Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6

Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko

April 6, 5pm ET

 

Russian forces continued to redeploy forces to the Izyum-Slovyansk axis and eastern Ukraine in the past 24 hours and did not secure any major advances. Russian forces completed their withdrawal from Sumy Oblast, and Russian forces previously withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine continued to redeploy to Belgorod, Russia, for further deployment to Izyum or Donbas. The Ukrainian military reported that Russia plans to deploy elements from the Kyiv axis to Izyum, but these units will not likely regain combat effectiveness for some time.

Russian forces may be preparing for a larger offensive in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the coming days, but are unlikely to generate the combat power necessary to break through Ukrainian defenses in continuing frontal assaults. Ukrainian officials and pro-Russian Telegram channels both reported additional Russian equipment arriving in Donbas from an unspecified location in preparation for a renewed offensive. Russian forces continued assaults in Mariupol, and we cannot confirm concrete control of terrain changes in the city. Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Izyum-Slovyansk axis but did not make any major territorial gains.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces with heavy air and artillery support continued assaults on Ukrainian positions in Mariupol in the past 24 hours.
• Russian and proxy forces in eastern Ukraine are likely attempting to consolidate forces and material for an offensive in the coming days.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations from Izyum towards Slovyansk but did not make any major territorial gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks towards Kherson from both the north and west.
• Russian forces completely vacated Sumy Oblast.
• Russian General Officers are reportedly instruction commanders to severely restrict internet access among Russian personnel in an attempt to combat low morale.
• The US and NATO should take a strong stance on any Russian threat to use its military forces in Transnistria, the illegally Russian-occupied strip of Moldova bordering Ukraine.

Ukrainian Military Intelligence reported increasing Russian censorship in an effort to combat growing morale problems among Russian troops. Ukraine’s GUR reported that Russian officers are intensifying censorship of their troops and restricting access to the internet due to low morale.[1] The GUR claimed that Russian commanders complain about increasing Ukrainian influence over the information consumed by Russian soldiers. The GUR claimed to have intercepted an extract from an order issued by the Deputy Commander of the Western Military District for military and political work, which blamed low Russian morale on the internet and social media. The document reportedly instructs Russian officers to either ban or severely censor all messages received by personnel, as well as access to the internet. Draconian measures to restrict access to information among Russian personnel will likely further exacerbate low morale and desertion rates.

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate main effort – Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces with heavy air and artillery support continued assaults on Ukrainian positions in Mariupol in the past 24 hours.[2] The information environment in Mariupol remains restricted, and we cannot confirm any further territorial changes. Independent Ukrainian media reported that international Red Cross aid was unable to reach the city on April 6.[3]

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Subordinate main effort – Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued unsuccessful operations to seize Popasna and Rubizhne and continued shelling along the entire line of contact in the past 24 hours.[4] Ukraine’s SBU claimed on April 6 that Ukrainian forces in Donetsk Oblast confirmed that Russian units in the area contain conscripts and cadets of the Moscow Higher Military Command School, indicating the low quality of ongoing Russian efforts to replace combat casualties.[5]

Russian and proxy forces are likely attempting to consolidate forces and material for an offensive in the coming days. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk urges civilians to evacuate on April 6 and stated it will be almost impossible to do so following a major Russian offensive.[6] Pro-Russian telegram channels shared several videos on April 6 of Russian forces arriving in Donbas via rail, and claimed the videos are several days old and the forces have already deployed.[7] The Ukrainian civilian head of Luhansk Oblast stated on April 6 that Russian forces are deploying additional equipment to Donbas and are preparing for an offensive in 3-4 days.[8] The redeployment of damaged Russian units from elsewhere in Ukraine and low-quality conscript replacements are unlikely to enable a Russian breakthrough.

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Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)

Elements of Russia’s 20th Combined Arms Army and 1st Guards Tank Army continued offensive operations from Izyum towards Slovyansk but did not make any major territorial gains in the past 24 hours.[9] Russian forces consolidated their control of Brazhkivka, captured on April 5, and began assaults on Dovhenke but did not capture the town.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces additionally intend to conduct offensive operations southwest of Izyum towards Barvinkove.[11] Russian forces may intend to bypass Ukrainian forces currently defending the direct highway from Izyum to Slovyansk. Russia is increasing efforts to deploy reinforcements to the Izyum axis. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 6 that Russian forces began using the railway between Valuyki station (Russia) and Kupyansk station (Kharkiv Oblast), which Russian forces began repairing on Marh 21.[12]

Russian forces continued to shell Kharkiv Oblast in the past 24 hours, but the situation remains unchanged.[13]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian forces continued successful counterattacks towards Kherson from both Mykolayiv and Kryvyi Rih on April 6.[14] Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Kherson Oblast made minor advances, recapturing Osokorivka, Dobryanka, Novovoznesenske and Trudolyubivka.[15] Ukrainian forces additionally conducted counterattacks towards Kherson along the Black Sea coast, with fighting ongoing in Oleksandrivka as of 6am local time on April 6.[16] Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast but did not conduct any offensive operations.[17]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 6 that Russian forces are attempting to improve their tactical position in the southern direction and may use Transnistria, the illegally occupied Russian territory in Moldova, to support this effort.[18] Russian forces in Transnistria will not be able to independently threaten Odesa and Russian forces around Kherson are highly unlikely to renew offensive operations towards Mykolayiv and Odesa in the near future. However, the US and NATO should take a strong stance on any potential Russian military use of its illegally occupied territory in Moldova against Ukraine.

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

Sumy Oblast Governor Dmytro Zhyvytskyi confirmed on April 6 that Russian forces have completely vacated Sumy Oblast, confirmed by local social media users.[19]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 6 that Russian forces withdrawn into Belarus from the Kyiv axis continued regrouping and preparations to redeploy by rail, and some Central Military District units have already arrived in Belgorod to reinforce the Izyum axis.[20] The General Staff specified that the 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army is preparing to redeploy from Belarus to Belgorod.[21] Any Russian elements withdrawn from the Kyiv axis, such as the 35^th Combined Arms Army, are highly unlikely to be combat capable after such a short period of rest and refit.

Click here to enlarge map below.

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces will continue reinforcing the Izyum-Slovyansk axis and attempting to advance to and through Slovyansk to encircle Ukrainian forces.
• The Battle of Mariupol continues, and it is unclear how much longer the Ukrainian defenders can hold out.
• Russian forces have fully vacated the Sumy axis and are regrouping in Belgorod for likely deploying to the Izyum-Slovyansk axis.
• Some Russian forces are likely to return to home stations in Russia while others will re-enter the fighting in the east.

 

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[1] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/286322277012533.

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511588183686975489; https://t.me/milchronicles/166; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288811783431907.

[3] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/obstril-kozyatina-ta-gumanitarna-katastrofa-na-hersonshini-situaciya-u-regionah-stanom-na-ranok-6-kvitnya.

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349; https://t.me/dvish_alive/11859; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511404592084533253; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511402635395534848.

[5] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/donbasse-unichtozhili-podrazdeleniya-rossiyskimi-1649233976.html.

[6] https://hromadske dot ua/posts/vlada-prosit-zhiteliv-harkivskoyi-doneckoyi-ta-luganskoyi-oblastej-evakuyuvatisya.

[7] https://t dot me/stranaua/35157; https://t dot me/istorijaoruzija/52215.

[8] https://t dot me/stranaua/35111.

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288811783431907; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1511590569864278019; https://t.me/sashakots/30863

[10] https://twitter.com/Guderian_Xaba/status/1511625599663681538

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288811783431907.

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108.

[13] https://t.me/synegubov/2821; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349; https://hromadske dot ua/posts/obstril-kozyatina-ta-gumanitarna-katastrofa-na-hersonshini-situaciya-u-regionah-stanom-na-ranok-6-kvitnya.

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349.

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288811783431907; https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1511518549055094784; https://twitter.com/SimTack/status/1511685030006997000.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288811783431907; https://hromadske dot ua/posts/obstril-kozyatina-ta-gumanitarna-katastrofa-na-hersonshini-situaciya-u-regionah-stanom-na-ranok-6-kvitnya.

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349.

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288811783431907.

[19] https://www.liga dot net/ua/politics/interview/glava-sumskoy-ova-rossiyane-brosili-trupy-svoih-orkov-zato-vyvezli-unitazy-i-jivyh-telyat; https://t.me/milinfolive/80304; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511458442279538704 

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349.

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/289180696728349.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 5

Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Karolina Hird

April 5, 4:30 pm ET

Russian forces continued to reposition to continue their invasion in eastern and southern Ukraine, having abandoned the attack on Kyiv.  They have largely completed their withdrawal from the Kyiv area and are reportedly redeploying some of the withdrawn combat forces from Belarus to Russia.  Ukrainian forces are moving to regain control over segments of the state border in Chernihiv, having already done so in Kyiv and Zhytomyr Oblasts.  Russian troops are pulling back toward Russia along the Sumy axis as well, but it is not yet clear if they intend to retreat all the way back to the border or will try to hold some forward positions on the Sumy axis.

Russia has not yet committed forces withdrawn from the Battle of Kyiv back into the fighting in eastern Ukraine.  Russian reinforcements continuing the drive southeast from Izyum toward Slovyansk are from elements of 1st Guards Tank Army units that had been in the Kharkiv-Sumy area.  Russian units that retreated from Kyiv will not likely regain combat effectiveness for some time, and it is not clear that the Russians intend to return them to the fight soon. That said, an unconfirmed Ukrainian military intelligence report suggests that Moscow could soon send the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, a unit that reportedly committed war crimes in Bucha, into the fight in eastern Ukraine in the hopes that guilty members of that brigade and witnesses of its war crimes are killed in combat with Ukrainian forces.[1]

Belgorod continues to emerge as the primary concentration area for Russian forces regrouping and refitting after their retreat from Kyiv and in preparation for onward movement to their home stations or to join the fighting in the east.  Elements of the Central Military District pulling back from Chernihiv Oblast are reportedly on their way to Belgorod.[2]  Their final destination is not yet known.

The Battle of Mariupol continues, with Russian forces continuing to pound the city using artillery and airpower.  The constrained information environment in Mariupol prevents us from assessing concrete changes in control of terrain, but Ukrainian forces appear to be sustaining organized resistance in parts of the city.

Russian offensive operations southeast from Izyum toward Slovyansk continued on a small scale and made limited progress.  Russia has not yet attempted to mass large concentrations of forces on this axis but continues instead to send individual battalion tactical groups to advance on their own.

Key Takeaways

• The withdrawal of Russian forces from around Kyiv is nearing completion.
• Russia has not yet introduced forces withdrawn from western Ukraine into the fight in the east.
• Ukrainian forces continued to put up organized resistance in parts of Mariupol.
• Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations on the Izyum-Slovyansk axis.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct an organized defense of parts of Mariupol in the past 24 hours.  Russian forces conducted an intense artillery and airstrike campaign against the city and targeted Ukrainian positions around the Azovstal Plant. The information environment in Mariupol remains restricted, however, and we cannot confirm further territorial changes over the last 24 hours.[3]

Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued operations to seize Popasna and Rubizhne, roughly 240 kilometers southeast of Kharkiv, in the past 24 hours, focusing primarily on air and artillery attacks, likely including the one that destroyed a nitric acid tank in Rubizhne on April 5.[4]  Russian forces also reportedly dropped petal mines on Popasna on April 5.[5]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)

Russian forces continued to bombard settlements in Kharkiv Oblast in the past 24 hours, and the situation around Kharkiv remains generally unchanged.[6]  Multiple sources report that Russian forces fired a long-range multiple launch rocket system from somewhere in Kharkiv Oblast toward an unspecified location in Mykolayiv Oblast on April 4, killing 10 and wounding 46.[7]

Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army continued efforts to advance southeast from Izyum toward Slovyansk.  Russian forces advanced seven kilometers southwest of Izyum in the direction of Barvinkove, about 47 km southwest of Izyum, and took control of the village of Brazhkivka, about 25 kilometers south of Izyum.[8] One battalion tactical group (BTG) of the 1st Tank Regiment of the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division attempted to seize the village of Sulyhivka (about 28 km south of Izyum) but was not successful.[9] The advance to the southwest may be part of a Russian effort to bypass Ukrainian forces that recently conducted a successful counterattack along the direct highway from Izyum to Slovyansk.  Pro-Russian sources reported that elements of both the 1st Guards Tank Regiment of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division and 13th Tank Regiment of the 4th Guards Tank Division are operating in the vicinity of Izyum as of April 4.[10]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 5 that Russian forces attacked Oleksandrivka, about 40 kilometers west of Kherson, likely in an effort to retake it after a successful Ukrainian counter-attack had seized it in mid-March.[11]

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

Russian forces continued to withdraw from Chernihiv Oblast, and Ukrainian forces continued clearing Romny Raion on the Sumy axis on April 4.[12]  The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported on April 5 that withdrawn Russian forces in Belarus are beginning to ship their equipment back to Russia.[13]

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces will continue reinforcing the Izyum-Slovyansk axis and attempting to advance to and through Slovyansk to encircle Ukrainian forces.
• The Battle of Mariupol continues, and it is unclear how much longer the Ukrainian defenders can hold out.
• Russian forces will likely abandon the Sumy axis entirely and fall back to regroup around Belgorod.
• Some Russian forces are likely to return to home stations in Russia while others will re-enter the fighting in the east.

 

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[1] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiiskykh-viiskovykh-iaki-chynyly-zvirstva-v-buchi-znovu-povertaiut-v-ukrainu.html

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288073300172422

[3] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511208449438363650; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/6636; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288073300172422; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1511267334970875904

[4] facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288073300172422; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1511242797424259074; https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1511276656371150855

[5] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1511019935404855296

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288435790136173; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288073300172422; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2078490155635313; https://t dot me/synegubov/2809

[7] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511203955757436929; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/6612; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511207011907739651; https://twitter.com/MarQs__/status/1511210162765414407

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288073300172422

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288073300172422

[10] https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/1511331879248609283; https://twitter.com/HN_Schlottman/status/1511058099079163905

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288073300172422

[12] https://t dot me/Zhyvytskyy/1524; https://tsn dot ua/exclusive/u-rayonah-de-buli-okupanti-znahodyat-zakatovanih-meshkanciv-situaciya-u-sumah-ta-oblasti-5-kvitnya-2029273.html; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511036486669553664; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511027329958567944; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1511024129184608260; https://tsn dot ua/ato/rosiyski-okupanti-tikayut-z-chernigivskoyi-oblasti-evakuyovanim-meshkancyam-radyat-ne-pospishati-z-povernennyam-2028544.html; https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/2114910632023057

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/288435790136173

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4

Mason Clark, George Barros, and Karolina Hird

April 4, 5:30 pm ET

Russian forces continue to make little to no progress in frontal assaults to capture Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, their current main effort of the war. Russian units in Donbas face growing morale and supply issues. Additionally, the Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol have outperformed ISW’s previous estimates and continue to hold the city. Russian efforts to generate replacements from reservists and feed damaged units from northeastern Ukraine into frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine are unlikely to increase their chances of success.

However, Russian forces advancing from the Kharkiv axis are setting conditions to resume offensive operations through the city of Slovyansk to link up with other Russian forces in Donbas and encircle Ukrainian defenders. Russian forces captured Izyum (southeast of Kharkiv) on April 1 and have conducted active preparations to resume offensive operations for the past three days—stockpiling supplies, refitting damaged units, repairing the damaged bridge in Izyum, and conducting reconnaissance in force missions toward the southeast. Russian forces will likely begin offensive operations towards Slovyansk, 50km southeast of Izyum, in the coming days.

Efforts by Russian forces advancing from Izyum to capture Slovyansk will likely prove to be the next pivotal battle of the war in Ukraine. Russian forces likely intend to cut off Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and will need to take Slovyansk as their minimum step to do so. If Russian forces take Slovyansk, they will then have the option to advance directly east to link up with Russian forces fighting in Rubizhne—a shorter drive that will not isolate many Ukrainian forces—or advance toward Horlivka and Donetsk to attempt a wider encirclement of Ukrainian forces. Both options could enable at least limited Russian breakthroughs in Luhansk Oblast. If Russian forces are unable to take Slovyansk at all, Russian frontal assaults in Donbas are unlikely to independently breakthrough Ukrainian defenses and Russia’s campaign to capture the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts will likely fail.

Degraded Russian forces in northeastern Ukraine continued to withdraw to Russia and are unlikely to be effective elsewhere, despite ongoing Russian efforts to redeploy them to eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are conducting operations to clear Russians left behind in the withdrawal, and Russian forces are unlikely to hold any cohesive defensive positions. The Ukrainian military reported that elements of Russian VDV (Airborne) units withdrawn from northern Kyiv flew to Belgorod, Russia, on April 4. These units are understrength, missing equipment, and likely highly demoralized. Russian servicemen from the Kyiv axis ordered to renter combat operations may desert or refuse orders, which has occurred in several Russian units throughout the war—including several units that had not yet entered combat.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces in Izyum are setting conditions to begin offensive operations southeast toward Slovyansk in the coming days to link up with other Russian forces in Donbas and encircle Ukrainian defenders.
• Russian forces in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts continue to make little to no progress and face mounting casualties and declining morale. Replacements and reinforcements from northeastern Ukraine are highly unlikely to meaningfully change the balance of forces.
• Efforts by Russian forces advancing from Izyum to capture Slovyansk and threaten Ukrainian forces in Donbas with encirclement will likely prove to be the next pivotal battle of the war in Ukraine. If Russian forces are unable to take Slovyansk, Russia’s campaign to capture the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts will likely fail.
• The defenders of Mariupol have outperformed ISW’s previous estimates, and Russian forces are likely taking heavy casualties in ongoing efforts to capture the city.
• Ukrainian forces likely conducted successful counterattacks in Kherson Oblast in the last 24 hours.
• Russian forces have almost completely withdrawn from Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts and will likely completely vacate these regions in the coming days.
• Russian forces withdrawn from the Kyiv axis are highly unlikely to be effectively deployed elsewhere in Ukraine and are likely a spent force.

Russian forces already deployed to the Kremlin’s main effort in eastern Ukraine are highly demoralized and do not have a cohesive command structure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 4 that Russian forces are attempting to create an operational group and expand control structures to “prepare for an offensive operation in eastern Ukraine” and are continuing to deploy additional forces to eastern Ukraine.[1] Russian officers will struggle to develop a new command structure from highly damaged units while simultaneously attempting to continue offensive operations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 4 that losses of the 33rd, 255th, and 294th Motor Rifle Regiments of the 20th Motor Rifle Division (part of the 8th Combined Arms Army and likely active in fighting in Donbas or Mariupol) amounted to up to 40% of equipment and personnel, and surviving servicemen are attempting to leave the military.[2] Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) separately reported that it acquired a document signed by Deputy Southern Military District commander Pyotr Gibert indicating that Russian officers are compensating their troops with the promise of additional leave days due to the inability to pay promised monthly salaries in cash.[3]

Russian efforts to generate reserves and replace officer casualties continue to face serious challenges. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the Russian military is deploying students and educators at higher military educational institutions directly to Ukraine to replace mounting officer casualties.[4] The deployment of untrained officers—and more crucially educational staff—to the war in Ukraine will impede the Russian military’s ability to develop its next generation of officers for years to come. The General Staff additionally reported on April 4 that the Kremlin began “hidden mobilization” measures to send approximately 60,000 personnel to Ukraine.[5] The General Staff stated the Kremlin is prioritizing reservists of all ranks who already have combat experience, particularly in Krasnodar Krai, Perm Oblast, the Dagestan Republic, Ingushetia, and Kalmykia.

We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
• Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

The defenders of Mariupol have outperformed ISW’s previous estimates, and Russian forces are likely taking heavy casualties in ongoing efforts to capture the city. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces continued efforts to take Mariupol with heavy air and artillery support on April 2.[6] The information environment in Mariupol remains poor and ISW cannot independently verify any territorial changes in the last 24 hours.

Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian assaults in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts on April 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled seven Russian attacks in the past 24 hours.[7] Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast remain concentrated on Popasna and Rubizhne.[8] Local Ukrainian authorities and Russian forces shared footage confirming ongoing urban fighting in Rubizhne, which the LNR previously falsely claimed to have captured on April 3.[9] Russian forces likely intend to capture Rubizhne before driving west to link up with planned Russian advances southeast from Izyum, discussed below.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)

Russian forces around Kharkiv continued to shell the city and attempt to fix Ukrainian forces in place.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on April 4 Russian forces additionally prioritized strengthening air defenses around Belgorod, Russia—the main Russian logistics base for the Kharkiv/Izyum axis.[11] Russian forces withdrawn from the Sumy axis are currently reconstituting in Belgorod prior to redeployment to the Izyum or Donbas axes. Russian forces will likely fully withdraw from Sumy Oblast in the coming days, exposing the western flank of Russian positions around Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces will likely increasingly conduct counterattacks in the Kharkiv area, forcing Russian forces to switch their objective from fixing Ukrainian forces in place to defending their lines of communication in the area. 

Russian forces in Izyum continued to set conditions on April 4 to resume major offensive operations southeast toward Slovyansk, 50km southeast of Izyum. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in Izyum, including the Russian 237th Tank Regiment and 752nd Motor Rifle Regiment (of the 3rd Motor Rifle Division) are restoring combat capabilities and repairing the bridge across the Siverskyi Donets River, which runs through the center of Izyum.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported a Russian tank company conducted a reconnaissance in force in Brazhivka (south of Izyum) on April 4.[13] Social media users additionally observed a column of Russian equipment redeploying from Kupyansk to Izyum on April 4.[14]

Russian forces likely intend to cut off Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and will need to take Slovyansk as their minimum step to do so. Local Slovyansk and Donetsk authorities called on Slovyansk residents to leave the region on April 4 and stated Russian forces will likely approach the city from Izyum.[15] If Russian forces take Slovyansk, they will then have the option to advance directly east to link up with Russian forces fighting in Rubizhne—a shorter drive that will not isolate many Ukrainian forces—or advance toward Horlivka and Donetsk to attempt a wider encirclement of Ukrainian forces.

Supporting Effort #2—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

The Ukrainian General Staff claimed Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks and retook territory in Kherson Oblast on April 4, though ISW cannot independently verify these attacks or their possible gains.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff previously reported at midnight local time on April 3 that Russian forces prioritized strengthening defensive positions around Kherson and sought to resume offensive operations to capture the entire oblast.[17] Russian attacks in Kherson Oblast in late March and early April were likely intended to regain favorable defensive terrain around Kherson, rather than being attempts to restart major offensive operations toward Mykolayiv.[18] Russian forces in northern Kherson Oblast shelled Ukrainian positions in Novovorontsovka and Maryanske on April 4 but did not conduct any offensive operations towards Kryvyi Rih.[19]

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

The disorderly withdrawal of Russian forces from northeastern Ukraine makes precise assessments of the situation in Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts difficult. There are likely no organized Russian defensive positions in those oblasts, and Ukrainian forces are conducting operations to clear Russians left behind in the withdrawal. We will not attempt to map those clearing operations or track their precise locations. Ukrainian forces may already have regained control of more of Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts than we depict, but we do not yet have sufficient evidence to adjust our assessed areas of advance beyond those shown in the accompanying maps. The situation will likely clarify over the next few days, and we will adjust our maps and written assessments accordingly.

Russian forces withdrawn from the Kyiv axis are highly unlikely to be effectively deployed elsewhere in Ukraine and are likely a spent force. Ukrainian forces control the entirety of Kyiv and Zhytomyr oblasts as of April 4, though the Ukrainian General Staff warned that Russian aircraft based in Belarus will likely continue to strike targets around Kyiv.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight local time on April 3 that Russian forces are regrouping in Belarus, and several VDV units, likely from the 76th Airborne Division, are deploying to Belgorod via transport aircraft.[21] These units are understrength, missing equipment, and likely highly demoralized. Russian servicemen from the Kyiv axis ordered to renter combat operations may desert or refuse orders, which has occurred in several Russian units throughout the war—including several units that had not yet entered combat. Russian efforts to use this spent force in combat operations will likely fail.

Russian forces have almost completely withdrawn from Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts and will likely completely vacate these regions in the coming days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 4 that Russian units from the Central Military District continued to withdraw from Chernihiv city, and Ukrainian forces recaptured several towns in Chernihiv Oblast.[22] The head of Sumy’s regional administration stated on April 4 that there are “almost no [Russian] troops in the Sumy region” and Ukrainian forces are clearing the region of ”single units [and] small groups of Russian forces,” but ISW cannot independently confirm full Ukrainian control of these oblasts to the Russian border.[23]

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces will likely complete their withdrawal from Kyiv along the Sumy axis in the coming days and will probably abandon their remaining positions around Konotop and Sumy thereafter.
• Russian troops around Kharkiv will likely continue to focus on supporting the shift of the main effort via Izyum toward the southeast and may pull back from the immediate environs of the city.
• Russian and proxy forces will attempt to increase the scope and scale of offensive operations to complete the linkup between the Kharkiv-Izyum axis and occupied Luhansk.
• Russian forces will likely secure Mariupol in coming days, and may attempt to launch renewed offensive operations northwest from the city in an effort to seize Donetsk Oblast.

 

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[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287562393556846.

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287740683539017.

[3] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vykhidni-zamist-hroshei-ta-zaborona-skarzhytys-otrymano-cherhovi-pidtverdzhennia-problem-v-armii-okupanta.html.

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287740683539017.

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287368616909557.

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287562393556846.

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287368616909557.

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287562393556846.

[9] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510724346901409796; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510709350595272712; https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/1136.

[10] Facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287562393556846; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287216026924816.

[11] facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287562393556846.

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287740683539017; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287216026924816.

[13] facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287562393556846; https://twitter.com/MarQs__/status/1510949518052839429.

[14] https://t dot me/stranaua/34726.

[15] https://t dot me/stranaua/34714.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287740683539017; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287562393556846.

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287216026924816.

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2.

[19] https://t.me/stranaua/34694.

[20] https://t.me/zhytomyrskaODA/653; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287562393556846.

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287216026924816.

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287740683539017; facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287562393556846; https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/2113526232161497; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1510673672587067393; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1510673916834062339, https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2022/04/4/7337046/.

[23] https://24tv dot ua/govoriti-shho-sumshhinu-zvilnili-povnistyu-shhe-rano-zhivitskiy_n1936664; https://www.segodnya dot ua/ua/strana/podrobnosti/v-sumskoy-oblasti-idet-zachistka-ot-okkupantov-glava-ova-1612770.html.