UA-69458566-1

Tuesday, September 6, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6

Karolina Hird, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

September 6, 10:00 pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) September 6 report on the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) described numerous ways in which Russian occupation authorities and the Russian military are jeopardizing the safe operation of the plant.[1] The report does not attempt to determine which party is responsible for the shelling that has damaged the facility and repeatedly calls on “all relevant parties” to take measures to improve the situation. The moderation and apparent neutrality of that language can overshadow the extremely clear articulation of the Russian activities undermining the plant’s safety and the fact that the report attributes no dangerous actions to Ukraine. The IAEA’s report is thus a coded condemnation of Russian moves that have created and are perpetuating the danger of nuclear disaster in Ukraine.

The report specifically notes that Ukraine reported to the IAEA that Russian forces had positioned military equipment in two turbine halls and various other facilities in and around the ZNPP.[2] It adds that the inspection team that finally visited the plant recently directly observed Russian military equipment in turbine halls and elsewhere around the plant.[3] It added that personnel from Russia’s state atomic energy organization, ROSATOM, were at the site and observed that “the presence of Rosatom senior technical staff could lead to interference with the normal lines of operational command or authority and create potential frictions when it comes to decision-making.”[4] It also noted that “the operating staff did not have unrestricted access to some areas, such as the spray cooling ponds, roofs of the buildings, and structures in the area of the water intake, and that access to the cooling ponds area was required to be granted by the military personnel at the site.”[5] The IAEA’s inspection team was told that “the on-site emergency centre was not accessible to the plant staff for emergency response as it was occupied by the military authority.” The team visited the alternative emergency center and observed that it lacked “an independent power supply or an independent ventilation system, and there is no internet connection to enable effective communication with all parties involved in an emergency response.”[6]

The IAEA report thus demonstrates that Russian officials have placed military equipment in locations inhibiting access to essential facilities, installed their own personnel to oversee the plant’s operations in ways that the IAEA judges could undermine effective response to a nuclear emergency, restricted the Ukrainian operating staff’s access to key parts of the facility, and shifted the emergency center to a location lacking essential components vital to an effective response to a serious nuclear emergency. The Russians have thus created conditions at the ZNPP that increase the risk that an emergency could occur and significantly increase the danger that the operating staff will be unable to respond efficiently and effectively in such an event.

Russian President Vladimir Putin could seek to use the fears that his actions are causing to coerce the IAEA and the international community into a de facto recognition of Russia’s right to be involved in the operation of the ZNPP, which he might seek to portray as de facto recognition of Russia’s occupation of southern Ukraine. The somewhat coded language of the IAEA report reflects the fact that Ukraine remains the operator of the ZNPP and the party responsible for its safe operation and for complying with the IAEA under international law. The IAEA cannot directly engage Russia regarding the plant’s operation without at least tacitly admitting that Russia has some right to be consulted. Putin might seek to take advantage of this situation to attempt to create a process analogous to the Minsk Accords that established the “ceasefire” in Ukraine following Russia’s 2014 invasion. The Minsk and Minsk II agreements treated Russia as a neutral party rather than a participant, thereby tacitly accepting Putin’s assertion that Ukraine was in civil war rather than the victim of Russian aggression. Putin might seek to use the conditions he has created at the ZNPP to establish a parallel international framework undermining Ukraine’s sovereign rights over the much greater expanse of Ukrainian territory Russian forces now occupy.

Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack in Kharkiv Oblast near Balakliya that likely drove Russian forces back to the left bank (north side) of the Severskyi Donets and Serednya Balakliika rivers on September 6. Ukrainian forces likely captured Verbivka (less than 3 km northwest of Balakliya) on September 6.[7] Geolocated footage posted on September 6 shows Ukrainian infantry in eastern Verbivka (less than 3 km from Balakliya).[8] Multiple Russian sources acknowledged Ukrainian gains in Verbivka and reported that Russian forces demolished unspecified bridges in Balakliya‘s eastern environs to prevent further Ukrainian advances.[9] Images posted on September 6 also show a destroyed Russian bridge over the Serednya Balakliika River—a geographic feature behind which the Russian front line in this sector likely lies.[10] Social media users reported that Russian forces withdrew from checkpoints six kilometers west of Balaklia on September 6.[11]

Russian forces likely no longer maintain their previous positions in Bairak and Nova Husarivka (just south of Balakliya on the right bank of the Seversky Donets River). Russian forces likely abandoned Bayrak and Nova Husarivka in late August. Images posted on August 30 show that Russian forces blew the bridge over the Seversky Donetsk River near Bayrak on an unspecified date.[12] Bridge demolition activity indicates a planned Russian withdrawal. Ukraine’s General Staff reported on September 6 that Russian forces conducted air strikes against Bayrak, indicating that Ukrainian forces may have advanced in the area.[13]

Russia’s deployment of forces from Kharkiv and eastern Ukraine to Ukraine’s south is likely enabling Ukrainian counterattacks of opportunity. The September 6 Ukrainian counterattack in Kharkiv was likely an opportunistic effort enabled by the redeployment of Russian forces away from the area to reinforce Russian positions against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast. Obituary data on Russian servicemen indicates that Russia deployed elements of the 147th Artillery Regiment of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army to Kherson Oblast no earlier than late August.[14] This is the first time ISW has observed elements of Russia’s elite 1st Guards Tank Army operating in southern Ukraine. Elements of the 147th previously fought in Bucha in Kyiv in March and elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army were active primarily along the Kharkiv Axis after the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv.[15]

Key Takeaways

  • The International Atomic Energy Agency report released on September 6 describes Russian activities that increase the likelihood of a nuclear accident at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant while decreasing the ability of the plant’s personnel to respond to such an accident effectively.
  • Ukrainian forces have launched likely opportunistic counterattacks in southern Kharkiv Oblast and retaken several settlements. Russian redeployments of forces from this area to defend against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson likely prompted and facilitated these counterattacks.
  • Ukrainian forces are continuing an operational-level interdiction campaign and striking Russian logistics nodes, transportation assets, manpower and equipment concentrations, and control points across Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian and Ukrainian sources discussed kinetic activity northwest of Kherson City and in western Kherson Oblast along the Inhulets River.
  • Russian forces made incremental gains south of Bakhmut and continued ground attacks north, northwest, and southwest of Donetsk City.
  • Russian authorities continue setting conditions to Russify Ukrainians living in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Ukrainian military officials reiterated on September 6 that Ukrainian forces are targeting Russian logistics nodes, transportation assets, manpower and equipment concentrations, and control points across the Southern Axis.[16] Ukraine’s Southern Operational command stated that Ukrainian troops carried out over 150 fire missions in the direction of Kherson Oblast and specifically targeted Russian river crossings in critical areas.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that these Ukrainian strikes are having significant impacts on Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive operations.[18] Ukrainian officials are maintaining operational silence and did not provide specifics on Ukrainian ground movements in Kherson Oblast.

Social media footage taken by residents of Kherson Oblast on September 6 provides visual evidence of the continuing Ukrainian operational-level interdiction campaign. Ukrainian forces likely struck key Russian logistics nodes and military assets in three main areas on the evening of September 5-6: around Kherson City, in and around Nova Kakhkovka (55km due east of Kherson City), and deep in Russian-held rear areas in southern Kherson Oblast. Social media reports from within the Kherson City area include video claiming to capture the sounds of explosions from a strike on Russian positions in Chornobaivka, on the northern outskirts of Kherson City.[19] Geolocated imagery and satellite imagery from September 5 indicates that Ukrainian strikes likely destroyed the Darivskyi Bridge (about 15km northwest of Kherson City).[20] Residents reported the sounds of explosions after a Ukrainian strike on Russian equipment concentrations in and around Nova Kakhkovka, about 55km due east of Kherson City.[21] Residents also reported explosions and the activation of Russian air defenses over various areas south of the Dnipro River, including Hola Prystan (10km southwest of Kherson City), Kalanchak (65km southeast of Kherson City), and Chaplynka (80km southeast of Kherson City).[22]

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported kinetic activity in two main areas along the Kherson Oblast frontline on September 6- northwest of Kherson City near the Mykolaiv-Kherson border and in western Kherson Oblast along the Inhulets River that runs between Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled an attempted Russian advance near Lyubomirivka, about 25km northwest of Kherson City.[23] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command similarly noted that Ukrainian troops fought against Russian assaults near Schmidtove and Ternovi Pody, both about 25km north of Kherson City and along the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast border.[24] The frontline northwest of Kherson City is likely highly contested as Ukrainian troops attempt to push inwards toward Kherson City and Russian troops attempt to push outwards towards Mykolaiv City.

Russian milbloggers discussed purported Ukrainian operations in western Kherson along the Inhulets River on September 6. One Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces are transferring reinforcements to the south bank of the Inhulets River but that Ukrainian troops have not been successful in pushing further south that Sukhyi Stavok (about 65km northeast of Kherson City).[25] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops attempted to advance towards Bilohirka (4km northeast of Sukhyi Stavok) from the northwest across the Inhulets River and that fighting is ongoing in Kostromka (4km southeast of Sukhyi Stavok).[26] Russian sources also stated that Russian troops fired on Ukrainian positions around the Sukhyi Stavok pocket, which confirms that Ukrainian forces are holding positions there.[27] Several geolocated videos further confirm that Ukrainian forces have captured territory in northern Kherson near the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, namely around Olhyne, Visokopillya, and Novovoznesenske.[28]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) seemingly adopted a more tempered tone in its claims about the Ukrainian counteroffensive on September 6 and stated that Ukrainian troops are continuing attempts to attack in the Mykolaiv-Kryvyi Rih direction.[29] Since the start of the counteroffensive of August 29, the prose employed by the Russian MoD has typically been acerbic and intended to undermine Ukrainian actions and present the counteroffensive on whole as a failing. The more neutral tone of the Russian MoD’s September 6 statement may suggest that the Russian MoD seeks to avoid getting too far away from the discourse of Russian milbloggers, who have been reporting specifics of the counteroffensive in granular detail. The Russian MoD likely is unwilling to directly refute concrete claims made by military correspondents, and the more neutral approach to the Ukrainian counteroffensive affords the MoD a margin of error when discussing operations in Kherson Oblast that does not put it too badly at odds with milbloggers in the wider Russian information space. 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort- Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort 1- Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort 2- Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort- Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort- Southern Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks along the Izyum-Slovyansk axis on September 6 and continued routine air and artillery strikes in this area.[30] Geolocated footage posted on September 5 shows Ukrainian troops walking freely along a road in Staryi Karavan, about 10km northeast of Slovyansk.[31] The footage suggests that Ukrainian forces may have conducted a limited counterattack northeast of Slovyansk and gained ground near the T0514 highway that runs into Slovyansk itself, or conducted an infiltration reconnaissance mission in the area. Russian forces’ control over Staryi Karavan is likely reduced in either event.

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks toward Siversk on September 6 and continued routine artillery strikes on Siversk and surrounding settlements.[32]

Russian force continued ground attacks south and northeast of Bakhmut on September 6 and made incremental gains south of Bakhmut. Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group fighters established full control over the entirety of Kodema (13km southeast of Bakhmut) by the end of the day on September 6, and a Russian military correspondent posted footage of soldiers moving freely around streets in Kodema.[33] Russian forces will likely use positions in Kodema to push northwards on Zaitseve, where fighting is ongoing.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian troops attempted attacks near Vesela Dolyna (5km southeast of Bakhmut) and in Soledar (10km northeast of Bakhmut).[35] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 3rd Brigade claimed they are also advancing from the outskirts of Horlivka (20km south of Bakhmut).[36]

Russian forces conducted a series of ground attacks north, west, and south of the outskirts of Donetsk City on September 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted assaults near Avdiivka (5km north of the outskirts of Donetsk City), Novobakhmutivka (15km north of the outskirts of Donetsk City), and Spartka and the Butivka mine (both directly on the northern outskirts of Donetsk City).[37] Russian sources claimed that the 11th DNR Regiment took control of a bridge on the road that runs between Pisky and Pervomaiske (both on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and are continuing efforts to advance westward on Pervomaiske.[38] Ukrainian troops also reportedly repelled Russian attacks in Marinka, on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[39] Russian troops conducted routine air and artillery strikes along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.[40]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City or in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 6 and continued routine air and artillery strikes in these areas.[41] DNR Territorial Defense claimed that proxy forces, under the cover of Russian artillery fire, took control of Novopil and Vremivka, about 90km southwest of Donetsk City and directly along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.[42] ISW has not observed any evidence of this claim, however.

Supporting Effort #1- Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication – GLOCs – to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on September 6 and continued routine shelling of Kharkiv City and its environs.[43]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched an offensive operation on Balakliya (about 65km southeast of Kharkiv City) on September 6. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces gained control of the northwestern part of Verbivka (4km northwest of Balakliya) on the north side of the Krainya Balakliya River.[44] Geolocated video footage from within Verbivka shows Ukrainian soldiers inspecting the bodies of dead Russian soldiers on September 6, indicating that Ukrainian troops have advanced into the settlement.[45] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing around Balakliya as Ukrainian troops have reportedly entrenched themselves on the outskirts of the settlement, forcing Russian troops to redeploy reserve troops to the area to support defensive operations.[46] Russian sources voiced their concern that the Ukrainian attack on Balaklyia is intended to cut Russian forces off from Izyum and slowly ”wedge” into Luhansk Oblast.[47] Ukrainian officials have not yet commented on the progression of Ukrainian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast.

Supporting Effort #2- Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 6 and continued routine air and artillery strikes along the line of contact in Zaporizhia Oblast.[48] Russian and Ukrainian sources continued to claim that the other side shelled Enerhodar and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) throughout the day on September 6.[49] Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov reported a large explosion that led to a total power and water outage in Enerhodar.[50] Russian sources accused Ukrainian troops of firing at a Russian passport office in Enerhodar.[51]

Russian forces continued routine missile and artillery attacks along the frontlines in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts on September 6.[52]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to recruit, form, and deploy volunteer battalions to Ukraine.

Former Deputy of Perm Oblast’s Legislative Assembly, Alexander Grigorenko, returned to Perm on September 5 after his unspecified volunteer unit deployed to Donbas.[53] Grigorenko’s return to Perm is the first indicator that ISW has observed of the deployment of a Perm Oblast’s volunteer unit to Ukraine. Russian media outlet Kasparov reported that military enlistment offices in Samara Oblast are conducting solicitation calls via phone to invite Samaran reserve officers to enlist for a one-time 300,000-ruble ($4,895) payment and 200,000-ruble ($3,263) monthly salary for volunteer service.[54] Russian media also stated that the ”Murman” rifle company, likely newly formed in Murmansk Oblast and part of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade, deployed to Ukraine on September 6 and that the “Komi“ motorized rifle company of the Northern Fleet deployed to Ukraine on August 30.[55] Russian outlet TVKOM reported that the formation of the Buryatian ”Baikal” battalion is at about 70 percent (of a planned end strength of 500 men) and that the battalion will deploy to Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod, to undergo training after forming.[56] Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov additionally stated on September 6 that the Chechen Republic is preparing ”several thousand” more volunteers and fighters for two new elements that will be part of the existing two volunteer Chechen regiments and three battalions generated to fight in Ukraine.[57]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian authorities continue setting conditions to Russify Ukrainians living in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. LNR Deputy Internal Minister Vitaly Kiselev stated on September 6 that the Kremlin’s ruling United Russia Party helped organize a “rehabilitation course” for Ukrainian children from Donbas with “neuropsychiatric pathologies of varying severity” at the Scientific and Practical Center for Child Psychoneurology of the Moscow City Department of Health.[58] A United Russia official reportedly stated that some parents from Donbas will go to sanatoriums in Dagestan for further "therapy” at the end of September.[59]

Russian occupation authorities continued to face partisan activity in occupied areas on September 6. Ukrainian partisans conducted an improved explosive device attack against Berdyansk city occupation commandant Artem Bardin in Berdyansk on September 6.[60] Russian sources claim that Bardin is alive but in serious condition at a local hospital.[61]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to prepare for annexation referenda. Russian-appointed Zaporizhia Oblast Military-Civilian Administration Head Vladimir Rogov claimed on September 6 that the “Electoral Commission of Zaporizhia Oblast” is preparing voter lists for the referendum. Rogov stated that voters will vote in stationary booths and voting boxes and that commission members have inspected all polling stations and selected law enforcement officers to safeguard the electoral process.[62] The Russian-backed chairperson of the election commission, Galina Katyushchenko, claimed that the election commission has begun analyzing and correcting voter lists to ensure that “every resident of the region can take part in the expression of will.”[63]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf (iaea.org)

[2] ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf (iaea.org), pp. 9-10.

[3] ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf (iaea.org), pp. 13-14.

[4] *ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf, p. 14.

[5] *ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf, p. 15.

[6] *ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf, pp 21-22.

[7] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/15913; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/15915; https://t.me/wargonzo/8138; https://t.me/notes_veterans/4603; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17328; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567158557660823552; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567123109680922624; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567102967517421571; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39967; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39970; https://t.me/readovkanews/41312; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9315; https://t.me/milchronicles/1081; https://t.me/milinfolive/90046

[8] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1567160253728362499; https://twitter.com/BarracudaVol1/status/1567166803847036928; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1567176031244525570; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567133322634985473; https://twitter.com/rollowastaken/status/1567136053751857152; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1567138899062923264

[9] https://t.me/rybar/38310; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62609; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39968; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62613; https://t.me/swodki/158300; https://t.me/milchronicles/1081; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/15914; https://twitter.com/YosypTar/status/1567119838241243140; https://twitter.com/typicaldonetsk/status/1567116959065448449; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567114214220644352; https://t.me/romanov_92/26830; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567158557660823552

[10] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1567160253728362499; https://twitter.com/BarracudaVol1/status/1567166803847036928; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1567176031244525570; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567133322634985473; https://twitter.com/rollowastaken/status/1567136053751857152; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1567138899062923264

[11] https://twitter.com/YosypTar/status/1567119838241243140; https://twitter.com/typicaldonetsk/status/1567116959065448449; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567114214220644352

[12] https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1564993725964914688; https///t.me/Info_BA_News/3763

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El

[14] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1567093095296126976

[15] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1513598227630673930

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql

[17] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/5764037823629468/

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El

[19] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25484; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25482; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62655; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25459; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/18169; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/18167

[20] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25476; https://twitter.com/cxemu/status/1567127529898610688; https://twitter.com/cxemu/status/1567127536856928258; https://www dot radiosvoboda.org/a/news-skhemy-pontonnyy-mist-daryivka/32020788.html; https://twitter.com/NLwartracker/status/1567064477874405376; https://twit

[21] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25477; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25474; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25473; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25469; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/18167; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62655; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25463; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25473; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62655

[22] ttps://t.me/hueviyherson/25485; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25483; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/18167; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25472; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25469

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El

[24] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5764037823629468

[25] https://t.me/rybar/38315

[26] https://t.me/rybar/38315; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62655

[27] https://t.me/rybar/38288

[28] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566945812071981058?s=20&t=N8BvkuQbltQCg4n3I1nUyg; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1566896227496906752?s=20&t=N8BvkuQbltQCg4n3I1nUyg; https://twitter.com/KremlinTrolls/status/1567119956109627392; https://twitter.com/rollowastaken/status/1567121894263996416; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566876730169724931; https://t.me/operativnoZSU/40028; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566378388964745217; https://twitter.com/NikoRadans/status/1566385002094403585; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1566950675749150721; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1566949261786451968; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567073673143586816; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1567119061406085128; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1567098226582355969; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1567189135323955201; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1566923951049244677; https://t.me/svoiKR/8069; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1566920624466952192; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1566923951049244677; https://t.me/svoiKR/8069; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1566920624466952192; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1567308451939770375

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/19576

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql

[31] https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1566706264851320832; https://twitter.com/Bazinga00264477/status/1567069067441278977https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1567111890433675266; https://streamable.com/i9kjeg

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566937898838114305?s=20&t=N8BvkuQbltQCg4n3I1nUyg; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1566795850445385728?s=20&t=N8BvkuQbltQCg4n3I1nUyg

[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62666; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62655; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62643 ; https://t.me/rybar/38317; https://t.me/milinfolive/90047; https://t.me/milinfolive/90048; https://t.me/riafan_everywhere/12736

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El

[36] https://t.me/nm_dnr/8943

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El

[38] https://t.me/nm_dnr/8939; https://t.me/rybar/38318; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1567171364699705346; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1567039729673318401; https://t.me/astrahandm/5327; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39969; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62655

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El; https://t.me/nm_dnr/8939; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17322; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566908871460921353?s=20&t=N8BvkuQbltQCg4n3I1nUyg; https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1566782782482825222?s=20&t=N8BvkuQbltQCg4n3I1nUyg; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1567039729673318401

[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02giaVA1p19ZyZMGUk6E5n5kYo5rLHit2Q6AoEpM6tCiaunCzi2oEu17EP9AkK6s4El; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql

[42] https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7171; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7170

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql; https://t.me/synegubov/4061; https://t.me/synegubov/4065; https://t.me/synegubov/4066; https://t.me/synegubov/4067; https://t.me/der_rada/2534; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/18158; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/1398; https://t.me/spravdi/16648; https://t.me/spravdi/16641

[44] https://t.me/rybar/38310; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62609 ; https://t.me/kommunist/9071; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62655; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39968; https://t.me/readovkanews/41312

[45] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1567160253728362499; https://twitter.com/BarracudaVol1/status/1567166803847036928; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1567176031244525570

[46] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/15913; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/15915; https://t.me/wargonzo/8138; https://t.me/notes_veterans/4603; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17328; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567158557660823552; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567123109680922624; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1567102967517421571; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39967; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39970; https://t.me/readovkanews/41312; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/9315; https://t.me/milchronicles/1081; https://t.me/milinfolive/90046  

[47] https://t.me/readovkanews/41312; https://t.me/sashakots/35380

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hd7KBxNrxycZYb8tHVqJ5DwFqtAk7Efnra5cYxBWuibDLWR2M4tTUwbiKks9nNWql; https://t.me/starukhofficial/3703; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/12616; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/12606; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/12593; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/12588

[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/19577; https://t.me/vrogov/4670; https://t.me/vrogov/4671; https://t.me/vrogov/4675; https://t.me/vrogov/4693; https://t.me/stranaua/62303; https://t.me/rian_ru/176772; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1567084290340421632; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39956

[50] https://t.me/orlovdmytroEn/979

[51] https://t.me/rian_ru/176772; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1567084290340421632

[52] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/18158; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/18146; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1772; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1771; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1767; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/1398; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/1392; https://t.me/vilkul/1881; https://t.me/vilkul/1880; https://t.me/vilkul/1879; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/731; https://t.me/stranaua/62305; https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/5764037823629468/ ; https://www.facebook.com/ouvKakhovka/posts/pfbid02yBWcQ9DLoyijDVr5LBYZ7ZPEiD6zpxSUJ1xe9JJAsgDZmVq9cf2mPrLn1U8eLmbpl; https://t.me/mod_russia/19576; https://t.me/mod_russia/19576

[53] https://www.kasparov dot ru/material.php?id=6315D45D864C5

[54] https://www.kasparov dot ru/material.php?id=63172BA91A40C

[55] https://regnum dot ru/news/3688800.html; https://www.bnkomi dot ru/data/news/148387/

[56] https://tvcom-tv dot ru/v-buryatii-prodolzhayut-komplektovat-imennoj-batalon-%C2%ABbajkal%C2%BB.html

[57] https://www.grozny-inform dot ru/news/politic/143231/; https://avia dot pro/news/glava-chechni-neskolko-tysyach-rossiyskih-dobrovolcev-i-professionalnyh-voennyh-gotovyatsya-k

[58] https://t.me/kommunist/9073

[59] https://t.me/kommunist/9073

[60] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1567130137308561408; https://ria dot ru/20220906/berdyansk-1814869563.html; https://euroweeklynews.com/2022/09/06/breaking-news-russian-commandant-hospitalised-after-car-bomb-explosion-in-occupied-berdyansk-ukraine/; https://twitter.com/Scilentor/status/1567132739622551553; https://twitter.com/rollowastaken/status/1567130567769989120; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1567134959348989954; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39963; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1567135794288115712; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1567137608169406464; https://twitter.com/typicaldonetsk/status/1567151061768540165; https://twitter.com/muryk412/status/1567131437702209536; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39958; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39964; https://t.me/readovkanews/41305 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/41307; https://t.me/readovkanews/41309; https://t.me/rybar/38305

[61] https://rg dot ru/2022/09/06/komendant-berdianska-artem-bardin-gospitalizirovan-v-tiazhelom-sostoianii-posle-vzryva.html;

[62] https://t.me/vrogov/4694

[63] https://t.me/vrogov/4694

 

 

Monday, September 5, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Angela Howard, and Mason Clark

September 5, 10:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive is tangibly degrading Russian logistics and administrative capabilities in occupied southern Ukraine. As ISW has previously reported, Ukrainian officials explicitly confirmed that Ukrainian troops seek to attrit Russian logistical capabilities in the south through precision strikes on manpower and equipment concentrations, command centers, and logistics nodes.[1] These counteroffensive actions also have intentional radiating effects on Russian occupation authorities. The head of the Kherson Oblast occupation regime, Kirill Stremousov, told Russian media outlet TASS that his administration has paused annexation referendum plans in Kherson Oblast due to “security” concerns.[2] The Ukrainian Resistance Center similarly reported that Russian occupation authorities are abandoning plans for referenda due to the ongoing counteroffensive.[3] Shortly after TASS published his comment, Stremousov posted on Telegram denying he called for a pause because his administration had never set an official date for the referendum.[4] Both of Stremousov’s statements indicate a high level of disorganization within occupation regimes that is likely being exacerbated by the effects of the counteroffensive. Ukrainian forces intend to slowly chip away at both Russian tactical and operational level capabilities in Kherson Oblast, and in doing so will likely have significant impacts on the administrative and bureaucratic capabilities of occupation officials. 

Putin publicly praised DNR and LNR forces (and denigrated the Russian military) on September 5, likely to motivate proxy recruitment and reframe Russian coverage of the war. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on September 5 that personnel in the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (the armed forces of the DNR and LNR) are fighting better in Donbas than professional Russian soldiers and insinuated that he is unhappy with the performance of the Russian Ministry of Defense.[5] Putin’s comments are likely intended to promote recruitment and force generation in the DNR and LNR and refocus coverage of the war in the Russian media space away from the fighting in southern Ukraine. Russian forces have increasingly relied on DNR and LNR personnel as core fighting forces, and the Kremlin likely seeks to rhetorically elevate their role in the war to enhance recruitment and increase morale. Putin additionally likely seeks to elevate the Kremlin’s preferred (and false) narrative of its invasion of Ukraine as an effort to “protect” the DNR and LNR by praising their forces. 

Key Takeaways

  • The Ukrainian counteroffensive is tangibly degrading Russian logistics and administrative capabilities in occupied southern Ukraine.
  • Putin publicly praised DNR and LNR forces (and denigrated the Russian military) on September 5, likely to motivate proxy recruitment and reframe Russian coverage of the war.
  • Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence regarding the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive but reported on the further destruction of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Central Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Siversk, northeast and south of Bakhmut, and along the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.
  • Ukrainian special forces conducted a limited operation against a Russian FSB base in the Enerhodar area.
  • Power unit No. 6 of the ZNPP became disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid.
  • Russian authorities continue to seek unconventional sources of combat power and are increasingly turning to ill and infirm individuals.
  • Occupation authorities set a 1.25 ruble/1 hryvnia exchange rate in Zaporizhia Oblast in order to facilitate the economic integration of occupied Zaporizhia into the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence and did not release any information pertaining to Ukrainian advances in Kherson Oblast on September 5. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Russian reconnaissance drones in Vysokopillya after previously not confirming that Ukrainian forces entered the town.[6] ISW independently assessed that Ukrainian forces captured the town on September 4 due to several social media videos.[7] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched airstrikes on Bezimenne and Sukhyi Stavok, approximately six and ten kilometers southeast of the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recaptured Kostromka (the village in between Bezimenne and Sukhyi Stavok), but geolocated footage depicted Ukrainian tanks attacking Russian positions around the settlement.[9] Combined with the geolocated footage, the Ukrainian General Staff report may indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostromka and Bezimenne areas. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces shelled the area of Novovoskresenske (about 18km southeast of Vysokopillya) but it is unclear if Ukrainian forces have advanced in the vicinity of the settlement.[10]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and ammunition depots in Central Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian pontoon crossing in Lvove (west of Nova Kakhovka), struck the command post of the 35th Combined Arms Army in the Kakhovka Raion, and two observation posts belonging to battalion tactical groups (BTGs) of the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment in Mykolaiv Raion and the 126th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade in Beryslav Raion.[11] Ukraine‘s Southern Operational Command added that Ukrainian forces struck a pontoon crossing in the area of the Kakhovka Bridge on September 5.[12] Ukrainian strikes also reportedly destroyed a Russian ammunition depot in Tomyna Balka (about 19km west of Kherson City), indicating Ukrainian forces are not operating in the settlement.[13] CNN previously reported that Ukrainian forces liberated the settlement on August 29.[14] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command added that Ukrainian missile units destroyed two ammunition depots in Khersonskyi Raion.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes eliminated 30 Russian servicemen and three tanks in the area of the Antonivsky Bridge, and an anti-aircraft missile system with six trucks near an unspecified crossing.[16] Geolocated footage showed Russian military convoys waiting to cross the Dnipro River from the left bank, and the Russian convoys remain vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces are prohibiting and threatening locals from crossing the Dnipro River.[18]

Social media footage from September 4 and September 5 also supports Ukrainian military reports that Ukrainian forces are continuing their missile campaign throughout central Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Telegram channels reported smoke around the Darivka Bridge over the Inhulets River, which is likely the result of another round of Ukrainian strikes on the GLOC east of Kherson City.[19] Ukrainian social media users also reported witnessing explosions in the industrial area of Tavriisk (east of Nova Kakhovka) and in Kherson City.[20] Kherson City residents also noted that unspecified actors fired signal flares in the city on September 4.[21]

Russian forces are continuing to undertake measures to establish river crossings and maintain their GLOCs to northern Kherson Oblast. Head of the Kherson Oblast occupation regime, Kirill Stremousov published a video rant depicting a pontoon crossing constructed out of barges in the background along the Antonivsky Road Bridge.[22] The footage showed that the pontoon bridge is halfway finished from the Kherson City direction. Satellite imagery from September 4 also showed three Russian pontoons and ferries operating west of Nova Kakhovka.[23]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces fought in four different areas around Kherson Oblast: in the vicinity of Vysokopillya, southwest of the bridgehead over the Inhulets River, approximately 60km east of Mykolaiv City in Snihurivka area, and northwest of Kherson City.  

A Russian milblogger stated that the new Russian frontline south of Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border runs through southern parts of Arkhanhelske and Olhyne, southern outskirts of Vysokopillya and Potomkyne, and via the southwestern outskirts of Novovoznesenske.[24] Milbloggers largely claimed that Russian forces are creating artillery “kill zones” by allowing Ukrainian forces to advance near the bridgehead.[25] A milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces will continue to try to extend the Ukrainian bridgehead and push for the T2207 highway.[26] Milbloggers also stated that artillery combat continued in Snihurivka, with Russian forces reportedly destroying a Ukrainian observation post in Kyselivka (about 28km west of Snihurivka).[27] Social media footage reportedly showed a large smoke cloud in Snihurivka, and some social media users noted that Ukrainian forces have struck a Russian base in the area.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting resumed in Ternovi Pody-Zelenyi Hai-Kyselivka line (within 30km northwest of Kherson City area), but Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the area.[29] A Russian milblogger noted that elements of the 7th Guards Air Assaults Division and 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army are firing artillery at Ukrainian forces attempting to advance northwest of Kherson City.[30] The milblogger added that elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 20th Division raided Ukrainian positions from the direction of Ternovi Pody.[31] Social media footage also showed Russian forces transporting two S-300V systems (a variant of the S-300 intended to target ballistic missiles) in unspecified areas of Kherson Oblast.[32]

The Russian Defense Ministry maintained that Ukrainian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to gain a foothold in certain areas in the Mykolaiv City-Kryvyi Rih direction, while Russian forces are striking Ukrainian reserves and units with artillery and precision missiles.[33] The Russian Defense Ministry likely is claiming Russian precision strikes on Ukrainian forces in Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts in an effort to emulate Ukrainian strikes on Russian reinforcements and GLOCs. Some milbloggers continued to express criticism towards Russian defenses around Inhulets River, with one milblogger claiming that Russian SPETSNAZ requested artillery support for hours before Ukrainian forces were able to break through Russian defenses.[34] Former Russian politician Viktor Alksnis noted that the Russian Defense Ministry again limited its discussion of conducting offensive operations, which likely indicated that Russian forces are largely undertaking defensive measures.[35] Alksnis noted that Russians do not have awareness of the lack of progress during the Russian ”special military operation” in Ukraine. Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation also noted that the Kremlin is exploiting Ukrainian operational silence to invent false claims about the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[36]

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort- Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort 1- Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort 2- Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort- Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort- Southern Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Note: We have revised our organization of Russian lines of effort to include Russian operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast as part of the Donetsk Oblast effort due to recently observed force allocations indicating the Russian grouping east of Hulyaipole, previously grouped with the Southern Axis, will support efforts southwest of Donetsk City.

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks along the Izyum-Slovyansk line on September 5 and continued routine shelling along the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.[37] An RT war correspondent noted that the most intense fighting along this axis in the last six months has occurred in the wooded area dubbed “Sherwood Forest” that lies alongside the E40 Izyum-Slovyansk highway.[38] Ukrainian and Russian troops in this area reportedly exchange small arms fire at a range of 10m or less, and the dense vegetation in the area is likely obfuscating precise troop movements along much of the Izyum-Slovyansk axis.[39]

Ukrainian military officials further confirmed on September 5 that Ukrainian troops made marginal gains northeast of Slovyansk along the left bank of the Severskiy Donetsk River on September 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces retook positions previously occupied by Russian forces in the “Kramatorsk direction,” typically describing the Lyman-Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area.[40] The language of the General Staff statement is consistent with reports that Ukrainian troops retook Ozerne (20km northeast of Slovyansk) on September 4.[41]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks east of Siversk on September 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian advances in Hryhorivka, about 10km northeast of Siversk, and in Bilohorivka.[42] It is unclear if the Bilohorivka that the General Staff referred to is the one 12km northeast of Siversk or 17km southeast of Siversk.[43] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) troops also reportedly fired on Ukrainian positions in Verkhnokamyanske, about 5km due east of Siversk, suggesting Russian troops lost their previous positions in Verkhnokamyanske on an unspecified date.[44] Russian forces continued routine artillery strikes on Siversk and surrounding settlements.[45]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut on September 5. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops fought in Pokrovske (10km east of Bakhmut) and the Bakhmutske-Soledar area (10km northeast of Bakhmut).[46] Russian troops, including Wagner Group fighters, continued attempts to advance north on Bakhmut from Kodema (13km southeast of Bakhmut), Vesela Dolyna (5km southeast of Bakhmut), Zaitseve (8km southeast of Bakhmut), and Semihirya (16km southeast of Bakhmut).[47] Russian troops also continued routine air and artillery strikes on and around Bakhmut.[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on September 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted assaults around Lozove, Spartak, Pervomaiske, Vodyane, and Nevelske, which all lie along the northwestern corner of Donetsk City.[49] Russian sources indicated that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 11th Regiment are continuously attempting to advance from Pisky to Pervomaiske, with certain sources claiming that DNR troops have entered the outskirts of Pervomaiske itself.[50] Proxy troops additionally continued attempts to advance within Marinka, on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[51] Russian and proxy troops conducted routine artillery strikes along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.[52]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City or in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 5 and continued routine air and artillery strikes in these areas.[53]

Supporting Effort #1- Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication – GLOCs – to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on September 5 and continued routine air, missile, and artillery strikes on Kharkiv City and its environs.[54]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and logistical hubs in Kupyansk and Semenivka southeast of Kharkiv City between September 4 and 5.[55] Russian forces expanded shelling near Bairak, Husarivka, and Chepil, between 8 and 18km from the site of confirmed Ukrainian strikes southeast of Kharkiv City on September 4.[56]

Supporting Effort #2- Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 5 and continued routine shelling along the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[57] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) notably stated that a GUR Spetznaz detachment conducted a limited special operation into Russian-occupied Kamianka-Dniprovska, just west of Enerhodar and on the south bank of the Kakhkovska reservoir.[58] The GUR noted that the Spetznaz detachment destroyed and significantly damaged Russian bases in the area, including a building where Russian forces were preparing for sham referenda and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) base that was reportedly protecting the referendum headquarters.[59] Geolocated satellite imagery corroborates the GUR report and shows a large fire burning in Kamianka-Dniprovska.[60]

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) continues to operate at the risk of violating radiation and fire safety hazards as a result of damage to the plant’s power lines. Both Ukrainian and Russian sources exchanged accusations that the other side shelled the plant on September 5. Ukrainian nuclear operating enterprise Energoatom stated that Russian shelling over the last three days caused a fire that disconnected the last power line that linked the ZNPP to the Ukrainian power system, which forced power unit No. 6 (the unit that powers the ZNPP internally) to unload and disconnect from the grid.[61] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled infrastructure at the ZNPP and in Enerhodar.[62] Notably, four of the six members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation departed the ZNPP on September 5, with two members staying at the plant to establish a permanent presence.[63]

Russian forces conducted missile and rocket strikes against Mykolaiv City and shelled along the line of contact in Mykolaiv Oblast on September 5.[64] Ukrainian sources reported heavy shelling of Nikopol and other settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, including a rocket strike against Kryvyi Rih.[65] Russian air defense reportedly shot down a Ukrainian drone over Yevpatoriia, Crimea.[66]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin directly acknowledged and took a further step toward creating a federal-level infrastructure for regional volunteer battalions to replace losses in Ukraine on September 5. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to task the Russian Cabinet of Ministers with protecting the civilian job positions of Russians who volunteer for the war in Ukraine.[67] This represents a departure from previous Kremlin silence on regional mobilization efforts, which allowed the Kremlin to present recruitment drives as “voluntary local initiatives” and insulate ethnically Russian areas and key urban centers from the burden of generating volunteer battalions. The Kremlin likely must take more direct measures in providing for regional battalions due to confusion over unclear or unset provisions from the central government.

Russian authorities are likely escalating efforts to forcibly mobilize residents of occupied Ukraine, potentially to meet increasing pressure from the Kremlin to solidify territorial gains before Putin’s reported September 15 deadline to capture all of Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Resistance center reported that Russian occupation authorities seek to mobilize 10,000 residents from Luhansk Oblast and are leveraging school enrollment data to forcibly mobilize fathers of schoolchildren attending Russian-run educational institutions.[68] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai also stated that authorities in the LNR are giving employees of LNR-owned enterprises recruitment quotas to incentivize the recruitment of contract soldiers in exchange for promises of extra pay and extended job security.[69]

Russian authorities are apparently attempting to recruit personnel typically unfit for military service due to physical and mental illnesses, further indicating that traditional sources of combat power are being increasingly exhausted. St. Petersburg Psychoneurological Dispensary No. 2 posted now-deleted military recruitment ads to its website on September 5.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff similarly noted that Russian authorities are forcibly mobilizing men of military age with various diseases and injuries from hospitals in occupied areas of Donetsk Oblast.[71] The increasing reliance on individuals with physical and mental illness, who are unlikely to receive proper training, medical, or psychological support before being deployed, will likely exacerbate already-poor morale and discipline within mobilized Russian units in Ukraine.

Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing to deploy volunteer battalions to Ukraine. Russian sources reported that the 400-strong “Kuzma Minin” Nizhny Novgorod tank battalion deployed to Ukraine on September 5.[72]

 

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities are continuing efforts to facilitate the economic integration of occupied areas into the Russian Federation. The Russian-backed head of the Zaporizhia occupation administration, Yevheny Balitsky, stated that his administration has set the exchange rate in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to 1.25 rubles/1 hryvnia, starting September 5.[73] Such efforts to codify the “rubleization” of occupied areas are intended to ease the integration of occupied territories into the Russian economy.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kherson-referendum-plans-paused-due-security-situation-tass-cites-russian-2022-09-05/; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15648957

[3] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/09/05/rosiyany-vidmovylys-vid-ideyi-provesty-11-veresnya-referendum-na-hersonshhyni/

[4] https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/280

[5] https://t.me/stranaua/61992

[6] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1068259933866103; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4

[7] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1566658479103873025?s=20&t=5shi1NIbjusdoaHV3mUAXA; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566629850143653890; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1566630180944322560?s=20&t=5shi1NIbjusdoaHV3mUAXA ; https://twitter.com/TarasBerezovets/status/1566509483689480201; https://twitter.com/TarasBerezovets/status/1566496465169653760 ; https://t.me/dvish_alive/17124; https://twitter.com/Caucasuswar/status/1566818542472798212?s=20&t=hUdaUaTaNneHCc8r3IrAcA ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566722083090055168;  https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566802556596224000; https://t.me/operativnoZSU/39933; https://www.tiktok.com/@edvard.arta/video/7139542793499757830?is_from_webapp=v1&item_id=7139542793499757830; https://twitter.com/the_ress_/status/1566783049810993152

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[9] https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1566829101008277510 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566851861449216000; https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/802; https://twitter.com/GreatFrisian/status/1566790306212839425?s=20&t=GNxinTY-ht37jUJg9Xszcg; https://twitter.com/BarracudaVol1/status/1566814918069944323

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[11] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=609032850810700

[12] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1068259933866103

[13] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=609032850810700; https://t.me/zalpalyanytsya/1515

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29

[15] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1068259933866103

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl

[17] https://twitter.com/NLwartracker/status/1566560115964231681

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[19] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25401; https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1566757584761421824; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1566690378346012673; https://twitter.com/davidhelms570/status/1566819724159238145; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1566757832128663553; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#m:advanced;d:today;l:noaa20-viirs=[tsd],viirs=[tsd],modis_a=[tsd],modis_t=[tsd],street;@32.8,46.7,14z

[20] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25400; https://t.me/hueviyherson/25416; https://t.me/stranaua/62035; https://t.me/stranaua/62040; https://twitter.com/kr007t/status/1566832357704974338  

[21] https://t.me/hueviyherson/25390

[22] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566709295328202753; https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/279; https://t.me/operativnoZSU/39862; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1566687795111936001

[23] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1566656499467927553; https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1566475503187394561

[24] https://t.me/rybar/38249; https://t.me/readovkanews/41226

[25] https://t.me/milchronicles/1077; https://t.me/rybar/38242

[26] https://t.me/rybar/38242

[27] https://t.me/rybar/38229

[28] https://twitter.com/typicaldonetsk/status/1566809892844978176?s=20&t=agLcJ5hr0CQPYMBQW9EjFg;

[29] https://t.me/rybar/38239; https://t.me/rybar/38229; https://t.me/strelkovii/3176; https://t.me/strelkovii/3174; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39940

[30] https://t.me/rybar/38229

[31] https://t.me/rybar/38229

[32] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1566536104785887237?s=20&t=5shi1NIbjusdoaHV3mUAXA; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566438438370516995; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566750391135571970; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1566752920724553728?s=20&t=5shi1NIbjusdoaHV3mUAXA

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/19532

[34] https://t.me/grey_zone/14887

[35] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566797582948507649; https://www.facebook.com/VAlksnis/posts/pfbid02eNcQ8TXVVAKrXXRWJvUYPooUwYQs74LoUdf3KT8WYMreS6QhLH4SUQhzhx6NjrdBl?__cft__[0]=AZV46pfa65BAH7gkmO2ltTc_t93q-d070KS1Io9awbdJYgMvOQ2ZBxDEuoFhcw1QJrYKWu-_LTdHlz7H9zZmuuaiW5gfGDcLNzPgzfUXc8QlP-Td7qjQIBvgGr5gt93D82a4nnykIkJAthYCsBi6oMwFPQuw75NeH0VWiTX0qCu54w&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[36] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/pfbid0yGkfNd4V8G3ntmbBenSuY9hFrx61xh5gjkGWRrqWpqDJ5hmS6yeUwrdzVSHrDaLXl

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[38] https://russian.rt dot com/ussr/article/1044564-specoperaciya-soyuznye-sily-prodvizhenie-shervudskii-les; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17264

[39] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17264; https://russian.rt dot com/ussr/article/1044564-specoperaciya-soyuznye-sily-prodvizhenie-shervudskii-les; https://www dot 9111.ru/questions/7777777771989122/

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl

[41] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566601323323211777; https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1566401926006177794

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl

[44] https://t.me/millnr/9394; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1566795850445385728

[45] https://t.me/millnr/9394; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1566795850445385728; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566755334072442880?s=20&t=agLcJ5hr0CQPYMBQW9EjFg  

[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://t.me/rybar/38205

[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[50] https://t.me/epoddubny/12150; https://t.me/rybar/38236; https://t.me/rybar/38205; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566601776832417792; https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1566424057221992450

[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/8934; https://t.me/nm_dnr/8932; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17266

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl; https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1566782791773261826; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17273; https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1566782782482825222; https://t.me/nm_dnr/8935; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17279; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/17273; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/25114; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566589712701292544; https://twitter.com/WindesyL/status/1566018762650054656

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl; https://t.me/milchronicles/1078; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566591289155633152; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/8948; https://twitter.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1566027654226186243

[54] https://t.me/synegubov/4059; https://t.me/der_rada/2523; https://t.me/spravdi/16587; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[55] https://t.me/zalpalyanytsya/1518; https://t.me/synegubov/4059;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566603810264551424; https://t.me/bal_ua/10479

[56] https://t.me/synegubov/4059; https://t.me/der_rada/2523; https://t.me/spravdi/16587; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZHdoD3FHYzM6CP2DCFdPmmMP3S4qWT5UCNETrfvAGubVgVWKuhmveMdWCBkXJ1kFl; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/12552; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/12555; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/12557; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/12568; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/12578; https://t.me/rybar/38205

[58] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-kam-iantsidniprovskii-znyshcheno-sklad-biuleteniv-psevdoreferendumu-ta-bazu-fsb.html

[59] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-kam-iantsidniprovskii-znyshcheno-sklad-biuleteniv-psevdoreferendumu-ta-bazu-fsb.html

[60] https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1566792805233598465

[61] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/9435

[62] https://t.me/vrogov/4656; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39934; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39932; https://t.me/rybar/38214; https://t.me/vrogov/4648; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39922; https://t.me/mod_russia/19533 

[63] http://t.me/supernova_plus/10166; https://twitter.com/Scilentor/status/1566695336994906113; https://twitter.com/Scilentor/status/1566694355108233216; https://t.me/orlovdmytroEn/966; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/9438; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/18096; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/9432

[64] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1068259933866103; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/2459; https://t.me/senkevichonline/2383; https://t.me/spravdi/16587; https://t.me/mod_russia/19532; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1566606863596150784; https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1566567147458990081

[65] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1765; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1760; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/1376; https://t.me/vilkul/1876; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/722; https://t.me/spravdi/16587; https://www.facebook.com/ouvKakhovka/posts/pfbid0218sXnVtU3mVRpwfT2iEyG92Z1ndzrjGrkZ9QwUjnRWJJpAW7hbJkbYNr9nc1fbw6l; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1068259933866103; https://t.me/rybar/38243; https://twitter.com/SPournis/status/1566705500611350528  

https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1566339249875652608;

[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39938; https://t.me/readovkanews/41260; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/62495; https://t.me/rybar/38238; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566824420534018060?s=20&t=agLcJ5hr0CQPYMBQW9EjFg ; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1566822553670279168?s=20&t=agLcJ5hr0CQPYMBQW9EjFg

[67] https://www dot m24.ru/news/vlast/05092022/498113

[68] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/09/05/okupanty-narostyly-tempy-prymusovoyi-pasportyzacziyi-na-luganshhyni/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5564; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5530

[69] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5564; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5530

[70] http://pnd2 dot spb dot ru/; https://twitter.com/skazal_on/status/1566743700302188545; https://twitter.com/ABarbashin/status/1566746195862626306; https://zona dot media/news/2022/09/05/advertising

[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0SruF8ZyasH7DKijGPtYwKKxgFhsNGctx9x2f6FncTSqdxf8UDJYjhWXjrmWRQb8Fl

[72] https://www.idelreal.org/a/32019174.html

[73] https://t.me/BalitskyVGA/251; https://t.me/vrogov/4653