Iran Crisis Update, November 17

Nicholas Carl, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Zachary Coles, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 17, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Crisis Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Crisis Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributor: LJ Trevette

Certain components of the ongoing protest movement in Iran may have reached the threshold identified in US military doctrine for a “latent and incipient” insurgency. American counter-insurgency doctrine, using a modified version of the Maoist insurgency framework, defines the lowest level of insurgency as follows:

“The first phase is latent and incipient. During this phase, activities include the emergence of insurgent leadership, creation of initial organizational infrastructure, training, acquisition of resources, and political actions, such as organizing protests. A group that eventually becomes members of an insurgency may simply be a legitimate political group at this stage. Governmental actions and changes in society can transform political groups into insurgencies.”[1]

Components of the protest movement are approaching or have already achieved some of these requirements. The neighborhood youth groups and other protest organizations have seemingly continued playing significant roles in coordinating and planning demonstrations on specific days and in specific locations. These protest organizations are also encouraging and supporting citizens to attack and undermine the regime. The Mashhad Neighborhood Youth, for instance, published statements on November 16 and 17 calling on protesters to cooperate with one another to wage partisan warfare, block roads, and use explosives against security forces, among other activities, and referred to its “operational teams,” implying some level of organization.[2] The group advised protesters to wear protective clothing “according to previous training.”[3] The Mashhad youth group also stated that it is fighting a “full-scale war” against the regime—rhetoric that is consistent with the revolutionary tone used by other protest organizations in recent weeks.[4]

CTP has documented previous instances of protesters cooperating with one another. Protesters have coordinated extensively in certain locations in recent weeks using militant tactics to respond to the regime crackdown.[5] Protesters are furthermore developing the infrastructure necessary to stage a protracted struggle against the regime, such as establishing an informal medical care network.[6]

CTP cannot verify that any of these youth groups and other protest organizations are  in control of the movement or able to carry through on some of their directives. The regime has indicated that at least some of these groups have a local presence. Iranian state media reported on November 17 that the IRGC Intelligence Organization arrested over 25 members of the Oroumiyeh Neighborhood Youth.[7] An unidentified source spoke to Mehr News Agency claiming that the group organized the blocking of roads and destruction of public property. The Twitter account of the Oroumiyeh Neighborhood Youth has continued posting since the reported arrests.[8]

CTP is not prepared to forecast the trajectory of these protester networks or how they will behave in the weeks and months ahead. We have not yet observed clear signs of coordination across these groups at this time. CTP will continually update and reevaluate this analysis based on observed indicators, which we will continue reporting in these daily updates.

Regime security personnel sustained relatively significant casualties on November 17. At least six security personnel have died across Iran in the past 24 hours. Unidentified individuals stabbed and killed two Basij members and injured three more in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province.[9] Unidentified individuals also stabbed and killed a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province.[10] An LEC Special Units member died on November 17 after unidentified gunmen shot him in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on November 16.[11] And two LEC Border Guards members died in an unspecified “accident” near Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[12] Anti-regime militancy and smuggling is common around Saravan.

Protest organizations are trying to sustain the recent high protester turnout for at least three to four more days. Protests have surged across Iran since November 15 in commemoration of the three-year anniversary of the regime’s crackdown on the Bloody Aban protest wave in November 2019.[13] The Karaj Neighborhood Youth called for these commemorative protests to continue until November 20.[14] The Countrywide Youth similarly called for these protests to continue until November 21.[15] Protest turnout in the coming days may offer insight into how influential these particular protest organizations are.

Key Takeaways

• Certain components of the ongoing protest movement in Iran may have reached the threshold identified in US military doctrine for a “latent and incipient” insurgency.
• Regime security personnel sustained relatively significant casualties.
• Protest organizations are trying to sustain the recent high protester turnout for at least three to four more days.
• At least 40 protests took place in 33 cities across 18 provinces.
• The regime may be trying to blame the Izeh attack on the Islamic State (IS) as part of an effort to associate the protests with terrorism.
• Anti-regime outlet Iran International published purported leaked memos from the Artesh Ground Forces.
• Likely Iranian proxies conducted a rocket attack on US forces in northeastern Syria.

Anti-Regime Protests

At least 40 protests took place in 33 cities across 18 provinces on November 17, despite reports of rain throughout the country. Protest activity may surge in Khuzestan Province in the coming days as protesters seek to commemorate Kian Pirfalak, a ten-year-old boy whom security personnel killed when suppressing an anti-regime protest on November 16.[16] Security forces reportedly shot and killed fourteen-year-old Sepehr Maghsoudi in Izeh on that same date.[17] CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the locations below.

Note: CTP is using asterisks to denote protests that included mourners commemorating killed protesters.

Bandar-e Ganaveh, Bushehr Province (population: approximately 64,110)

• Dozens of protesters gathered on a Ganaveh city street.[18]

Bushehr, Bushehr Province (population: approximately 223,504)

• Footage shows security personnel shooting at an undetermined number of protesters who lit fires on a city street corner.[19]

Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province (population: approximately 1,559,000)

• An undetermined number of protesters gathered on a Tabriz city street.[20]

*Esfahan City, Esfahan Province (population: approximately 1,961,00)

• Over 100 mourners marched to Ahmad Shokrollahi's 40-day commemoration ceremony in Esfahan. Security personnel killed Shokrollahi for participating in anti-regime protests.[21]

Fouladshahr, Esfahan Province (population: approximately 88,426)

• An undetermined number of protesters—but likely over 50--gathered on a city street. Protesters appear to have lit a fire in the vicinity of a Fouladshahr city square or street.[22]

Vilashahr, Esfahan Province (population: unknown)

• An undetermined number of protesters lit fires on a Vila Shahr city street.[23]

Neyriz, Fars Province (population: approximately 113,291)

• Dozens of protesters clashed with security personnel on a Neyriz city street.[24]

Masal, Gilan Province (population: approximately 52,368)

• Hundreds gathered on a Masal city street. Over 50 protesters lit fires and chanted anti-regime slogans later that evening. Footage shows security personnel purportedly throwing stones at protesters from a nearby rooftop.[25]

Sarableh, Ilam Province (population: approximately 12,393)

• Roughly 50 protesters lit a fire and gathered on a Sarableh city street.[26]

Paveh, Kermanshah Province (population: approximately 25,771)

• Dozens of protesters lit a fire and chanted anti-regime slogans on a Paveh city street.[27]

Sabzevar, Khorasan Razavi Province (population: approximately 243,700)

• A still image depicts dozens of protesters gathering and lighting fires on a city corner. Footage suggests that protesters set fire to security vehicles.[28]

Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province (population: approximately 3,001,000)

• Fewer than a dozen protesters were captured on video clashing with security personnel. Over 50 protesters lit fires on a city street. Some social media users reported that protesters damaged a local Basij building.[29]

Baghmalek, Khuzestan Province (population: approximately 114,343)

• Dozens of protesters marched on a Baghmalek city street. Audible gunfire is heard on the video.[30]

Bandar-e Mahshahr, Khuzestan Province (population: approximately 162,797)

• Dozens of protesters chanted anti-regime slogans on a Bandar-e Mahshahr city street.[31]

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province (population: approximately 1,185,000)

• Dozens of protesters chanted "death to the dictator" on an Ahvaz city street.[32]

Izeh, Khuzestan Province (population: approximately 119,399)

• Footage shows large crowds chanting "death to Khamenei" while carrying the coffin of Kian Pirfalak, a ten-year-old boy whom security personnel killed in anti-regime protests on November 16.[33]

Bijar, Kurdistan Province (population: approximately 50,014)

• An undetermined number of protesters gathered on a city street, and cars honked in solidarity.[34]

Ghorveh, Kurdistan Province (population: approximately 78,276)

• An undetermined number of protesters lit fires on a Ghorveh city street. Other footage shows dozens of protesters running away, likely from security personnel.[35]

*Kamyaran, Kurdistan Province (population: approximately 57,077)

• Dozens of protesters gathered on a Kamyaran city street.[36]
• Hundreds of protesters chanted "martyrs never die" in front of Fouad Mohammad's house. Security personnel killed Mohammad for participating in anti-regime protests on November 15.

* Saghez, Kurdistan Province (population: approximately 165,258)

• Over 100 protesters gathered to mourn Daniel Pabandi, a 17-year-old boy whom security personnel killed for participating in anti-regime protests on November 16.[37]
• Footage shows that protesters targeted security personnel with fireworks and firecrackers at an unspecified location. A clip shows security personnel purportedly throwing rocks at protesters, suggesting that they had depleted their ammunition. It is unclear if these events occurred in the same location.[38]

*Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province (population: approximately 453,000)

• Hundreds of protesters marched on a city street to commemorate 40 days since security personnel killed four Sanandaj residents for participating in anti-regime protests. Footage shows protesters severely injuring a purported LEC officer. Social media users reports that security personnel killed two protesters. Security personnel reportedly attacked the Kowsar Hospital. Audible gunfire was reportedly all across the city.[39]

Doroud, Lorestan Province (population: approximately 121,638)

• Over 50 protesters lit a fire and chanted anti-regime slogans on a Doroud city street.[40]

Khomein, Markazi Province (population: approximately 76,706)

• Over 100 protesters marched on a Khomein city street.[41]

Qom City, Qom Province (population: approximately 1,201,000)

• Dozens of protesters chanted "death to the dictator" and lit a fire on a Qom city street.[42]

Eyvanekey, Semnan Province (population: approximately 13,518)

• Footage shows an undetermined number of protesters carrying a protester shot by security personnel. Roughly 50 protesters set fire to a regime-affiliated bank.[43]

*Goyoum, Shiraz Province (population: approximately 7,297)

• Roughly 100, possibly more, protesters gathered to commemorate three years since security personnel killed Amir Alwandi for participating in the 2019 gasoline protest wave. Protesters chanted "we will stand by our wounded comrades until the end."[44]

Tehran City, Tehran Province (population: approximately 8,700,00)

• Dozens of protesters gathered in what appears to be a park or public square in Ekbatan in western Tehran.[45]
• Over 50 protesters chanted "freedom, freedom, freedom" on trashcan barricades on an undetermined Tehran city street.[46]
• Roughly 70-100 protesters gathered in the vicinity of the Sadeghiyeh district in Tehran.[47]
• Dozens of protesters gathered in the Gisha district in Tehran. NOTE: This may be the same protest as protest 2.[48]
• Dozens of protesters chanted anti-regime slogans in the Tehran City Theatre metro station.[49]

*Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province (population: 193,501)

• Dozens—likely more--protesters lit fires and joined hands in a Boukan city street.[50]
• Hundreds of mourners commemorated Mohamad Hassan Zadeh and Salar Mojaver, whom security forces killed for participating in anti-regime protests on November 16. Protesters from Mahabad reportedly walked to Boukan to attend the funerals. One social media account compared Boukan to a warzone. Protesters reportedly set fire to several security vehicles and vandalized a store that is allegedly regime-affiliated for failing to participate in anti-regime strikes. Uncorroborated reports suggest that protesters penetrated and/or damaged a Boukan municipality building. Security personnel reportedly shot at protesters, killing one and injuring several others.[51]

Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province (population: 95,716)

• Dozens of protesters chanted "woman, life freedom" and "death to the dictator" and lit fires on a Piranshahr city street.[52]

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Hamedan City, Hamedan Province (population: approximately 554,406)

• Footage shows an undetermined number of protesters clashing with security personnel. Protesters threw what appear to be Molotov cocktails at security personnel.[53]

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province (population: approximately 946,651)

• Dozens of protesters gathered on a Kermanshah city street. There is insufficient data to assess with high to moderate confidence that this event occurred. [54]

Khorramabad, Lorestan Province (population: approximately 373,416)

• An undetermined number of protesters gathered on a Khorramabad city street. It is unclear from available footage if this event meets CTP's threshold for protest activity.[55]

Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province (population: 168,393)

• An undetermined number of protesters lit fires on a Mahabad city street, possibly suggesting that protests occurred on this date. It is unclear if this event meets CTP's threshold for protest activity.[56]

The regime may be trying to blame the Izeh attack on the Islamic State (IS) as part of an effort to associate the protests with terrorism. Iranian media outlets, including the Raisi-administration-controlled Islamic Republic News Agency, have circulated a seemingly fake IS claim of responsibility for the attack.[57] A BBC journalist argued that the statement is likely fake due to its grammatical errors and presentation.[58] The regime has intensified its information operation to link the protests to terrorism since the Shiraz attack on October 26 to delegitimize protesters and their grievances.[59]

Anti-regime outlet Iran International published purported leaked memos from the Artesh Ground Forces on November 17.[60] The Artesh Ground Forces reportedly issued a memo on November 7 requiring unit commanders to report daily whether any service members or their families participated in anti-regime protests or used anti-regime language. The Artesh Ground Forces reportedly issued a second memo on November 9, warning that anti-regime actors may sabotage military facilities. If true, these memos indicate that Artesh leadership is concerned about service members and their families joining and sympathizing with protesters. The English-language version of the Iran International article mischaracterized these memos, however, reporting that they “show that [Artesh] staff and their families have been supporting the popular anti-government protests since September.”[61] There is no information in the memos to corroborate this claim nor can CTP verify their authenticity.

Law Enforcement Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ghassem Rezaei denied that LEC officers are tired on November 17—a remark which could frustrate the low-level security personnel heavily involved in the crackdown and killing citizens. CTP has reported that security personnel are facing bandwidth constraints, exhaustion, and low morale since September 2022.[62] Rezaei stated that the security personnel's tirelessness is evident from “their cheerful faces.” Rezaei’s comments are particularly tone-deaf given the rate at which security personnel are dying.

Axis of Resistance and Regional Developments

An unidentified senior Western official told a BBC journalist that the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted the drone attack on the Israeli-owned tanker on November 16 from Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[63] The IRGC Aerospace Force is the primary operator of the regime’s drone and missile arsenals.

Likely Iranian proxies conducted a rocket attack on US forces in northeastern Syria on November 17.[64] The attack caused no casualties or damage to the facility. The IRGC may renew its regular proxy attacks against US positions in Iraq and Syria to expel US forces from the region and also respond to Washington’s perceived role in stoking the protests.

Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi held a phone call with Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu to discuss security cooperation against terrorism, among other issues, on November 17.[65] Tehran and Ankara may increase cooperation against anti-regime Kurdish militant groups in northern Iraq and northern Syria in the coming weeks. CTP previously reported that Kurdish military and political groups in Iraq and Syria may face increasing attacks from Iran and Turkey simultaneously.[66] Vahidi is nominally responsible for administering the LEC in his capacity as interior minister. He likely plays a more prominent role in influencing regime defense and foreign policies, however, given his connections to the IRGC and his experience as the IRGC Quds Force commander from 1988 to 1998.[67]

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[1] https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_24.pdf

[2] https://twitter.com/Javanan_mashhad/status/1592780084876038145; https://twitter.com/Javanan_mashhad/status/1593189464058527744

[3] https://twitter.com/Javanan_mashhad/status/1592780084876038145

[4] https://twitter.com/Javanan_mashhad/status/1593189464058527744

[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-3

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-30

[7] www.mehrnews dot com/news/5634385

[8] https://twitter.com/ur_javanane

[9] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/08/26/2805901

[10] https://www.yjc dot news/fa/news/8285756

[11] http://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1401/08/26/2805785

[12] https://mehrnews dot com/xYTKh

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-16

[14] https://twitter.com/javanane_k/status/1593284968595263489

[15] https://twitter.com/iran_javanan/status/1593000512961777666

[16] https://twitter.com/HichkasOfficial/status/1592964710185304065?s=20&t=vpkl_Zi7bsw_tEIVuf3fNA

[17] https://twitter.com/ICHRI/status/1593259539633258496?s=20&t=vpkl_Zi7bsw_tEIVuf3fNA

[18] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593324230514458624?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[19] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593344477846011905?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593339285134098436?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[20] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593257105632411648?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[21] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593224311242121221?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[22] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593308749892145158?s=20&t=rqmVFiunFOI7eb-x_HsEfg ; https://twitter.com/pouriazeraati/status/1593335310552899593?s=20&t=rqmVFiunFOI7eb-x_HsEfg ; https://twitter.com/chawshin_83/status/1593339340918235138?s=20&t=rqmVFiunFOI7eb-x_HsEfg

[23] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593287622725615616?s=20&t=GY4Ldo7_uiYwr9zyCjpbMw

[24] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593311811826237440?s=20&t=fWkgptsaDLqjcSHeLOTqFA; https://twitter.com/indypersian/status/1593348889410682880?s=20&t=JvEkO5Rs9R0fojkjfPR-xg

[25] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593302315842273281?s=20&t=SEmslC6kx00V4b6AFb7bog ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593282755386818560?s=20&t=q7H0YLsBi3SDj3L3ksVjKw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593264205347622912?s=20&t=wfmC26yZzBYLkZ6eqpM_BQ ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593262184620068864?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[26] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593192853249085445?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[27] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593284888433725441?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[28] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593320626080649218?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593342007530979331?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[29] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593323881531674625?s=20&t=KTnaIDMXHWhE9gLwNR3d5w ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593322568223694850?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593277221732507651?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593345534772772871?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[30] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593299778099634176?s=20&t=ETq1tZ-pJukLcXtKQiZjrg; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593310549294694403?s=20&t=NsY5hP3gc0fxmqRv087kzA; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593312475344211968?s=20&t=7ImFO9BkYel1pK4Xh_Gd5Q

[31] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593284359313825792?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[32] https://twitter.com/IranIntl/status/1593335519873830921?s=20&t=B9zeATL5sqbsnV_VrXfUMw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593360961729069061?s=20&t=EMFeaYB5ATXkdV0BCudxUg

[33] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593348869382967297?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1593171291561160709?s=20&t=sCeUrO1hmrzhYhHiKXEknw

[34] https://twitter.com/ManotoNews/status/1593365519281041408?s=20&t=oodvWWUQul-oYmHZVPpd4A; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593289313076355076?s=20&t=EcdtwvnJXdr8wMx78AVNMg

[35] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593291909363007488?s=20&t=XwBfWQMS0sE_8AmKFcJ1Qc0SkDDdtsKt425-0PMsMuM ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593285757602504705?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[36] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593313559932542976?s=20&t=Xbk3EoaDgF6kEH2B5w-UZA

[37] https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1593180129433292800?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/FSeifikaran/status/1593248458856894465?s=20&t=L2M3dFMF5OrDMN4Mljr18g

[38] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593309338260705280?s=20&t=EMFeaYB5ATXkdV0BCudxUg ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593347985475342338?s=20&t=EMFeaYB5ATXkdV0BCudxUg

[39] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593259344287735810?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593234221820436480?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593232782041698305?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593217402124521472?s=20&t=dp7qPbEtxl2v4pvBxA9NaA ; https://twitter.com/barin_omid/status/1593202886049046529?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593197499233505281?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1593188758551408648?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[40] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593287030347284480?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[41] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593300862968991746?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593299423215370243?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593286342171103235?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593280451413778432?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593298628973674503?s=20&t=EMFeaYB5ATXkdV0BCudxUg

[42] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593354888217595908?s=20&t=EMFeaYB5ATXkdV0BCudxUg; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593363887746859014?s=20&t=B9zeATL5sqbsnV_VrXfUMw

[43] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593303623466975233?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593264963958837248?s=20&t=3Br4Ly-wc5R8f3ep9aPJBA

[44] https://twitter.com/fereshteh531/status/1593343009218699266?s=20&t=yJNnb2M9-PT-KPm2rRFNxg ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593330750342021121?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[45] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593294055630409731?s=20&t=2F7ACUNv1GPET82wy0nBzw

[46]  https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593291006979497985?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593290025948545025?s=20&t=bMFqE-F2vxxJSFRxTH8AQg

[47] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593281118362636288?s=20&t=KIyPCzA4nEerHFQJ9at2yg

[48] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593269292472143873?s=20&t=SlWfpuC1Y7Vm4bAQ8i9zOw ; https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593268787868061696?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[49] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593250355835711488?s=20&t=frNDrXpjeGArPpTP72-Ldg

[50] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593293123127595008?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[51] https://twitter.com/barin_omid/status/1593220068552343552?s=20&t=93db8Ls_2MgCogovrWd4_A ; https://twitter.com/barin_omid/status/1593219200788856838?s=20&t=qg8gPfixCHiLCylUBmFyPw ; https://twitter.com/barin_omid/status/1593199762005696513?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1593181375401984000?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593295340714721283?s=20&t=EMFeaYB5ATXkdV0BCudxUg ; https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1593228695388708864?s=20&t=N9qQhhkm_TY-swQuQeyg1g ; https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1593281108526907393?s=20&t=B9zeATL5sqbsnV_VrXfUMw ; https://twitter.com/SamRasoulpour/status/1593327635370852353?s=20&t=B9zeATL5sqbsnV_VrXfUMw ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593165653116346368?s=20&t=EMFeaYB5ATXkdV0BCudxUg

[52] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593266465071067136?s=20&t=p7w-oiiY2JhByO9LJFL_Iw; https://twitter.com/chawshin_83/status/1593271715831971841?s=20&t=plULRIm8J_MPit7m1BeZ8Q;  https://twitter.com/RadioFarda_/status/1593342142369652738?s=20&t=fWq9ruaiDCvEDMZ3UPfxSA;

[53] https://twitter.com/Hashshaashin/status/1593302702598987776?s=20&t=0gowiq-l0EfkV-1u_WAABQ

[54] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593351226497843201?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[55] https://twitter.com/1500tasvir/status/1593282875062894595?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[56] https://twitter.com/barin_omid/status/1593288884074356736?s=20&t=r8WgW5CMABjMAynEeGtbEQ ; https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1593343092920311808?s=20&t=JtIBoffCng_icMpyzdqIMw

[57] www.hamshahrionline dot ir/news/720798; https://donya-e-eqtesad dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-62/3917827-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%88%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AB%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B0%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%BE%D8%B0%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AA

[58] https://twitter.com/KianSharifi/status/1593139378842308609

[59] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-6

[60] https://www.iranintl.com/202211179464

[61] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202211179779

[62] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-13;%20https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-september-28

[63] https://twitter.com/nafisehkBBC/status/1593207214252380160

[64] https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1593339605260140547?s=20&t=i0Xti5ekCGzKX35Mjox2SQ

[65] https://irna dot ir/xjL3vx

[66] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-16

[67] https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/pdf_uploadanalysisThe_IRGC_Command_Network-1.pdf

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 17

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 17, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces conducted another massive wave of missile strikes across Ukraine on November 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops launched five airstrikes and 25 cruise missile strikes at civilian infrastructure objects in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts throughout the day.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Command noted that Ukrainian air defense forces destroyed four cruise missiles, five Shahed-136 drones, and two Kh-59 guided missiles.[2] Russian forces conducted the largest missile attack since the start of the war on November 15, and as ISW has previously assessed, such missile campaigns are consuming Russia’s already depleted store of precision munitions.[3]

Russian forces in eastern Kherson Oblast are likely partially vulnerable to a Ukrainian interdiction campaign such as the one Ukrainian forces successfully exploited to retake western Kherson Oblast. Several major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) run through eastern Kherson Oblast into other Russian-controlled areas in southern Ukraine: the southern T2202 Nova Kahkovka-Armiansk route, the southeastern P47 Kakovkha-Henichesk route, and the M14 highway that runs eastward into Melitopol, Berdyansk, and Mariupol. Geolocated satellite imagery indicates that Russian troops are establishing defensive positions along some of these critical GLOCs, and social media reporting indicates that Ukrainian strikes have already begun targeting Russian concentration areas and military assets on these routes.[4] The limited number of high-quality roads and railways in this area, particularly connecting Crimea to the mainland, creates potential bottlenecks that could be vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction efforts that would gradually degrade the Russian ability to continue supplying its grouping in eastern Kherson Oblast and other areas of southern Ukraine. ISW previously reported the targeting of similar bottlenecks along key GLOCS--not just the bridges across the Dnipro River--during Ukraine’s Kherson counteroffensive in late August to mid-October culminated in the Russian withdrawal from the west bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further south of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian forces will likely find it harder to achieve such dramatic effects in eastern Kherson but may be able to disrupt Russian efforts to solidify and hold their new defensive lines.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree changing the composition of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC) on November 17.[5] The decree notably expels four Russian human rights activists, including Ekaterina Vinokurova, who wrote a piece criticizing the rise of “patriotic” Telegram channels and nationalist milbloggers who have cornered the information space against opposition outlets who deviate from the predominant Kremlin line of the war in Ukraine.[6] Russian media previously reported that Vinokurova and other members of the HRC appealed to the Russian Investigative Committee to look into the widely circulated video of the execution of a former Wagner Group fighter who reportedly defected to Ukraine.[7] Putin’s new appointees to the HRC include a slate of Russian political and proxy members and notably Sasha Kots, a prominent milblogger and war correspondent who has been heavily involved in covering Russian operations in Ukraine.[8] Kots most recently called for Russia to maintain massive missile strikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure on November 17.[9] This decree likely represents the Kremlin’s wider effort to stifle domestic civil opposition by continuing to platform prominent voices in the information space that propagate the Kremlin’s line on the war in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted another massive wave of missile strikes across Ukraine on November 17
• Russian forces in eastern Kherson Oblast are likely partially vulnerable to a Ukrainian interdiction campaign such as the one Ukrainian forces successfully exploited to retake western Kherson Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree changing the composition of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC) on November 17.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops are conducting counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Ukrainian troops continued targeting Russian military assets and concentration areas on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and in the rear areas of Zaporizhia Oblast on November 17.
• Russian authorities continue to face discontented mobilized personnel and low morale on the front lines.
• Russian occupation officials continued to destroy Ukrainian culture in Russian-occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the directions of Svatove and Kreminna on November 17. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air and artillery strikes prevented Ukrainian forces from attacking in the direction of Novoselivske and Kolomychikha (both within 15km northwest of Svatove); near Makiivka, Ploshchanka, and Chervonopopivka (all within 22km northwest of Kreminna); and near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 17 that Ukrainian forces also repelled Russian assaults within 16km northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[11] Russian mibloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces tried to attack Russian defenses near Svatove and conducted offensive operations near Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove) on November 16.[12] A milblogger cited a BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) commander who claimed that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a large offensive along the Orlianka-Zatizhne-Svatove line, although ISW offers no assessments about future Ukrainian operations.[13]

The BARS-13 commander also claimed that Ukrainian forces tested Russian defenses near Kreminna on November 16 and that Ukrainian operations south of Kreminna have created another active sector of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Luhansk Oblast.[14] Another BARS-13 source claimed that fighting is ongoing 12km south of Kreminna in Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast as of November 16.[15] Russian sources also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Myrne, Zymohiria, Starobilsk, Svatove, Biloukrakyne, and Kadiivka in Luhansk Oblast with HIMARS rockets.[16] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to target Russian military concentrations and logistics in Luhansk Oblast as the eastern Ukrainian counteroffensive progresses.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast on November 17. Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated that the most difficult situation is in eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces are attempting to cross the administrative border of Donetsk Oblast.[17] Hromov stated that there have been 500 combat clashes between Ukrainian and Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast within the last week alone.[18] ISW has previously reported that the Russian military is likely trying to use mobilized personnel and troops who were previously deployed on the west bank of Kherson Oblast to revitalize the Donetsk offensive but will likely continue to fail to achieve operationally significant gains.[19]

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Forces repelled Russian assaults within 34km northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamianske and Soledar.[20]  A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked Vesele and Bilhorivka to cut the road in the Soledar area.[21] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group formations southeast of Bakhmut retain control over Vesela Dolyna, Odradivka, the western outskirts of Opytne, and the southeastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[22]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area and western Donetsk Oblast on November 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 28km southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske, Marinka, and Pervomaiske.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 100^th Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia established control over a stronghold on the southeastern outskirts of Nevelske that they claimed would allow Russian forces to control the Krasnohorivka-Pervomaiske-Avdiivka supply road.[24] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces southwest of Avdiivka are clearing the northern outskirts of Opytne and the eastern part of Vodiane.[25] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked a Ukrainian stronghold within the city limits of Avdiivka itself.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that the developed network of Ukrainian strongholds in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area makes the Russian advance in the area particularly slow.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Russian forces took full control of the road between Pavlivka and Mykilske (47km southwest of Donetsk City).[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces deployed 400 personnel from the Rosgvardia rapid response special forces units to Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[29]  The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast on November 17.[30]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Russian forces continued to conduct defensive operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 17. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces are attempting to secure safe supply lines on the east bank and withdrawing further into the rear of Kherson Oblast to avoid Ukrainian fire damage.[31] Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov noted that Ukrainian control of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River allows Ukrainian troops to control territory near the occupied Crimean Peninsula (presumably by fire, since Ukrainian forces are not yet operating on the east bank of the river), and that Ukrainian troops are continuing to target Russian positions on the east bank at maximum range.[32]

Geolocated satellite imagery from November 15 shows that Russian troops have constructed additional defensive positions in Chkalove, a settlement approximately 55km south of the current Dnipro River frontline.[33]

Ukrainian troops continued targeting Russian military assets and concentration areas on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and in the rear areas of Zaporizhia Oblast on November 17.[34] Social media reports indicate that Ukrainian strikes hit Chaplynka (50km south of the Dnipro River) and Kalanchak (58km south of the Dnipro River).[35] Footage posted by Ukrainian military sources shows Ukrainian troops striking a Russian armored personnel carrier in Oleshky, just south of Kherson City.[36] A Russian media outlet additionally reported Ukrainian strikes on an administrative building in Nova Kakhovka.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Ukrainian strike destroyed Russian headquarters in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[38]

Russian forces targeted areas in Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts during a missile strike on November 17. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched air and sea-based missiles at infrastructure facilities in Odesa Oblast on the morning of November 17.[39] Russian missiles additionally struck critical infrastructure in Dnipro City, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed was a defense enterprise.[40] Russian and Ukrainian sources additionally reported a Russian missile strike on infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City and the Vilniansk Raion of Zaporizhia Oblast and Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast.[41] Russian sources reported that Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian drone near Feodosiia, Russian-occupied Crimea.[42] Russian forces otherwise continued routine artillery strikes along the line of contact in western Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson oblasts.[43]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities are continuing force-generation efforts across occupied Ukrainian territory and the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian officials are preparing a draft law that provides for the legalization of conscription for military service for Ukrainian citizens in the temporarily occupied territories who possess a Russian passport from the spring of 2023.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces recruited about 650 prisoners from correctional institutions in the Russian Federation during the previous week and sent them for training in Rostov Oblast.[45] A Russian source reported that the military registration and enlistment offices in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug will continue issuing summonses to all persons liable for military service, allegedly to verify information on eligibility for service.[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to share videos of conscripted soldiers being called up for service in Murmansk Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai,  Saint Petersburg, Sevastopol, and Stavropol Krai as well as training in Stavropol and Chelyabinsk Oblast.[47]

Multiple sources reported the movement of Russian military equipment in the temporarily occupied territories, presumably in support of incoming Russian recruits. Video footage shows Russian forces unloading heavy equipment, including tanks, off of trains in Bilokurakyne, Luhansk Oblast.[48] Video footage also shows Russian trucks carrying prefabricated concrete bunkers near Melitopol and Russian forces unloading self-propelled artillery in the Luhansk Oblast.[49]

Russian authorities continue to face discontented mobilized personnel and low morale on the front lines. A Russian source reported that mobilized soldiers from Novosibirsk Oblast wrote reports stating that they received insufficient training and therefore refused to fight without further training.[50] Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malyar stated in a briefing that Russian forces are experiencing an increase in panic and declining morale as a result of successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[51] Malyar stated that Russian forces are engaging in mass abuse of alcohol and in some cases, committing self-mutilation to leave the front lines. Details continue to emerge about holding cells for deserting mobilized Russian personnel in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, with one source identifying eight such cells across the regions.[52]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continued to destroy Ukrainian culture in Russian-occupied territories on November 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation officials seized all Ukrainian history textbooks in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, and plan to destroy them.[53] Social media sources amplified pictures posted on November 17 showing Ukrainian books and portraits in a waste pile in an unspecified location in Luhansk Oblast.[54] The Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian occupation educational institutions teach Ukrainian schoolchildren about the greatness of the Russian Federation and force them to write letters to Russian military personnel.[55] Fedorov reported that Russian occupation officials plan to introduce a new curriculum emphasizing that Ukrainians and Russian are ”one people” and justifying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[56] Russian occupation officials will likely continue to enact measures aimed at minimizing and destroying Ukrainian cultural identity as Russia pursues what ISW has previously assessed likely amounts to a deliberate ethnic cleansing campaign.[57]

Russian occupation officials and forces continued to intensify filtration measures and restrictions on movement in Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine on November 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation officials and forces are increasing filtration measures in Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast as well as in the Kakhovka raion in Kherson Oblast.[58] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces have instituted restrictions on movement in Rubizhne from the directions of Kreminna and Varvarivka in Luhansk Oblast.[59] A Russian source reported that Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo signed a decree on November 15 instituting a new network of checkpoints in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast to prevent the ”export” of special equipment and trucks from the Oblast.[60] Russian occupation officials and forces will likely continue to intensify filtration measures and restrictions on movement as the Ukrainian counteroffensive progresses.

Russian occupation officials continued to coerce residents of occupied areas of Ukraine into supporting the Russian war effort Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on November 17 that residents of occupied areas are receiving a full range of social support measures for donating blood.[61] Balitsky stated that his administration intends to offer 736-ruble ($12) payments to popularize blood donations.[62] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 17 that many companies in Russian-occupied Donetsk Oblast have received a plan with a designated number of employees who must donate blood, indicating that the blood donation measures may not be voluntary.[63] Russian occupation officials are likely pursuing some level of a coercive blood donation scheme to aid a substantial number of wounded Russian military personnel in occupied territories and address the Russian military’s likely shortage of blood supplies.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. 

---

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FuSvtbgXrJrVDt2bmHgB4d2AcmWBYVtcHDrttzuG3Uk9eg2cqWSywpjbF4a6fZUQl?__cft__[0]=AZUCOKGDqsq5z2OoRf6rc5uMyd6yWAwhwmjysyk4JZuMQVjmLaTVBEoHnco6cuUxHQ7IzlJRpwyrhp1RcC4340k5gepRD6pEBAsKjsajFZ098smO5LIhKiLXpD2cVNjvlskb9WKVOtYEFWY54YjhahY8Fh20V-Z-_Q-TM9o39Fg8SEqbcEselFVpJ4bGGQAdESsLNRSRT2aXgX7Xp3WtWYlx&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R  

[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/2162

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111622; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111022

[4] https://t.me/hueviyherson/29269 ; https://t.me/hueviyherson/29270; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1593029184674484225?s=20&t=JUUgef3L6aOWJEWZA9T8LQhttps://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1592973388150370304; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1593017709109080064?s=20&t=D8IQ_tvJktiAyLwpwK8GJA; https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1592973388150370304?s=20&t=D8IQ_tvJktiAyLwpwK8GJA;

[5] http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202211170001?index=0&rangeSize=1;

[6] https://yarnovosti dot com/news/mejdu-molotom-i-nakovalney-o-chem-govorit-reakciya-gosudarstva-na-kazn-byvshego-vagnerovca/; https://t.me/ekvinokurova/22598

[7] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/14/11/2022/637258f89a794786a2f8adf9?from=from_main_11; https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/11/15/russian-presidential-human-rights-council-members-ask-investigative-committee-head-to-investigate-video-allegedly-showing-wagner-group-defector-s-murder

[8] http://publication.pravo.gov.u/Document/View/0001202211170001?index=0&rangeSize=1; https://t.me/sashakots/37199

[9] https://t.me/sashakots/37174

[10] https://t.me/mod_russia/21815

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04KhQjDCxtBfoQBMwAx93fmEtVA6194BL1GbjEKs1VoGgaQqCRYydg757k4eXbq7Kl?__cft__[0]=AZX_LZ_M0LeVnF_SfwgMtp0W_czCrq5cl14iuhZ4VuLm4_FWoCLEZwj3My_HIYxgjsvhLJhi5g_o1l6M7njddXLifNaMFGSr94Y82pN-fNP7J807AldapxNjm1T4BeY3dYYpJpuyHRqJgIgJFBkj7mX3-WyBuLKgGeIrao_r22QLtHtMJVYFy6WR5LNaPcW7cbPlCcBWl_5dII1wLsF-mGgm&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[12] https://t.me/rybar/41250 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/9310

[13] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34978       

[14] https://t.me/wargonzo/9310

[15] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/34978       

[16] https://t.me/millnr/9740 ; https://t.me/kommunist/13307

[17] https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/11/17/ponad-500-bojovyh-zitknen-z-protyvnykom-vidbulos-na-shodi-krayiny-protyagom-tyzhnya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KvG5-vJfEn4

[18] https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/11/17/ponad-500-bojovyh-zitknen-z-protyvnykom-vidbulos-na-shodi-krayiny-protyagom-tyzhnya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KvG5-vJfEn4

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110422; https://isw.pub/UKrWar111422

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04KhQjDCxtBfoQBMwAx93fmEtVA6194BL1GbjEKs1VoGgaQqCRYydg757k4eXbq7Kl?__cft__[0]=AZX_LZ_M0LeVnF_SfwgMtp0W_czCrq5cl14iuhZ4VuLm4_FWoCLEZwj3My_HIYxgjsvhLJhi5g_o1l6M7njddXLifNaMFGSr94Y82pN-fNP7J807AldapxNjm1T4BeY3dYYpJpuyHRqJgIgJFBkj7mX3-WyBuLKgGeIrao_r22QLtHtMJVYFy6WR5LNaPcW7cbPlCcBWl_5dII1wLsF-mGgm&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/9297

[22] https://t.me/milchronicles/1311    

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04KhQjDCxtBfoQBMwAx93fmEtVA6194BL1GbjEKs1VoGgaQqCRYydg757k4eXbq7Kl?__cft__[0]=AZX_LZ_M0LeVnF_SfwgMtp0W_czCrq5cl14iuhZ4VuLm4_FWoCLEZwj3My_HIYxgjsvhLJhi5g_o1l6M7njddXLifNaMFGSr94Y82pN-fNP7J807AldapxNjm1T4BeY3dYYpJpuyHRqJgIgJFBkj7mX3-WyBuLKgGeIrao_r22QLtHtMJVYFy6WR5LNaPcW7cbPlCcBWl_5dII1wLsF-mGgm&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[24] https://t.me/rybar/41261

[25] https://t.me/rybar/41261

[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/9297

[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/9306 ; https://t.me/rybar/41245

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/21815     

[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FuSvtbgXrJrVDt2bmHgB4d2AcmWBYVtcHDrttzuG3Uk9eg2cqWSywpjbF4a6fZUQl?__cft__[0]=AZUCOKGDqsq5z2OoRf6rc5uMyd6yWAwhwmjysyk4JZuMQVjmLaTVBEoHnco6cuUxHQ7IzlJRpwyrhp1RcC4340k5gepRD6pEBAsKjsajFZ098smO5LIhKiLXpD2cVNjvlskb9WKVOtYEFWY54YjhahY8Fh20V-Z-_Q-TM9o39Fg8SEqbcEselFVpJ4bGGQAdESsLNRSRT2aXgX7Xp3WtWYlx&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FuSvtbgXrJrVDt2bmHgB4d2AcmWBYVtcHDrttzuG3Uk9eg2cqWSywpjbF4a6fZUQl?__cft__[0]=AZUCOKGDqsq5z2OoRf6rc5uMyd6yWAwhwmjysyk4JZuMQVjmLaTVBEoHnco6cuUxHQ7IzlJRpwyrhp1RcC4340k5gepRD6pEBAsKjsajFZ098smO5LIhKiLXpD2cVNjvlskb9WKVOtYEFWY54YjhahY8Fh20V-Z-_Q-TM9o39Fg8SEqbcEselFVpJ4bGGQAdESsLNRSRT2aXgX7Xp3WtWYlx&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04KhQjDCxtBfoQBMwAx93fmEtVA6194BL1GbjEKs1VoGgaQqCRYydg757k4eXbq7Kl?__cft__[0]=AZX_LZ_M0LeVnF_SfwgMtp0W_czCrq5cl14iuhZ4VuLm4_FWoCLEZwj3My_HIYxgjsvhLJhi5g_o1l6M7njddXLifNaMFGSr94Y82pN-fNP7J807AldapxNjm1T4BeY3dYYpJpuyHRqJgIgJFBkj7mX3-WyBuLKgGeIrao_r22QLtHtMJVYFy6WR5LNaPcW7cbPlCcBWl_5dII1wLsF-mGgm&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[31] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/pfbid02MKePDg48miQH9Z7i61UmY8xU8zpNG9Uvgsbsc2LL2wZYtbd2ooaeURDdhUdBfdfwl

[32] https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/11/17/zsu-kontrolyuyut-terytoriyu-poblyzu-tymchasovo-okupovanogo-pivostrova-krym-gromov/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KvG5-vJfEn4

[33] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1592973388150370304; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1593017709109080064?s=20&t=D8IQ_tvJktiAyLwpwK8GJA; https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1592973388150370304?s=20&t=D8IQ_tvJktiAyLwpwK8GJA

[34] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/pfbid02MKePDg48miQH9Z7i61UmY8xU8zpNG9Uvgsbsc2LL2wZYtbd2ooaeURDdhUdBfdfwl; https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/pfbid0YLdmUhue6EQMCmiUFt5EhfrMBEfFx4sh3NsxTDvh64hA1qRg1Vavq7Vrd7EnrA7xl

[35]  https://t.me/hueviyherson/29269 ; https://t.me/hueviyherson/29270; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1593029184674484225?s=20&t=JUUgef3L6aOWJEWZA9T8LQ

[36] https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1593300520843808769

[37] https://t.me/readovkanews/47116

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04KhQjDCxtBfoQBMwAx93fmEtVA6194BL1GbjEKs1VoGgaQqCRYydg757k4eXbq7Kl?__cft__[0]=AZX_LZ_M0LeVnF_SfwgMtp0W_czCrq5cl14iuhZ4VuLm4_FWoCLEZwj3My_HIYxgjsvhLJhi5g_o1l6M7njddXLifNaMFGSr94Y82pN-fNP7J807AldapxNjm1T4BeY3dYYpJpuyHRqJgIgJFBkj7mX3-WyBuLKgGeIrao_r22QLtHtMJVYFy6WR5LNaPcW7cbPlCcBWl_5dII1wLsF-mGgm&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[39] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/pfbid02MKePDg48miQH9Z7i61UmY8xU8zpNG9Uvgsbsc2LL2wZYtbd2ooaeURDdhUdBfdfwl

[40] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/2451 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/2453 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/2454 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1431 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1435 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/4040; https://t.me/hueviyherson/29273; https://t.me/mod_russia/21815 ; https://t.me/stranaua/75741

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FuSvtbgXrJrVDt2bmHgB4d2AcmWBYVtcHDrttzuG3Uk9eg2cqWSywpjbF4a6fZUQl?__cft__[0]=AZUCOKGDqsq5z2OoRf6rc5uMyd6yWAwhwmjysyk4JZuMQVjmLaTVBEoHnco6cuUxHQ7IzlJRpwyrhp1RcC4340k5gepRD6pEBAsKjsajFZ098smO5LIhKiLXpD2cVNjvlskb9WKVOtYEFWY54YjhahY8Fh20V-Z-_Q-TM9o39Fg8SEqbcEselFVpJ4bGGQAdESsLNRSRT2aXgX7Xp3WtWYlx&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04KhQjDCxtBfoQBMwAx93fmEtVA6194BL1GbjEKs1VoGgaQqCRYydg757k4eXbq7Kl?__cft__[0]=AZX_LZ_M0LeVnF_SfwgMtp0W_czCrq5cl14iuhZ4VuLm4_FWoCLEZwj3My_HIYxgjsvhLJhi5g_o1l6M7njddXLifNaMFGSr94Y82pN-fNP7J807AldapxNjm1T4BeY3dYYpJpuyHRqJgIgJFBkj7mX3-WyBuLKgGeIrao_r22QLtHtMJVYFy6WR5LNaPcW7cbPlCcBWl_5dII1wLsF-mGgm&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/14762 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/14767; https://t.me/mod_russia/21815; https://t.me/vrogov/6121  

[42] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1593204610768211969?s=20&t=R0WfNRjukcOsh6EU4iJCnQ; https://t.me/mash_na_volne/2391; https://t.me/readovkanews/47091 ; https://t.me/southtower/7324

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FuSvtbgXrJrVDt2bmHgB4d2AcmWBYVtcHDrttzuG3Uk9eg2cqWSywpjbF4a6fZUQl?__cft__[0]=AZUCOKGDqsq5z2OoRf6rc5uMyd6yWAwhwmjysyk4JZuMQVjmLaTVBEoHnco6cuUxHQ7IzlJRpwyrhp1RcC4340k5gepRD6pEBAsKjsajFZ098smO5LIhKiLXpD2cVNjvlskb9WKVOtYEFWY54YjhahY8Fh20V-Z-_Q-TM9o39Fg8SEqbcEselFVpJ4bGGQAdESsLNRSRT2aXgX7Xp3WtWYlx&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04KhQjDCxtBfoQBMwAx93fmEtVA6194BL1GbjEKs1VoGgaQqCRYydg757k4eXbq7Kl?__cft__[0]=AZX_LZ_M0LeVnF_SfwgMtp0W_czCrq5cl14iuhZ4VuLm4_FWoCLEZwj3My_HIYxgjsvhLJhi5g_o1l6M7njddXLifNaMFGSr94Y82pN-fNP7J807AldapxNjm1T4BeY3dYYpJpuyHRqJgIgJFBkj7mX3-WyBuLKgGeIrao_r22QLtHtMJVYFy6WR5LNaPcW7cbPlCcBWl_5dII1wLsF-mGgm&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R;  https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/pfbid02MKePDg48miQH9Z7i61UmY8xU8zpNG9Uvgsbsc2LL2wZYtbd2ooaeURDdhUdBfdfwl; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/2447 ; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/1423 https://t.me/stranaua/75735; https://t.me/vilkul/2267 

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FuSvtbgXrJrVDt2bmHgB4d2AcmWBYVtcHDrttzuG3Uk9eg2cqWSywpjbF4a6fZUQl?__cft__[0]=AZUCOKGDqsq5z2OoRf6rc5uMyd6yWAwhwmjysyk4JZuMQVjmLaTVBEoHnco6cuUxHQ7IzlJRpwyrhp1RcC4340k5gepRD6pEBAsKjsajFZ098smO5LIhKiLXpD2cVNjvlskb9WKVOtYEFWY54YjhahY8Fh20V-Z-_Q-TM9o39Fg8SEqbcEselFVpJ4bGGQAdESsLNRSRT2aXgX7Xp3WtWYlx&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FuSvtbgXrJrVDt2bmHgB4d2AcmWBYVtcHDrttzuG3Uk9eg2cqWSywpjbF4a6fZUQl?__cft__[0]=AZUCOKGDqsq5z2OoRf6rc5uMyd6yWAwhwmjysyk4JZuMQVjmLaTVBEoHnco6cuUxHQ7IzlJRpwyrhp1RcC4340k5gepRD6pEBAsKjsajFZ098smO5LIhKiLXpD2cVNjvlskb9WKVOtYEFWY54YjhahY8Fh20V-Z-_Q-TM9o39Fg8SEqbcEselFVpJ4bGGQAdESsLNRSRT2aXgX7Xp3WtWYlx&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[46] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/4098   

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/21780 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/21796 ; https://t.me/heroesofZ/225

[48] https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1592925204405444609   

[49] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1593233079115841538?s=20&t=JUUgef3L6aOWJEWZA9T8LQ; https://t.me/riamelitopol/75444  ; https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1592946401977151488?s=20&t=D8IQ_tvJktiAyLwpwK8GJA; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1593018335637434368?s=20&t=D8IQ_tvJktiAyLwpwK8GJA

[50] https://ngs dot ru/text/world/2022/11/16/71817767/  

[51] https://armyinform(dot)com.ua/2022/11/17/na-foni-ukrayinskyh-peremog-okupanty-panikuyut-masovo-zlovzhyvayut-alkogolem-ta-zdijsnyuyut-samokalichennya/

[52] https://t.me/news_sirena/7558

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04KhQjDCxtBfoQBMwAx93fmEtVA6194BL1GbjEKs1VoGgaQqCRYydg757k4eXbq7Kl?__cft__[0]=AZX_LZ_M0LeVnF_SfwgMtp0W_czCrq5cl14iuhZ4VuLm4_FWoCLEZwj3My_HIYxgjsvhLJhi5g_o1l6M7njddXLifNaMFGSr94Y82pN-fNP7J807AldapxNjm1T4BeY3dYYpJpuyHRqJgIgJFBkj7mX3-WyBuLKgGeIrao_r22QLtHtMJVYFy6WR5LNaPcW7cbPlCcBWl_5dII1wLsF-mGgm&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[54] https://twitter.com/TarasChuprynk/status/1593285341892468737?s=20&t=Mkf8t0m5BhvWRc0GEjhpWg ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1593278491260321792  ; https://t.me/luhansktoday/10296

[55] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/887

[56] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/887   

[57] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct15

[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FuSvtbgXrJrVDt2bmHgB4d2AcmWBYVtcHDrttzuG3Uk9eg2cqWSywpjbF4a6fZUQl?__cft__[0]=AZUCOKGDqsq5z2OoRf6rc5uMyd6yWAwhwmjysyk4JZuMQVjmLaTVBEoHnco6cuUxHQ7IzlJRpwyrhp1RcC4340k5gepRD6pEBAsKjsajFZ098smO5LIhKiLXpD2cVNjvlskb9WKVOtYEFWY54YjhahY8Fh20V-Z-_Q-TM9o39Fg8SEqbcEselFVpJ4bGGQAdESsLNRSRT2aXgX7Xp3WtWYlx&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid04KhQjDCxtBfoQBMwAx93fmEtVA6194BL1GbjEKs1VoGgaQqCRYydg757k4eXbq7Kl?__cft__[0]=AZX_LZ_M0LeVnF_SfwgMtp0W_czCrq5cl14iuhZ4VuLm4_FWoCLEZwj3My_HIYxgjsvhLJhi5g_o1l6M7njddXLifNaMFGSr94Y82pN-fNP7J807AldapxNjm1T4BeY3dYYpJpuyHRqJgIgJFBkj7mX3-WyBuLKgGeIrao_r22QLtHtMJVYFy6WR5LNaPcW7cbPlCcBWl_5dII1wLsF-mGgm&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FuSvtbgXrJrVDt2bmHgB4d2AcmWBYVtcHDrttzuG3Uk9eg2cqWSywpjbF4a6fZUQl?__cft__[0]=AZUCOKGDqsq5z2OoRf6rc5uMyd6yWAwhwmjysyk4JZuMQVjmLaTVBEoHnco6cuUxHQ7IzlJRpwyrhp1RcC4340k5gepRD6pEBAsKjsajFZ098smO5LIhKiLXpD2cVNjvlskb9WKVOtYEFWY54YjhahY8Fh20V-Z-_Q-TM9o39Fg8SEqbcEselFVpJ4bGGQAdESsLNRSRT2aXgX7Xp3WtWYlx&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[60] https://t.me/readovkanews/47128

[61] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/494

[62] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/494

[63] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/494