Iran Crisis Update, January 8, 2023

 

Nicholas Carl and Kitaneh Fitzpatrick

January 8, 2023, 6:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

[Correction: A previous version of this update incorrectly recorded a protest in Javanroud, Kermanshah Province on January 8. CTP mistakenly used old protest footage and is revising this update to exclude Javanroud. We have updated our text and map to fix this error.]

Protest activity increased significantly on January 8—in line with the calls from protest organizers for countrywide demonstrations to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) shooting down of a Ukrainian civilian airplane. These protests are the most that CTP has reported in a single day since December 5, 2022.[1] Protests have seen reduced turnout in recent weeks, likely in part due to the discordant messaging and internal fissures within the protest movement.[2] But protest coordinators and organizations aligned at least in their calls for countrywide demonstrations on January 8, demonstrating that they can still generate substantial turnout, especially when their messaging is coherent and consistent.

The Iranian regime has reaffirmed its aggressive and hardline stance toward the protests and calls for social reform, which could enflame political dissent further. Social media accounts have reported that the Judiciary plans to execute two more protesters—one 19-years-old and the other 22-years-old—on January 9.[3] Protest organizers have called for gatherings outside the Rajaei Shahr prison in Karaj, Alborz Province—where the two protesters are being held—and social media users have reported that crowds have begun to form.[4] The Supreme Cultural Revolution separately reiterated its support for the mandatory hijab law in a long-expected statement on the subject on January 8.[5] The council argued that veiling promotes sexual equality and condemned the West for allowing “nudity and promiscuity.” The council also repeated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s argument that the regime should continue to enforce the hijab requirement but tolerate women who only veil partially.[6] Prosecutor General Mohammad Javad Montazeri previously stated that Parliament and the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council would issue an opinion on the hijab requirement by December 16.[7] The regime published no such opinion until now, suggesting Iranian authorities delayed issuing their opinion in support of the mandatory hijab law until they felt that the protest movement has lost sufficient momentum to avoid public backlash.

Key Takeaways

• Protest activity increased significantly—in line with the calls from protest organizers for countrywide demonstrations to commemorate the three-year anniversary of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) shooting down of a Ukrainian civilian airplane.
• At least 26 protests occurred in 16 cities across 12 provinces. This protest count does not include the situation at the Rajaei Shahr prison in Karaj, Alborz Province, which is ongoing at the time of this writing.
• The Iranian regime has reaffirmed its aggressive and hardline stance toward the protests and calls for social reform, which could enflame political dissent further.
• Unidentified gunmen clashed with the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) in Khash, Khuzestan Province.
• An unidentified gunman shot and killed an employee of Allameh Tabatabaei University in Tehran.

Anti-Regime Protests

At least 26 protests occurred in 16 cities across 12 provinces on January 8. This protest count does not include the situation at the Rajaei Shahr prison in Karaj, Alborz Province, which is ongoing at the time of this writing. CTP will cover this item in our update on January 9. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Karaj, Alborz Province[8]

• Size: Undetermined
• Notes: Reports of audible gunfire throughout the city

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[9]

• Size: Small

Najaf Abad, Esfahan Province[10]

• Size: Medium

Ghazvin City, Ghazvin Province[11]

• Size: Small

Bandar-e Anzali, Gilan Province[12]

• Size: Undetermined
• Demographic: Mourners
• Regime Repression: Security forces fired tear gas at protesters
• Notes: 40-day commemoration ceremony for killed protester Mehran Samak

Bandar-e Abbas, Hormozgan Province[13]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Fire lit in street

Dashti, Hormozgan Province[14]

• Size: Small

Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province[15]

• Size: Small
• Notes: Social media users recorded sounds of gunfire throughout the city

Saghez, Kurdistan Province[16]

• Size: Medium
• Demographic: Mourners
• Notes: Protesters gathered at a local cemetery to mourn the victims of downed Ukrainian civilian aircraft

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[17]

• Size: Undetermined
• Protester Activity: Fires lit in street
• Notes: Two clips show unidentified assailant throwing explosives in street

Arak, Markazi Province[18]

• Size: Small

Babol, Mazandaran Province[19]

• Size: Undetermined

Shahed Shahr, Tehran Province[20]

• Size: Medium
• Notes: Protesters held pictures of the victims of downed PS752 aircraft

Tehran City, Tehran Province[21]

• Size: Small
• Location: Sattar Khan (District 2)

Tehran City, Tehran Province[22]

• Size: Small
• Location: Enghelaab Street

Tehran City, Tehran Province[23]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Tehran University students
• Regime Repression: Security forces beat and violently arrested at least one protester

Tehran City, Tehran Province[24]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Soureh University students

Tehran City, Tehran Province[25]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Shahid Beheshti University Students

Tehran City, Tehran Province[26]

• Size: Undetermined
• Location: In a Tehran subway station

Tehran City, Tehran Province[27]

• Size: Undetermined
• Location: Shariati Street (Districts 1, 3, and 7)

Tehran City, Tehran Province[28]

• Size: Small
• Location: Haft Hoz, Tehran Pars (District 8)
• Regime Repression: Security forces threw tear gas at protesters

Tehran City, Tehran Province[29]

• Size: Small
• Location: Ekbatan (District 5)

Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province[30]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Mourners
• Notes: Protesters gathered at a local cemetery to mourn the victims of downed PS752 aircraft

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Abdanan, Ilam Province[31]

• Size: Undetermined
• Protester Activity: Fires lit in street

Saghez, Kurdistan Province[32]

• Size: Undetermined
• Protester Activity: Fires lit in street

Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province[33]

• Size: Undetermined
• Protester Activity: Fires lit in street

NOTE: CTP defines small protests as fewer than 100 individuals, medium protests as between 100 and 1,000, and large protests as over 1,000.

Unidentified gunmen clashed with the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) in Khash, Khuzestan Province on January 8.[34] The LEC killed two armed individuals.

An unidentified gunman shot and killed an employee of Allameh Tabatabaei University in Tehran on January 8.[35] Tasnim News Agency reported that unidentified individuals previously tried to assassinate the employee two months prior.

Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi denied that the regime uses plainclothes security and intelligence officers on January 8.[36] Vahidi asserted that security officers wear distinctive uniforms when working. Vahidi’s comments contradict repeated footage documenting plainclothes officers violently arresting, beating, and shooting protesters.[37]

Deputy Parliament Speaker Ali Nikzad blamed protesters for ongoing, regime-imposed internet restrictions on January 8.[38] Nikzad claimed that users who had “incorrectly” used the internet to participate in protests forced the regime to impose countrywide censorship measures. A VPN review website recently reported that Iranian internet outages in 2022 resulted in a cumulative loss of $773 million.[39]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

There was nothing significant to report today.

---

[1] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-december-5

[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-7-2023

[3] https://twitter.com/KhosroKalbasi/status/1612202398813937666

[4] https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1612214881402372097 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612231953624829956?s=20&t=sOoRyWBZ-uhHS7V6hc_S1Q ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612229194389327874?s=20&t=sOoRyWBZ-uhHS7V6hc_S1Q ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612228515075686402?s=20&t=sOoRyWBZ-uhHS7V6hc_S1Q ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612227794892722178?s=20&t=sOoRyWBZ-uhHS7V6hc_S1Q

[5] http://entekhab dot ir/002ygl

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-4-2023

[7] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-december-2

[8] https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612110652318924800?s=20&t=UmiIN9OPFeQ1bwW1Kl-uQQ ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612123104859275292?s=20&t=UmiIN9OPFeQ1bwW1Kl-uQQ ; https://twitter.com/indypersian/status/1612117549440815109?s=20&t=UmiIN9OPFeQ1bwW1Kl-uQQ

[9] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612135397919711232?s=20&t=IhYH4T_BbHJXbCo2AJn_9w ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612119564632096776?s=20&t=HxCV5ur1vUh7UYARGtZv7A ; https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1612142204235177985?s=20&t=aKz22mB8uLDKvyegnq3HJg

[10] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612013050860797952?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612012158224572416?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/etelaf10/status/1612030839914741760?s=20&t=imHkkzBBnIzmYoWcAI_Rng

[11] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612142807090593793?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612118360711483393?s=20&t=RPRUtZyqdR0221BQ46vgyg ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612121872275062786?s=20&t=RPRUtZyqdR0221BQ46vgyg ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1612183398889684993?s=20&t=RPRUtZyqdR0221BQ46vgyg

[12] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612097562701340675?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612093829229826049?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612089982788796416?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612088778952253444?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612086873689563137?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612072106300428294?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612071595631067136?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/indypersian/status/1612123087499059200?s=20&t=Ac90OHJvso3KBamKNflENg

[13] https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612162788058611712?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1612164510206365706?s=20&t=NYGqIis9SCl8COaLq0iObg ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612167028625874949 ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612184625379434496?s=20&t=NYGqIis9SCl8COaLq0iObg

[14] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1612186098708398080?s=20&t=Q8jfFn7if8okg5LYH09trQ ; https://twitter.com/etelaf10/status/1612163720947302401?s=20&t=Q8jfFn7if8okg5LYH09trQ ; https://twitter.com/kayvanrassooli/status/1612187048273711104?s=20&t=Q8jfFn7if8okg5LYH09trQ

 

 

[15] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612162106442366976?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/kayvanrassooli/status/1612125940938674176?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/etelaf10/status/1612145298159140866?s=20&t=IhAW1ShQSF4EUpiAQHm7zQ ; https://twitter.com/etelaf10/status/1612133416966709250?s=20&t=IhAW1ShQSF4EUpiAQHm7zQ

[16] https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1612053363205570560?s=20&t=gAgLpO09UEr0QVyj-3XC3g ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612077347817115648?s=20&t=gAgLpO09UEr0QVyj-3XC3g ; https://twitter.com/PanahiRafiq/status/1612057542288343040?s=20&t=gAgLpO09UEr0QVyj-3XC3g

[17] https://twitter.com/Kolbarnews/status/1612141223418134529?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1612143516775481344?s=20&t=xHb6lDiIsdEajHMvJHr7Bg ; https://twitter.com/mamadporii/status/1612146200660299777?s=20&t=xHb6lDiIsdEajHMvJHr7Bg ; https://twitter.com/PanahiRafiq/status/1612131234309869569?s=20&t=xHb6lDiIsdEajHMvJHr7Bgv ; https://twitter.com/PanahiRafiq/status/1612135948845711365?s=20&t=xHb6lDiIsdEajHMvJHr7Bg ; https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1612190428987592707?s=20&t=Q8jfFn7if8okg5LYH09trQ

[18] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1612164586291236866?s=20&t=Q8jfFn7if8okg5LYH09trQ ; https://twitter.com/Javanmardi75/status/1612193423552815104?s=20&t=dXxa0LJ3Con92M9wizl4Dg ; https://twitter.com/salarchamosh/status/1612162136653938689?s=20&t=dXxa0LJ3Con92M9wizl4Dg

 

 

[19] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612162085613408262?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/Javanmardi75/status/1612127653783343104?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/asal72703818/status/1612116506976059393?s=20&t=-LDKH-WCedCNw_5Jc_49Ag

 

 

[20] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612109364583870464?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/ps752justice/status/1612069908296208385?s=20&t=M0YTmboL_PYtxgFSYh2GYw ; https://twitter.com/beast_at68/status/1612110395971604482?s=20&t=M0YTmboL_PYtxgFSYh2GYw

[21] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612122555816595457?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1612113200559886337?s=20&t=yImqEar3K6q_zPQD1S7fRA ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612110461985603586?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612105067754323969?s=20&t=krAITLwdnM6WZ2e6h-rx_A ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612155499612446726?s=20&t=QlwfD9TVbZghVNe3zXXr-g ; https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1612153886521057280?s=20&t=QlwfD9TVbZghVNe3zXXr-g

[22] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612111371625435136?s=20&t=wlroE_CJNLwhWrgqhrmHNA ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612138763584507904?s=20&t=wlroE_CJNLwhWrgqhrmHNA ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612169466380705793?s=20&t=wlroE_CJNLwhWrgqhrmHNA

[23] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612073512079867904?s=20&t=g87A8DMu7seXaxmJIuUwhA ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612068094519742465?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612067562455547904?s=20&t=zZrWZQLuuGLmjNobSNlB2w ; https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1612066309386211330?s=20&t=zZrWZQLuuGLmjNobSNlB2w

[24] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612017682551042050?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612090885482717186?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612047308501180416?s=20&t=uB-CwsUDBhoACPyIFT7kqw

 

[25] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612159755639832576?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/iranwire/status/1612151965055700993?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/dw_persian/status/1612169311552147457?s=20&t=HkI2gJq_Hu1OGZOtV3BPpQ

[26] https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612145137450098690?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612142107665530880?s=20&t=oVPP3roX-_fyc9-PzDXhwA

[27] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612177819894747137 ; https://twitter.com/Vahid/status/1612171177560264704?s=20&t=S56uIqBvNT7hiftaXTiLHg

 

[28] https://twitter.com/Javanmardi75/status/1612131242350374914?s=20&t=n2BaHY9u7MsfyERwe0t8Bw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1612145341779873794?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1612147915513888768

[29] https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1612170168137809922?s=20&t=Q8jfFn7if8okg5LYH09trQ ; https://twitter.com/Vahid/status/1612168347990347778?s=20&t=UYICMif2j_z0vWukUZyOFg

 

[30] https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1612071387950202880?s=20&t=x7w2uvkv4BK0YPCHcvVRqQ ; https://twitter.com/Kolbarnews/status/1612132966439981056?s=20&t=x7w2uvkv4BK0YPCHcvVRqQ

[31] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1612205677535023106?s=20&t=vbNfm8VU3LxmbPQqG8fE4Q

[32] https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1612142973390651393?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A

[33] https://twitter.com/Kolbarnews/status/1612147959801544709?s=20&t=uLYYkE4brLs6jBsNpseC0A

[34] http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/10/18/2833920

[35] http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/10/18/2833818

[36] http://entekhab dot ir/002yfk

[37] https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-uses-covert-police-tech-to-crack-down-on-protests-11666104668 ; https://twitter.com/Ritajoker2/status/1580155707487576066?s=20&t=fQ8QCtOXeQb67LE7ioyXmA ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1581305532056424448?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1581305532056424448%7Ctwgr%5E9f9758dc69524950ce28043ac9e2c50161c4a453%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fd-929455352907677562.ampproject.net%2F2212151632002%2Fframe.html ; https://twitter.com/hafezshyrazi72/status/1609686737034379264

[38] http://entekhab dot ir/002yfv

[39] https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AC%DB%8C%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-19/3933039-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-7-2023

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2023

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

January 8, 3:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 8. This report discusses the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) attempts to claim that Russian forces responded to the December 31 Ukrainian strike on Russian positions in Makiivka; the Russian MoD’s use of a grievance-and-retaliation framework and the resulting creation of negative feedback loops in the pro-war Russian information space; Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s potential attempts to financially exploit Ukrainian natural resources around Bakhmut; and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense’s (UK MoD) assessment that Russian forces may be preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensive actions along the Zaporizhia and Luhansk oblast frontlines.

The Russian MoD’s attempts to claim Russian forces responded to the December 31 Ukrainian strike against Russian positions in Makiivka are generating further discontent in the Russian information space. The Russian MoD announced on January 8 that Russian forces conducted a “retaliation operation” against Ukrainian forces for the December 31 strike on Makiivka that killed up to 400 mobilized soldiers due to Russian command failures and poor personnel dispersal practices.[1] The Russian MoD falsely claimed the retaliatory strike targeted several temporary Ukrainian deployment points in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, and killed over 600 Ukrainian personnel.[2] This claim is false — a Finnish reporter visited the site of the strike in Kramatorsk on January 8 and noted that it hit an empty school.[3] Several Russian milbloggers responded negatively to the Russian MoD’s claim, pointing out that the Russian MoD frequently presents fraudulent claims and criticizing Russian military leadership for fabricating a story to “retaliate” for the Makiivka strike instead of holding Russian leadership responsible for the losses accountable.[4]

The Russian MoD application of a grievance-and-retaliation framework to many of its operations has created a negative feedback loop with prominent members of the pro-war Russian information space. At the beginning of the massive campaign of strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in October 2022, the Russian MoD employed a similar framing of “retaliation” against claimed Ukrainian strikes on the Kerch Strait Bridge and other Russian infrastructure.[5] The Russian MoD partially used this framing to mollify escalated demands from the pro-war community to “avenge” Ukrainian actions but provoked an array of responses from milbloggers outlining other instances that the Russian MoD should equally “retaliate” for.[6] The Russian MoD has thus created a negative feedback loop, wherein it attempts to respond to Ukrainian offensive successes with a discrete, retaliatory, offensive action, which then opens the MoD up to continued criticism from discontented Russian milbloggers highlighting their beliefs that the MoD is responding in the wrong manner or to the wrong event. The Russian MoD’s response to the Makiivka strike is a clear continuation of this grievance-and-retaliation model that has once again opened Russian military leadership to staunch criticism of their conduct of the war.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to financially exploit Ukrainian natural resources around Bakhmut and is using the war in Ukraine to connect his military forces with Russian regional officials. An unnamed White House official stated on January 5 that the United States believes Prigozhin seeks to extract salt and gypsum from mines in the Bakhmut area for monetary gain.[7] Prigozhin attempted to justify the importance of mines around Bakhmut and Soledar (which Russian forces have struggled to capture from Ukrainian defenders) on January 7, stating that these mines have “unique and historic defenses” that act as a “network of underground cities.”[8] Prigozhin added that these mines can house personnel and military equipment up to a depth of 80 to 100 meters and claimed that these mines are stocked with weaponry from World War I. Prigozhin’s statements are likely an attempt to both explain the slow pace of Wagner’s advances around Bakhmut but may also partially explain his months-long and costly determination to establish control of the area. A former Russian officer and milblogger criticized Prigozhin and Russian commanders, stating that everyone knew about the existence of these mines when developing an offensive plan and dismissed the claim of the presence of historic weapons in the area.[9] The milblogger also noted even if Russian forces and Wagner troops seize Soledar, Prigozhin and the Russian military will lose strategically due to committing their best forces to an attritional battle.[10] ISW had previously reported that another Russian silovik, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, is reportedly attempting to secure business opportunities in occupied Mariupol.[11]

Prigozhin is also continuing to publicly align himself with select Russian governors in an effort to increase his influence and advance his personal interests in Russia, as opposed to strictly winning the war. Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit visited the Wagner training facility for the Kursk Oblast People’s Militia on January 8 and reportedly trained alongside Prigozhin and “real men” who are patriots during his visit.[12] Russian outlets claimed that Starovoit even received an offer to sign a contract with Wagner, which he declined due to his public duties.[13] Some Russian outlets even framed Starovoit’s visit to the training ground as model behavior for a Russian politician, further boosting Prigozhin’s image as a patriotic wartime leader in the Russian information space.[14] Prigozhin is likely attempting to rally up support for the legalization of Wagner Group in Russia.

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) confirmed ISW’s previous assessments that Russian forces are preparing for the possibility of future Ukrainian counteroffensives in Zaporizhia or Luhansk oblasts. The UK MoD reported on January 8 that in recent weeks, Russian forces have expanded defensive fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast along the Vasylivka-Orikhkiv line and are maintaining a large force grouping in this sector in a way that suggests that Russian commanders are concerned by the possibility of a major Ukrainian counteroffensive push in southern Ukraine.[15] The UK MoD suggested that Russian forces are facing two equally exigent counteroffensive scenarios: A Ukrainian breakthrough on the Zaporizhia line that could seriously challenge the viability of the Russian land bridge linking Rostov Oblast with occupied Crimea, or a Ukrainian breakthrough in Luhansk Oblast that could further unhinge the Russian offensive objective of occupying the entirety of Donbas.[16] ISW has previously noted indicators of preparations for a Russian decisive effort (likely of a defensive nature) along the Svatove-Kreminna line in Luhansk Oblast and assessed that the Russian force posture and prevalence of defensive structures in Zaporizhia Oblast suggest that Russian forces may be preparing for potential Ukrainian efforts against this sector.[17]

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on January 8:

• Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated on January 8 that Russia plans to begin domestic production of Iranian-made drones.[18]
• Russian forces continued counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 8.[19] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 8 that Russian forces transferred several battalions from the Bakhmut area to the Kreminna area.[20]
• Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty stated on January 8 that Russian forces do not control Soledar, and other official Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces captured Russian positions near Bakhmut.[21] Prominent Russian milbloggers expressed divergent opinions of the potential for the Russian encirclement of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City.[22]
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on January 7 that 300 Chechen Akhmat-1 OMON personnel deployed to Ukraine.[23]
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to strike civilian infrastructure in Kherson City overnight on January 7–8.[24]
• Russian forces are continuing to intensify filtration measures to identify partisans in occupied territories. Russian occupation authorities claimed that likely Ukrainian partisans committed sabotage by mining a gas pipeline in Luhansk Oblast on January 8.[25]
• Russian occupation authorities intensified passportization efforts in occupied territories on January 8.[26]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitsky stated on January 8 that Russia is planning to use mobilized personnel in offensive operations in unspecified areas of the front in the spring and summer.[27] Skibitsky stated that Russia will need two months to prepare its military forces for the offensive and that Russian forces’ success depends on their training and provisions.[28]
• Russia deployed more military personnel to Belarus on January 7–8. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated that a Russian Military Space Forces aviation element of an unspecified echelon arrived in Belarus on January 8.[29] Independent Belarusian monitoring outlet Belarusian Hajun Project reported that an additional 15 passenger train cars carrying 700–800 Russian military personnel arrived in Vitsebsk, Belarus on the evening of January 7.[30] The Hajun Project reported that Russian armored elements of the same echelon arrived to Vitsebsk, Belarus on January 6, as ISW has previously reported.[31]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

• The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 8.[32]

 

 

 

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[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/23279

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/23279

[3] https://twitter.com/YLEKuronen/status/1612093160343191553;
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1612097090473103360

[4] https://t.me/grey_zone/16528; https://t.me/milinfolive/95242; https://t.me/rybar/42550

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10

[6] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct11; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102522; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct09; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct8

[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-thinks-putin-ally-prigozhin-wants-control-salt-gypsum-mines-near-bakhmut-2023-01-05/

[8] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/236

[9] https://t.me/strelkovii/3701

[10] https://t.me/strelkovii/3701

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7

[12] https://t.me/gubernator_46; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/08/gubernator-kurskoy-oblasti-rasskazal-chto-proshel-kurs-podgotovki-v-lagere-chvk-vagnera

[13] https://t.me/readovkanews/50311

[14] https://t.me/readovkanews/50311

[15] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1611978511719301120

[16] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1611978511719301120

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122822; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29

[18] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/01/08/sovet-natsionalnoy-bezopasnosti-i-oborony-ukrainy-rossiya-sobiraetsya-zapustit-sobstvennoe-proizvodstvo-iranskih-dronov-kamikadze

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09TykkgtKMGfEa6LXMuADghg8trYANsnWJCzEL5pMSGqeUB92RTKtXt68PSkah2Zdl

[20] https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/9059 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7889;

[21] https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/pfbid02i8fWznXG3K86t74j2zY6Yj5Rq67nv3UwsMAdq6PzPTZS7QKQGAe7B6D9nGiWVSvtl ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=940911193984952 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/okupanty-soledar-ne-kontrolyuyut-sergij-cherevatyj/

[22] https://t.me/rybar/42543 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/3701 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09TykkgtKMGfEa6LXMuADghg8trYANsnWJCzEL5pMSGqeUB92RTKtXt68PSkah2Zdl

[23] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3255

[24] https://suspilne.media/354598-rosijska-armia-obstrilala-odin-z-mikrorajoniv-hersona-zapaluvalnimi-boepripasami/; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/2972; https://t.me/hueviyherson/32567; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/26545

[25] https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2293; https://telegra dot ph/V-Lutuginskom-rajone-proizoshel-vzryv-gazoprovoda-01-08; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/2294; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10142;

[26] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/08/rosiyany-prymusovo-pasportyzuvaly-praczivnykiv-zaes/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7886; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/08/na-zaporizkij-aes-prodovzhuyut-perebuvaty-rosijski-vijskovi-ta-tehnika-agresora/

[27] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/mobilizovanykh-rosiian-planuiut-vykorystaty-v-nastupalnykh-operatsiiakh-navesni-ta-vlitku.html; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/06/russia-preparing-mobilise-extra-500000-conscripts-claims-ukraine

[28] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/mobilizovanykh-rosiian-planuiut-vykorystaty-v-nastupalnykh-operatsiiakh-navesni-ta-vlitku.html; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/06/russia-preparing-mobilise-extra-500000-conscripts-claims-ukraine

[29] https://t.me/modmilby/21535

[30] https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1611784572399923200

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2023

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid081fnfTsQVA6d3hp19meQiyF7wJiTWG8BuFpG7SR6sCWygFpY7A3qf3mciHcqWeYSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid081fnfTsQVA6d3hp19meQiyF7wJiTWG8BuFpG7SR6sCWygFpY7A3qf3mciHcqWeYSl

Iran Crisis Update, January 7, 2023

Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 7, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to empower hardline security figures to enforce his uncompromising position toward the protests and mandatory hijab law. Khamenei appointed Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan as law enforcement commander on January 7.[1] Radan will thus head the Law Enforcement Command (LEC)—Iran’s national police force and first line of defense against protests. Khamenei called on Radan to provide public security, improve LEC capabilities, properly compensate LEC employees, and train specialized police units for different security missions.

Radan is a hardline member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and has extensive experience crushing political dissent and protests. Radan joined the Basij and IRGC as a teenager to fight in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.[2] He transferred to the LEC after the war, where he held several key positions, including commanding the police units responsible for Kurdistan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Khorasan, and Tehran provinces. Radan likely acquired experience quashing anti-regime dissent and militancy while overseeing police forces in the restive border provinces. Radan served as law enforcement deputy commander from 2008 to 2014, during which time he played critical roles in cracking down on the 2009 Green Movement and suppressing protests in Syria.[3] Radan traveled to Damascus in 2011 to meet with Syrian security services and support their crackdown against the Syrian people. He finally headed the LEC Strategic Studies Center from 2014 to 2023, where he likely developed new concepts and doctrine that he could introduce to the LEC.

Radan will likely adopt a hard line on enforcing the mandatory hijab law. Radan was an architect of the morality patrol program while he was law enforcement deputy commander.[4] He is an aggressive supporter of the hijab requirement and of penalizing citizens for attire that the regime deems inappropriate. CTP has previously argued that the regime may end or reduce the morality patrol but will likely use other means to enforce the mandatory hijab law, such as facial recognition and surveillance cameras.[5]

Khamenei likely appointed Radan as law enforcement commander partly due to dissatisfaction with the performance of the incumbent in responding to the protests. Radan replaced Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari, who had held the position since 2015. The dismissal of Ashtari is particularly noteworthy given Khamenei’s apparent trust in him historically. Khamenei shuffled and replaced many senior officers responsible for internal security after previous major protest waves in Iran.[6] But Khamenei kept Ashtari as law enforcement commander—even after the 2017-18 Dey protests and 2019 Aban protests—likely reflecting Khamenei’s confidence in him at the time. Ashtari may have since lost that confidence. It is unclear what position he will hold next.

The Judiciary executed two additional protesters—Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Mohammad Hosseini—on January 7. Iranian authorities tortured Karami and Hosseini and convicted them in sham trials for their alleged roles in killing a Basij member Ruhollah Ajamian in Karaj, Alborz Province on November 3.[7] The regime may have timed these executions immediately before the planned protests on January 8 to intimidate citizens and reduce turnout. Karami and Hosseini mark the third and fourth individuals whom the regime has executed since protests began on September 16. Iranian human rights organizations and activists estimate that the judiciary has sentenced at least 14 other arrested protesters to death and that these individuals face imminent executions.[8]

Protest organizers tied to the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union again failed to generate increased protest activity on January 7, despite their repeated calls for countrywide demonstrations and strikes on January 6-8.[9] Protest groups affiliated with the Iranian Neighborhood United Front have contrastingly called for protests only on January 8. CTP has previously argued that discordant messaging and internal fissures within the protest movement may be one of the factors driving decreased turnout.

Key Takeaways

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues to empower hardline security figures to enforce his uncompromising position toward the protests and mandatory hijab law.

• The Judiciary executed two additional protesters—Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Mohammad Hosseini.

• Protest organizers tied to the Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union again failed to generate increased protest activity, despite their repeated calls for countrywide demonstrations and strikes on January 6-8

• At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.

• Unknown gunmen shot and killed one person and injured two others at the Gachsaran Oil and Gas Company in Gachsaran, Kohgilouyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province.

• State security services arrested reformist journalist Saeid Seyf Ali, according to his wife.

Anti-Regime Protests

At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces on January 7. CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Karaj, Alborz Province[10]

• Size: Undetermined

• Demographic: Mourners

• Notes: Footage may be from January 5 or 6, which marked the birthday of killed protester Hadis Najafi

Tehran City, Tehran Province[11]

• Size: Small

Protest coordinators and organizations circulated calls for demonstrations and strikes on the following days:

January 8[12]

• Type: demonstrations and strikes

• Location: countrywide

January 8[13]

• Type: placing flowers on graves of citizens whom the regime has killed

• Location: countrywide

Unknown gunmen shot and killed one person and injured two others at the Gachsaran Oil and Gas Company in Gachsaran, Kohgilouyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province on January 7.[14]

State security services arrested reformist-affiliated journalist Saeid Seyf Ali, according to his wife on January 7.[15] Seyf Ali is the manager of reformist-affiliated outlet Didban Iran. Seyf Ali is at least the third journalist tied to the reformist faction whom state security services have arrested in recent days.[16]

Iranian website Jobvision reported that one in five Iranian online workers have become unemployed within the past four months due to ongoing internet restrictions.[17] A separate study estimated that Iranian internet outages in 2022 resulted in a cumulative loss of $773 million.[18]

Parliament is considering legislation that would restrict international travel for former Iranian officials. The proposed bill would particularly affect former officials who hold dual citizenship or whose families live abroad. The legislation, if approved, would require designated officials to obtain permission from regulatory entities, such as the Judiciary, IRGC, and LEC, before leaving the country.[19]

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

There was nothing significant to report.
 

---

[1] http://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/26235
[2] http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/10/17/2833046
[3] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1224
[4] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f10_iran_police_hijab_unveil/24233430.html
[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-december-23
[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Whatever-it-takes-to-end-it.pdf
[7] https://www.sharghdaily.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6/866426-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D9%85%D9%85%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3 ; https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iran-executes-2-men-detained-amid-nationwide-protests-96281485; https://iranhumanrights.org/2023/01/two-more-men-executed-in-iran-in-connection-with-protests-others-at-imminent-risk/
[8] https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iran-executes-2-men-detained-amid-nationwide-protests-96281485 ; https://iranhumanrights.org/2023/01/two-more-men-executed-in-iran-in-connection-with-protests-others-at-imminent-risk/
[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-4-2023
[10] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1611750403485351938?s=20&t=l4iJ0WwjAEKy31nYuEQ3hw ; https://twitter.com/VOAfarsi/status/1611397845818671104?s=20&t=l4iJ0WwjAEKy31nYuEQ3hw
[11] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1611779520113041410?s=20&t=UWJtoXnVaFYp7jnTMX11OA ; https://twitter.com/bmahalat_ir/status/1611768966287966208?s=20&t=y5zZCgZ7Mout5lKHDD8YGg
[12] https://twitter.com/javanane_t/status/1609883019308843010?s=20&t=SW6ER8cf604U_gsZY_kmow
[13] https://twitter.com/esmaeilion/status/1609663751879270401?s=20&t=bKh2ncamNpLW_K6WB4KAKw
[14] www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/709782
[15] https://www.sharghdaily.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6/866454-%D8%B3%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D8%AF
[16] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-january-2-2023
[17] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/32213387.html
[18] https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AC%DB%8C%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-19/3933039-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84
[19] http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/10/17/2832909; https://www.sharghdaily dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-6/866426-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D9%85%D9%85%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A6%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3