons to attack US personnel in Syria. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) have trained militias since January to construct and begin using explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) against US forces in Syria.[1] Iranian-backed militias killed at least 603 US personnel in Iraq with EFPs from 2003 to 2011.[2] Iranian Quds Force leaders in Deir ez Zor ordered surface-to-surface missile and man portable air defense system training for a local proxy group in late May.[3] CTP cannot independently verify the report about surface-to-surface missiles. Iranian-backed militias also have received training on drones, which enabled them to conduct an ISR flight over the US Conoco Base in Deir ez Zor Province in February and target other US bases in Syria with attack UAVs.[4] Iranian-backed militias have also accelerated the training and use of drone capabilities in Deir ez Zor Province since April.[5] These capabilities enable Iranian-backed militias to carry out attacks on US bases, ground forces, and helicopters in Syria. [6] That the SDF seized three EFPs near a US base in northeast Syria indicates the imminent threat that Iranian proxies armed with EFPs pose to US forces.[7]

Iranian-backed militias in Iraq may conduct attacks against US forces in Syria. The Iranian-backed militia Kataib al Sabreen announced its formation and intention to target US forces in Iraq on June 1.[8] The Asaib Ahl al Haq and Harakat al Nujaba-affiliated group Ashab al Kahf announced it has ordered its rocket unit operating in Mosul to redeploy to Baghdad to attack US forces at Camp Victory and the US Embassy.[9] The Iraq-based Iranian proxy group Liwa al Ghaliboun killed a US contractor in an attack on US forces in Syria on March 23.[10]

Iran likely calculates that it has achieved strategic depth and using militias in Iraq and Syria to attack US forces will keep conflict confined to Syria. Iranian-backed militias have previously attacked US forces from positions in Iraq and Syria.[11] US forces retaliated with attacks against Iranian-backed militia positions in Syria. Using proxies to attack US forces obfuscates Iran’s role and gives it plausible deniability. Iranian calculations to target US forces in Syria aligns with Iran’s goals in preventing an attack on Iran and Iran’s offensive regional strategy.[12]

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iranian media circulated reports of an IRGC-conducted a drone strike targeting Kurdish Iranian separatist groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan region on June 2. Iranian English-language news outlet West Asia News Agency cited unidentified Iranian outlets claiming that the IRGC bombed headquarters of Kurdish Iranian separatist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan.[13] Iranian-backed proxy Telegram channels circulated the report and added that the IRGC had targeted the separatist groups in a drone strike.[14] Iranian media has not yet reported on this incident, which deviates from the regime’s regular pattern of reporting on Iranian strikes targeting Kurdish separatist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

The Iranian regime is pursuing gas swaps with Turkmenistan, likely to preempt electricity shortages in the summer that could fuel internal unrest. President Ebrahim Raisi discussed increasing the volume of gas swaps with Turkmenistan during a meeting with Turkmenistan People’s Council Chairman Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in Tehran on May 30.[15] Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji separately announced on May 30 that Iran and Turkmenistan will soon sign an agreement for Iran to import 10 million cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan each day.[16] Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan previously signed a gas swap agreement in November 2021 wherein Iran transports Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan via the Iranian city of Astara.[17] This deal allows Iran to use some of the gas it imports from Turkmenistan to supply electricity and heating to its northern provinces. Iranians previously protested power outages in Tehran, Fars, and Mazandaran Provinces in July 2021.[18]

Iranian officials also discussed water problems with Berdymukhamedov on May 30. President Ebrahim Raisi praised Iranian-Turkmen water cooperation and discussed the Friendship Dam—a dam situated along the Iran-Turkmenistan border in Khorasan Razavi Province—during a meeting with high-ranking Turkmen and Iranian officials on May 30.[19] Iranian officials have expressed increased concern over Khorasan Razavi Province’s water supply in recent weeks.[20] Iran’s water discussions with Turkmenistan also coincide with rising tensions over water rights between Iran and Afghanistan. The Raisi administration has placed greater pressure on the Afghan Taliban to release water from the Helmand River to Sistan and Baluchistan Province in recent weeks because it is concerned that water shortages could precipitate unrest in this province.[21]

Iran could decrease the volume of natural gas it keeps from gas swaps with Turkmenistan to gain water concessions. The Turkmen government has no incentive to provide Iran with more water, however, given that many Turkmen farmers rely on the Friendship Dam for water. A regime decision to risk natural gas imports for water concessions would indicate that Iran currently prioritizes water issues over energy issues.

Iranian security personnel violently suppressed an anti-regime demonstration in Abdanan, Ilam Province on June 1, demonstrating that protesters remain undeterred from further protest despite the brutal regime crackdown during the Mahsa Amini movement.[22] Social media users reported that security forces shot at and injured at least 20 individuals protesting the suspicious death of 21-year-old Bamshad Soleimankhani, who died shortly after he was released from prison. CTP previously recorded a significant uptick in anti-regime protests in May 2023 compared to April and March of this year.[23]


[13] https://t dot co/trR9s7uKUk

[15] https://president dot ir/fa/144444

[16] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85126979

[19] https://president dot ir/fa/144440

[20] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5788450

https://www.yjc dot ir/fa/amp/news/8425787

Posted by at
Labels:
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)