Iran Update, April 10, 2023

  Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Zachary Coles, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, James Motamed, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 10, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Palestinian militants expanded rocket attacks into Israel from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip to the Golan Heights. Palestinian militants have carried out a series of rocket attacks into Israel since April 6 in retaliation for Israeli security forces raiding the Al Aqsa Mosque on April 4, as CTP previously reported.[1] The attacks have originated from multiple countries—including the potential Sinai Peninsula attack and a series of terrorist incidents in the West Bank on April 7[2]—and have targeted different areas in Israel. Palestinian militants launched two waves of two or three rockets into Israel from positions in the Golan Heights on April 8.[3] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted several of the rockets and the rest fell on uninhabited terrain near Avnei Eitan approximately five kilometers from the Sea of Galilee.[4] Iran-aligned Lebanese outlet Al Mayadeen claimed the Syria-based Quds Brigade militia carried out the attack.[5] A social media account affiliated with the group denied any involvement in the attack and stated it has no presence in southern Syria.[6] The IDF also downed a Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) quadcopter surveillance drone that crossed into northern Israel on April 7.[7] Israeli open-source intelligence social media accounts widely reported on April 8 that the Egyptian army thwarted an attempt by Iranian-backed Palestinian militants to conduct a rocket attack against Eilat in southern Israel.[8]

The IDF responded to the April 8 attacks by striking Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southwest Syria. IDF artillery and combat drones targeted positions in the Golan Heights occupied by the SAA 90th and 52nd Brigades.[9] The IDF also conducted airstrikes on an SAA radar site, military positions occupied by the Iranian-backed SAA Fourth Division, and an unspecified target near the Yarmouk refugee camp outside Damascus.[10] One of the airstrikes destroyed a road leading to a villa located approximately five kilometers from the Syrian presidential palace and owned by Maher al Assad, the Fourth Division commander and brother of Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[11] CTP has not observed any evidence that SAA personnel were directly involved in the April 8 rocket attacks that originated from the Golan Heights.

Iran may view the Palestinian attacks into Israel as an opportunity to redouble its efforts to transfer air defense and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) into Syria. Iran has long sought to transfer air defense systems and PGMs into Syria and station the equipment at Iranian or Iranian-backed militia sites across the country.[12]CTP previously reported that the Iranian regime has also publicly expressed its intent to sell air defense systems to the Assad regime, although Iranian personnel may still operate the systems sold to the Assad regime.[13] CTP has also previously reported that Israel is conducting an intensive military campaign to disrupt Iranian transportation networks into Syria and destroy sites that house and produce advanced weapons in Syria.[14] The IDF’s attacks into Syria have responded to Palestinian rocket attacks since April 6, however. The last target linked to advanced Iranian weapons that Israel struck was on March 22. Iran may perceive Israel’s focus on the threat of Palestinian militia rocket attacks presents an opportunity to surge PGM and air defense assets into Syria. The maps below show the change in the targets Israel has struck in Syria since April 4, compared to the preceding three months. Israel has focused on Palestinian and SAA locations in southwest Syria during the last week, rather than Iranian convoys transporting weapons, lines of communication, and military production sites.

CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran has facilitated the rocket attacks from Palestinian militants in part to distract Israel from the transfer of Iranian air defense and PGM systems into Syria. Hamas likely needed permission from LH to conduct the April 6 rockets from southern Lebanon, as CTP previously assessed.[15] LH often acts as an intermediary for Iranian coordination with Iranian-backed Palestinian groups. Iran may be urging Hamas to continue rocket attacks to keep Israeli military activity focused away from Iranian efforts to bring PGM and air defense systems into Syria through Damascus and Aleppo airports or via truck. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh met with LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on April 9, suggesting ongoing and high-level coordination of the groups’ military activities.[16] Leadership from Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian militia groups arrived in Damascus on April 10 to allegedly pay their respects to the outgoing Iranian ambassador to Syria.[17] Iranian regime media reported IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani also arrived in Damascus on April 10, which suggests the reason for his visit included meeting with the Palestinian militants.[18]

The Iranian regime is trying to leverage the recent Israeli raids on al Aqsa Mosque to politically unite Muslim countries against Israel and prevent further expansion of the Abraham Accords. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf criticized Israel’s attacks on the Palestinian territories and the recent raid on al Aqsa Mosque and called on OIC countries to “outlaw normalizing relations with Israel and using Israeli goods” on April 10.[19] President Ebrahim Raisi additionally called on Muslim states to condemn the al Aqsa Mosque raids and to form a broad coalition against Israel on multiple occasions between April 6 and 9.[20] Raisi further emphasized how Iran and its Axis of Resistance is beginning to benefit from current regional dynamics.[21] Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani separately stated that Iran is confident that Muslim countries will “rise“ in support of ”the oppressed Palestinian nation“ on April 8.[22] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami argued on April 8 that the pattern of Gulf normalizations with Israel will end following the al Aqsa incident.[23] Interim Tehran Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami similarly stated on April 7 that Iran had reversed attempts to create a united Arab-Israeli anti-Iran front as regional states increasingly seek to normalize ties with Iran, citing the March 10 Iran-Saudi normalization agreement.[24]

Regime attempts to unite the region against Israel coincide with heightened kinetic and rhetorical escalations between Iran and Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi expressed on April 5 Israel’s readiness to preemptively strike Iran without US support.[25] Artesh Commander Major General Abdul Rahim Mousavi responded to Halevi’s comments on April 10, stating that “Israel is too inferior a country to be considered a threat to Iran.”[26] Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari separately warned on April 10 that Iran would provide a “toothbreaking and crushing” response to a foreign attack.[27] Iran and Israel have also been engaged in a tit-for-tat escalation cycle in Syria in recent days, as CTP previously reported.[28] The New York Times separately reported on April 8 that the US had warned Israeli shipping companies of a potential IRGC Aerospace Force drone attack on Israeli tankers in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.[29]

Iranian officials participated in a series of diplomatic engagements between April 7 and 9 to preserve Iranian strategic interests in the Caucasus. The regime’s interests in this region include keeping overland trade routes open, preventing Israel from operating against Iran from Azerbaijan, and preempting the spread of separatist sentiments among Iran’s Azeri minority. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani discussed the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) in separate meetings with Armenian National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Russian Presidential Aide Igor Levitin in Tehran on April 9.[30] The INSTC is a land route through the Caucasus which enables Iran to export products to Russia and Europe. Shamkhani may have discussed the INSTC with Grigoryan and Levitin in the context of Azerbaijani efforts to link mainland Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region—an Azerbaijani exclave in western Armenia.[31] Connecting the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region to mainland Azerbaijan would cut off Iran from an overland route in the Caucasus.[32] The regime regards territorial changes in the Caucasus as a threat to Iran’s internal security, likely fearing that territorial changes could precipitate calls for separatism among Iran’s large Azeri minority in northwestern Iran.[33] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately held two phone calls with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov on April 7 and 8.[34] Iranian state media reported that Abdollahian and Bayramov discussed “misunderstandings” between Iran and Azerbaijan, likely referring to the regime’s disapproval of growing Azerbaijani-Israeli ties.[35] Regime officials have strongly criticized Azerbaijan’s decision to open an embassy in Israel in recent days.[36] The regime has additionally repeatedly accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to use its territory as a base to organize and launch operations against Iran, as CTP previously reported.[37]

The regime has failed to prevent further poisonings as Iranian officials issue inconsistent messaging about the nature of the attacks. CTP recorded at least twenty-two student poisoning incidents between April 8 and 10 across twelve cities and eight provinces, resulting in several hospitalizations.[38] Iranian social media users circulated uncorroborated reports that the Ministry of Guidance advised Iranian state-owned and state-affiliated media to avoid covering poisonings and poisoning-related incidents.[39] CTP did not observe Iranian state-owned and state-affiliated media coverage of poisonings following this report although more instances of poisonings did occur, which adheres to the uncorroborated reports. Impacted students’ symptoms remain consistent with prior incidents of reported poisonings throughout March and early last week.[40] Deputy Health Minister Saeed Karimi stated that at least ten percent of the affected students showed respiratory symptoms, acknowledging in effect that the symptoms are not psychosomatic as regime officials have previously claimed.[41] Parliament Poisoning Fact-Finding Commission Head Hamid Reza Kazemi similarly acknowledged that poisonings occurred, but denied reports of student hospitalizations.[42] Parliamentarian Mehrdad Karami denied that poisonings were deliberate attacks, arguing that students were nauseated by ”the smell of oil.”[43] A reliable Kurdish human rights organization Hengaw separately reported that one 16-year-old male student died on April 9 due to complications from a poisoning attack last month in Tehran, directly contradicting Karami’s statement.[44]

Protest activity increased sharply on April 9 in response to deteriorating economic conditions and recent student poisonings. CTP recorded 18 protests in 16 cities across 12 provinces on April 9. The majority of these protests were economically motivated, indicating that the regime’s success in stabilizing the Iranian rial in recent days has not been sufficient to alleviate economic hardships among large segments of the population.[45] Various government officials and institutions have announced in recent weeks that Iran’s inflation rate hovers between 40 and 50 percent, making it difficult for many Iranians—such as retirees with fixed incomes—to afford basic goods.[46] Residents in Saghez, Kurdistan Province additionally protested the poisoning of schoolgirls in this city on April 9.[47] Iranian social media users circulated videos of security forces reportedly shooting at protesters in Saghez, highlighting the regime’s sensitivity to the issue of student poisonings.[48] CTP previously observed similar levels of protest activity on March 13 and 14, when Iranian citizens participated in anti-regime protests for Chahar Shanbeh Souri.[49] The Chahar Shanbeh Souri protests were primarily fueled by general anti-regime frustrations as opposed to poor economic conditions, however.

Key Takeaways

• Palestinian militants expanded rocket attacks into Israel from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip to the Golan Heights.
• The IDF responded to the April 8 attacks by striking Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southwest Syria.
• Iran may view the Palestinian attacks into Israel as an opportunity to redouble its efforts to transfer air defense and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) into Syria.
• CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran has facilitated the rocket attacks from Palestinian militants in part to distract Israel from the transfer of Iranian air defense and PGM systems into Syria.
• Iranian officials participated in a series of diplomatic engagements between April 7 and 9 to preserve Iranian strategic interests in the Caucasus.
• The Iranian regime is trying to leverage the recent Israeli raids on al Aqsa Mosque to politically unite Muslim countries against Israel and prevent further expansion of the Abraham Accords.
• Protest activity increased sharply on April 9 in response to deteriorating economic conditions and recent student poisonings.
• At least five protests occurred in five cities across five provinces on April 8, 18 protests occurred in 16 cities across 12 provinces on April 9, and one protest occurred in one city across one province on April 10.
• Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Chief Ahmad Reza Radan announced that the LEC will begin using advanced surveillance capabilities to widely enforce mandatory veiling in public spaces on April 15.
• The Iranian rial remained relatively stable between April 7 and April 10, depreciating from 505,500 rials to one US dollar on April 7 to 506,000 rials to one US dollar on April 10.
• IRGC-affiliated media circulated reports of cabinet reshuffles within the Raisi administration’s economic team.
• Iranian and Saudi officials continued to discuss reestablishing diplomatic relations on April 10.
• IRGC Ground Force (GF) Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization Head Ali Kouhestani announced on April 9 that the IRGC-GF had successfully tested the new Meraj-532 kamikaze drone.
• Iranian-backed militants launched two rockets at US Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor province, Syria on April 10.
• Iranian-backed militants deployed to Al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor province on April 10.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least five protests occurred in five cities across five provinces on April 8. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[50]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Farmers

Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province[51]

• Size: Medium
• Demographic: Nurses and emergency personnel

Tehran City, Tehran Province[52]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Shahid Beheshti University students protesting mandatory veiling

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Jolfa, East Azerbaijan Province[53]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Jolfa Aras Paraplastic Company workers

Divandarreh, Kurdistan Province[54]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Protesting student poisonings

At least 18 protests occurred in 16 cities across 12 provinces on April 9. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[55]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

Ghazvin City, Ghazvin Province[56]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Family members of Javad Heydari

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[57]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication retirees

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[58]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Shoush, Khuzestan Province[59]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Shoushtar, Khuzestan Province[60]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Saghez, Kurdistan Province[61]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Protesting student poisonings

Yazd City, Yazd Province[62]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Ardabil, Ardabil Province[63]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication retirees

Hamedan City, Hamedan Province[64]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication retirees

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[65]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province[66]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

Bandar Mahshahr, Khuzestan Province[67]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Fired workers

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[68]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Electricity operators

Marivan, Kurdistan Province[69]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

Khorramabad, Lorestan Province[70]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication retirees

Arak, Markazi Province[71]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province[72]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

At least one protest occurred in one city across one province on April 10. CTP assesses with high confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Ghazvin City, Ghazvin Province[73]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Nurses

Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Chief Ahmad Reza Radan announced that the LEC will begin using advanced surveillance capabilities to widely enforce mandatory veiling in public spaces on April 15. Radan clarified that the LEC would send identified unveiled women a “warning text” and impound the vehicles of second-time offenders. Some Iranian officials have recently suggested that repeat offenders may also face fines and other legal consequences.[74] Radan noted that mandatory veiling standards extended to shopkeepers and restaurant owners who service unveiled women and warned that the LEC would continue to seal such facilities.[75] The LEC—the entity that encompassed the Morality Patrol that led to the violent killing of Mahsa Amini on September 16 and months of anti-regime protests—is publicly resuming hijab enforcement. CTP previously assessed on December 23 that the regime would expand an Orwellian surveillance-punishment model relying on collective punishment through shutting down non-compliant businesses and remote punishments such as seizing financial assets in state banks as alternatives to physical confrontations.[76]

Economic Affairs

The Iranian rial remained relatively stable between April 7 and April 10, depreciating from 505,500 rials to one US dollar on April 7 to 506,000 rials to one US dollar on April 10.[77]

IRGC-affiliated media circulated reports of cabinet reshuffles within the Raisi administration’s economic team. IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reported that Program and Budgeting Organization Head Massoud Mir Kazemi will resign at an unspecified date and be replaced with high-ranking tax official Davoud Manzour.[78] Another IRGC-affiliated outlet, Tasnim News Agency, separately reported that Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Ehsan Khandouzi will resign in the coming weeks without providing further details.[79]

Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy

Iranian and Saudi officials continued to discuss reestablishing diplomatic relations on April 10. Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani confirmed the presence of a Saudi “technical” delegation in Tehran on April 10 and announced that an Iranian delegation will travel to Saudi Arabia “in the next two to three days.” Kanani added that Iran and Saudi Arabia are in the process of appointing ambassadors.[80] The Saudi Ambassador to Oman Abdollah bin Saud Al-Anzi separately met with his Iranian counterpart Ali Najafi in Muscat on April 10.[81]

External Security and Military Affairs

IRGC Ground Force (IRGC-GF) Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization Head Ali Kouhestani announced on April 9 that the IRGC-GF had successfully tested the new Meraj-532 kamikaze drone. The Meraj drone can allegedly travel 450 km in a one-way mission, has a maximum altitude of 3.6 km, can stay aloft for three hours, and can carry a 50 kg warhead.[82]

Iranian-backed militants launched two rockets at US Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor province, Syria on April 10. US CENTCOM stated that one rocket landed within the vicinity of the outpost and the other crashed shortly after launch.[83] The attack did not harm any US personnel or property. Iranian-backed militants last targeted US forces in eastern Syria on March 25, as CTP previously reported.[84]

Iranian-backed militants deployed to Al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor province on April 10. Two buses of militants from Fatemiyoun Division—Iran’s Afghan Shia proxy—arrived in Al Mayadin from positions in the vicinity of Palmyra, Homs province. Eye of Euphrates reported that local Lebanese Hezbollah and IRGC Quds Force leadership received the militants upon their arrival.[85] A separate convoy of Fatemiyoun militants crossed the Al Qaim Iraq-Syria border crossing before stopping in Al Mayadin.[86] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights similarly reported that four buses of Syrian Arab Army Fourth Division militants similarly arrived in Al Mayadin from Homs and Hama Provinces.[87]

Unidentified militants crashed two kamikaze drones in Duhok and Erbil provinces on April 10. Shafaq News reported that local security officials are examining the wreckage and have not issued a statement on the likely perpetrators.[88] An Iranian proxy Telegram channel posted a video of the drone that crashed in Duhok province.[89] The drone does not appear to match any kamikaze drone models that the IRGC or Iranian-backed militants possess. Iranian Arabic media outlet Al Ahad claimed one of the drones targeted US forces at Erbil International Airport.[90] CTP has not observed any evidence to corroborate this claim.

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[1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-7-2023

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-65211160

[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-65224316

[4] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1644785790025625601?s=20; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1644858531886006274?s=20

[5] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-65224316

[6] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=529899076021778&set=a.394653492879671

[7] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1644363533486809091?s=20

[8] https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1644822471999205376?s=20; ﷟HYPERLINK "https://twitter.com/TheIsraelink/status/1644802263813181442?s=20"https://twitter.com/TheIsraelink/status/1644802263813181442?s=20;

[9] https://www.syriahr dot com/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82/600317/; https://www.sana dot sy/?p=1872636&tg_rhash=d4b381eabcd5f1; https://www.enabbaladi dot net/archives/637144

[10] https://suwayda24 dot com/?p=21039; https://www.enabbaladi dot net/archives/637144; https://www.syriahr dot com/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82/600317/; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1644900197573468160?s=20

[11] https://www.qasioun-news dot com/ar/articles/261824

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-13-2023

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-7-2023

[14] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-7-2023

[15] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-7-2023

[16] https://www.haaretz dot com/middle-east-news/2023-04-09/ty-article/.premium/hezbollahs-nasrallah-meets-hamas-chief-haniyeh-in-lebanon-after-rocket-barrage-on-israel/00000187-652a-dde0-afb7-7f3b5a210000

[17] https://almanar dot com.lb/10522096

[18] https://kayhan dot london/1402/01/20/316823/

[19] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402012110424/%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7-%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%81-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B1%DA%98%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B5%D9%87%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF ;

[20] https://president dot ir/fa/143218 ; https://president dot ir/fa/143221 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-7-2023

[21] https://president dot ir/fa/143222

[22] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85078597/%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%BE%DB%8C%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%DA%AF%D8%B4%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%88-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%84%DA%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA

[23] https://www.farsnews dot ir/en/news/14020120000255/IRGC-Chief-Underlines-Arab-Nains-Unwillingness-Nrmalize-Ties-wih ; https://www.hamshahrionline dot ir/news/752626/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%84%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AD%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%AA-%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF-%D9%87%DB%8C%DA%86-%DA%A9%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A2%D9%86-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA

[24] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/18/2876592/خاتمی-مشکلات-اقتصادی-زیربنای-بخشی-از-آسیب-های-فرهنگی-است-از-کارهای-خودسرانه-در-مسئله-حجاب-پرهیز-شود

[25] https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/04/05/Israel-ready-to-attack-Iran-can-do-so-without-US-help-IDF-chief

[26] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85078855/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%DA%A9%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%B1%DA%98%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%B5%D9%87%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%82%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3-%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[27] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1402012110432/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A2%D8%AA%DB%8C

[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2023

[29] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/08/world/middleeast/us-submarine-middle-east-iran.html#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20Navy%20said,to%20a%20U.S.%20Navy%20spokesman.

[30] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85077970/%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%88%DB%8C%DA%98%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%86%D9%87-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%B4%D8%AA ;

https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85078429/%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B4-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87-%D9%82%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%87%DB%8C%DA%86-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA

[31] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/8/analysis-will-azerbaijan-iran-tensions-lead-to-war

[32] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/8/analysis-will-azerbaijan-iran-tensions-lead-to-war

[33] https://www.mei.edu/publications/streets-border-irans-growing-paranoia-toward-azerbaijan

[34] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85077283/%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[35] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85077283/%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[36] https://amwaj dot media/media-monitor/iran-azerbaijan-tensions-mount-as-baku-engages-with-israel

[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-6-2023

[38] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644667955580379138?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644642380497207299?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644666845239160834?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644626128882003975?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644666845239160834?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644616662082023425 ; https://twitter.com/huburz/status/1644649696671985666?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644625330605371392?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644647907901988867?s=20 ; https://t.co/8FOLCntgtV ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644630945893347332?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644666845239160834 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644669596421562370?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1644666845239160834?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1645015742922776578?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1645004476384702467?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1645002049308839936?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1644996999832371200?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1645009851737571328?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1645350870698131456?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1645393286989852672?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1645370396684722177?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1645359851600506882?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1645357505562722304?s=20 ; https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/crgqp44v225o

[39] https://twitter.com/Vahid/status/1645074730414665730?s=20 ; https://youtu.be/yaEn4UkWWzM

[40] https://t dot co/quUKMs6ZQU ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-5-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-4-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-3-2023

[41] https://t dot co/quUKMs6ZQU

[42] https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/crgqp44v225o

[43] https://www.instagram.com/p/Cq0N1vPNerM/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link

[44] https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1645067491838754816?s=20

[45] https://bonbast dot com/

[46] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/720288/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86%DA%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%81%D9%86%D8%AF-%DB%B4%DB%B6%DB%B5-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B5%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AF ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/07/2872234/موتور-تولید-تورم-خاموش-شد-تورم-50-سال-پیش-ریشه-دواند ; https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202303269039

[47] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645041808651563009?s=20

[48] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645036479087820800?cxt=HHwWgIC2qcj9q9QtAAAA

[49] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-13-2023 ;

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-14-2023

[50] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644639802241720323?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1644623141644148736?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1644689259205369858?cxt=HHwWhICxzdqKjtMtAAAA

[51] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644593490498666501?cxt=HHwWioC-kZ7E4tItAAAA ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644639173150666752?cxt=HHwWgMCztain99ItAAAA ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644641385801211907?cxt=HHwWhoCz-Y2o-NItAAAA ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1644615243769757698?cxt=HHwWhIC20bi27NItAAAA ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1644596649983868929?cxt=HHwWgoCwkZL849ItAAAA

[52] https://twitter.com/Davoudlotfi/status/1645159693742923777?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1645110928973737985?cxt=HHwWgsC9mY_rzdQtAAAA

[53] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644665671739928576?cxt=HHwWgMCzpd6tg9MtAAAA

[54] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644749965518946304

[55] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645035477538357248?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645042666634203136?s=20

[56] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645062597518000128?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1645293235160350722?s=20

[57] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644987151325573121?cxt=HHwWgsC97afGldQtAAAA ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1644998415422566401?cxt=HHwWgsC99fvVmtQtAAAA

[58] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645054841587216386?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645076402016866304?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1645112053307252736?s=20

[59] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644979342412242944?cxt=HHwWgICz9eL_kdQtAAAA ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1644994106400153600?cxt=HHwWgIC9mZPbmNQtAAAA ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1644996762812272640?cxt=HHwWgMC-geP1mdQtAAAA ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644992398521425920?s=20

[60] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645038673266720772?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645046336289484802?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1645140382542331904?s=20

[61] https://www.instagram.com/reel/Cq0kLOHohDE/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/Cq0Z3AwNylg/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/Cqz9OCnNqW2/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link ; https://www.instagram.com/reel/Cq0FUPnook5/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645036973139058690?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645041808651563009?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645041760882622466?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645030115552665601?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1645027692679512064?s=20

[62] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644989728607858689?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645022700006518784?s=20

[63] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645051144274583556?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645088650194046979?s=20

[64] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645005677570424834?cxt=HHwWhICwkdf8ndQtAAAA

[65] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645065632843550722?s=20

[66] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644988912136339456?s=20

[67] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645095865286000640?s=20

[68] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1644973096799961091?cxt=HHwWhoCwvZ2Uj9QtAAAA ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644974256441245696?cxt=HHwWgIC-vd3Xj9QtAAAA

[69] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644988208705355776?s=20

[70] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645005677570424834?cxt=HHwWhICwkdf8ndQtAAAA ; https://twitter.com/ArefRahmini/status/1645065496058896384?s=20

[71] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645015581857284099?s=20

[72] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1644990303500107778?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645015581857284099?s=20

[73] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645341540418560000?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1645389923141275649?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1645344753322536965?s=20 ; https://twitter.com/VOAfarsi/status/1645506432630923264?s=20

[74] https://www.instagram.com/p/Cq0nmD4tyKf/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link ; https://t dot co/iKoTALsL0Z

[75] https://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020119000853/برخورد-جدی-پلیس-با-کشف-حجاب-از-شنبه-۲۶-فروردین-سردار-رادان-تاکید-کرد

[76] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-december-23

[77] Bonbast dot com

[78] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202304095176

[79] https://t dot co/1F9VaAVoaO ; https://t. co/JSWMpQwUwN

[80] https://t dot co/C69bTzDv4H ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/8/saudi-foreign-ministry-says-delegation-arrives-in-iran

[81] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85079062/%D8%B3%D9%81%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA

[82] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/04/09/2877484/irgc-tests-new-suicide-drone-with-50-kg-of-ammo

[83] https://www.inherentresolve.mil/NEWSROOM/News-Articles/Stories-Display/Article/3357442/cjtf-oir-commander-condemns-attack-in-deir-ez-zor-syria/; https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1645498000440008713?s=20

[84] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-31-2023

[85] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/04/09/8189

[86] https://www.qasioun-news dot com/ar/articles/261793

[87] https://www.syriahr dot com/%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%af%d9%85%d8%a9-%d9%85%d9%86-%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%81%d8%b8%d8%aa%d9%8a-%d8%ad%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%ad%d9%85%d8%b5-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81%d8%b1%d9%82%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%a7/600409/

[88] https://www.shafaq dot com/en/Kurdistan/Unidentified-drone-crashes-in-Duhok

[89] https://t.me/sabreenS1/73867

[90] https://twitter.com/ahad_en/status/1645419114616303617?s=20

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 10, 2023

 Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 10, 7pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is reportedly advancing his political aspirations by seeking to gain control of a Russian political party. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s growing cooperation with members of the A Just Russia — For Truth party likely indicates that Prigozhin seeks to gain control over the party.[1] Meduza noted that four members of the party left to form a new movement, with some members citing the rapprochement between party leader Sergey Mironov and Prigozhin as the reason for their exit.[2] ISW has consistently reported on the growing relationship between Mironov and Prigozhin and assessed that Mironov’s advocacy for recognition of Wagner in Russia could trigger further fractionalization within the Kremlin.[3] Two Kremlin sources and one St. Petersburg government insider claimed that Prigozhin is pursuing a leadership position within A Just Russia — For Truth’s St. Petersburg branch to compete with St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov for influence in the city. Meduza’s sources claimed that Prigozhin previously was interested in investing in the “Motherland” political party and may be interested in pursuing a position on the federal level. Mironov, in turn, is likely attempting to revive his political influence and use Prigozhin as a patron for his political ambitions. Meduza’s interlocutors indicated that the Russian Presidential Administration is unlikely to allow Prigozhin to gain control of the A Just Russia — For Truth party due to Prigozhin’s conflict with administration officials and with Beglov.

The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) directly responded to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s criticisms of its agenda for Russia’s presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), marking the first time that a Russian government institution has formally responded Prigozhin’s criticism. Prigozhin criticized the MFA’s work in Africa on April 7, claiming that the Russian MFA does “absolutely nothing” and that Wagner forces face “enormous difficulties” when interacting with the MFA and other government institutions in the region.[4] The MFA responded to Prigozhin’s criticism on April 9 and said that it is ready to cooperate with Russian businesses and entrepreneurs to promote Russian businesses abroad and that a number of upcoming events under Russia’s UNSC chairmanship are dedicated to African issues.[5] Prigozhin then responded to the MFA, questioning its ability to solve problems through the UNSC, and published a list of 15 issues that Prigozhin believes require urgent discussion at the UNSC, most of which relate to support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Africa.[6]

The Russian MFA’s attack on Prigozhin is a continuation of the Kremlin’s efforts to discredit and undermine Prigozhin. The MFA, other Russian government institutions, and Kremlin affiliates likely seek to shut down any attempts by Prigozhin to garner public or political support. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) refused to name Wagner forces as participants in the battle of Bakhmut, referring instead to “assault detachments.”[7] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov indirectly accused Prigozhin of deliberately exposing conflicts between the MoD and Wagner.[8] Russian political scientist Aleksey Mukhin — who contributes to the Kremlin-affiliated Valdai Discussion Club and Russian state media — criticized Prigozhin for pursuing political objectives that endanger Wagner forces in Bakhmut.[9] Prigozhin likely criticized the Russian MFA agenda in the UNSC in an effort to portray himself as a capable statesman able to influence foreign affairs and to garner support from the Russian ultranationalist community. Prigozhin continues to attempt to aggrandize himself by exaggerating Wagner forces’ role in Russian successes in Ukraine and using his prominence in the Russian nationalist information space to criticize the Russian government.[10]

Russian milbloggers adamantly decried the charging of Russian military doctor and “Union of Donbas Volunteers” member Yuri Yevich for “discrediting the Russian armed forces,” suggesting that the broad applications of this new law will likely be a growing source of discontent in the pro-war information space. Russian authorities reportedly charged Yevich under the discreditation law because of a lecture on tactical medicine he gave to Rosgvardia employees, which someone reported to the authorities as offering a “negative assessment” of Russian forces.[11] Yevich fought with Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) militias in Donbas after 2014 and was a part of the ”Union of Donbas volunteers” following the full-scale invasion in 2022.[12] Yevich became popular in the pro-war Russian information space for popularizing and advocating for the application of tactical combat medicine on the battlefield.[13] Several pro-war milbloggers and commentators seized on the news of Yevich’s arrest and criticized Russian authorities for targeting someone whom they deem to be a true Russian patriot.[14] Many milbloggers noted that Yevich’s charging will become a carte blanche for Russian authorities to sanction every Russian soldier, volunteer, and patriot and questioned the legitimacy of both the case against Yevich and the law itself.[15] Yevich likely presented an important truth regarding the state of Russian combat medicine to an internal audience and was arrested for it. If the Kremlin uses this law to shut down honest critiques of the performance of Russian forces or the Russian government even during internal discussions it runs a very high risk of repeating the kinds of fundamental errors that led to the failure of the initial Russian plans and campaign in February 2022.

The Russian State Duma will consider an amendment to the Russian Criminal Code increasing criminal penalties for high treason and terrorist activities on April 13.[16] The Russian State Duma Committee on State Construction and Legislation approved amendments to the Russian Criminal Code that would introduce life prison sentences for high treason and increase prison sentences for terrorist activities, including conducting terrorist activities, aiding terrorist activities, sabotaging transport and health infrastructure and, organizing and participating in a terrorist society.[17] The Russian Criminal Code’s definition of treason is likely intentionally vague, including espionage, passing state secrets to foreign governments or their representatives, and providing financial, logistical, consulting, or other assistance to foreign organizations engaged in activities directed against Russian state security.[18] Such legislative manipulations are part of a larger domestic effort to encourage self-censorship and codify conditions for domestic repressions, as ISW has previously reported.[19]

Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus, on April 10. Shoigu and Lukashenko mainly used the meeting to reiterate boilerplate rhetoric that emphasized the strength of Russian and Belarusian bilateral cooperation and blamed NATO and the collective West for threatening Belarusian territorial integrity.[20] Lukashenko expressed his gratitude that Russia maintains a military presence in Belarus and accused Poland and Lithuania of threatening the Belarusian borders, while Shoigu thanked Lukashenko for providing Belarusian training grounds for the use of Russian troops.[21]

Key Takeaways

•  Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is reportedly advancing his political aspirations by seeking to gain control of a Russian political party.
• Putin may be unable to satisfy the role of a patron to loyalist figures to the same extent as he had been able to before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) directly responded to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s criticisms of its agenda at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), marking the first time that a Russian government institution has formally responded to Prigozhin’s criticism.
• The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) attack on Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is a continuation of the Kremlin’s efforts to discredit and undermine Prigozhin.
• Russian milbloggers adamantly decried the charging of Russian military doctor and “Union of Donbas Volunteers” member Yuri Yevich for “discrediting the Russian armed forces,” suggesting that the broad applications of this new law will likely be a growing source of discontent in the pro-war information space.
• The Russian State Duma will consider an amendment to the Russian Criminal Code increasing criminal penalties for high treason and terrorist activities on April 13.
• Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus, on April 10.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued to make territorial gains in and around Bakhmut, and continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces continued defensive preparations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin criticized Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) prisoner recruitment efforts, likely in an effort to advertise ongoing Wagner volunteer recruitment campaigns.
• Wagner forces are reportedly continuing to commit war crimes by beheading Ukrainian servicemen in Bakhmut.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to deport children to Russia under the guise of medical, rehabilitation, and voluntary evacuation schemes.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka and Chervonopopivka (within 21km northwest of Kreminna), and south of Kreminna near Kuzmyne, Dibrova, Bilohorivka, and Verkhnokamianske (all within 3 to 18km south of Kreminna).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Yampolivka, Torske, Nevske, and Makiivka (all within 14 to 21km west or northwest of Kreminna).[23] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces gained new positions in the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[24] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on April 9 that seven engagements occurred in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[25] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov published footage on April 8 that purportedly shows Chechen ”Akhmat” Special Forces and elements of the 4th Brigade of the 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Army Corps operating near Kreminna and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[26] A Russian BARS (Combat Reserve)- affiliated source published footage on April 9 that reportedly shows the BARS-14 Battalion operating on the Svatove-Kreminna line.[27] Several Russian milbloggers posted footage on April 8 and 9 that claims to show Russian Airborne (VDV) units operating near Kreminna.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to make territorial gains in and around Bakhmut on April 9 and 10 but likely continue to suffer significant casualties. Geolocated footage posted on April 9 and 10 shows that Russian forces made marginal advances northwest of Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut), in southwest Bakhmut, and north of Sacco i Vanzetti (15km north of Bakhmut.[29] Ukrainian Spokesperson for the Eastern Group of Forces Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on April 9 that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces began to appear in Bakhmut likely to reinforce conventional, rather than Wagner Group, forces.[30] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on April 10 that Ukrainian forces have exhausted Wagner forces so much that the Russian military command has had to send SPETSNAZ and VDV elements to Bakhmut.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made advances in northwestern Bakhmut and in central Bakhmut near the railway on April 9 and 10.[32] A milblogger claimed on April 10 that Russian forces made advances in central and southern Bakhmut.[33] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed to visit Bakhmut and presented DNR awards to Wagner Group fighters.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks in Bakhmut and near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and Khromove.[35]

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Avdiivka, Novokalynove (9km north of Avdiivka), Berdychi (7km northwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka), Vodyane (6km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made marginal advances near Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka), Novokalynove, and Novobakhmutivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka).[37] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Keramik (10km north of Avdiivka), Sieverne, Pervomaiske, and Pobieda (5km southwest of Donetsk City).[38] Geolocated footage posted on April 9 shows that Russian forces made a marginal advance in southwestern Marinka.[39]

A Ukrainian official indicated that the tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Donetsk direction is slowing, and that Russian forces are engaging in defensive preparations. Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Head Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 9 that the tempo of Russian ground attacks has decreased in this sector of the front and that Russian forces are now shelling at a rate one third less than that of February 2023.[40] Dmytrashkivskyi also reported that Russian forces have concentrated 205 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the Donetsk direction out of fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[41] These BTGs are unlikely to be at full strength, however.

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on April 9 and 10. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 9 that Ukrainian forces conducted an unsuccessful ground attack near Novosilka (42km northwest of Vuhledar).[42]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive preparations in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued building defensive lines and fortifications in the Kherson and Zaporizhia directions on April 9 and 10.[43] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Head Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 9 that Russian forces are intensively equipping and mining defensive positions in Zaporizhia Oblast and have concentrated 113 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in this direction out of fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[44] It is however highly unlikely that any of these BTGs are at full strength or operating in a manner consistent with Russian doctrine considering widespread Russian manpower and equipment losses in previous phases of the war. Satellite imagery shows that Russian forces constructed additional fortifications around Vasylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast between March 2 and March 22.[45] A local Kherson Oblast Telegram channel reported on April 10 that Russian forces are attempting to simulate their withdrawal from Nova Kakhovka to mislead Ukrainian troops and disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensive plans.[46]

Russian forces conducted artillery and missile strikes throughout southern Ukraine on April 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 10 that Russian forces launched two S-300 missiles at civilian objects in Zaporizhia Oblast over the past day.[47] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated on April 9 that six Russian Su-35 aircraft attacked the Beryslav area of Kherson Oblast with guided aerial bombs and Kh-31 anti-radar missiles on the night of April 8 to 9.[48] Russian forces continued routine shelling of Kherson, Mykolayiv, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on April 9 and 10.[49] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly showing Russian forces using a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system to strike Ukrainian positions near Ochakiv, Mykolayiv Oblast.[50] Another Russian milblogger noted that artillery units of the 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) struck Ukrainian positions in Orikhiv, Zaporizhia Oblast on April 8.[51]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for its efforts to recruit prisoners, likely in an effort to advertise ongoing Wagner volunteer recruitment campaigns. Prigozhin responded to a media inquiry about Russian MoD recruitment of prisoners on 18-month contracts, stating that Wagner was first to recruit prisoners because it was felt that convict forces would damage the image of the Russian conventional forces.[52] Prigozhin emphasized that Wagner convicts served only for six months. Prigozhin insinuated that the Russian MoD would treat convicts worse than Wagner treated them to further advertise recruitment into Wagner and discredit the MoD’s recruitment efforts. The insinuation seems odd given that Wagner reportedly used convicts in human wave attacks that cost thousands of them their lives. A local Yekaterinburg outlet reported that Wagner established mobile recruitment points in at least eight towns in Sverdlovsk Oblast offering salaries of 240,000 rubles (about $2,940 USD) with bonuses.[53] Prigozhin’s press service also published a recruitment ad for prospective volunteers between 21 and 60 years of age.[54]

Wagner forces are reportedly continuing to commit war crimes by beheading Ukrainian servicemen in Bakhmut. Russian social media users published footage purportedly showing the remains of a head belonging to a Ukrainian serviceman on a spike at an unspecified area in Bakhmut.[55] Social media users recalled similar instances of skulls mounted on spikes in Popasna, Luhansk Oblast, where Wagner troops operated over spring–summer of 2022.[56] The Geneva Convention prohibits the mutilation and despoilment of dead bodies in war.[57]

Russian federal subjects are continuing to expand domestic volunteer recruitment efforts. A Russian online news aggregator reported that Moscow officials launched an online volunteer recruitment website advertising contract service for Moscow residents.[58] Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan Radiy Khabirov stated that the republic is entertaining proposals to form another volunteer motorized rifle regiment and announced the deployment of the “Vatan” volunteer battalion to Ukraine over the upcoming days.[59] A local Khabarovsk Krai outlet reported that the region is recruiting personnel for the “Khabarovsk” and “Kofra“ volunteer battalions.[60] The outlet noted that the Khabarovsk volunteer battalion is open to all civilians with or without military training, whereas the “Kofra” signals battalion is recruiting volunteers with past signals experience or civilian professional experience in the field. Khabarovsk Krai officials are planning to form an infantry battalion with mortar elements and drone operators.

Russian sources complained about the mediocre performance of the Russian “Nevsky” volunteer detachment — complaints that likely apply to other Russian volunteer battalions operating in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Nevsky volunteer detachment — which now calls itself a brigade - conducted mediocre assaults on Ukrainian positions through a minefield without armor or artillery.[61] The milblogger claimed that the detachment has some professional servicemen but that many contract servicemen are leaving their units. The milblogger also published footage showing one Nevsky serviceman accidentally shooting at another Russian serviceman.[62] Nevsky detachment is continuing to recruit personnel for a wide variety of positions.[63]

Russian businessmen and personnel are continuing to exploit the Russian war effort for their benefit. The Moscow City Court canceled the international warrant for Russian businessman Alexander Dagutsy who reportedly transferred $24 million USD abroad after he had reportedly joined the 108th Guards Kuban Cossack Air Assault Regiment.[64] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that Russian military personnel and private military companies are participating in illegal arms exchanges and are selling weapons to locals in Russian border areas.[65]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to deport children to Russia under the guise of medical, rehabilitation, and voluntary evacuation schemes. The Ukrainian Office of the General Prosecutor issued a notice of suspicion against a Crimea-based businesswoman under accusations that she has helped deport 1,000 Ukrainian children and 64 guardians to Sevastopol, Crimea, under the guise of tourism and voluntary evacuation.[66] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed on April 10 that Russia has returned 10 Ukrainian children and their mothers to Horlivka, Luhansk Oblast, after they reportedly received medical treatment at the Klyazma sanitorium in Moscow Oblast.[67] Ukrainian news outlet Suspilne Novosti on April 10 shared the story of a 16-year-old boy whom Russian forces had illegally transported to a political re-education camp after he had spent two weeks resting at the “Dream” sanatorium in Yevpatoria, Crimea.[68] Suspilne Novosti amplified reports that Russian occupation authorities continue to brainwash Ukrainian children at re-education camps in Russia, coercing them to abandon their Ukrainian identity and instead show pro-Russia sentiment.[69] LNR head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on April 9 that occupation authorities have conducted professional medical evaluations on more than 94,000 Ukrainian children in occupied Luhansk Oblast, thousands of whom Russian occupation officials have since deported to Russia for medical treatment.[70] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereschuk stated on April 10 that Russia is illegally holding 4,396 deported Ukrainian children in Russia and announced that Ukraine is forming an international coalition to return the children to Ukraine.[71]

Russian federal subjects continue to formalize patronage-like partnerships in an effort to bring the standard of living in occupied territories up to the Russian standard. Russian Minister of Health Mikhail Murashko announced that the Henichesk Central District Hospital in Kherson Oblast will become the leading medical institution in occupied Kherson Oblast. Murashko stated that Krasnodor Krai has allocated 200 million rubles (about $2.5 million USD) to sponsor repairs and the purchase of modern medical equipment. Murashko set out measures to complete the repair of old and construction of new buildings at the facility by the end of 2023.[72]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Russian and Belarusian forces continued combat training in Belarus on April 9 and 10. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage and imagery of Belarusian forces conducting exercises as part of an ongoing combat readiness check.[73] The Ukrainian General Staff noted on April 10 that certain unspecified Russian units continue to serve on Belarusian territory but reiterated that there are no signs of the formation of a Russian offensive group in Belarus.[74] The Ukrainian Resistance Center cited Belarusian partisans on April 10 who reported that Russian forces are training with the Belarusian 38th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade at the Brest training ground in Brest Oblast and that there are growing frictions between Russian and Belarusian forces during training.[75]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

---

[1] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/04/10/on-hochet-svoyu-partiyu

[2] https://meduza dot io/feature/2023/04/10/on-hochet-svoyu-partiyu

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2023

[4] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3019

[5] https://t.me/MID_Russia/26900

[6] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/718

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2023

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2023

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2023

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7;

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2023

[11] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/10/voennogo-vracha-obvinili-v-diskreditatsii-armii-iz-za-prochitannoy-im-lektsii-dlya-rosgvardii-za-nego-vstupilis-voenkory-i-gubernator

[12] https://theins dot ru/news/260822

[13] https://theins dot ru/news/260822; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/10/voennogo-vracha-obvinili-v-diskreditatsii-armii-iz-za-prochitannoy-im-lektsii-dlya-rosgvardii-za-nego-vstupilis-voenkory-i-gubernator; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24086; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24094 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/6367; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82595 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/56550

[14] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24086; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/24094 ; https://t.me/rsotmdivision/6367; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82595; https://t.me/strelkovii/4467 ; https://t.me/tvtacticalmed/666; https://t.me/strelkovii/4475 ; https://t.me/Topaz_Govorit/4031; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/22642; https://t.me/readovkanews/56550; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/22668; https://t.me/olegtsarov/5952

[15] https://t.me/strelkovii/4475 ; https://t.me/Topaz_Govorit/4031; https://t.me/pgubarev/611; https://t.me/strelkovii/4493

[16] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/895213; https://ria dot ru/20230410/gosizmena-1864199735.html

[17] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/895213; https://ria dot ru/20230410/gosizmena-1864199735.html

[18] https://борисово-адм dot рф/statja-275-gosudarstvennaja-izmena/

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040823

[20] https://president dot gov.by/ru/events/vstrecha-s-ministrom-oborony-rossii-sergeem-shoygu-1681119493; https://t.me/modmilby/25495; https://t.me/modmilby/25490; https://t.me/modmilby/25493

[21] https://president dot gov.by/ru/events/vstrecha-s-ministrom-oborony-rossii-sergeem-shoygu-1681119493; https://t.me/modmilby/25495; https://t.me/modmilby/25490; https://t.me/modmilby/25493

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02q1Yxei59Ea9tEdAibRDfMkpceqPfTNSvNQ79nCKqV9TjRXgm4XWNTiHzFMPFrwyfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRXYHWSS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl

[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/11850; https://t.me/wargonzo/11867

[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/11850

[25] https://suspilne dot media/439878-povernenna-deportovanih-ditej-sotni-btr-vid-polsi-boi-za-marinku-ta-bahmut-410-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1681043625&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[26] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3513

[27] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/36289

[28] https://t.me/milinfolive/99064; https://t.me/grey_zone/18103; https://t.me/milinfolive/99090

[29] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1645004188814802944; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1644830208816455680 ; https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1644729375739330560; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1645392485626130432; https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1645380938942013442; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1645407081753718786; https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1645314796512854016; https://twitter.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1645374066381975553; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1645333170269704194

[30] https://suspilne dot media/439878-povernenna-deportovanih-ditej-sotni-btr-vid-polsi-boi-za-marinku-ta-bahmut-410-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

[31] https://suspilne dot media/440451-rosiani-namagautsa-zablokuvati-avdiivku-sili-oboroni-z-dobu-vidbili-40-atak-411-den-vijni-onlajn/

[32] https://t.me/readovkanews/56515; https://t.me/brussinf/5853; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82579; https://t.me/wargonzo/11850; https://t.me/readovkanews/56554;

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/11867

[34] https://t.me/pushilindenis/3311; https://t.me/readovkanews/56564

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02q1Yxei59Ea9tEdAibRDfMkpceqPfTNSvNQ79nCKqV9TjRXgm4XWNTiHzFMPFrwyfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRXYHWSS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02q1Yxei59Ea9tEdAibRDfMkpceqPfTNSvNQ79nCKqV9TjRXgm4XWNTiHzFMPFrwyfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRXYHWSS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl

[37] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/46690;

[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/11850; https://t.me/readovkanews/56515; https://t.me/wargonzo/11867

[39] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1645175760120840194?s=20; https://twitter.com/antiputler_news/status/1645150589574082560?s=20

[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/09/cherez-strah-pered-kontrnastupom-okupanty-na-zaporizhzhi-intensyvno-oblashtovuyut-ta-minuyut-oboronni-pozycziyi-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/09/cherez-strah-pered-kontrnastupom-okupanty-na-zaporizhzhi-intensyvno-oblashtovuyut-ta-minuyut-oboronni-pozycziyi-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[42] https://t.me/readovkanews/56554

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl

[44] https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/04/09/cherez-strah-pered-kontrnastupom-okupanty-na-zaporizhzhi-intensyvno-oblashtovuyut-ta-minuyut-oboronni-pozycziyi-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[45] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1645105977656582145

[46] https://t.me/hueviyherson/37748

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRXYHWSS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil

[48] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02Gxgj4dT1n1eGimDF4Tt9Hn3CUcEyaoUqWfzEcRGqhmHBxfvkxgdGwqKG5djJJv1Pl

[49] https://t.me/rybar/45607; https://t.me/rybar/45625; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/5005; https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0NUzxJGzA7prKb2eR3iapFM9nfbPSSWr8zez8pSaSfmK5Dr9fkZpVT7tAk3f2ZwGAl; https://t.me/hueviyherson/37718; https://t.me/milinfolive/99073 https://suspilne.media/439920-armia-rf-atakue-silskogospodarski-zemli-na-hersonsini-ce-priklad-terorizmu-bo-voni-nisat-zitta-ludej-gumenuk/https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TaCDz6muubBP5Tn3HcphRFY74VQA4pYE4Zrz3xPyRbMTnvK8AsFum1dwSVUcLVsQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02LJyGWQmBBoha7JxjJ9Sewig1Wua3YBySmQfD7pxYxEPCDeTZw1X99a5M6jiaMnqNl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Yvu1VvdpxfP4Ey2sNwXD411aauYjga4cxSbHLP5PDvjRXYHWSS8DfmkY5Yb28ehil; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/5026; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/5027; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/4741; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/18161

[50] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/16620

[51] https://t.me/rybar/45607

[52] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/719

[53] https://www.e1 dot ru/text/gorod/2023/04/05/72194627/

[54] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/724

[55] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1645314394224484352; https://vk dot com/wall-168586038_370587; https://archive.is/FUB9V; https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1645179787118272518?s=20; https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1645179787118272518?s=20

[56] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1645314394224484352; https://vk dot com/wall-168586038_370587; https://archive.is/FUB9V

[57] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule113#Fn_28E57177_00002

[58] https://t.me/readovkanews/56567

[59] https://ufa1 dot ru/text/gorod/2023/04/10/72206783/

[60] https://transsibinfo dot com/news/2023-04-10/v-habarovsk-prishla-raznaryadka-o-nabore-voennosluzhaschih-po-kontraktu-2897405; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202303070007?index=2&rangeSize=1

[61] https://vk dot com/wall-217310531_116; https://t.me/strelkovii/4463

[62] https://vk.com/wall-217310531_116

[63] https://t.me/BTGR_NEVSKIY/202

[64] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/09/mosgorsud-otmenil-mezhdunarodnyy-rozysk-figuranta-dela-o-vyvode-za-granitsu-24-millionov-dollarov-obvinyaemyy-otpravilsya-dobrovoltsem-voevat-v-ukrainu

[65] https://t.me/vchkogpu/37685

[66] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/10/kolaborantczi-yaka-dopomogla-rf-deportuvaty-ponad-tysyachu-ukrayinskyh-ditej-povidomleno-pro-pidozru/; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/11142

[67] https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11011

[68] https://suspilne dot media/440985-sob-a-ne-cuv-so-vi-z-ukraini-vi-narodilisa-u-rf-ak-rosia-perevihovue-vikradenih-ukrainskih-ditej/

[69] https://suspilne dot media/440985-sob-a-ne-cuv-so-vi-z-ukraini-vi-narodilisa-u-rf-ak-rosia-perevihovue-vikradenih-ukrainskih-ditej/

[70] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/942

[71] https://minre.gov dot ua/2023/04/10/formuyetsya-mizhnarodna-koalicziya-dlya-povernennya-ukrayinskyh-ditej-syrit/

[72] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8436

[73] https://t.me/modmilby/25455; https://t.me/modmilby/25463 ; https://t.me/voentv_by/3657; https://t.me/modmilby/25487; https://t.me/modmilby/25488; https://t.me/modmilby/25489; https://t.me/modmilby/25491; https://t.me/modmilby/25492; https://t.me/modmilby/25508

[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02q1Yxei59Ea9tEdAibRDfMkpceqPfTNSvNQ79nCKqV9TjRXgm4XWNTiHzFMPFrwyfl

[75] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2023/04/10/rosiyany-ta-bilorusy-prodovzhuyut-spilni-navchannya/