Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3

  Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Karolina Hird

April 3, 3:30 pm ET

Ukraine has won the Battle of Kyiv. Russian forces are completing their withdrawal, but not in good order. Ukrainian forces are continuing to clear Kyiv Oblast of isolated Russian troops left behind in the retreat, which some Ukrainian officials describe as “lost orcs.” Russian forces had attempted to conduct an orderly retreat from their positions around Kyiv with designated covering forces supported by artillery and mines to allow the main body to withdraw. The main body of Russian troops has withdrawn from the west bank of the Dnipro and is completing its withdrawal from the east bank, but the retrograde has been sufficiently disorderly that some Russian troops were left behind.

The war is far from over and could still turn Russia’s way if the Russian military can launch a successful operation in eastern Ukraine. The current line of Russian occupation in southern and eastern Ukraine is still a significant gain in Russian-controlled territory since the start of the war. If a ceasefire or peace agreement freezes a line like the current front-line trace, Russia will be able to exert much greater pressure on Ukraine than it did before the invasion and may over time reassemble a more effective invasion force. Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kyiv is thus significant but not decisive.

The disorder of the Russian withdrawal suggests that at least some of the units now reconcentrating in Belarus and western Russia will remain combat ineffective for a protracted period. Russian troops attempting to refit after pulling back from around Kyiv will likely have to reconsolidate into their units, identify which soldiers are still present, sort out their equipment and assess its combat readiness, and generally reconstitute before they can even begin to receive replacements and new equipment and prepare for further combat operations.

Russian forces are likely abandoning the east bank of the Dnipro fully as well, withdrawing from around Chernihiv to the north and from Brovary to the east. Russian troops will likely seek to hold a salient around Konotop and Sumy long enough to allow their forces to complete their retrograde from near Kyiv but will then likely withdraw back to Russia from almost all their positions west of Kharkiv.

Moscow is attempting to concentrate reserves and some units pulled from the fight around Sumy to reinforce its offensive operations in the east but is encountering serious challenges in that effort. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Russian soldiers are resisting and in some cases refusing orders to enter or re-enter the war effort. The General Staff asserted that the two battalion tactical groups (BTGs) that moved from South Ossetia toward Donbas less than a week ago refused to fight and that plans to move them back to South Ossetia are in train.[1] The General Staff claimed that about 25 soldiers of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne Brigade refused orders to re-enter combat citing excessive losses.[2] The General Staff also asserted that commanders at various echelons in the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division have refused to participate in combat operations.[3] We have no independent verification of these reports, but they are credible in light of the losses Russian forces have suffered and of independent reports of Russian soldiers killing commanders and commanders committing suicide from earlier in the conflict.

Russian efforts to advance its offensive operations in eastern Ukraine made limited progress in the past 24 hours. Fighting continues in Mariupol and on the Izyum-Severodonetsk axis.

Key Takeaways

• Ukraine has won the Battle of Kyiv, and Russian forces are completing their withdrawals from both the east and the west banks of the Dnipro in disorder.
• Russian forces retreating from around Kyiv will likely need considerable time before they can return to combat.
• Incidents of refusals of orders to engage in combat operations among Russian units continue and may lead to the redeployment of two BTGs that had arrived near Donbas within the last few days to their home stations in South Ossetia.
• The continued existence of an independent Ukrainian state with its capital in Kyiv is no longer in question at this time, although much fighting remains and the war could still turn Russia’s way.

We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine; and
• Supporting effort 3—Southern axis.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate main effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capturing Mariupol and reducing Ukrainian defenders)

Little information about what is occurring in Mariupol is available likely due to the loss/interdiction of communications from the city. Russian media reported fighting in the city on April 2.[4] Russia will likely make much of its final capture of the city for propaganda purposes but has not yet done so, which suggests that it has not yet completed the seizure. The Ukrainian General Staff also noted on April 3 that Russian forces are still preparing efforts to complete their seizure of the city.[5]

Subordinate main effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

The Ukrainian governor of Luhansk Oblast claimed on April 3 that mayors of the towns of Rubizhne, Milove, Stanytsia Luhanska, and Markivka are working with the LNR.[6] LNR officials separately claimed to be clearing Rubizhne and evacuating civilians, while blaming Ukrainian forces for damaging the city (presumably by defending it).[7] We have no independent verification of the LNR claims. It is unclear if the LNR claims are based on actual Russian military control over the towns or on the claimed collaboration of the towns’ mayors. The Ukrainian General Staff report of 2400 April 2 suggested that Russian forces had not yet secured Rubizhne, in any event.[8]

Russian units reportedly attacked Ukrainian positions at various locations throughout Donetsk Oblast but made few gains, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[9] Social media reports confirm heavy fighting over the past few days.[10]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)

Russian forces appear to be continuing efforts to concentrate forces to resume the offensive from Izyum toward the southeast but did not launch any large-scale operation in the past 24 hours. The Russians continue to bombard Kharkiv, but the Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 2 that the intensity of the bombardment had somewhat decreased.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed on April 3 that Ukrainian forces had inflicted 80% losses on the Russian 59th Tank Regiment near Kharkiv over an unspecified period.[12]

Russian forces west of Kharkiv and around Sumy appeared to focus on covering the withdrawal of Russian troops from eastern Kyiv.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 2 that one battalion tactical group (BTG) of the 1st Guards Tank Army was covering the retrograde of the elements of the 2nd Combined Arms Army from Brovary through Sumy.[14] Local Ukrainian reports indicate that Russian forces still operate from Billopilya to Konotop on April 2.[15] We assess that these reports are likely accurate despite claims by a Ukrainian member of parliament on April 3 that Ukrainian forces had liberated Konotop.[16] Russian forces likely will eventually abandon Konotop and most or all of their positions west of Kharkiv once their withdrawal from the Brovary axis is complete.

Supporting Effort #2—Kyiv and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

The withdrawal of the main body of Russian forces along both banks of the Dnipro River is likely complete. The disorderly nature of the withdrawal, which apparently left numerous individual Russian soldiers and possibly small pockets of Russian troops behind, makes precise assessments of the situation throughout Kyiv and Chernihiv Oblasts impossible at this time. Ukrainian officials describe their clearing operations as looking for “lost orcs.”[17] We will update our assessments in the coming days as the situation clarifies but anticipate that Ukrainian forces will finish clearing the last remnants of Russian troops from the Kyiv axis within the next few days. There is no evidence that the isolated Russian troops Ukrainian forces are encountering stayed behind deliberately, and the Russian pockets do not appear to be offering coherent or coordinated resistance to Ukrainian clearing operations.

Sourcing for this assessment is available here.[18]

Supporting Effort #3—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the southern axis. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Russian troops were fighting to retake Oleksandirvka in northern Kherson Oblast after Ukrainian forces regained control of the town in mid-March.[19]

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces will likely complete their withdrawal from Kyiv along the Sumy axis in the coming days and will probably abandon their remaining positions around Konotop and Sumy thereafter.
• Russian troops around Kharkiv will likely continue to focus on supporting the shift of the main effort via Izyum toward the southeast and may pull back from the immediate environs of the city.
• Russian and proxy forces will attempt to increase the scope and scale of offensive operations to complete the linkup between the Kharkiv-Izyum axis and occupied Luhansk.
• Russian forces will likely secure Mariupol in coming days, and may attempt to launch renewed offensive operations northwest from the city in an effort to seize Donetsk Oblast.

 

---

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286674743645611

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287074630272289

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286674743645611

[4] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510150685404319748; https://t.me/msgazdiev/846

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286533730326379

[6] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.gaidai.loga/videos/530507801751384/

[7] https://t.me/millnr/7962; https://t.me/nm_dnr/7383; https://t.me/millnr/7963; https://t.me/millnr/7964

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286533730326379

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286450870334665; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286845780295174; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286674743645611; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286533730326379; https://t.me/stranaua/34547

[10] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510504344722063362; https://t.me/faceofwar/17976; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510446556251664386; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510446260704194565; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510445772743090178; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510444683540975623; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510442825581793281; https://t.me/romanov_92/7401; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510370095469629446; https://t.me/romanov_92/74263.

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286533730326379; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1510385431984099329; https://t.me/synegubov/2789; https://t.me/stranaua/34411; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510507608272211969; https://t.me/rian_ru/156893; https://t.me/stranaua/34402; https://t.me/stranaua/34514

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/287074630272289

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286845780295174

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286533730326379

[15] https://tsn dot ua/exclusive/vid-bilopillya-do-konotopu-okupuyutsya-okupanti-situaciya-u-sumah-ta-oblasti-2-kvitnya-2026933.html

[16] https://t.me/stranaua/34567

[17] https://www.facebook.com/koda.gov.ua/posts/285198820455809

[18] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/bilshist-skotyniak-znyshcheno-inshi-rozbihlysia-komandyr-hrupy-spetsnazu-hur-mo-pro-zvilnennia-dmytrivky-ta-kapitanivky.html; https://twitter.com/rhoint_en/status/1510278646472323076; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286845780295174; https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1510501223203581954; https://t.me/mysiagin/5010; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286845780295174; https://www.facebook.com/www.dshv.mil.gov.ua/posts/343533734487288; https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/310580261180851; https://t.me/stranaua/34544; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286533730326379; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1510301472629665800; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/818; https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/2112837795563674; https://t.me/stranaua/34393; https://www dot rbc.ua/rus/news/vsu-nachinayut-zachistku-slavuticha-zhiteley-1648970750.html; https://focus dot ua/voennye-novosti/511216-vsu-zachishchayut-slavutich-voennye-prosyat-soobshchat-o-podozritelnyh-licah; https://nv dot ua/ukraine/events/voyna-rossii-protiv-ukrainy-v-slavutiche-nachinayut-rabotat-vsu-novosti-ukrainy-50230669.html; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1510617010656493576

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286845780295174

 

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 2

  Mason Clark, George Barros, and Karolina Hird

April 2, 5:00 pm ET

Continuing Russian operations along their new main effort in eastern Ukraine made little progress on April 2, and Russian forces likely require some time to redeploy and integrate reinforcements from other axes. Ukrainian forces repelled likely large-scale Russian assaults in Donbas on April 2 and inflicted heavy casualties. Russian forces continued to capture territory in central Mariupol and will likely capture the city in the coming days. Russian units around Kyiv and in northeastern Ukraine continued to successfully withdraw into Belarus and Russia, and heavy mining in previously Russian-occupied areas is forcing Ukrainian forces to conduct slow clearing operations.

However, the Russian units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine for redeployment to eastern Ukraine are heavily damaged. Russian forces likely require an extensive operational pause to refit existing units in Donbas, refit and redeploy reinforcements from other axes, and integrate these forces—pulled from several military districts that have not yet operated on a single axis—into a cohesive fighting force. We have observed no indicators of Russian plans to carry out such a pause, and Russian forces will likely fail to break through Ukrainian defenses if they continue to steadily funnel already damaged units into fighting in eastern Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continued to capture territory in central Mariupol on April 2 and will likely capture the city within days.
• Ukrainian forces repelled several possibly large-scale Russian assaults in Donbas, claiming to destroy almost 70 Russian vehicles.
• Russian forces will likely require a lengthy operational pause to integrate reinforcements into existing force structures in eastern Ukraine and enable successful operations but appear unlikely to do so and will continue to bleed their forces in ineffective daily attacks.
• Russian forces in Izyum conducted an operational pause after successfully capturing the city on April 1 and will likely resume offensive operations to link up with Russian forces in Donbas in the coming days.
• Russia continued to withdraw forces from the Kyiv axis into Belarus and Russia. Ukrainian forces primarily conducted operations to sweep and clear previously Russian-occupied territory.
• Ukrainian forces likely repelled limited Russian attacks in Kherson Oblast.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have rendered two-thirds of the 75 Russian Battalion Tactical Groups it assesses have fought in Ukraine either temporarily or permanently combat ineffective.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 2 that out of the 75 Russian Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) it assesses have participated in operations in Ukraine, 16 BTGs have been “completely destroyed” and 34 more are currently combat ineffective and recovering.[1] ISW cannot independently confirm these numbers, but Russian forces will be unlikely to be able to resume major operations if two-thirds of the BTGs committed to fighting to date have been rendered temporarily or permanently combat ineffective.

The Ukrainian General Staff stated on April 2 that Belarusian forces are increasing the pace of ongoing training, but that Ukraine does not observe any indicators of preparations for a Belarusian offensive.[2] Belarusian social media users observed Belarusian air defenses redeploying towards Luninets and Slutsk (in central Belarus) on April 2, but no Belarusian forces were observed moving near the Ukrainian border.[3] ISW assesses Belarusian President Lukashenko will continue to resist Russian efforts to involve Belarus in the war in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

• Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
• Supporting effort 2—Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine; and
• Supporting effort 3—Southern axis.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate main effort – Mariupol (Russian objective: Capturing Mariupol and reducing Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces continued to capture territory in central Mariupol on April 2 and will likely capture the city within days.[4] ISW geolocated a video released by Russian forces inside the Ukrainian SBU headquarters in central Mariupol on April 2.[5] Russian forces have likely bisected or trisected Ukrainian defenders in the city.

Subordinate main effort – Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian assaults in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts on April 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 6:00 am local time on April 2 that Ukrainian forces repelled nine enemy attacks in the past 24 hours, destroying eight tanks, 44 armored vehicles, 16 unarmored vehicles, and 10 artillery systems.[6] These numbers are far higher than the daily totals of destroyed Russian vehicles claimed by Ukrainian forces, which are typically less than ten per day. Ukrainian forces may have repelled significant Russian assaults in the last 24 hours and inflicted heavy casualties, but ISW cannot independently confirm these claims. Russian offensive operations in Luhansk Oblast are centered on Popasna and Rubizhne, and operations in Donetsk Oblast are concentrated on Marinka, though Russian forces reportedly launched unsuccessful attacks all along the line of contact in the past 24 hours.[7]

Ukrainian forces continue to successfully repel Russian assaults in Donbas. Russian forces will likely require an operational pause to reconstitute their existing forces in the region and integrate reinforcements currently redeploying from northern Ukraine to mount an effective offensive. However, we have seen no indication of a Russian operational pause on the Donbas axis, and they appear likely to further bleed their forces with ineffective daily attacks.

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast, and fix Ukrainian forces around Kharkiv in place)

Russian forces in Izyum conducted an operational pause on April 2 after successfully capturing the city on April 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces regrouped and established a pontoon crossing in the past 24 hours in preparation for further offensive operations.[8] The General Staff additionally reported that elements of the 4th Tank Division (likely withdrawn from the Sumy axis in the past week) were observed in Belgorod, Russia, and elements of the 106th Guards Airborne Division deployed to Pisky, northeast of Izyum.[9] Russian forces will likely leverage these and other reinforcements to conduct offensive operations southeast from Izyum to link up with Russian forces in Donbas in the coming days.

Russian forces continued to shell Kharkiv and its outskirts but did not conduct any ground attacks. Local Kharkiv and Ukrainian military authorities reported that Russian forces shelled Saltivka, Pyatykhaty, Derhachi, and Oleksyivka in the past 24 hours and conducted an Iskander-M missile strike on an unspecified Ukrainian position in Kharkiv Oblast on April 1.[10]

Supporting Effort #2—Kyiv and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

Russia continued to withdraw combat elements from the northwestern Kyiv axis on April 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight local time on April 1 that elements of the 5th, 29th, and 35th Combined Arms Armies and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade withdrew from positions northwest of Kyiv into Belarus for further redeployment.[11] Elements of the 39th Motor Rifle Brigade (of the 35th Combined Arms Army) and the 5^th Tank Brigade (of the 36th Combined Arms Army) are screening the withdrawal of other Russian units to Belarus.[12]

Ukrainian forces likely made significant territorial gains on April 2 and undertook operations to secure previously Russian occupied territory. While Russian forces abandoned large amounts of military equipment in the withdrawal from Kyiv, they appear to have withdrawn a substantial portion of their (damaged) units on this front successfully.[13] Russian forces withdrew in good enough order to mine abandoned positions and infrastructure to slow Ukrainian units, which conducted operations to clear settlements in the Bucha, Vyshhorod, and Brovary districts on April 2.[14] Deputy Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated at 10:15 pm local time on April 2 that Ukrainian citizens should refrain from returning to their homes and that Ukrainian forces sought to ”identify and destroy” remaining Russian forces in Kyiv Oblast throughout the day.[15]

Russian forces east of Kyiv similarly withdrew into Belarus and Kursk Oblast, Russia, on April 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 41st CAA continued to hold positions around Chernihiv city and screen withdrawing Russian forces.[16] Ukrainian forces continued to pursue Russian forces in Chernihiv Oblast on April 2, capturing Horodnia, Sloboda, Shestovytsya, and Novyi Bykiv in the past 24 hours.[17] Sumy regional authorities stated on April 2 that Russian forces in Konotop Rayon are maintaining a corridor through which equipment from Kyiv and Chernihiv is withdrawing to Russia, specifying that Russian forces are active in Bilopillya, Buryn, Putyvl, and Novoslobidske.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff stated at noon local time on April 2 that elements of Russia’s 2nd CAA withdrew from Brovary to Russia’s Kursk Oblast, likely through this corridor.[19]

Supporting Effort #3—Southern axis: (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on April 2 that Russian forces conducted limited attacks “to reach the administrative borders of Kherson Oblast,” though ISW cannot independently confirm the extent and focus of these attacks.[20] Russian forces north of Kherson continued to shell Kryvyi Rih but did not conduct offensive operations toward the city.[21] Ukraine’s National Resistance Center and local social media users additionally reported that Russian forces in Enenhodar forcefully dispersed a protest on April 2.[22] Ukrainian protests and partisan actions in southern Ukraine continue to tie down Russian forces.

The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported on April 2 that Russian forces in Transnistria, the illegally Russian-occupied strip of Moldova bordering Ukraine, began preparations for a demonstration of combat readiness and possible combat in Ukraine.[23] ISW cannot independently confirm this report, and Russian forces in Transnistria are highly unlikely to launch unsupported operations against Odesa. Russian forces may seek to fix Ukrainian forces in Odesa in place through the threat of an operation from Transnistria, but this remains a low risk.[24]

Immediate items to watch

• Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming days;
• Russian forces conducted an operational pause after capturing Izyum on April 1 and will likely leverage reinforcements redeployed from northern Ukraine to renew an offensive through Slovyansk to link up with Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast in the coming days;
• Russian forces withdrawn from the Kyiv axis are unlikely to provide meaningful combat power in eastern Ukraine in the coming days.
• Sustained Ukrainian counteroffensives northwest of Kyiv will likely push Russian forces out of Kyiv Oblast in the next 48 hours.

 

---

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286106820369070.

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286106820369070.

[3] https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1509958745245237262; https://twitter.com/MotolkoHelp/status/1509946147682631682.

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286106820369070; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285748630404889.

[5] https://topwar dot ru/194345-vo-vzjatom-pod-kontrol-zdanii-sbu-mariupolja-obnaruzhena-dokumentacija-s-agenturnymi-dannymi.html; https://twitter.com/KremlinTrolls/status/1510180695607500802.

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285911127055306.

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286353797011039; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286106820369070; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285748630404889.

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285748630404889.

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285748630404889.

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286106820369070; https://t dot co/DRf8A4r04p; https://t dot me/synegubov/2788; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285748630404889.

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285748630404889.

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285748630404889.

[13] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1510211839925358606?cxt=HHwWnMC45dfqrPUpAAAA; https://twitter.com/OSINTua/status/1510142062829703170;

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286106820369070; https://hromadske dot ua/posts/obstril-zhitlovih-rajoniv-harkova-ta-10-raket-po-dnipropetrovshini-situaciya-v-regionah-zranku-2-kvitnya; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=919365395425375.

[15] https://www.facebook.com/ganna.maliar/posts/2124242781068086.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286106820369070; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285748630404889.

[17] https://www.facebook.com/58OMPBr/posts/5038874609528112; https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/2112423875605066; https://suspilne.media/224371-pidirvali-perepravu-i-pisli-rosijski-okupanti-vijsli-z-gorodni/; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1509930666108071940; https://twitter.com/Arslon_Xudosi/status/1509696135601995777; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1509934994822766593;

[18] https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/1489; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YEpQo_JLDqI

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286106820369070.

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/286106820369070.

[21] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/785; https://t dot me/stranaua/34381.

[22] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/04/02/v-energodari-misczevi-meshkanczi-zirvaly-informaczijnu-speczoperacziyu-voroga/; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1510200045945171974?cxt=HHwWjMC55Ze8p_UpAAAA; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1510195531515060226?cxt=HHwWhICz1bS1pfUpAAAA ; https://t.me/stranaua/34372.

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285911127055306.

[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/285911127055306.

 

Ukraine Invasion Update 21

Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team  

with the Critical Threats Project, AEI

April 2

The Ukraine Invasion Update is a semi-weekly synthetic product covering key political and rhetorical events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. This update covers events from March 30-April 1. All of the ISW Russia’s team’s coverage of the war in Ukraine—including daily military assessments and maps, past Conflict Updates, and several supplemental assessments—are available on our Ukraine Crisis Coverage landing page.

Key Takeaways March 30-April 1

• Ongoing peace talks will likely protract, and the Kremlin is unlikely to withdraw its main demands in the near future.
• Russia and Ukraine may have reached initial agreements on Ukrainian “neutrality” in ongoing negotiations, but remain stalled on the Kremlin’s refusal to discuss Crimea and the Donbas.
• The Kremlin set additional conditions on March 30-April 1 for a chemical or biochemical false-flag attack in eastern Ukraine or Russia.
• Ongoing European efforts to find alternatives to Russian energy likely successfully undercut a Kremlin attempt to buttress the Russian economy by coercing Europe into buying Russian gas in rubles.
• Sustained Western military aid to Ukraine will help enable further Ukrainian counterattacks in the coming weeks.

Key Events March 30-April 1

Negotiations:

Ongoing peace talks will likely protract, though Russia and Ukraine may have reached initial agreements on Ukrainian “neutrality.” However, the Kremlin is unlikely to drop its maximalist demands—which are inadmissible to Kyiv—in the near term. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on March 30 that the March 29 negotiations in Istanbul on March 30 did not result in "anything too promising or any breakthroughs.”[1] Lead Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky claimed on March 30 that Ukraine has stated its willingness to meet core Russian demands to end what the Kremlin claims is “the threat of creating a NATO bridgehead on Ukrainian territory” but clarified that only the “essence” of agreements was agreed on.[2] Smaller Russian and Ukrainian delegations arrived in Jerusalem, Israel, on March 30 for further negotiations.[3] Ukrainian and Russian negotiators resumed peace talks virtually on April 1 and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that Russia has not yet provided responses to Ukraine’s March 30 proposals.[4] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the Kremlin is preparing a response to Ukraine’s March 30 proposals but did not provide a timeline for delivery.[5]

The Ukrainian government flatly denied Kremlin claims that Kyiv has agreed to Russian control over Crimea and Donbas. Lavrov falsely claimed on March 30 that "the issues of Crimea and Donbas have been finally resolved,” likely to maintain domestic support for the continued Russian military operation in Ukraine and to frame the operation as achieving its objectives.[6] Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Oleg Nikolenko refuted Lavrov’s claims on March 30, asserting that Lavrov has an “erroneous understanding of the negotiation process” and that “the issues of Crimea and Donbas will finally be resolved after the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty over them.”[7] The Kremlin is unlikely to drop its territorial demands and Kyiv is unlikely to meet them.

Kyiv received initial positive rhetoric from several states on its demanded security guarantees in exchange for dropping its NATO aspiration, but the Kremlin is unlikely to accept any Western involvement in a possible peace deal. The United Kingdom, Germany, and Turkey separately stated their willingness to act as security guarantors for Ukraine in principle on March 30 and 31, though all three states declined to comment on specifics.[8] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on March 31 that the United States directly refused to give Ukraine security guarantees, citing US President Joe Biden’s assertion that the United States will not provide aid to Ukraine that would lead to direct US-Russia military conflict.[9]

Russian Domestic Opposition and Censorship:

N/A

Kremlin Narratives:

The Kremlin set additional conditions on March 30-April 1 for a chemical or biochemical false-flag attack in eastern Ukraine or Russia.

• Russian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Igor Konashenkov claimed on March 30 that Ukrainian forces “considered the possibility of using biological weapons against the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR)” with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[10]
• Russian Radiation, Chemical and Biological Protection Forces Head Igor Kirillov claimed on March 31 that Ukraine asked Bayraktar (the Turkish manufacturer of many of Ukraine’s UAVs) to equip Ukraine’s drones with an aerosol spraying mechanism for biological weapons in December 2021.[11]
• Russian State Duma officials convened a committee on March 31 to “investigate” Russia’s repeated and false allegations that US biolabs are participating in “the development of biological weapons components in the immediate vicinity of the territory of Russia.”[12]
• Russian First Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Dmitry Polyansky told Russian state media on April 1 that Ukrainian forces “plan to blow up railway containers containing up to 800 tons of chlorine” in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region and claimed that Russia is providing additional evidence of alleged Ukrainian biological weapons programs to the United Nations.[13]

ISW warned on March 9 that the Kremlin may conduct a chemical or radiological false-flag attack and blame Ukraine, the United States, or NATO.[14] Russian media would leverage a potential false flag attack to stoke domestic outrage and establish a pretext for further escalation in Ukraine or against NATO.

Russian Reactions to Sanctions:

Ongoing European efforts to find alternatives to Russian energy likely successfully undercut a Kremlin attempt to buttress the Russian economy by coercing Europe into only buying Russian gas in rubles. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitri Medvedev stated on March 30 that sanctions against Russia may leave EU countries without gas, an implicit threat to cut off Russian energy exports to Europe.[15] Russian President Vladimir Putin decreed on March 31 that “unfriendly countries” purchasing Russian gas must have Russian bank accounts and pay in rubles.[16] The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan separately announced on March 31 and April 1 that they would not meet the Kremlin's demand to pay for gas in rubles, in effect calling the Kremlin's bluff.[17] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov backtracked on April 1 that Russia will indefinitely delay implementing Putin‘s decree, claiming the procedure would be “a long and time-consuming process.”[18] Ongoing efforts by European and other states to reduce their reliance on Russian energy and preparations to ration existing energy reserves likely enabled them to refuse the Kremlin’s demand.[19]

Belarus:

N/A

Russian Occupation:

N/A

Drivers of Russian Threat Perceptions:

Sustained Western military aid to Ukraine will help enable further Ukrainian counterattacks in the coming weeks. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated claims on March 31 that the United States and NATO are responsible for the Ukraine crisis for “pumping Ukraine full of weapons” that threatened Russia and violated Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) decisions.[20] The United States and its allies continued to provide monetary and military supply assistance to Ukraine since ISW’s previous Invasion Update on March 29.[21]

• US Pentagon Spokesperson John Kirby stated on March 29 that the United States is deploying six US Navy Growler electronic warfare aircraft, along with 240 US military personnel, to Germany to bolster electronic warfare capabilities on NATO’s eastern flank. Kirby noted that the aircraft will not be used in Ukraine.[22]
• US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin approved a deployment extension for the USS Harry Truman aircraft carrier on March 31. The carrier’s aircraft have been flying in support of NATO security operations in Eastern Europe.[23]
• US President Joe Biden pledged $500 million in direct budgetary aid to Ukraine in a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on March 30.[24]
• British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace reported on March 31 that the United Kingdom and its partners will send more lethal aid to Ukraine in the form of anti-aircraft assets, armored vehicles, and long-range artillery.[25]
• Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison said on April 1 that Australia will send additional armored vehicles to Ukraine.[26]

Foreign Involvement:

N/A

 

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[1] https://tass dot com/politics/1429697; https://nv dot ua/ukraine/politics/dmitriy-peskov-proryva-na-mirnyh-peregovorah-s-ukrainoy-poka-net-novosti-ukrainy-50229623.html; https://riafan dot ru/22594223-peskov_zayavil_chto_rossiya_ne_sobiraetsya_obsuzhdat_status_krima_na_peregovorah_s_ukrainoi

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-ukraine-willing-meet-core-demands-work-continues-2022-03-30/.

[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-ukraine-war-news-putin-live-updates/#link-IJFVU7DLUBFSRDS7NVL5NSVQUM

[4] https://nv dot ua/ukraine/politics/vtorzhenie-rossii-v-ukrainu-est-li-otvet-rf-na-predlozheniya-ukrainy-novosti-ukrainy-50230235.html; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2022/04/1/7336313/; https://www.rferl dot org/a/ukraine-talks-russia-ruble-payments/31780852.html; https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-perehovory-ukraina-rosia-vidozvyazok/31781282.html

[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/01/russia-ukraine-war-news-putin-live-updates/#link-2QDALYFARJAH3N3CR7TJ4VSTXI

[6] https://ru dot krymr.com/a/news-rossiya-lavrov-vopros-kryma-i-donbassa-reshen-okonchatelno-mid-ukrainy-otvet/31778293.html; https://tass dot ru/politika/14231727.

[7] https://nv dot ua/ukraine/politics/peregovory-s-rossiey-ukraina-namerena-vosstanovit-suverenitet-zayavili-v-mid-50229746.html; https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-mzs-slova-lavrova-pro-krym-i-donbas/31778250.html.

[8] https://t.me/stranaua/33824; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/scholz-zelenskiy-germany-ready-act-security-guarantor-ukraine-2022-03-30/; https://media.un.org/en/asset/k14/k14ax6oa6l; https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/03/31/turkey_garantee/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-invasion-update-20.

[9] https://iz dot ru/1313319/2022-03-31/zakharova-otcenila-otkaz-ssha-dat-garantii-bezopasnosti-ukraine.

[10] https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/03/30/plann/

[11] https://tass dot com/politics/1430505

[12] https://tass dot ru/info/14237063; https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/03/31/prestup/

[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/14258659;https://tass dot ru/politika/14258007

[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-update-russia-may-conduct-chemical-or-radiological-false-flag-attack-pretext

[15] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/14233283.

[16] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-31-22/h_79823f5a468256da0a0596bea7cb4818.

[17] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-31-22/h_a04bba26e30aacce486b7b87803d4ee3; https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-31-22/h_1cc93e013a82eb72c6c5f10d06317e7b; https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/04/01/world/ukraine-russia-war/japan-says-it-wont-meet-russian-demands-to-pay-for-gas-in-rubles

[18] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-04-1-22/h_7f33c1cd2998ed058cc0fc7571b1cfaa; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-ukraine-war-news-putin-live-updates/#link-XNHVMGH3RVFN3EUINDMM6SVPPY.

[19] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-ukraine-war-news-putin-live-updates/#link-WB54COPMHFEKTKI4QZ3XDCQVV4; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-germany-0205525f2107f57e31b41d02e5a91e6c; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/1845; https://twitter.com/PremierRP_en/status/1509081786135072769?cxt=HHwWgsC--fL4qvEpAAAA; https://www.ft.com/content/a0a442e6-5603-4b16-8218-e5fd36b0e1bf#post-33c1d8c7-d8e9-4e28-b5cb-baa7c6f08dd1; https://www.ft.com/content/0706d6f4-6668-4f67-ab1c-d535d847caf7; https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germany-declares-early-warning-potential-gas-supply-disruptions-2022-03-30/  

[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/14235885; https://iz dot ru/1313342/2022-03-31/lavrov-nazval-politiku-ssha-i-nato-prichinoi-krizisa-na-ukraine

[21] https://iz dot ru/1312032/2022-03-29/v-pentagone-obiasnili-postavki-amerikanskikh-samoletov-reb-v-frg ; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/600038-pentagon-sends-growler-electronic-warfare-aircraft-to-germany; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/30/readout-of-president-bidens-call-with-president-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-8/ ; https://tass dot ru/politika/14235885; https://iz dot ru/1313342/2022-03-31/lavrov-nazval-politiku-ssha-i-nato-prichinoi-krizisa-na-ukraine

[22] https://iz dot ru/1312032/2022-03-29/v-pentagone-obiasnili-postavki-amerikanskikh-samoletov-reb-v-frg ; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/600038-pentagon-sends-growler-electronic-warfare-aircraft-to-germany

[23] https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-31-22/h_da136225e27254b09e13694a75bab50c

[24] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/30/readout-of-president-bidens-call-with-president-zelenskyy-of-ukraine-8/ ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-ukraine-war-news-putin-live-updates/#link-VWR6JY5JMRBTRBIAALKDVFW6YQ

[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/01/russia-ukraine-war-news-putin-live-updates/#link-FJ7WCQ3TFRHNJEZYPP4B77JBIM    

[26] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/01/russia-ukraine-war-news-putin-live-updates/#link-KM6BGHG74BBEHNEQYJIWEHSFVI

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/04/01/world/ukraine-russia-war