Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 24, 6:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stated on August 24 that Russian forces are slowing down the overall pace of their offensive operations in Ukraine while reaffirming that Russia’s objectives in the war have not changed. At a meeting with defense ministers from member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Shoigu stated that Russian troops will be slowing down the pace of offensive operations in Ukraine in a conscious effort to minimize civilian casualties.[1] Shoigu also reiterated that operations in Ukraine are going according to plan and that Russian forces will accomplish all their objectives, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russia’s maximalist strategic war aims in Ukraine have not changed.[2] The Russian MoD has previously issued similar statements to account for the pace of operations in Ukraine.[3]

Shoigu‘s statement may also represent an attempt by the Russian MoD to set information conditions to explain and excuse the negligible gains Russian forces have made in Ukraine in the last six weeks. Since Russian forces resumed offensive operations following a pause on July 16 Russian forces have gained about 450.84 km² (roughly 174 square miles) of new territory, an area around the size of Andorra.  Russian forces have lost roughly 45,000 km² of territory since March 21 (the estimated date of Russian forces’ deepest advance into Ukraine), an area larger than Denmark. As ISW has previously assessed, Russian forces are unable to translate limited tactical gains into wider operational successes, and their offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are culminating. Shoigu’s statement is likely an attempt to explain away these failings.[4]

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces have lost an area larger than Denmark since the high-water mark of their invasion of Ukraine in mid-March and gained an area the size of Andorra (one percent of what they have lost) in the last 39 days. 
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reaffirmed that Russia has not changed its maximalist strategic war aims.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest and southeast of Izyum, northeast, and south of Bakhmut, and west and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to face partisan and internal challenges to the administration of occupation agendas.
• Russian proxy leadership is continuing efforts to oversee the legislative and administrative integration of occupied territories into Russian systems.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
• Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
• Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest and southeast of Izyum on August 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Nova Dmytrivka (25km southwest of Izyum) and conducted an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force attempt near Bohorodychne (25km southeast of Izyum).[5] Russian forces also continued artillery strikes along the Izyum-Slovyansk line and near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.[6]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks towards Siversk and continued air and artillery strikes on Siversk and surrounding settlements on August 24.[7]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 24.  Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Russian troops continued fighting in the Soledar-Bakhmutske area, 10km northeast of Bakhmut.[8] Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group mercenaries control the eastern part of Patrice Lumumba Street, which runs westward from Pokrovske to Bakhmut.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian troops conducted offensive operations near Kodema (13km southeast of Bakhmut).[10] Russian forces conducted air and artillery strikes on Bakhmut and surrounding settlements.[11]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in order to advance from the western outskirts of Donetsk City on August 24. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops attempted offensive operations in the direction of Pisky, Nevelske, and Pobieda- which form a line along the western outskirts of Donetsk City.[12] Russian sources reported that Russian and Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) troops are continuing to push westward of positions near Pisky towards Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Optyne and are conducting artillery strikes to support ground attacks towards Avdiivka.[13]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on August 24. Russian troops reportedly attempted to advance towards Novomykhailivka (25km southwest of Donetsk City), Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City), and Velyka Novosilka (75km southwest of Donetsk City).[14] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces shelled Vuhledar, likely to continue efforts to cut ground lines of communication that run from Vuhledar to Marinka and the Donetsk City area.[15]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults near Kharkiv City but continued shelling frontline settlements including Slatyne, Ruski Tyshky, Verkhniy Saltiv, Pryshyb, Rubizhne, and Odnorobivka.[16] Local Kharkiv authorities reported that Russian forces struck Dokuchaievske—a suburb approximately 23 km from Kharkiv’s city center—with S-300s.[17] Russian forces continue to strike Ukraine’s industrial base in Kharkiv City. Russian forces conducted a missile strike against the Kharkiv Shevchenko Instrument-Making Plant in southern Kharkiv City on August 23.[18]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces conducted a limited ground assault in northwestern Kherson Oblast on August 24 but did not make confirmed territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault in the direction of Mykolaivka south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[19] Russian forces continued to launch airstrikes near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, northwest of Kherson City, and near the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.[20]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts. Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Administration Serhiy Khlan confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the Kakhovka Bridge over the Dnipro River on August 24.[21] Geolocated footage also showed smoke around the Kakhovka Bridge.[22] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian aviation struck Russian equipment concentration points in Novovoznesenske, Arhanhenske, and Pravdyne, all situated along the Kherson Oblast administrative border.[23] Social media footage also reportedly showed a Ukrainian strike on a Russian ammunition depot in Tokmak, approximately 50km northeast of Melitopol.[24]

Russian forces continued to shell and launch missiles at Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv Oblasts on August 24. Russian forces launched unspecified missiles at Zaporizhia City twice, resulting in damage to residential infrastructure.[25] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched S-300 air-defense missiles at Bereznehuvate (approximately 20km northwest of a Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River).[26] Mykolaiv Oblast officials also reported shelling near the line of contact.[27] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials reported that Russian forces targeted the Dnipro City district with two Kh-22 missiles.[28] Russian forces continued to fire Grad MLRS systems and tube artillery at Nikopol Raion and targeted settlements in the Kryvyi Rih Raion with Uragan MLRS systems.[29]

Russian-appointed Zaporizhia Oblast Military-Civilian Administration Head Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled Enerhodar’s beach and the industrial area on August 24 but did not provide visual evidence.[30] ISW cannot independently identify the claim or the party responsible for the reported shelling. Social media footage published on August 23 shows forest fires reportedly nearing Enerhodar’s southern industrial and residential sites in the city.[31]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) continued to form new volunteer units to reinforce Russia’s war in Ukraine. Altai Krai announced the formation of five volunteer units: the “Kalashnikov” and “Altai” battalions, the “Skurlatova” and “Katun” companies, and the “Biya” platoon. Local outlets did not specify if Altai Krai will be offering one-time enlistment bonuses but noted advertised monthly salary ranging from 30,000 to 300,000 rubles (about $500 to $5,000).[32] The Republic of Tatarstan local outlet Biznes Online stated that Russian authorities’ classification of such volunteer formations as "battalions” exaggerates the actual number of recruits in each volunteer unit.[33] The outlet noted that Perm Krai’s ”Parma” Battalion has 90 people and is structurally more consistent with a motorized rifle company.[34]  The outlet noted that Russia did not previously have territory-based volunteer units as was common in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) since 2014 and that Russian forces may be modeling these units after DNR and LNR proxy units, such as the ”Vostok” and ”Somali” battalions.

Battalion personnel complements range in size in any military based on the specialization of the battalion, but the Russian volunteer units’ advertised complements are low, and reported fill levels are even lower. Most “battalions” (and even some “regiments”) will more likely have the size of reinforced companies. It is also noteworthy that these ad hoc volunteer battalions are not described as battalion tactical groups (BTGs) and do not appear to be structured like BTGs. It is not clear how they are being employed on the battlefield unless they are being assembled with one another or with the remnants of already deployed BTGs. It is clear that a volunteer “battalion” has nothing like the notional combat power of a battalion tactical group that invaded Ukraine in February, even discounting the inexperience and ages of many volunteers and the very limited training they receive before deploying to combat. Biznes Online also indicated that recruitment into volunteer units decreased throughout the summer and that local Russian officials are intensifying advertising efforts in certain regions. The outlet claimed that the Republic of Tatarstan had only 10-15 interested recruits at the beginning of the recruitment campaign in early June, and such numbers reportedly tripled by the end of the campaign. The outlet’s report confirmed ISW’s assessment that federal subjects began increasing one-time enlistment bonuses to increase recruitment rates in August.[35] The outlet added that Russian federal subjects also began advertising military contracts in public transportation and other recruitment campaigns ”behind the scenes,” but noted that the Kremlin-sponsored sources have not shared such advertisements.

The Kremlin is likely attempting to shield Moscow City residents from the military recruitment campaign, which may lead to some social tensions. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied any reports of the formation of the Moscow-based “Sobyaninsky Polk” volunteer regiment on July 13, shortly after Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Moscow City military commissariats started recruiting labor migrants and residents of different Russian regions into the regiment.[36] Biznes Online noted that all media discourse regarding the “Sobyaninsky Polk” stopped following Peskov’s denial. The sudden change in reporting may suggest that Moscow City ceased recruitment for the “Sobyaninsky Polk” in an effort to avoid drawing Muscovite criticism of the recruitment campaign. The apparent lack of a Moscow City-based volunteer unit may also spark some criticism from other federal republics.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian-backed occupation administrators continued to face various challenges to their authority. A Ukrainian partisan improvised explosive device (IED) attack killed the Russian-appointed head of Mykhailivka, Zaporizhia Oblast on August 24, likely part of a wider campaign of Ukrainian partisans targeting specific Russian-backed administrators who are attempting to advance the integration of occupied regions into the Russian system.[37] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also reported that Russian forces in occupied Luhansk Oblast dispersed a rally held by the wives, mothers, and relatives of Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) forces who have been captured by Ukrainian forces.[38] Predatory mobilization processes in the LNR and reports that the Kremlin considers DNR and LNR fighters the lowest priority in prisoner exchanges are likely exacerbating social friction in the LNR and complicating the consistent administration of occupation regimes.[39]

Russian-backed proxy leaders continue to take measures to oversee the legislative and administrative integration of occupied territories into corresponding Russian systems. DNR Head Denis Pushilin met with Russian State Duma Deputy Vyacheslav Volodin on August 24 to discuss the intensification of efforts to harmonize the legislative institutions of the DNR with Russian legislative processes.[40] The harmonization of the DNR’s legislative process with Russia’s will likely afford the Kremlin increased legal control and oversight of the internal legal and bureaucratic affairs of proxy republics. LNR Head Leonid Pasechnik met with a United Russia Party delegation to discuss United Russia’s provision of “comprehensive assistance” to Donbas, including educational support.[41] Pasechnik also further confirmed that Russian authorities are engaging in the deportation of children from occupied areas in Ukraine to Russia and stated that his administration plans to identify children “in need of psychological help” and transfer them to Kislovodsk for “rehabilitation.”[42] As ISW has previously reported, Russian authorities are likely using the guise of education camps and psychological rehabilitation in order to facilitate the transfer of children to Russia as part of a wider population replacement campaign.[43]

Note:  ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports.  References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

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[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/19067

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/19066

[3] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/15150167

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21

[5]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[6]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[7]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[8] https://t.me/rybar/37638; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[9] https://t.me/rybar/37638

[10]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/19075; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1562349994690093056 ; https://twitter.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1562373642322845696; https://t.me/zhdanovrt/1194 https://twitter.com/Bazinga00264477/status/1562372135208816641;  https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[12]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[13] https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/8620; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/61274

[14]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/8620; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/61274

[15]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[16]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[17] https://t.me/synegubov/3979; https://t.me/synegubov/3977

[18] https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/status/1562352427973521410;

[19]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl

[20]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021nDRk3mn7pM6TmcW1PXGbT9JShRe3BfzdieeS5YG85XHqjLdNJJFLx5sLRGLWfEhl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zNdjKS5yCFtb9mMqmso3guha8yiFZ54v6uqhTonWrcdUeCt19PvU6RiNLrwzSqJLl

[21]https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0jmVWNZWMGFjCc5auZJ4rqze3GHXdcpyJsTu9X144UU7QQXo2Yz9Y47RpnkH83oakl

[22] https://twitter.com/Flash43191300/status/1562416508684439553; https://twitter.com/foofighters95/status/1562418793573498881; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/10381; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1562417567884509184

[23] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1078293132799887

[24] https://twitter.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1562214864227115008

[25] https://www dot pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/08/24/7364549/; https://t.me/stranaua/59565

[26] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=11916843450077990

[27] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/2264

[28] https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/629; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/1217; https://t.me/stranaua/59558; https://t.me/stranaua/59576; https://t.me/stranaua/59662

[29] https://t.me/vilkul/1790; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1191684345007799; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/627; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/1217; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1663  

[30] https://t.me/readovkanews/40711; https://t.me/energodar_ru/2507

[31] https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1562082315915902976

[32] https://www dot ap22 dot ru/paper/Zhiteley-Altayskogo-kraya-priglashayut-na-kontraktnuyu-sluzhbu-v-Rossiyskuyu-Armiyu.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xB3z50HtDig

[33] https://www dot business-gazeta.ru/article/561117

[34] https://www dot business-gazeta.ru/article/561117

[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23

[36] https://ria dot ru/20220713/polk-1802170655.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23

[37] https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1562384503108259840?s=20&t=8CV_5xifSx5RDSP1eepXNQ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1562345890194628608?s=20&t=8CV_5xifSx5RDSP1eepXNQ https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/24/na-zaporizhzhi-likviduvaly-chergovogo-zradnyka/

[38] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/08/24/v-lugansku-okupanty-rozignaly-mityng-rodychiv-polonenyh-lnrivcziv/

[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27; https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-minyust-rf-obmin-polonenymy/31962110.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NlaaSLBFps0l; https://www.ft.com/content/e98976cd-27e2-455d-806a-fe1618b86cb5

[40] https://t.me/pushilindenis/2560

[41] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/261

[42] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/261

[43] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 23

  

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 23, 8:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian government sources confirmed that Russia is bringing Ukrainian children to Russia and having Russian families adopt them. Russian federal subject (region) Krasnodar Krai’s Family and Childhood Administration posted about a program under which Russian authorities transferred over 1,000 children from Mariupol to Tyumen, Irkutsk, Kemerov, and Altay Krai where Russian families have adopted them.[1] The Administration stated that over 300 children are still waiting to “meet their new families” and that citizens who decide to adopt these children will be provided with a one-time bonus by the state.[2] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) additionally reported that Russian officials transferred 30 Ukrainian children from Khartsyzk, Ilovaysk, and Zuhres in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Nizhny Novgorod under the guise of having the children participate in youth educational-training programs.[3] The forcible transfer of children of one group to another “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group“ is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[4]

Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents. The LNR Internal Ministry reported on August 23 that LNR Internal Ministry personnel conducted joint patrols with consolidated police detachments from the Internal Ministries of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast in Starobilsk, Shchastya, and Stanystia, occupied Luhansk Oblast.[5] The LNR Internal Ministry also reported on August 22 that Rosgvardia (Russian national guard) units conducted security for Russian Flag Day celebrations in Starobilsk.[6] Ukraine‘s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Rosgvardia elements in Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk), Luhansk Oblast are not subordinate to the local LNR forces and that Rosgvardia conducted a search of an LNR official in Dovzhansk.[7] The deployment of Russian security forces to police-occupied areas of Luhansk Oblast supports ISW’s previous assessment that LNR residents and possibly militia forces may be unwilling to continue fighting now that they have reached the Luhansk Oblast borders.[8] Recent intensified Russian efforts to forcibly mobilize residents in Luhansk likely exacerbated this disillusionment, and Russian authorities may be increasing Russian security forces’ presence in Luhansk to suppress any internal instability and/or because they are losing confidence in indigenous Luhansk forces.[9]

Russian authorities’ deployment of Rosgvardia elements to security duties in occupied Luhansk Oblast diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine, likely contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into operational successes. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had likely exhausted their momentum from territorial gains around Avdiivka and Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast – a very small section of the whole Ukrainian theater – partially due to their inability to allocate sufficient resources to offensive operations.[10] LNR forces’ unwillingness to fight in the war, coupled with Rosgvardia forces’ presence in the rear instead of near the front will likely contribute to continued Russian failures to make significant territorial gains.

Russian officials may have conducted a false flag event in Donetsk City on August 23 to justify attacks against Ukrainian government buildings on August 24, Ukrainian Independence Day. Social media networks in Donetsk City reported that a strike caused damage to the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) administrative building, where DNR Head Denis Pushilin works.[11] Pushilin was reportedly absent at the time of the strike. Russian media framed the attack as a direct Ukrainian strike on a DNR government building, potentially to set information conditions for retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian government buildings on Ukrainian Independence Day.[12] Ukrainian government authorities previously warned government workers in Kyiv to work from home the week of August 22 to 26 and cited concerns that Russian forces will target Ukrainian government assets as part of an extended missile and artillery campaign on Independence Day.[13] Russian-backed head of Kherson’s occupation administration Kirill Stremousov also claimed on August 22 that his administration was preparing for Ukrainian provocations on Independence Day, which could have been conditions-setting for a false-flag attack.[14]

Unverifiable sources reported that axis commanders in Ukraine are reporting directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin, bypassing both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov in the chain of command. Independent Russian outlet Vazhnye Istorii or iStories quoted unnamed sources within the Russian General Staff stating that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu has lost Putin’s trust after the initial phase of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that failed despite Shoigu’s assurances of a swift victory.[15] The sources claimed that Putin now bypasses Shoigu and interacts directly with Commander of Central Military District Alexander Lapin who oversees the “central” group of forces in Ukraine, and the Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces Sergey Surovikin who commands the “southern” group of forces. ISW cannot independently verify the validity of this report, but if the report is true, it indicates that Putin is also bypassing Gerasimov.

Key Takeaways

• Russian government sources confirmed that Russian authorities are bringing Ukrainian children to Russia and having Russian families adopt them. The forcible transfer of children from one group to another “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
• Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents. This deployment diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine, likely contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into operational successes.
• Russian officials may have conducted a false flag event in Donetsk City to justify attacks against Ukrainian government buildings on Ukrainian Independence Day.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut, on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces made limited gains east of Mykolaiv City and in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing to increase one-time enlistment bonuses for recruits, and are likely recruiting personnel with no prior military experience for specialist positions.
• Ukrainian partisan activity continues to disrupt Russian occupation activities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
• Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
• Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
• Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
• Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks between Izyum and Slovyansk on August 23. A Ukrainian volunteer claimed that Russian troops launched several attacks around Izyum on August 22 but did not specify exactly where these attacks occurred.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Bohorodychne (20km northwest of Slovyansk) and continued shelling settlements near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.[17]

Newly observed and geolocated footage of artillery exchanges between Ukrainian and Russian forces north of Slovyansk in the Sviatohirsk supports ISW’s previous assessment that Russian forces are likely occupying positions within the Sviaty Hory forest and have not yet crossed the Siverskyi Donets River around Pryshb and Tetyanivka.[18] The footage shows Ukrainian troops striking Russian positions in densely forested areas about 22km north of Slovyansk and Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in Pryshyb (17km north of Slovyansk), which reaffirms ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have been unable to conduct a contested river crossing of the Siverskyi Donets and advance on Slovyansk from its due north.[19] Russian forces additionally shelled residential infrastructure in Slovyansk on the night of August 22 to 23.[20]

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks toward Siversk on August 23. Siversk’s Civil Military Administration reiterated that the city remains under Ukrainian control but that Russian forces constantly conduct artillery strikes on Siversk and surrounding environs.[21]

Russian forces continued ground attacks to the northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 23. Russian troops, including elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic 6th Cossack Regiment, continued to fight in Soledar, about 10km northeast of Bakhmut.[22] Russian forces additionally continued attempts to advance on Bakhmut from the south, specifically from around Kodema and Zaitseve.[23] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces have encircled Kodema (13km southeast of Bakhmut) from three sides and are advancing on Zaitseve (9km southeast of Bakhmut).[24]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City on August 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to break through Ukrainian defensive lines and advance towards Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske, and Nevelske- which form a line along Donetsk City’s northwestern outskirts. [25] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces are continuing to focus on the encirclement of Adviivka (north of Donetsk City) and are in control of 75% of Marinka, on the southwestern outskirts of Donestk City.[26] Russian forces continued to fire on Ukrainian positions along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City-Marinka frontline.[27]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City on August 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to improve their tactical positions near Novomykhailivka and Zolota Nyva 25km and 60km southwest of Donetsk City, respectively.[28] Russian troops additionally continued offensive operations around Vuhledar, 45km southwest of Donetsk City.[29]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults around Kharkiv City on August 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces focused on maintaining current positions.[30] The Derhachi City Council reported that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian defensive lines near Dementiivka, west of Kozacha Lopan, and towards Velykii Prokhody and Tsupivka, all north of Kharkiv City, which may suggest that Ukrainian forces are continuing limited ground attacks to contest Russian-held lines in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[31] Russian forces conducted airstrikes near Pytomnyk, Kostyantynivka, and Verkhnii Saltiv.[32] Russian forces continued shelling Kharkiv City and settlements along the line of contact.[33]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces made limited territorial gains east of Mykolaiv City and in northwestern Kherson Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces took control of Blahodatne (which the Russian MoD referred to as Komsomolske) about 45km due east of Mykolaiv City.[34] The Russian MoD added that Russian forces have established a 12 square km zone of control around Blahodatne by advancing three kilometers into Ukrainian defenses. Geolocated footage posted on August 22 also showed Russian forces reportedly firing TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems at Ukrainian forces in the northern part of the settlement on an unspecified but likely recent date.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 22 that Russian forces had unspecified “partial” success in the direction of Blahodatne, and Russian forces likely advanced into the settlement.[36] The Russian MoD also claimed control over Blahodativka, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over Inhulets River, and unspecified settlements in its vicinity.[37] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces striking a Russian BMD-2 airborne infantry fighting vehicle in Blahodativka, which indicates that the settlement is contested.[38] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Oleksandrivka, approximately 38km west of Kherson City, and reached the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast administrative border.[39] ISW cannot independently verify this claim, for which the Russian MoD did not provide visual evidence.

Ukrainian military officials claimed several strikes on Russian positions, ammunition depots, and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian missile and artillery units destroyed the ammunition depot and command post of the Russian 247th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 7th Guards Air Assault Division in Chornobaivka northwest of Kherson City and struck the command post of the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division in Novovoskresenke just south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[40] Elements of the 331st Regiment had previously operated near Hostomel, Kyiv Oblast, in February and March and suffered heavy losses.[41] It is unclear how long elements of the 331st Regiment have been operating in Kherson Oblast.[42] Elements of the 247th Regiment have been operating in Kherson Oblast since February 24, the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[43] The Ukrainian Southern Command also confirmed Ukrainian strikes on the Antonivsky and Kakhovka bridges over the Dnipro River, and the destruction of a Russian ammunition depot in Kakhovka on August 22.[44]

Russian forces are attempting to repair damaged GLOCs across the Dnipro River, but Ukrainian forces will likely continue to strike Russian attempts to establish a river crossing. The UK Defense Ministry reported that Russian forces likely started to move barges into position to construct a substantial floating bridge over the Dnipro River immediately neat the Antonivsky road bridge between August 20 and August 21.[45] ISW has previously reported that Russian forces have been using barges to transport unknown equipment between August 17 and August 22.[46] Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Administration Serhiy Khan also noted that Russian forces are building a ”weird construction” under the Antonivsky Bridge and assessed that Russian forces are constructing a pontoon bridge.[47] Russian improvised attempts to improve GLOCs will remain vulnerable to Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continued to accumulate military equipment at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and are setting conditions to manipulate the public’s perception of the situation in Enerhodar. Ukrainian state energy enterprise Enerhodar reported that Russian forces deployed 40 pieces of military equipment to the ZNPP: 16 military vehicles at the first power unit; seven vehicles near the second power unit; 12 vehicles under an overpass; and two armored personnel carriers and six special trucks in the ZNPP repair zone.[48] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian forces have been deliberately targeting ash pits at the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP) about 5km east of ZNPP with mortars.[49] The GUR stated that ZTPP produces dust-like waste in the ash pits, which contain toxic substances and a radiation level 1.5 times above normal levels. The GUR argued that by striking the ash pits, Russian forces can create a cloud of smoke with radioactive dust for which Russian forces can blame Ukraine.

Russian forces continued to target Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts with missile and MLRS strikes on August 23. Dnipropetrovsk officials reported that Russian forces struck Dnipro City with unspecified missiles, fired Grad MLRS at Marhanets and Nikopol (across the Dnipro River from Enerhodar), and fired Uragan MLRS at Zelenodolsk.[50]

Russian-appointed officials in occupied Crimea claimed shooting down another drone in Sevastopol on August 22.[51] Social media footage showed Russian air-defense systems striking an unspecified object in Sevastopol on August 22.[52]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing to increase one-time enlistment bonuses for recruits, likely due to a shortage of interested volunteers. Samara Oblast Governor Dmitry Azarov announced that recruits for the “Samara” Volunteer Battalion – part of the newly-forming 3rd Army Corps - will receive a bonus of 300,000 rubles (about $4,980) instead of the originally-promised 200,000 rubles (about $3,320).[53] Oryol Oblast officials also announced an additional payment of 100,000 rubles (about $1,660) to all Russians with a permanent address within or outside of Oryol Oblast ordered to serve in the 3rd Army Corps.[54] ISW has previously reported that the republics of Buryatia and Tatarstan increased their one-time enlistment bonuses by 100,000 rubles (about $1,660). Other Russian federal subjects are also likely increasing payments to generate more volunteers for the 3rd Army Corps or for regional volunteer units.[55] It is also unclear if the volunteer battalions in Buryatia and Tatarstan will join the 3rd Army Corps.

Russian federal subjects are forming specialized military units with likely volunteers without prior military experience. The Republic of Udmurt claimed to have recruited seven volunteers who are currently undergoing training in Tolyatti for the “Italmas” SPETSNAZ unit.[56] Local military recruitment centers in Udmurt announced the recruitment for the ”Italmas” unit on July 23 and did not specify previous military experience as a requirement.[57] There was no information about the ”Italmas” unit prior to this July 23 announcement, suggesting that it is a new volunteer unit. Some local outlets claimed that the unit is recruiting reservists, while others noted that anyone interested in signing a military contract with the unit may do so at a local military recruitment center.[58] The recruitment of only seven volunteers since late July further confirms that Russian federal subjects continue to face challenges in recruiting the planned number of volunteers. Tatarstan local outlets also reported that 21 recruits are undergoing combat coordination activities in Orenburg Oblast with the ”Alga” and ”Timer” volunteer battalions, despite previously claiming to have recruited over 300 volunteers as of June 23.[59]

 

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Ukrainian partisan activity continues to disrupt Russian occupation activities. Ukrainian partisans attempted to assassinate the Russian-appointed Kherson Oblast Deputy Head of the Internal Policy Department Igor Telegin with an improvised explosive device (IED) on August 23.[60] Telegin reportedly survived the attack with minor injuries.[61] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published a document reportedly giving guidance to Russian occupation forces to not accept food or medication from local Ukrainians due to fear of poisoning.[62] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed on August 20 that Ukrainians poisoned Russian forces and occupation official Volodymyr Saldo, though these reports remain unconfirmed.[63]

Russian officials continue importing Russians into occupied territories to serve in occupation administrations likely due to a lack of trust in local Ukrainian collaborators. Ukraine’s Resistance Center reported that former officials in the Russian government now serve as occupation officials.[64] The Resistance Center reported that two new former Russian officials now serve in the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation government and that Russians now hold almost all positions in the Russian occupation governments.[65] The Resistance Center also reported that occupation authorities continue to import skilled workers, such as doctors, teachers, and utility workers, into occupied territories and that the Kremlin aims to import more Russians into occupied territories as a policy.[66] ISW previously reported that occupation administrations face a widespread shortage of willing Ukrainian collaborators and issues trusting established Ukrainian collaborators.[67]

Russian occupation officials continue preparations to hold annexation referenda in occupied Ukraine. A Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official indicated on August 23 that Luhansk residents now residing in Russia will still be eligible to vote in the annexation referendum, supporting ISW’s prior assessments that occupation authorities seek to accelerate preparations for annexation referenda.[68] LNR Deputy Internal Minister Vitaly Kiselev announced that Luhansk Oblast residents who left Luhansk Oblast for Russia will be able to vote on the LNR referendum for Russian annexation.[69] Kiselev claimed that voter turnout will be 100% and that 70% of voters will vote in favor of annexation.[70] Kiselev claimed that the number of people in occupied territories who applied for Russian passports indicates a widespread desire to join Russia.[71]

Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to establish Russian schools in occupied Ukraine. The GUR reported that Russian authorities attempted to reopen 43 educational facilities with Russian teachers and collaborators in occupied Ukraine.[72] The GUR also reiterated prior reporting that occupation officials are threatening to fine Ukrainian parents who do not send Ukrainian children to the occupation-established schools.[73] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin announced that DNR and Russia will cooperate to ensure children in occupied Donetsk Oblast have access to education and educational supplies.[74]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

---

[1] The original post has since been removed from the administration website, but Ukrainian sources reposted screenshots of the post and ISW was able to locate an archived version.

https://web.archive.org/web/20220823081906/https://uvsd.ru/news/info/339-malyshi-iz-mariupolja-ishhut-novye-semi.html; https://suspilne dot media/273917-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-181-tekstovij-onlajn/; https://uvsd dot ru/news/info/339-malyshi-iz-mariupolja-ishhut-novye-semi.html; https://t.me/andriyshTime/2469

[2] https://suspilne dot media/273917-vtorgnenna-rosii-v-ukrainu-den-181-tekstovij-onlajn/; https://uvsd dot ru/news/info/339-malyshi-iz-mariupolja-ishhut-novye-semi.html; https://t.me/andriyshTime/2469

[3] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-pohrozhuiut-shtrafamy-batkam-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-viddavaty-ditei-v-rosiiski-shkoly-takozh-prodovzhuietsia-nezakonne-vyvezennia-ditei-na-terytoriiu-rf.html

[4] https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf

[5] https://telegra dot ph/Sotrudniki-BPKS-MVD-LNR-i-Svodnogo-otryada-policii-GU-MVD-Rossii-po-gorodu-Sankt-Peterburgu-i-Lenoblasti-proveli-patrulirovanie--08-23; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1530; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1530; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1532

[6] https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1533; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1534; https://t.me/mvdlnr_official/1544

[7] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/v-lnr-namahaiutsia-provesty-zahalnu-zahalnu-mobilizatsiiu-ta-provodiat-poshuk-rashystivdezertyriv.html 

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5156; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/5174 

[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21

[11] https://twitter.com/KyivPost/status/1562019295332278272 https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39535; https://www.svoboda.org/a/separatisty-zayavili-o-povrezhdenii-pri-obstrele-administratsii-dnr-/32000824.html;  https://www.interfax dot ru/world/857821; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15538959; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1562001504353062912; https://t.me/Donetsk_Z_chat/206110; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1562002817468043265;  https://t.me/Donetsk_Z_chat/206091; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39531; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1562004035028279300; https://t.me/donbassr/25761; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1562013857375191044;  https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1562015631779794944;  https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1562032082850816002; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1562026350092980225 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39531

[12] https://twitter.com/KyivPost/status/1562019295332278272 https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39535; https://www.svoboda.org/a/separatisty-zayavili-o-povrezhdenii-pri-obstrele-administratsii-dnr-/32000824.html;  https://www.interfax dot ru/world/857821; https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15538959

[13] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2022/08/21/7364206/; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/16769; https://t.me/donrf22/4034; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/39488  

[14] https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/230

[15] https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/opinions/2022/08/23/kto-upravlyaet-rossiiskimi-voiskami/index.html

[16] https://twitter.com/donikroman/status/1561791088557449216; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txXb0s98nlc; https://t.co/rWlMvmYxlD; https://t.me/romandonik/3305  

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl

[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VS4z8uk-eqM&ab_channel=%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B4%D0%B0; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1561776692313657348; https://twitter.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1561756543174991872; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1561937832800837633; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1561953049366540288; https://t.me/evgeniy_lisitsyn/1079 https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1561946392951590912

[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VS4z8uk-eqM&ab_channel=%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%8C%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B4%D0%B0; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1561776692313657348; https://twitter.com/PauliusZaleckas/status/1561756543174991872; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1561937832800837633; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1561953049366540288; https://t.me/evgeniy_lisitsyn/1079 https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1561946392951590912

[20] https://t.me/stranaua/59377

[21] https://www.facebook.com/Gromadasiversk/posts/pfbid02ZdiqDLz3WWN5sB2rUNjajQJ1S6M3RfN1F2sYqGVyyMyXqPLELAp9JeUyEeUyCs7bl; https://suspilne dot media/274114-siversk-znahoditsa-pid-kontrolem-ukraini/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl; https://t.me/rybar/37618

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/19029; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl

[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/19029

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl; https://t.me/rybar/37616

[26] https://t.me/mod_russia/19029

[27] https://t.co/N6yo4tSLGc; https://t.me/rian_ru/175172; https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1561847993938198530; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/16851; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/16831; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/16832 https://t.me/milchronicles/1043; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1561961334803009536; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl

[29] https://t.co/hLT08VL1Vp; https://t.co/uQaXlMFzsB; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/61159

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl

[31] https://t.me/der_rada/2398

[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl; https://t.me/mod_russia/19029

[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/19029; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02GfC7o4QgR9yXhenYHLYGoyDgZcQUwfwTP332qwCmD25HVzhLawBj2jLwcXtKWdJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0izc8c2fssB2UFEdEvqdophhwYnan51xUz7qzMbEFQDCMZVFBhyK5S2Qx4t1U4WLbl; https://t.me/synegubov/3966; https://t.me/stranaua/59360 ; https://t.me/stranaua/59381; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/437; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/52110; https://t.me/der_rada/2398

[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/19029

 

[35] https://twitter.com/Mr_Hornblower/status/1561781024777961475

[36] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22

[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/19029

[38] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1561814506543669251; https://t.me/horevica/5398; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1561827949938188289; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1561828566261702657; https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1561711928665378816; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1561757917627367425 ; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1561771239298834432; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1561776039017254912; https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1561711928665378816

[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/19029

[40] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1292020424664692

[41] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61966317

[42] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1505140495256891399; https://vk dot com/wall-26673779_77322

[43] kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/373907/… https://elista.bezformata.com/listnews/serzhantom-vdv-maksimom-medvedevim/103209896/… https://vk.com/public104933948?w=wall-104933948_66928… https://riakalm.ru/index.php/news2/32030-glava-kalmykii-batu-khasikov-vyrazil-soboleznovaniya-rodnym-i-blizkim-serzhanta-vs-rf-maksima-medvedeva; https://golosstepi.ru/news/54889/

[44] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1292020424664692; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22

[45] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1561957400420274176  

[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22

[47] https://youtu.be/P2hA2Tb2Zmw

[48] https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/17492; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/9114; https://t.me/spravdi/15788

[49] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-obstriliuiut-zolovidvaly-zaporizkoi-tes-shchob-pidniaty-khmary-radioaktyvnoho-pylu.html; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/9127

[50] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1292020424664692; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/618; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1648; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/17503; https://t.me/vilkul/1764

[51] https://t.me/razvozhaev/933

[52] https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1561747373411520515 https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1562068846055415808  

[53] https://samara dot tsargrad.tv/news/bojcam-samarskogo-batalona-uvelichat-edinovremennuju-denezhnuju-vyplatu_610880

[54] https://newsorel dot ru/fn_1133279.html

[55] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22

[56] https://glazovlife dot ru/?p=48019; https://vk.com/wall-187448798_89638; https://udm-info dot ru/news/society/23-08-2022/6-glazovchan-zapisalis-v-podrazdelenie-spetsnaza-italmas-dlya-uchastiya-v-svo-v-ukraine

[57] https://vk dot com/wall-187448798_89638

[58] https://glazovlife dot ru/?p=48019; https://udm-info dot ru/news/society/23-08-2022/6-glazovchan-zapisalis-v-podrazdelenie-spetsnaza-italmas-dlya-uchastiya-v-svo-v-ukraine

[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-0

[60] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1562036489768386560; https://t.me/rian_ru/175281; https://t.me/Stremousov_Kirill/233; https://t.me/readovkanews/40640 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/40644; https://t.me/stranaua/59434 https://t.me/milinfolive/89286; https://t.me/rybar/37606 ; https://iz dot ru/1383931/2022-08-23/zamglavy-vga-stremousov-soobshchil-o-pokushenii-na-khersonskogo-chinovnika-telegina

[61] https://t.me/stranaua/59434 https://t.me/milinfolive/89286; https://t.me/rybar/37606 ; https://iz dot ru/1383931/2022-08-23/zamglavy-vga-stremousov-soobshchil-o-pokushenii-na-khersonskogo-chinovnika-telegina

[62] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/rashysty-rozrobyly-metodychku-dlia-svoikh-ahitatoriv-na-okupovanykh-terytoriiakh-shchob-perekonuvaty-naselennia-shcho-vony-ne-marodery-i-vbyvtsi-dokument.html

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/18910

[64] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/23/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-gaulyajteriv-na-okupovani-terytoriyi/ 

[65] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/23/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-gaulyajteriv-na-okupovani-terytoriyi/ 

[66] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/08/23/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-zvozyty-gaulyajteriv-na-okupovani-terytoriyi/ 

[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27

[68] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7

[69] https://ria dot ru/20220823/referendum-1811536717.html

[70] https://ria dot ru/20220823/referendum-1811536717.html

[71] https://ria dot ru/20220823/referendum-1811536717.html

[72] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-pohrozhuiut-shtrafamy-batkam-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-viddavaty-ditei-v-rosiiski-shkoly-takozh-prodovzhuietsia-nezakonne-vyvezennia-ditei-na-terytoriiu-rf.html

[73] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/okupanty-pohrozhuiut-shtrafamy-batkam-iaki-vidmovliaiutsia-viddavaty-ditei-v-rosiiski-shkoly-takozh-prodovzhuietsia-nezakonne-vyvezennia-ditei-na-terytoriiu-rf.html

[74] https://t.me/pushilindenis/2558