UA-69458566-1

Thursday, June 2, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2

 

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Mason Clark, and George Barros

June 2, 6:15pm ET

Russian forces continued to make incremental, grinding, and costly progress in eastern Ukraine on June 2. Russian troops continued operations to capture Severodonetsk and further operations to capture Lysychansk. Russian military leadership will likely use the capture of these two cities to claim they have “liberated” all of Luhansk Oblast before turning to Donetsk Oblast but Russian forces are unlikely to have the forces necessary to take substantial territory in Donetsk Oblast after suffering further losses around Severodonetsk. Russian forces are evidently limited by terrain in the Donbas and will continue to face challenges crossing the Siverskyi Donets River to complete the encirclement of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk and make further advances westward of Lyman towards Slovyansk via Raihorodok.[1]

Russian military leadership continues to experience complications with sufficient force generation and maintaining the morale of mobilized personnel. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) 1st Army Corps, under Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army, is conducting forced mobilization in occupied areas of Donetsk Oblast.[2]  Russian forced mobilization is highly unlikely to generate meaningful combat power and will exacerbate low morale and poor discipline in Russian and proxy units. The 113th Regiment of the DNR posted a video appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 2 wherein forcibly-mobilized soldiers complain they have spent the entire war on the frontline in Kherson without food or medicine, and that mobilization committees did not conduct requisite medical screenings and admitted individuals whose medical conditions should have disqualified them from service.[3] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate additionally released an intercepted phone conversation wherein DNR soldiers similarly complained that physically unfit individuals were forced into service and that mobilized units are experiencing mass drunkenness and general disorder.[4] Russian forces are additionally struggling to successfully rotate servicemen in and out of combat. Spokesperson for the Odesa Military Administration Maksym Marchenko stated that 30 to 40% of Russian personnel that rotated out of Ukraine refused to return, forcing Russian commanders to send unprepared and unmotivated units back into combat.[5] This is consistent with complaints made by DNR servicemen that rotation practices are contributing to poor morale and dissatisfaction within units that have been forcibly mobilized.[6]

Russian occupation authorities continue to face challenges establishing permanent societal control in newly occupied Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupational administrations “are [only] created on paper” and are incapable of controlling local populations, enforcing the use of the Russian ruble, or conducting bureaucratic processes.[7] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Ukrainian civilians welcome partisan activity that systematically sabotages Russian occupation rule.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian operations to advance on Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman continue to make little progress and are unlikely to do so in the coming days, as Russian forces continue to prioritize Severodonetsk at the expense of other axes of advance.
  • Russian forces continued assaults against Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in order to claim full control of Luhansk Oblast.
  • Russian forces made incremental advances around Avdiivka.
  • Ukrainian counteroffensives in northwestern Kherson Oblast pushed Russian forces to the eastern bank of the Inhulets River and will likely continue to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the T2207 highway.
  • The Kremlin continued to pursue inconsistent occupational measures in southern Ukraine, indicating both widespread Ukrainian resistance and likely Kremlin indecision on how to integrate occupied territory.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted limited unsuccessful attacks and continued efforts to resume larger-scale offensives southeast of Izyum towards Slovyansk on June 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces focused on maintaining their current positions southeast of Izyum and shelled Dovhenke, Kurulka, Virnopillya, and Dolyna in order to set conditions to renew offensive operations towards Slovyansk.[8] Russian forces additionally conducted unsuccessful assault operations around Studenok, Sosnove, Svyatohirsk, and Yarova, several settlements southeast of Izyum along roadways connecting to the Izyum-Slovyansk highway near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.[9] Russian troops likely seek to capture this highway to exploit road access to support advances on Slovyansk. Russian forces in the Lyman reportedly attempted an additional, unsuccessful assault on Raihorodok, northeast of Slovyansk.[10]Russian forces attempting to advance on Slovyansk from both Izyum and Lyman remain largely stalled and are unlikely to make significant progress in the coming days, particularly as the majority of Russian forces continue to focus on Severodonetsk.

Russian forces continued ground assaults in and around Severodonetsk on June 2.[11] Head of the Luhansk People‘s Republic (LNR) Leonid Pasechnik claimed that the LNR controls all of Luhansk Oblast except for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.[12] Deputy Chief of the Main Operations Department of the Ukrainian General Staff Oleksiy Gromov notably stated that despite Russian efforts to surround Severodonetsk, Ukrainian troops do not need to fully withdraw from the city.[13] Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks to the south of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk in Bobrove and Ustynivka.[14] The UK Ministry of Defense stated that Russian forces will likely be inhibited in their attempt to advance into Lysychansk from Severodonetsk (if they are first able to capture Severodonetsk itself) due to the tactical challenge of crossing the Siverskyi Donets River.[15] The UK Ministry of Defense additionally noted that Russian forces will likely need a brief tactical pause to prepare for subsequent attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donets River if they intend further operations into Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. [16]

Russian forces continued ground, rocket, and artillery strikes around Donetsk Oblast on June 2.[17] Russian forces continued offensive operations to the east of Bakhmut around Komyshuvakha, Mykailivka, Vrubivka, Berestove, Bilohorivka, Svitlodarsk, and Nahirne in order to cut ground lines of communication (GLOCs) northeast of Bakhmut and support continuing but slow-moving operations to encircle Severodonetsk-Lysychansk from the south.[18] The DNR claimed that the Russian grouping in the Donetsk City-Avdiivka area made incremental gains around Avdiivka and reportedly broke through Ukrainian defenses in Verkhnotoreske, though ISW cannot independently confirm this claim.[19]


Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces conducted rocket and artillery strikes on Kharkiv City and northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 2.[20] Russian forces shelled residential districts of Kharkiv City, Tsyrkuny, Chuhuiv, Prudyanka, and Mykhailivka in an attempt to maintain their positions to the north of Kharkiv City.[21] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that clashes between Russian and Ukrainian troops occurred in Vesele and Tsupivka, both north of Kharkiv City, indicating that local fighting continues along the frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[22]


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian counteroffensives in northwestern Kherson Oblast likely pushed Russian forces back to their established defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River on June 2. Geolocated drone footage confirms Ukrainian forces conducted a counteroffensive near Starosillya, a settlement on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River and just 12 kilometers south of the northernmost area of Russian control.[23] Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Hannadiy Lahuta reported that Ukrainian forces liberated 20 unnamed villages in Kherson Oblast, likely referring to the settlements on the western bank of the Inhulets River.[24] ISW cannot independently confirm these territorial changes at this time, but Ukrainian defenders have likely secured the western Ihululets riverbank. Ukrainian forces on the west bank of the Ihulets River are likely able to fire on and disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that stretch along the T2207 highway within a kilometer of the river.[25]

Russian forces are taking measures to hinder further Ukrainian counteroffensives on the western Kherson-Mykaloiv Oblast border. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces are planning a counteroffensive in Mykolaiv Oblast and engaged in heavy battles with Russian forces in the Oblast on June 2.[26] Russian military Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Ukrainian forces will attempt to liberate Snihurivka, approximately 66 kilometers east of Mykolaiv City.[27] Russian forces conducted a missile strike on a railway bridge northwest of Mykolaiv City likely to preempt the transfer of Ukrainian forces and equipment in the area.[28] Russian occupation authorities continued to cut off telecommunications signals in Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts, and Ukrainian officials speculated that Russian forces fear Ukrainian counteroffensives and partisan activity in occupied settlements and seek to limit Ukrainian communications.[29]


Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

The Kremlin continues to send mixed signals about its plans to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories – likely indicating the Kremlin has not decided on a single course of action. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that a referendum to integrate Donbas to Russia is “hardly possible” without fully ensuring security in the region, but did not specify what the Kremlin would consider “ensuring security.”[30] Leader of the “Fair Russia” Party (part of the pro-Kremlin “systemic opposition” of parties not directly affiliated with Putin’s United Russia party but not posing any real opposition) Sergei Mironov said that any Ukrainian Oblast may join Russia, likely in support of other claims by Russian State Duma members that the Kremlin will annex Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblast as soon as July.[31] Russian Senator Andrey Turchak announced the opening of a United Russia ”humanitarian center” in Kherson City and claimed to have negotiated industrial cooperation agreements between Kherson Oblast and Russia, but exact Russian plans for occupied Kherson remain unclear.[32] Russian-backed occupation authorities in Zaporizhia also announced the “nationalization” of Ukrainian state property, including the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), which could suggest that the Kremlin seeks to economically exploit newly occupied territories with or without direct annexation.[33] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin previously stated that the Zaporizhia NPP will exclusively work for Russia and will sell electricity to Ukraine.[34] Ukrainian state energy company “Energoatom” noted that Russia physically cannot export electricity from the Zaporizhia NPP as Russia is not connected to the Ukrainian or European energy grid.[35]

The fate of the Mariupol defenders taken prisoner by Russian forces remains unclear. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian officials are discussing prisoner exchanges with Russian forces, but refused to comment on the status of the negotiations.[36] Russian sources claimed that members of the Ukrainian Azov Regiment are imprisoned in Olenivka, approximately 22 kilometers from Donetsk City.[37]


[1] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1532238230137057281

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330999902546428

[3] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1532206218042916865

[4] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/druzhyny-blokuiut-viiskovu-chastynu-dnrivtsi-shcho-sluzhat-v-okupatsiinii-armii-skarzhatsia-na-bezlad-ta-bezpravnist-perekhoplennia.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=euJaDQP6jjQ&ab_channel=%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%83%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%9C%D0%9E%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B8

[5] https://t.me/odeskaODA/610

[6] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/druzhyny-blokuiut-viiskovu-chastynu-dnrivtsi-shcho-sluzhat-v-okupatsiinii-armii-skarzhatsia-na-bezlad-ta-bezpravnist-perekhoplennia.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=euJaDQP6jjQ&ab_channel=%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%83%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%9C%D0%9E%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B8

[7] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/06/02/okupanty-imituyut-stvorennya-rosijskyh-administraczij-i-ne-mozhut-protydiyaty-ruhu-oporu/

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330568765922875

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330999902546428; https://t.me/epoddubny/11039

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330568765922875

[11] h https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRapsXYeAxk&ab_channel=UkrinformTVhttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330999902546428https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330568765922875https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3111https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3107

[12] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/36946

[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRapsXYeAxk&ab_channel=UkrinformTV

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330568765922875https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3107

[15] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1532238230137057281

[16] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1532238230137057281

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330999902546428https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330568765922875

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330999902546428https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330568765922875https://t.me/milinfolive/84346

[19] https://t.me/nm_dnr/8163

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330999902546428https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330568765922875; https://t.me/synegubov/3364

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330999902546428https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330568765922875; https://t.me/synegubov/3364

[22] https://t.me/swodki/108082

[23] https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1532004263848722435https://twitter.com/5urpher/status/1532077412888227840; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1532083906475966468

[24] https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-says-retaken-20-villages-182616294.html

[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1

[26] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2071429826361593

[27] https://t.me/rybar/33448

[28] https://t.me/swodki/108510; https://t.me/swodki/108463; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1410

[29] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8557; https://t.me/khersonskaODA/472; https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/06/01/cherez-strah-posylennya-oporu-okupanty-vidklyuchyly-hersonshhynu-vid-zvyazku/

[30] https://t.me/stranaua/45202

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1

[32] https://t.me/readovkanews/35689; https://t.me/readovkanews/35687

[33] https://t.me/stranaua/45240

[34] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-18; https://m dot business-gazeta.ru/news/550416; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/36486

[35] https://ru.krymr.com/amp/rossiya-ukraina-voyna-energodar-zaporozhskaya-aes-zakhvat/31863811.html

[36] https://t.me/mariupolnow/12414

[37] https://t.me/readovkanews/35707; https://t.me/readovkanews/35701

 

Wednesday, June 1, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1

 


Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 1, 5:30pm ET

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast has gotten the attention of Russian forces in the area, and the Russians are scrambling to secure the vital ground line of communication (GLOC) the Ukrainians have threatened.  Ukrainian forces carried out a series of organized counterattacks targeting settlements on the eastern bank of the Ihulets River that are very close to a key highway supporting Russian forces further north. The Russians have responded by destroying the bridges the Ukrainians used in one of those counterattacks and other bridges across the river in an effort to hold their line against anticipated continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are likely still close enough to the highway to disrupt its use as a main supply route, potentially undermining the Russians’ ability to hold against Ukrainian counter-offensives from the north.

Russian milbloggers are expressing growing alarm about the threat of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the areas Russian forces have deprioritized while concentrating on Severodonetsk. Russian milbloggers have increasingly focused on tracking the rate of Ukrainian counterattacks in late May.[1] Pro-Russian Telegram channel “Dmitriyev” (over 100,000 followers) reported that Ukrainian forces are fully capable of inflicting ”painful and cutting blows” on Russian GLOCs in Kherson, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia Oblasts by July-August due to lack of adequate Russian defensive forces in the areas.[2]  Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces “will grope for weakness” in Russian defenses in Kherson Oblast.[3] Russian milbloggers are effectively criticizing the Russian military command for endangering Russian territorial gains across other axes by prioritizing the Donbas offensive operation so heavily.

Russian authorities are likely anticipating Ukrainian partisan pressure in Luhansk Oblast. The Main Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on June 1 the launch of the “Luhansk partisan” project to galvanize resistance to Russian attempts to consolidate control of Luhansk Oblast.[4]  A Russian Telegram channel reported that the Russian Internal Ministry is sending a special detachment of its employees on “leave” to the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), which is a likely attempt to reinforce Russian administrative presence in the LNR in the face of growing internal and partisan discontent.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces moved a battalion tactical group (BTG) to Kupyansk, a Russian-controlled city in eastern Kharkiv Oblast along the P07 highway within 30 kilometers of the Luhansk Oblast administrative border.[6] Kupyansk is far from the front lines and in no apparent danger of imminent Ukrainian conventional attack.  Taken together, the reported deployment of Internal Ministry employees and a BTG suggest that Russian forces are anticipating partisan resistance against their attempts to gain control of Luhansk Oblast.

Russian forces continue to undermine the economic viability of areas they are attempting to capture. Russian forces reportedly hit the “Azot” fertilizer production plant in Severodonetsk on May 31 and caused the dissemination of toxic nitric acid smoke.[7] The production plant was an economically-significant resource for Severodonetsk and the Luhansk region and it would have been prudent for Russian forces to maintain and take control of the plant’s production capabilities. Russian forces similarly destroyed the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol, which had considerable industrial significance for Ukraine and could have been economically exploited by Russian occupiers if they had not destroyed it. While the Azot plant in Severodonetsk was less productive on whole than Azovstal, its destruction is part of the systemic failure of Russian forces to take effective control of the economic and industrial capabilities of occupied territory. Russian forces will likely continue to destroy productive infrastructure and continually undermine the economic benefits they could have hoped to gain from occupied territories.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces reportedly made incremental advances north of Slovyansk but likely have not yet been able to take control of the road into Slovyansk.
  • Russian forces are attempting to advance towards Lysychansk from the south and west in order to avoid having to fight across the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk but are having limited successes so far.
  • Russian troops made incremental gains north of Avdiivka.
  • Russian troops reportedly destroyed Ukrainian-built bridges over the Inhulets River near Davydiv Brid in response to Ukrainian counteroffensive pressure.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time.  We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall.  We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces attempted to advance south of Izyum but did not make any confirmed advances on June 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks on Dibrovne and Dovhenke, both within 20 kilometers south of Izyum.[8] A Russian Telegram channel reported that Russian forces are engaged in positional battles to the southwest of Izyum in Kurulka and Velyka Komyshuvakha.[9]

Russian forces reportedly made advances to the north of Slovyansk and took control of Yarova and Svyatohirsk and are conducting westward offensives from Lyman towards Slovyansk.[10] In order for Russian forces to gain access to Slovyansk via road, however, they would have to cross a bridge across the Severskyi Donets River outside of Raihorodok, and ISW has not yet seen evidence that they have been able to do so, which suggests Russian forces do not yet control the road into Raihorodok-Slovyansk.

Russian forces continued to advance within Severodonetsk on June 1.[11] Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian troops now control upwards of 70% of the city and that Ukrainian troops are retreating from the city center.[12] Russian Telegram channels additionally indicated that Russian forces are fighting in Ustynivka and Myrna Dolyna, which is a likely attempt to advance northwest to Lysychansk without having to cross the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk.[13] Russian forces are reportedly fighting for control of Bilohorivka (where they attempted a costly and failed crossing of the Severskyi Donets River in early May) and Vrubivka, which would allow them to advance on Lysychansk from the west.[14] Ukrainian forces likely are holding onto Toshkivka, south of Severodonetsk, after reports that Russian forces lost their positions in Toshkivka on May 28.[15] Russian forces have continued ground and artillery attacks against Toshkivka to attempt to regain lost positions.[16]

Russian forces continued ground, air, and artillery attacks against Donetsk Oblast on June 1.[17] Russian troops continued fighting to the east of Bakhmut around Komyshuvakha, Berestove, Nyrkove, Pylypchatyne, and Svitlodarsk in order to gain access to highways to the northeast of Bakhmut, which would facilitate attempts to encircle the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian grouping around Avidiivka is holding its positions in the area, and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) claimed that DNR troops encircled Ukrainian troops in Avdiivka.[19] Russian forces reportedly cut the Donetsk City-Avdiivka-Konstantinivka highway.  Russian forces have been close enough to the highway for some time that Ukrainian forces have probably not been relying on it as a main supply route.  If the Russians could secure it from its base (rather than simply cutting it), however, they could be able to use it advance northward towards Konstantinivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk.[20] Russian forces are fighting north of Avdiivka in the vicinity of Krasnohorivka and on the southern outskirts of Niu York.[21]


Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces conducted air and artillery strikes against Kharkiv City and its environs on June 1. Russian forces shelled the Kyivskyi district of Kharkiv City, Ruski Tyshky, Zolochiv, Derhachi, and Tsyrkuny and conducted airstrikes against Vesele and Ternova.[22]


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian forces continued to threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northeastern Kherson Oblast, despite Russian forces restricting further Ukrainian counteroffensives on May 31 and June 1. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces destroyed bridges over the Inhulets River in Davydiv Brid, an operationally significant settlement located on the Russian-controlled T2205 highway.[23] Russian forces likely destroyed bridges in an effort to hinder Ukrainian efforts to reach Davydiv Brid on May 31.[24] Ukrainian forces can likely still disrupt Russian forces‘ ability to use the highway as a main supply route if they remain just on the other side of the river, which is less than a kilometer from the road and therefore within range of many tactical systems. Disruption of the T2205 as a primary GLOC could undermine Russian defenses against Ukrainian counteroffensives on the northern Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border. Russian forces have also destroyed another bridge just north of Davydiv Brid and intensified artillery fire in northern Kherson, likely in anticipation of continued Ukrainian counterattacks.[25] Russian forces also unsuccessfully attempted to reconnoiter by battle Ukrainian positions on the Mykolaiv-Kherson Oblast on June 1.[26]

Russian forces continued to fortify positions across southern Ukraine in an effort to establish permanent control over occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast, instead executing engineering work for the second lines of defense.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Russian forces transferred likely one T-62 tank battalion and one motorized rifle battalion to Vasylivka, approximately 50km south of Zaporizhia City. ISW has previously reported on an increase in Russian military presence and fortifications east of the Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[28]

The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command said that Russian forces are transferring anti-aircraft missile systems, electronic warfare equipment, and multiple rocket launchers to Snake Island off Romanian coast.[29]


Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Some Russian milbloggers continue to question Russian policy, this time regarding the status of occupied territories.  The Head of Russian State Duma International Committee Leonid Slutskiy claimed that Russia may annex Kherson Oblast and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) as soon as July.[30] A small-scale Russian Telegram Channel MoscowCalling ridiculed Slutskiy’s announcement, noting that Russian forces have not secured the land corridor to Crimea via Zaporizhia Oblast.[31] MoscowCalling also noted that without control over Zaporizhia Oblast, Russian forces will not have the capacity to support commercial and administrative routes via the Kerch Strait bridge. Governor of St. Petersburg Alexander Belov and Russian-appointed Head of Mariupol Konstantin Ivanchenko signed a cooperation agreement between two cities on June 1, but it is unclear whether the Kremlin has decided to fully annex Mariupol.[32]

 


[1] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/14000https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/13999https://t.me/rybar/33448https://t.me/rybar/33424https://t.me/rybar/33410https://t.me/rybar/33382; https://t.me/rybar/33361

[2] https://t.me/russ_orientalist/10965

[3] https://t.me/strelkovii/2631

[4] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/01/videoproyekt-ruhoporu-yak-protydiyaty-okupantam-ta-uberegty-sebe-i-svoyu-rodynu-vid-represij/

[5] https://t.me/bazabazon/11847

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329873672659051

[7] https://twitter.com/wammezz/status/1531923327496888322https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1532005942333677569; https://t.me/serhiy_hayday/6801

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330226645957087

[9] https://t.me/readovkanews/35536

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329873672659051; https://t.me/readovkanews/35536;  https://twitter.com/leonidragozin/status/1531665569392508929; https://t.me/swodki/107715 https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/36930https://t.me/swodki/107780https://t.me/swodki/107779; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1532031877766426625

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330226645957087https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329873672659051; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1531881644206002177

[12] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3087

[13] https://t.me/swodki/107473

[14] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3081

[15] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2984  

[16] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/2975 , https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3015, https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3095

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330226645957087https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3558; https://twitter.com/Garik_Youmar/status/1531890972916961280https://t.me/sashakots/33289

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329873672659051; https://t.me/readovkanews/35536lhttps://t.me/readovkanews/35536

[19] https://t.me/nm_dnr/8150; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/5591https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329873672659051

[20] https://t.me/epoddubny/11018; https://t.me/swodki/107675

[21] https://t.me/readovkanews/35536

[22] https://t.me/synegubov/3349; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329873672659051

[23] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=318068250488935

[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31

[25] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=318068250488935; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329873672659051; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330226645957087

[26] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=318068250488935

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329873672659051; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/330226645957087; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/06/01/na-pivdennobuzkomu-napryamku-okupanty-obladnuyut-drugu-i-tretyu-liniyi-oborony/

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23

[29] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=318068250488935

[30] https://t.me/readovkanews/35588

[31] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/6531

[32] https://t.me/mariupolnow/12271